JUDGMENT S. Ali Ahmad, J, This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with a prayer to quash the award (Annexure 12) given by the Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court no. 3 in so far as it was against the petitioner. 2. Facts necessary for the decision of this application are that the petitioner, a dumper-driver, filed au application under section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) on the 18th March, 1965, before the Industrial Tribunal. Dhanbad. It was stated, inter alia, in that application that the services of the petitioner had been terminated by the Management in violation of the provisions contained under section 33 of the Act inasmuch as the termination was effected without seeking the approval of the Tribunal where Reference No. 70 of 1964 was pending and in which reference the petitioner was a concerned workman. According to the petitioner, at the instance of the Barbil Workers Union of which he was Joint Secretary, a dispute was raised on 28th November. 1963, asking the management to raise the grade of the truck drivers to Rs. 100-6-160 EB 8-200 which was applicable to the Dumper drivers. There was some negotiation with the management on this issue and a meeting of the Executive Committee or the Union was held on 19.2.1964. In this meeting the Secretary of the Union was authorised to agree to a reference under section 10 (2) of the Act. In pursuance or this agreement, the management and the Union assigned joint application for referring the dispute for adjudication under section 10 (2) of the Act. Thereafter on 8th October, 1964, the Notification was issued under section 10 (2) of the Act by which the dispute was referred to adjudication. It will be useful here to mention the terms of reference- "Whether the Truck-drivers of M/s Orissa Mineral Development Company Limited are entitled to the grade of Rs.100-6-160 EB 8-200 which is applicable to the Dumper drivers of the management and if not what relief, if any, they are entitled to ?" While the reference was pending adjudication, the petitioner was falsely implicated alongwith three other workmen in a criminal case under sections 147 and 325 of the Indian Penal Code and was arrested by the police on 29-10-1964. The petitioner and the other workmen were released on ball on the same day on the condition that they will not go to Thakurani Mines till 13-11-1964 which was the next date fixed in the case. Faced with this conditional order of bail, the petitioner applied for leave on 2-11-1964. Later on, when on 13-11-1964 the restriction was lifted at about 4.30 P. M. the petitioner was served with letter no. 7561 dated 13-11-1964 by which the services of the petitioner were terminated with effect from 1-11-64. The grievance of the petitioner is that he was not given any charge sheet for which his services were terminated and there by the management violated the principle of natural justice. According to him, the termination of the services was the result of unfair labour practice and victimisation. On these facts, the petitioner prayed before the Industrial Tribunal to pass orders for his reinstatement with full wages for the period. The management filed a petition challenging the maintainability of the application on the ground that the petitioner was not a concerned work man and prayed that this matter be decided as a preliminary issue in the case. 3. Respondent no. 2, Sri B.S. Tripathi, Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour court, Dhanbad by his award dated 31.3.1973 (Annexure 12) held that the petitioner was not a concerned workman as the decision given in the said Industrial dispute, the dumper drivers were not going to be affected in any way either by acceptance or rejection of the demand of the truck drivers. It also held that the petitioner was not a member of the Union on 13.11.1964, the day his services were terminated. It also appears that the management took the defence during the course of hearing of the maintainability application that this was a case of termination of services simpliciter and the Management had passed order in exercise of the powers as per paragraph 36 of the Standing Order of the Company and, as such, there was no question of violation of section 33 of the Act. Respondent no. 2 negatived this plea and held that this was not a case of termination of services simpliciter. Respondent no.2, however, dismissed the section 33A of the Act on the petitioner was not a complaint under the ground that concerned workman. 4. Respondent no. 2 negatived this plea and held that this was not a case of termination of services simpliciter. Respondent no.2, however, dismissed the section 33A of the Act on the petitioner was not a complaint under the ground that concerned workman. 4. The only question that needs determination in this application is as to whether the petitioner is a concerned workman. Mr. T.K. Prasad in support of this application submitted that the petitioner was a concerned workman and respondent no. 2 was wrong in holding that be (the petitioner) did not satisfy the requirements of a concerned workman. Mr. Sanyal, Learned counsel for respondent no.1, on the other hand, submitted that respondent no. 2 was justified in holding that the petitioner was not a concerned workman. Learned counsels in support of their respective submissions have referred to certain cases. I now propose to deal with them. 5. The case of M/S New India Motors (P) Ltd. New Delhi V. K.T. Morris is the first case on the point. The Supreme Court in this case had occasion to consider the expression "workmen concerned in such dispute." In that case an industrial dispute with reference to the termination of services of seven employees was referred to adjudication. During the pendency of that reference the services of one K.T. Morris were terminated by the management. He, therefore, filed an application under section 33A of the Act. His grievance was that the termination of his services was the result of mala fide as he had taken interest in the case of the apprentices which had given rise to the industrial dispute which was pending disposal and had, in fact, given evidence in the said dispute on behalf of those workmen. The management in that case also took a plea that the complaint made by K.T. Morris was not competent inasmuch as be was not a workman concerned in the dispute pending adjudication. The Tribunal negatived this argument and held Morris to be a workman concerned in the dispute. The matter was taken to the Supreme Court and it was argued there that Morris was not at all concerned in the dispute that had been referred to adjudication and so the termination of his services could not attract the provision of section 33 (1) (a) of the Act. The matter was taken to the Supreme Court and it was argued there that Morris was not at all concerned in the dispute that had been referred to adjudication and so the termination of his services could not attract the provision of section 33 (1) (a) of the Act. In that connection, Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) observed as follows :- "Prima facie the argument that "workmen concerned in such dispute" should be limited to the workmen directly or actually concerned in such dispute appears plausible, but if we examine the scheme of the Act and the effect of its material and relevant provisions this limited construction of the clause in question cannot be accepted." Thereafter, the learned Judge considered the definition of 'industrial dispute' prescribed by section 2 (k) of the Act and also section 18 of the Act which deals with persons on whom awards are binding. After laying down the ambit of these two sections and the object of section 33, the learned Judge observed as follows :- "In dealing with the question as to which workmen can be said to be concerned in an industrial dispute we have to bear in mind the essential condition for the raising of an Industrial dispute itself, and if an industrial dispute can be raised only by a group of workmen acting on their own or through their union then It would be difficult to resist the conclusion that all those who sponsored the dispute are concerned in it. As we have already, pointed out this construction is harmonious with the definition prescribed by section 2 (s) and with the provisions contained in S.18 of the Act. Therefore, we are not prepared to hold that the expression' "workmen concerned in such dispute" can be limited only to such of the workmen who are directly concerned with the dispute in question. In our opinion, that expression includes all workmen on whose behalf the dispute has been raised as well as those who would be bound by the award which may be made in the said dispute. The learned Judge thereafter referred to certain decisions and dismissed the appeal. In our opinion, that expression includes all workmen on whose behalf the dispute has been raised as well as those who would be bound by the award which may be made in the said dispute. The learned Judge thereafter referred to certain decisions and dismissed the appeal. It is evident, therefore, that in the case before the Supreme Court K.T. Morris was held to be a workman concerned with the dispute only because he was interested in the dispute and had given evidence in support of the workmen whose case was pending adjudication before the Tribunal. 6. The next case is the case of Digwadih Colliery V. Ramji Singh. This case also arose out of an application filed under section 33A of the Act on behalf of a dismissed employee. The allegation in the petition was that because there was Reference No. 60 of 1959 pending between the management and some of its employees section 33 (2) of the Act applied. The Tribunal following the case of M/s New India Motors (P) Ltd., New Delhi held that a broad view of the requirements of section 33 (2) of the Act supported the case of the workman. The Supreme Court on these facts held that the workman did not make any averment about the nature of the said dispute and, therefore the Tribunal was in error in holding that the broad construction of section 33 (2) automatically led to the conclusion that the respondent was the workman concerned and could therefore, claim the protection of section 33 (2) of the Act. It is significant to note that in this case, the complainant did not claim to be a workman concerned in the dispute on account of the fact that he was interested in the dispute giving rise to Reference no. 60 of 1959 or that he had given evidence in that case or that the reference was the result of any action taken by him. The complainant claimed to be a workman concerned in the dispute only because a reference with regard to the management under which he was working was pending adjudication. 7. The Supreme Court again considered the expression "workmen concerned in such dispute" In the case of Tata Iron and Steel Co. The complainant claimed to be a workman concerned in the dispute only because a reference with regard to the management under which he was working was pending adjudication. 7. The Supreme Court again considered the expression "workmen concerned in such dispute" In the case of Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. V. D.R. Singh and observed that the problem was ultimately resolved by it in two decisions i.e. the case of M/s New India Motors P. Ltd. 8. There is yet another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Upper Ganges Valley Electricity Supply Company Ltd. V. Srivastava (G.S.). In this case, It was held that the complainant was not a concerned workman under section 23 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, as he was not a workman concerned in the only pending appeal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal which related to an individual dispute of one employee. 9. The next is the case of Cane Manager New India Sugar Mills Ltd. V. Krishna Ballabh Jha. In this case an industrial dispute was pending with the management of New India Sugar Mills regarding the dismissal with respect to two workmen, namely, Lal Bahadur and Mohiuddin. During the pendency of that reference Krishna, another workman of New India Sugar Mills was dismissed without obtaining approval of the Tribunal under the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 33 of the Act. A preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the complaint was raised on the ground that Krishna, the complainant was not a workman concerned with the dispute pending adjudication in the reference. The Tribunal decided the matter in favour of the complainant presumably on the ground that New India Sugar Mills Workers Union had taken up the case of Lal Bahadur and Mohiuddin which ultimately resulted in reference Case no. 7 of 1963 and Krishna also was a member of that very Union. This reasoning was attached and it was urged that merely because the complainant was a member of the same Union which sponsored the dispute giving rise to Reference No.7 of 1963, it will not be correct to hold that he also was concerned "in the previous dispute" unless tile nature of the dispute In the two cases indicated some common feature which affect the workman. Narasimham, C.J. (as he then was) considered the above referred decisions of the Supreme Court and seems to have accepted the contention that mere membership of the Union which raised the dispute giving rise to the reference will not make the complainant a workman concerned with the dispute. The learned Chief Justice, however, found that there was a link between the dismissal of the complainant and the dispute pending adjudication. He, therefore, held the complainant to be a workman concerned with the previous dispute. 10. The case of Khagendra Prasad Patra V. C.T.M.S.T.S. Koraput is the case where a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court took the view that merely because the petitioner was a workman of the Union will not make the workman "concerned" in the dispute within the meaning of section 33 (i) (a) of the Act. They said that it was a dispute that the workman had to be concerned with and not only with the parties to the dispute. The learned Judges considered several cases, including the case of M/s New India Motors (p) Ltd., New Delhi. 11, The last case cited at the Bar is the case of Bhaskaran Nair V. Management, Premier Tyres Ltd. In this case a learned Single Judge of Kerala High Court held that a workman is interested in the earlier dispute, if it was a collective dispute on behalf of the workman in general. 12. The expression "workmen concerned in such dispute" has vexed the Courts in India before the case was decided by the Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 875 and has continued to vex even thereafter although its ambit has been reduced substantially. The conclusion to which I reach on a resume of all the decisions, I have just referred to, is that a broader construction has to be given to the expression "workmen concerned in such dispute" and this broad construction will include such workmen who are directly or actually concerned in such dispute and also such workmen, who are interested in the dispute. This Interest can be manifested either by giving evidence before the Tribunal and/or taking part in raising the dispute giving rise to the reference for its adjudication (This illustration is not exhaustive). Having determined this position in law, I now revert to the fact of this case. 13. The petitioner is a dumper-driver. This Interest can be manifested either by giving evidence before the Tribunal and/or taking part in raising the dispute giving rise to the reference for its adjudication (This illustration is not exhaustive). Having determined this position in law, I now revert to the fact of this case. 13. The petitioner is a dumper-driver. The dispute referred to the Tribunal for adjudication was as to whether the truck-drivers are entitled to get the grade of dumper driver. The Tribunal as observed earlier has held that the petitioner will not in any way be affected by the decision given by the Tribunal either way. On this ground, therefore, it held that there being no link, the petitioner could not be said to be a concerned workman. Mr. Prasad learned counsel has attacked this. According to him, the fact that the truck-driver may be given the grade which the petitioner was drawing will make him a concerned workman with the dispute. The link, in my opinion. if not missing is so thin that I cannot conceive of. I am, therefore, of the view that on this ground respondent no. 2 has rightly held the petitioner not to be concerned with the dispute. 14. The next argument of Mr. Prasad that the petitioner being a member of the Executive Committee of the Union which raised the dispute giving rise to the reference seems to be a substantial one. I have indicated earlier that the Tribunal as a matter of fact, held that the complainant was not a member of the Union on 13.11.1964 when his services were terminated. Respondent no.2 in paragraph 5 of its award has mentioned that three witnesses were examined on behalf of the workman. According to their evidence, the petitioner was Joint Secretary and a member of the Executive Committee in the year 1964. This fact is not disputed by the management. According to the evidence adduced on its behalf and also according to the statement made in paragraph 3 of the counter-affidavit filed in this Court, the petitioner ceased to be a member of the Barbil Workers Union sometime in March, 1964. On the basis of these materials, there can be no doubt that the petitioner was an office-bearer of the Union which raised the dispute on 28.11.1963 and 19th February, 1964. On the basis of these materials, there can be no doubt that the petitioner was an office-bearer of the Union which raised the dispute on 28.11.1963 and 19th February, 1964. True the Union raised the dispute, but it raised the dispute through its office- bearers and on the finding the petitioner was one of them. He certainly, therefore was interested in the dispute. It cannot be conceived that a person, who sponsors the dispute will not be interested in it particularly when the Supreme Court in the case of M/s New India Motors (P.) Ltd., New Delhi upheld the view of the Tribunal that a person, who gives evidence in the case has interest in the dispute and as such is a concerned workman. I have no alternative but to hold that the petitioner, being an office bearer of the Union, which raised the dispute giving rise to the reference, is a concerned workman with the dispute which was pending adjudication. 15. Mr. Sanyal in that connection vehemently urged that in case it was held that the petitioner was a concerned workman by virtue of being a member of the Union then the relevant date will be 13.11.1964 (the day on which the petitioner's services were terminated) and not earlier. I do not see any justification to accept this contention, The complainant became interested and as such concerned with it when the dispute was raised. It is immaterial as to when his services were terminated. In my opinion, all that has to be seen for the competence of the application under section 33 A of the Act is as to whether the workman was a concerned workman with the dispute at any time during its pendency and as to whether his services were terminated while the dispute was pending adjudication. Any other construction will be against the broad construction theory laid down by the Supreme Court. The petitioner fulfills both these two requirements. In my view, therefore, the complaint filed under section 33A of the Act was maintainable and the Tribunal, respondent no. 2 erred in law in dismissing it on the ground that the petitioner was not a concerned workman. The case, therefore, has to be sent back on remand. 16. The application under section 33 A of the Act was filed sometime in 1955. 2 erred in law in dismissing it on the ground that the petitioner was not a concerned workman. The case, therefore, has to be sent back on remand. 16. The application under section 33 A of the Act was filed sometime in 1955. It is rather unfortunate that for one reason or the other, it remained pending for about 15 years. The tribunal, I am sure, will now try to mend the harm caused by this very unusual delay and will give top priority to this case in the matter of disposal. The application is accordingly allowed and Annexure 1, 2 to the writ application in so far as it is against the petitioner is quashed. Cost must be paid by respondent no.1 to the petitioner. Hearing fee Rs. 250/-. I agree. Application allowed.