Judgment These two petitioners are under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court for the purpose of quashing the criminal proceedings launched against the petitioners in C.C.Nos. 28 and 29 of 1978 on the file of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Cheyyar. 2. It appears that these petitioners, the President, Secretary and the Directors of the Iyppedu Co-operative Credit Union were previously tried in S. C. Nos. 5 to 7 of 1974 for offences under sections 409, 467 and 471-A etc., of the Indian Penal Code, and were acquitted of those offences. The charge-sheets in those cases were filed on 27th May, 1973 and were the result of the investigation made by the police on a complaint laid by the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies to the Superintendent of Police on 23rd June, 1970 after an enquiry under section 65 of the Cooperative Societies Act had been held and the enquiring officer had filed his report on 24th April, 1967. 3. In S.C.No. 5 of 1974, the petitioners were tried in respect of two instances of criminal breach of trust, falsification of accounts etc., alleged to have been committed by them in the month of December, 1964. In S.C. No. 6 of 1974 the petitioners were tried in regard to the two instances of criminal breach of trust, falsification of accounts etc., committed during the month of March, 1965. In S.C. No. 7 of 1974 they were tried in regard to two instances of criminal breach of trust and falsification of accounts etc., committed during the month of March, 1965, but they were acquitted in all those cases. Subsequently, the police filed two charge-sheets against the petitioners on 31st October, 1977. The first charge-sheet related to two instances of criminal breach of trust, falsification of accounts etc., committed during December, 1965, and the other charge-sheet related to one instance of criminal breach of trust, falsification of accounts etc., committed during the month of December, 1965 and they have been taken on file as C.C.Nos. 28 and 29 of 1978 by the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate of Cheyyar. 28 and 29 of 1978 by the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate of Cheyyar. It is under these circumstances that the petitioners have come up before this Court asking for the criminal proceedings against them to be quashed, in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, on the ground that the charge-sheets which were the basis of the trials in S.C. Nos. 5, 6 and 7 of 1974 and the charge-sheets which are the basis of the trials to be held in C.C.Nos. 28 and 29 of 1978 resulted from the investigations conducted on the complaint by the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies to the Superintendent of Police on 23rd June, 1970, which complaint embraced the subject-matters of all these charge-sheets, and which complaint itself is based on the report filed after an enquiry under section 65 of the Co-operative Societies Act on 24th April, 1967. 4. Mr. Vibishanan, on behalf of the petitioners has first of all invoked the principle of autrefois acquit as barring the present prosecution of these accused persons after they had been, acquitted in S.C. Nos. 5 to 7 of 1974.Secondly, he has raised the doctrine of issue estoppel and thirdly he has invoked section 300, Criminal Procedure Code, and tried to show-that this case will be covered by the provisions of that section. 5. Though the principle of res judicata as contained in section 11 of Civil Procedure Code, does not apply mutatis mutandis to criminal cases, yet that principle, as applied to criminal cases is enshrined in section 300, Criminal Procedure Code. 5. Though the principle of res judicata as contained in section 11 of Civil Procedure Code, does not apply mutatis mutandis to criminal cases, yet that principle, as applied to criminal cases is enshrined in section 300, Criminal Procedure Code. section 300, Criminal Procedure Code, says that “a person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under sub- section (1) of section 221, or for which he might have been convicted under sub- section (2) thereof.” Sub section (2) of section 300 says that “a person acquitted or convicted of any offence, may be afterwards tried, with the consent of the State Government, for any distinct offence for which a separate charge might have been made against him at the former trial under sub section (1) of section 220 6. Now, section 220, Criminal Procedure Code, reads as follows: “(1) If, in one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction, more offences than one are committed by the same person, he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, every such offence.” It is needless to consider the other sub- sections of section 220, Criminal Procedure Code, now. section 221 reads as follows: ” (1) If a single act or series of acts is of such a nature that it is doubtful which of several offences the facts which can be proved will constitute, the accused may be be charged with having committed all or any of such offences, and any number of such charges may be tried at once; or he may be charged in the alternative with having committed some of one of the said offences. (2) If in such a case the accused is charged with one offence and it appears in evidence that he committed a different offence for which he might have been charged under the provisions of sub-section (1), he may be convicted of the offence which he is shown to have committed, although he was not charged with it.” 7. (2) If in such a case the accused is charged with one offence and it appears in evidence that he committed a different offence for which he might have been charged under the provisions of sub-section (1), he may be convicted of the offence which he is shown to have committed, although he was not charged with it.” 7. Now, reading section 300 with the aforesaid sections of the Criminal Procedure Code, it is clear that the person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remained in force, not be liable to be tried again:(1) for the same offence; (2) nor on same facts for any other offence for which under section 221 (1) he could have been charged or tried at the previous trial or could have been convicted under section 221 (2), That a person who has been acquitted or convicted of an offence, may with the consent of the State Government be tried again for any distinct offence for which a separate charge might have been made at the former trial by reason of the provision contained in sub- section (1) of section 220. It is in the light of these provisions that we have to examine the facts of the case now before me. 8. I have already pointed out that in S.C. No. 5 of 1974 the petitioners were tried in respect of two instances of criminal breach of trust, falsification of accounts etc. which were alleged to have been committed on 28th December, 1964, while in S.C.No. 6 of 1974 they were similarly tried in respect of two instances of similar offences committed during the month of March, 1965 and in S.C.No. of 1974 they were tried for two instances of similar offences committed during the month of March, 1965. Now they are being tried in C.C.Nos. 28 and 29 of 1978 in respect of two other instances of criminal breach of trust etc., committed during December, 1965, and another instance of criminal breach of trust and falsification of accounts committed during the month of December, 1965. 9. Now they are being tried in C.C.Nos. 28 and 29 of 1978 in respect of two other instances of criminal breach of trust etc., committed during December, 1965, and another instance of criminal breach of trust and falsification of accounts committed during the month of December, 1965. 9. It cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that all these acts of criminal breach of trust, falsification of accounts etc., are series of acts to be committed together or to form the same transaction so as to bring them under the purview of section 220. Each offence of criminal breach of trust and each offence of falsification of accounts to cover up the commission of the offence of criminal breach of trust, is a distinct and separate offence. The Court certainly cannot try all these instances of criminal breach of trust and falsification of accounts at one trial. It can only try three of such instances by virtue of the provisions contained in section 219 which enables a person accused of more than one offence of the same kind, committed within the space of twelve months from the first to the last of such offences to be tried at the same trial, provided that such instances do not exceed three. Therefore it was that three separate charge-sheets were filed against the petitioners, each of which was concerned with two instances of criminal breach of trust, falsification of accounts etc. and those charge-sheets were separately taken on file and the petitioners were tried for three offences in S.C. Nos. 5, 6 and 7 of 1974. Now, at present the petitioners are sought to be prosecuted, in respect of three more instances of criminal breach of trust, falsification of accounts etc., committed during the month of December, 1965. Such being the case, merely because the complaint given by the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies to the Superintendent of Police on 23rd June, 1970, embraced not only the instances which were the subject-matter of the trial in S.C.Nos.5 to 7 of 1974 but also the instances which are subject-matter of the trial in C.C.Nos.28 and 29 of 1978, and that complaint was based on the report filed by the Co-operative Inspector after an enquiry under section 65 of the Cooperative Societies Act, which covered all these instances, it cannot be argued that the trials in C.C.Nos. 28 and 29 of 1978 would be based under section 300, Criminal Procedure Code. 10. The Supreme Court has in Jai Dev v. State of Punjab pointed out in a similar case that the petitioner's trial there was under section 233 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and not under section 234 read with section 222 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898. In the case before the Supreme Court 21 prosecutions were launched against an accused person arising out of one complaint. At first 10 prosecutions were launched against the accused and he was convicted in some and acquitted in some. Subsequently, 11 more prosecutions were launched against him and that was objected to as being barred under section 403 (1) of Criminal Procedure Code of 1898. The Supreme Court however held that the latter prosecutions were not hit by section 403 (1), Criminal Procedure Code, and pointed out that the appellant therein had been prosecuted for various misappropriations alleged to have been committed by him and each one of these misappropriations is a distinct offence by itself and therefore it was open to the Court to separately charge him and separately try him for those offences. It further pointed out that the normal rule in respect of trial of criminal cases is that laid down in section 233 of the old Code, that sub- section (2) of section 222 provides that when an accused is charged with criminal breach of trust or dishonest misappropriation of money, it would be sufficient to specify the gross sum in respect of which the offence is alleged to have been committed and the dates between which the offence is alleged to have been committed without specifying particular items or the exact dates and the charge so framed shall be deemed to be a charge of one offence within the meaning of section 234 provided that the time included between the first and the last of such dates does not exceed one year. The Supreme Court pointed out that sub- section (2) of section 222 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 was an enabling provision and it is not incumbent on the prosecution to have recourse to that provision in each case. In the case now before me also, the prosecution did not have recourse to that provision at all. The Supreme Court pointed out that sub- section (2) of section 222 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 was an enabling provision and it is not incumbent on the prosecution to have recourse to that provision in each case. In the case now before me also, the prosecution did not have recourse to that provision at all. The Supreme Court further pointed out that sub-section (2) of section 403, of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 (which is analogous to section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973), specifically provides that a person acquitted or convicted of any offence may afterwards be tried for a distinct offence for which a separate charge might have been made against him on the former trial and that it was not disputed that in respect of the offences for which the appellant was tried and convicted or acquitted, separate charges might have been made against him and as such there was no basis for the plea that the prosecutions were hit by section 403(1), Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore it is clear that section 300 of Criminal Procedure Code of 1973 cannot be invoked by the petitioners as a bar to the launching of the prosecutions against them in C.C. Nos. 28 and 29 of 1978 on the file of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate of Cheyyar. 11. With regard to the doctrine of issue estoppel also, in the circumstances of this case, that doctrine cannot be invoked in favour of the petitioners. But, Mr. Vibishanan, however urges that he is not pressing that issue how before me but would be content to bring thesecases within the ambit of the decision of the Supreme Court in Jai Dev v. State of Punjab. 12. Mr. Vibishanan next endeavoured to persuade me to quash the criminal proceedings on the ground of the peculiar circumstances of this case. He pointed out that the report against the petitioners by the Co-operative Inspector after an enquiry under section 65 of the Co-operative Societies Act was filed on 24th April, 1967, and after three years thereafter the complaint against them was laid by the Deputy Registrar before the Superintendent of Police and in the year 1973 three charge-sheets were filed against them and those charge-sheets resulted in S.C.Nos. 5, 6 and 7 of 1974 in which they were eventually acquitted of the charges on 11th March, 1974 and thereafter only on 31st October, 1977, the prosecution laid the present charge-sheets which have resulted in C.C.Nos. 28 and 29 of 1978 on the file of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate Cheyyar. It is in these circumstances that Mr. Vibishanan has pressed for the invocation of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. He attempts to derive support for his plea in the observations of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision. In that decision the Supreme Court after holding that the subsequent prosecutions were not barred under section 403, Criminal Procedure Code of 1898, however pointed out therein that 10 prosecution had been launched against the accused person there at first and after he was tried and acquitted in some of them and convicted in some of them and had served out the sentences imposed on him, 11 other prosecutions were launched 4 years later i.e., in the year 1961. It further pointed out that if the present prosecutions had been launched against the accused person along with the other prosecutions then even if he should have been convicted in those cases, it was most likely that the sentence that might have been awarded to him would have been ordered to run concurrently and that apart, fresh batch of prosecutions have been launched nearly four years after the earlier prosecutions were launched. It was in those circumstances, that the Supreme Court, felt it would not be in the interest of justice to allow those prosecutions to go on. 13. But then, in the case now before me, even though the present prosecutions have been filed nearly 3½ years after the disposal of S.C. Nos. 5, 6 and 7 of 1974 the petitioners were acquitted in those sessions cases and that is significant difference between this and the case which came up before the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision. 14. Yet another decision cited by Mr. Vibishanan is Ramekbal Tiwary v. Madan Mohan Tiwary and another. There also there was a consideration of section 403, Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 and the Supreme Court rejected the contention raised on behalf of the accused person that section 403 (1) would bar the subsequent prosecution of the accused person. 14. Yet another decision cited by Mr. Vibishanan is Ramekbal Tiwary v. Madan Mohan Tiwary and another. There also there was a consideration of section 403, Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 and the Supreme Court rejected the contention raised on behalf of the accused person that section 403 (1) would bar the subsequent prosecution of the accused person. But the Supreme Court, nevertheless, set aside the order of the Additional Sessions Judge ordering the commitment of the appellant on the ground that in the circumstances of that case they thought that it was not expedient that the appellant should be tried after such a long lapse of time. In that case a charge-sheet was laid against the accused persons for an offence under section 307 but the learned Magistrate decided to try the accused persons for offences under sections 326 and 338, Indian Penal Code, on the ground that the evidence did not disclose an offence under section 307 and therefore the Magistrate tried the accused persons for offences under sections 326 and 338, Indian Penal Code and acquitted them on 13th July, 1960. Subsequently, an application in revision was made to the Additional Sessions Judge who set aside the orders of the Magistrate and directed the Magistrate to commit the appellant and other accused to take their trial before the Court of Session on charges under section 307, Indian Penal Code, etc. That order was taken in revision to the High Court which affirmed that decision of the learned Additional Sessions Judge and then the matter went up before the Supreme Court. Before the Supreme Court disposed of the matter, 7 years had elapsed since the accused person was acquitted by the Magistrate, and it was in view of that long delay the Supreme Court set aside the order of the Additional Sessions Judge, confirmed by the High Court. Such a long lapse of time had not acquired in the case now before me. The offences committed by the petitioners are serious offences and as such considering the circumstances of this case, I do not think it expedient to invoke the powers of this Court under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, to quash the proceedings launched against the petitioners. These two petitions are therefore dismissed.