JUDGMENT - CHANDURKAR M.N., J. : - This petition arises out of the proceedings for possession of Flat No. 25 in a building, which admittedly, belonged to a Co-operative Society of which respondent No. 1 Mandayan Raman(hereinafter referred to as “the Landlord”) as well as original respondent No. 2 K. T. Mirchandani who were both members. All the material facts have been enumerated in great detail in the earlier judgment of the Division Bench which had earlier disposed of this petition by the order, dated 28th January, 1971 and we are, therefore, referring in this Judgment only such facts which appear to us necessary for the disposal of the arguments which have been advanced before us. 2. The Landlord had earlier, after revoking the licence in favour of Mirchandani by a notice, dated 4th June, 1971, approached the Bombay City Civil Court for eviction of the present petitioner, who claimed to have taken the premises from Mirchandani the very next day after an agreement of Leave and Licence was executed by Mirchandani on 30th July, 1960 in favour of the Landlord. The agreement between Mirchandani and the Petitioner is dated 1st August, 1960. In the City Civil Court where the Landlord had filed Suit No. 3814 of 1961, which substantially was a suit for possession but styled as a Suit for mandatory injunction against Mirchandani alone was contested by Mirchandani mainly on the ground that he and the landlord were both members of the Dhuru Mahal Co-operative Housing Society and the dispute raised in the City Civil Court could be decided only by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies or his Nominee under section 94 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act. This contention was accepted by the City Civil Court and the suit came to be dismissed on 10th September, 1965 on the ground that the City Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the Suit. 3. Thereafter, the landlord took the proceedings under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, for having the dispute referred to the Registrars Nominee. To these proceedings, Mirchandani and the present petitioner were both parties. 3. Thereafter, the landlord took the proceedings under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, for having the dispute referred to the Registrars Nominee. To these proceedings, Mirchandani and the present petitioner were both parties. Under the provisions of section 91 as it then stood in 1965, the Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bombay, made an order that “I am satisfied that the dispute, within the meaning of section 91(1) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, does exist in this case and the dispute touches the business of the Society and the parties to the dispute are one or other of the persons mentioned in section 91, of the said Act. Consequently, he referred the dispute to his Nomineetor decision. One Shri Advani, original respondent No. 3 in this petition, ultimately dealt with the dispute. He made an award on 29th June 1968, directing Mirchandani and the present petitioner to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of Flat No. 25 in Dhuru Mahal. He also made an order with regard to the payment of arrears of compensation from 1st July, 1961. He gave reasons in support of the award and he found that the two agreements viz. one between the landlord and Mirchandani and the other between Mirchandani and the petitioner, did not create any tenancy. With regard to the claim of the present petitioner that she was a sub-tenant, the Nominee held that there was no power to create sub-tenancy in respect of premises which vested in the Co-operative Society. 4. It may be stated that in addition to the Flat in question, there was a dispute between the daughter of the landlord, who has now succeeded to the landlord as his legal representative and Mirchandani with regard to a garage. We are not concerned with that litigation which has finally culminat- ed against Mirchandani. 5. After the award of the Nominee was made, the Petitioner challeng- ed it by an appeal before the Co-operative Tribunal, Mirchandani also challenged it by another appeal filed independently. Part of the Award relat- ing to the garage was also challenged by Mirchandani by another indepen- dent appeal. The Co-operative Tribunal dismissed all the appeals, holding that neither Mirchandani nor the present petitioner was a tenant and that parties clearly intended to enter into a transaction of Leave and Licence. 6. Part of the Award relat- ing to the garage was also challenged by Mirchandani by another indepen- dent appeal. The Co-operative Tribunal dismissed all the appeals, holding that neither Mirchandani nor the present petitioner was a tenant and that parties clearly intended to enter into a transaction of Leave and Licence. 6. Three petitions came to be filed against this Order of the Tribunal, petition No. 2058 of 1969 was filed by the present petitioner. Petition No. 2142 of 1969 was filed by Mirchandani in respect of the flat and Petition No. 2143 of 1969 was filed by Mirchandani in respect of the garage. AH these three petitions came to be disposed of by this Court by a common order dated 5th February 1971. The order of the Division Bench shows that the Division Bench declined to interfere with the findings of the Tribunal and the Registrars Nominee that Mirchandani was a licensee. The findings recorded by the Division Bench were as follows: (1) The finding that Mirchandani was a Licensee was well founded and had to be accepted.(Paragraph 9.) (2) Mirchandani is found to be disentitled to claim any protection of the Rent Act and as such he as well as the present petitioner, claiming through him, are liable to be evicted even by the Court empowered to hear such cases under the Rent Act.(Paragraph 12). (3) It is not enough for a person invoking jurisdiction under Arti- cles 226 and 227 when the Courts below had no jurisdiction or that their orders suffered merely from some error of law, but it shall have further to be shown by the petitioner that justice also is on his side. (4) While dealing with the dispute, the Registrars nominee followed the view propounded by the High Court in(S. Bhattacharjee v. S. B. Gosavi)1, 1968 Mh.L.J. 837 that a member of a Co-operative Society can claim possession of the flat even from his tenant by recourse to the proceedings under section 91 of the Co-operative Societies Act. (5) It will not be proper to interfere with the orders passed earlier merely because the law as to jurisdiction has been interpreted differently by the Supreme Court. (5) It will not be proper to interfere with the orders passed earlier merely because the law as to jurisdiction has been interpreted differently by the Supreme Court. (6) If records of the case did not show any facts showing as to how the dispute touched the business of the Society, but this was mainly be- cause no such pleas were raised at any time by either the present petitioner or Mirchandani. (7) The Written Statement of Mirchandani before the City Civil Court goes to admit the necessary facts which confer jurisdiction on the Registrar or his Nominee to adjudicate the dispute under section 91 of the Co-operative Societies Act and the present petitioner, had, in terms, adopted the Written Statement of Mirchandani(Paragraph 14). (8) It was not possible to say that any one of the opponents was misled or in any way adversely affected merely because the claim was entertained by a forum which is now found to be incompetent as a result of different interpretations placed on section 91 at a later stage by the Supreme Court. (9) Mirchandani was equitably estopped from raising pleas of juris- diction because the landlord was driven to set up his claim before the Registrar and his Nominee as a result of the written statement of Mirchan- dani in the City Civil Court(Paragraph 14). (10) Even the alleged sub-tenancy was created on 1st August 1960 when it was specifically prohibited and the present petitioner was not entitled to any protection. 7. Thus, the Division Bench of this Court confirmed the Award of eviction passed against the present petitioner and Mirchandani. 8. Against this Judgment of the Division Bench, three Appeals came to be filed before the Supreme Court, Civil Appeal No. 19 of 1971 was filed by the present petitioner and Civil Appeals Nos. 641 and 642 of 1971 were filed by Mirchandani. Admittedly, one of these appeals, probably Civil Appeal No. 641 of 1971 related to the garage and Civil Appeal No. 642 of 1971 related to the flat in question. 9. It appears that Mirchandani died sometime in August, 1974. The appeals before the Supreme Court filed by Mirchandani came to be dismissed as having abated by an Order of the Supreme Court dated 20-9-1976. 9. It appears that Mirchandani died sometime in August, 1974. The appeals before the Supreme Court filed by Mirchandani came to be dismissed as having abated by an Order of the Supreme Court dated 20-9-1976. The Appeal filed by the present petitioner came to be heard on merits and the Supreme Court by an Order set aside the Judgment of the High Court. The material part of that Judgment reads as follows:- “We are of opinion that without reference to the objects of the Society, in particular, it is not possible to determine whether the present case fell within the business of the Society. The High Court will give opportunity to the parties for placing the objects of the Society and the Rules and the Bye-laws of the Society, if any. The High Court will deal with all rival contentions of the parties on the question as to whether the present case is a dispute touching the business of the Society.” This petition filed by the present petitioner has now been put up for hearing before us. At the outset, there was considerable debate as to what exactly was the scope of hearing which should be given to the petitioner and the Landlord. According to Mr. Thakkar, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, present hearing must be restricted only to the limited issue as to whether the dispute touches the business of the Society. According to the learned counsel, the other findings recorded by the High Court will stand and that the decision of the petition must rest only on the view which we could take on the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner that the present dispute was not one touching the business of the Society and the petition would have to be disposed of accordingly. In other words, the contention was that if we were satisfied that the present dispute did not touch the business of the Society, the petition would have to be allowed and if we took a contrary view, the petition would have to be dismissed, but in any case it was vehemently urged that no other question was open to the debate or arguments. 10. Mr. Thakkar has referred to certain decisions and particularly the decision of this Court in(Kalawati v. Shankarrao Patil)2, 1973 Mh. L.J. 207 and the decision in(Panjumal v. Harpalsingh)3, 1975 Mh. L.J.29=A.I.R. 1975 Bom. 120. 10. Mr. Thakkar has referred to certain decisions and particularly the decision of this Court in(Kalawati v. Shankarrao Patil)2, 1973 Mh. L.J. 207 and the decision in(Panjumal v. Harpalsingh)3, 1975 Mh. L.J.29=A.I.R. 1975 Bom. 120. which according to the learned counsel now decide beyond controversy that the dispute relating to recovery of possession by a member of the Co-operative Society from his tenant of the premises which he holds as a member of the Society is not covered within the phrases business of the Society in section 91 of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1961. 11. On the other hand, it was contended by Mr. Gursahani appearing on behalf of the landlord that the Supreme Court had wholly set aside the judgment of the High Court and, therefore, the whole petition was before us and he was, therefore, entitled to agitate all the grounds on which, according to him, the petitioner would not be entitled to any relief. It is pointed out to us that the landlord is entitled to urge that the present petition also abates because Mirchandanis heirs have not been brought on record. It is also argued that it is open to the landlord to contend that the order of the Registrars Nominee has no independent existence apart from the earlier order made by the Assistant Registrar, holding that there was a dispute within the meaning of section 91 as it then existed, and since the initial order of the Registrar, dated 6-11-1965 has not been challenged in the petition it is not now open to the petitioner to contend that the Nominee did not have jurisdiction to deal with the dispute. In view of this controversy with regard to the scope of hearing before us, it becomes necessary for us to decide that question first. It is not in dispute that the Supreme Court has set aside the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in to as will be clear from the following observations of the Supreme Court: “Having heard the parties, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the High Court should be set aside. We accordingly do so.” The only effect of these observations can be, in our opinion, that the decision of the Division Bench dismissing the petition, has been set aside in the appeal filed by the present petitioner. We accordingly do so.” The only effect of these observations can be, in our opinion, that the decision of the Division Bench dismissing the petition, has been set aside in the appeal filed by the present petitioner. There is nothing in the order of the Supreme Court to indicate that the hearing of the petition has to be restricted merely to the question as to whether the dispute fell within section 91 or not. Since the judgment of the High Court has been set aside, in our view, while dealing with the petition of the petitioner, it will be open to the landlord to urge all possible grounds on which the petitioner could be denied reliefs in her petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. We are, therefore, not inclined to accept the submission of Mr. Thakkar that the hearing before us must be restricted only to the question of jurisdiction and that no other grounds on which the petition was liable to be dismissed, should be entertained by us. 12. When we thus take up the petition for being dealt with, we find that there is some difficulty in the way of the petitioner in successfully prosecuting this petition. Admittedly, the petitioner was claiming the right to occupy the flat in question through Mirchandani. Her contention that she was a direct tenant or she derived the right to occupy the premises directly from the landlord has been negatived and that finding has not been challenged before us. The petitioner, therefore, cannot have any independent right vis-a-vis the landlord and she cannot, in any case, have a larger right than the right which Mirchandani had. Now, whether it is an agreement of Leave and Licence or whether it is an agreement of tenancy, the fact remains that nobody has come forward to claim as the heir of Mirchandani, the rights he may have acquired from the landlord. The decision of the High Court rendered earlier was the decision given independently in a petition filed by Mirchandani, challenging the award filed by Mirchandani before the Co-operative Tribunal. We have already pointed out that Mirchandanis appeal is dismissed by the Supreme Court as having abated. The effect of this order of the Supreme Court in the petition filed by Mirchandani is concerned, that order stands undisturbed. We have already pointed out that Mirchandanis appeal is dismissed by the Supreme Court as having abated. The effect of this order of the Supreme Court in the petition filed by Mirchandani is concerned, that order stands undisturbed. In other words, there is an operative order of the Division Bench of this Court against Mirchandani in favour of the land-lord. It is also significant that to the petition filed by Mirchandani with regard to the flat, the present petitioner was also party, no doubt as a respondent. Now, if the order of the High Court continues to be operative as against Mirchandani and the present petitioner claims through Mirchandani alone, then there cannot be any subsisting right which can be agitated by the present petitioner, because with the death of Mirchandani, right claimed under the agreement entered into by him with the landlord regarding the premises in question, so far as Mirchandani is concerned, have come to an end. In our view, therefore, the effect of the abatement of the appeal filed by Mirchandani holding that he was a licensee and liable to be evicted stands and any disturbance of the orders of the Nominee and the Co-operative Tribunal is bound to bring into being two contradictory decisions with regard to the same subject matter, a result which must clearly be avoided. It is true that it has been stated at one stage while making an application for substitution in the present petition that Mirchandani has no heirs at all. This was the application made on 8th December, 1977 in the present petition by the petitioner. In that application, two stands have been taken, firstly it is stated that Mirchandani was not a necessary party to the petition and, therefore, the petitioner was advised not to bring any heirs of Mirchandani. on record and failure to do so was not fatal to the petition. The alternative stand taken is that Mirchandani has died without leaving any heirs, and, therefore, under Order 22, Rule 4-A of the Code of Civil Procedure Order should be made appointing either the Administrative General or some Officer of the Court to represent Mirchandani. Admittedly, no notice of this application was issued or even served on the landlord. This application has come to be granted on 9th December, 1977. Admittedly, no notice of this application was issued or even served on the landlord. This application has come to be granted on 9th December, 1977. It is obvious that this order passed without serving a copy on the landlord or without hearing him will not bind the landlord at all. What is contended by Mr. Thakkar is that the order granting the application stating that either Mirchandani was not a necessary party or in any case, the petition can proceed without his legal representatives, was made by the Court and the petitioner cannot, therefore, be blamed. We are not interested in apportioning any blame. We are only considering the legal effect of, firstly, an order made behind the back of the landlord and secondly of the fact of Mirchandani having died without leaving any heirs. So far as the first part is concerned it cannot be disputed that the order allowing the application will not bind the landlord and the land-lord was, therefore, entitled to contend that the petition must abate as a whole. Mr. Gursahani, appearing on behalf of the landlord, has relied upon the provisions of section 141, Explanation of the Code of Civil Procedure, which specifically provides that the “Proceedings” in section 141 does not include any proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. In reply to this argument, Mr. Thakkar naturally contended that the concept of abatement is a creation of the Code of Civil Procedure and if the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure did not apply, then it will not be open to the counsel for the landlord to contend that the proceedings in the petition abated. In reply to this argument, Mr. Thakkar naturally contended that the concept of abatement is a creation of the Code of Civil Procedure and if the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure did not apply, then it will not be open to the counsel for the landlord to contend that the proceedings in the petition abated. Now, we do not think it necessary in this case to consider the implications of the Explanation to section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code, and further implications of the absence of reference to Article 227 of the Constitution of India, in the Explanation to section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, leaving aside the question whether the petition abates if the provi-sions of Code of Civil Procedure are applicable or whether the provisions do not apply at all, one fact which is clear is that the adjudication in the instant case is in respect of a right which vested personally in Mirchandani and Mirchandani or his heirs if any, were clearly necessary parties to such a petition and if Mirchandani has died in the meanwhile, the result is that the right of Mirchandani has come to an end and the right must revert back to the person from whom it was derived, because the rights were personal to Mirchandani. Such personal rights could not last beyond the lifetime of Mirchandani and the petitioner could not, therefore, agitate any rights in respect of the flat in question because such rights would cease by the death of Mirchandani. On this ground also, in our view, it is not now open to the petitioner to contest this petition and the petition must, in our view, fail on that ground. 13. There is another difficulty which, we find, is in the way of the petitioner. When the Nominee proceeded to decide the dispute in this case, he could not have been called upon to decide whether he had jurisdiction to decide the dispute or not. There is a slight difference between section 91 of the Co-operative Societies Act as it is now and that section as it existed in 1965. The question as to whether the dispute exists for the purpose of section 91 had no doubt to be made by the Registrar, but the scheme of the provisions of section 91 at that time was that this decision of the Registrar was made final. The question as to whether the dispute exists for the purpose of section 91 had no doubt to be made by the Registrar, but the scheme of the provisions of section 91 at that time was that this decision of the Registrar was made final. Section 91(2) reads as follows: “When any question arises, whether for the purposes of the foregoing matter referred to for decision, is a dispute or not, the question shall be considered by the Registrar, whose decision shall be final.” Now when this sub-section refers to the finality attached to a decision of the Registrar relating to the question as to whether there is a dispute or not within the meaning of section 91, though it could be challenged under-Article 226 of the Constitution for the purposes of the Act, however, the decision was made final and it could not be called in question before the Nominee of the Registrar. It is important to remember that the order under section 91 has not been made appealable under section 152. ft is obvious that the effect of sub-section(2) of section 91 is that once the Registrar decides that there is a dispute, the correctness of that decision cannot be challenged before the Nominee. The powers of the Tribunal in appeal against the award of the Nominee are co-extensive with the powers of the Registrars Nominee and consequently, in view of no express, provision for an appeal being made against the order under section 91 even before the Tribunal, the decision of the Registrar could not have been challenged before the Tribunal. Therefore, unless the order of the Registrar can be challenged only by a petition under Article 226 and it was not open to challenge in any proceedings under the Co-operative Societies Act. It may be that in a given case where the petition is filed, challenging the decision of the Co-operative Tribunal upholding the award made by the Registrars Nominee, the High Court may permit the challenge to the order of the Registrar made under section 91, though it may also be possible that such a challenge may not be allowed to be made on other grounds such as delay or the affected party allowing the proceedings before the Nominee to go on and taking part in them. 14. 14. We have tried to find out whether the petitioner has even in this petition at least challenged the decision of the Assistant Registrar holding that there is a dispute. To a petition and where such challenge is made, the Registrar or the Assistant Registrar must be a necessary party. The decision under section 91 cannot be set aside behind the back of the Registrar or the Assistant Registrar and it is no answer that the Registrars Nominee is already a party to the petition. The jurisdiction of the Registrars Nominee become effective only after the order under section 91(1) is made and to which the finality is given under section 91(1). The present petition shows that neither the Assistant Registrar who made the order under section 91, is made a party nor is there any ground raised, challenging that order under section 91 which stands independent of the proceeding following such an order. The only averment, which deals with the powers of the Registrar to try and decide the dispute under section 91, is to be found in ground No. 1. But that is a ground which is made in the context of claim to tenancy and the ground raised is that having regard to the provi-sions of section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act, the jurisdiction under sec-tion 91 is ousted. Section 91(2) has been construed by the Division Bench of this Court in(Satpalsingh v. Santdas)4, 1973 Mh. L.J. 202=73 BLR 777. The Division Bench of this-case, while dealing with the provisions of sections 91 and 91(2), has pointed out. that the initial issue as to jurisdiction whether there is a dispute or not as. contemplated by section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act 1961, has first to be determined by the Registrar alone. Such an issue can-not be raised or considered at all before the Registrars Nominee, because the jurisdiction of the Registrars Nominee only commences after the Registrar is satisfied that a dispute within the meaning of section 91 of the Act has arisen. The decision further lays down that the jurisdiction of the Maharashtra State Co-operative Tribunal being conterminous with the jurisdiction of the Registrars Nominee, it cannot also in an appeal against the award of the Registrars Nominee hear and decide the issue as to whether a dispute as contemplated by section 91(1) of the Act has arisen at all. 15. Mr. The decision further lays down that the jurisdiction of the Maharashtra State Co-operative Tribunal being conterminous with the jurisdiction of the Registrars Nominee, it cannot also in an appeal against the award of the Registrars Nominee hear and decide the issue as to whether a dispute as contemplated by section 91(1) of the Act has arisen at all. 15. Mr. Thakkar on behalf of the Petitioner has fairly conceded that this part of the decision of the Division Bench in Satpalsinghs case with regard to the construction of section 91(1) and(2) has not, in any way, been affected by the decision of the Supreme Court in(Mrs. Sabharwal Brothers v. Smt. Guna Thadani)5, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1891. We may point out at this stage that the Division Bench in Kalawatis case(cited supra) has taken the view that the view taken by the Division Bench in Satpalsinghs case with regard to whether a dispute arising out of the claim for possession of a flat by a member of a Co-operative Society falls within section 91, stands over-ruled by the decision in Sabharwals case. That is why, we have pointed out that so far as the construction of provisions of section 91(1) and(2) are concerned, no infirmity is created in the view of the Division Bench in Satpalsinghs case by the decision in Sabharwals case. 16. Where under section 91, the Registrar decides that he has jurisdiction, such a decision cannot be ignored unless it is held to be bad by a competent authority so, because it is not a decision by an authority which inherently lacks the jurisdiction to decide that question. The Registrar, under section 91, has been expressly given jurisdiction to decide whether he has jurisdiction. This question maybe rightly or wrongly decided by him. Therefore, his decision under section 91 may be a correct decision or wrong decision. Such a. decision cannot become decision which can be challenged on the ground of want of jurisdiction to decide the question as to jurisdiction. Thus, apart from the fact that the original decision of the Registrar has not been challenged in this petition and the Registrar has not even been made a party, it will not now be open to the petitioner to contend that the Award is without jurisdiction, because the order from which the jurisdiction was derived by the Nominee stands undisturbed. Thus, apart from the fact that the original decision of the Registrar has not been challenged in this petition and the Registrar has not even been made a party, it will not now be open to the petitioner to contend that the Award is without jurisdiction, because the order from which the jurisdiction was derived by the Nominee stands undisturbed. On that ground also, it appears that it will not be possible for us to give any relief to the petitioner. In our view, the findings recorded by us are sufficient for the dismissal of the petition because in view of those findings, it will not be permissible to interfere with the orders impugned in this petition. 17. However, for the purposes of the completeness of the order and having regard to the directions given by the Supreme Court, we are recording our findings on the question as to whether such a dispute constitutes the dispute under section 91. If the petitioner was entitled to challenge the jurisdiction of the Nominee, as the view of this Court presently stands, in our view, the finding would have to be in favour of the petitioner. We need not go into the details of the decision in Kalawatis case. In Kalawatis case, the Division Bench has extensively reviewed the law with regard to the question as to whether the dispute relating to the possession of a flat given by a member of a Co-operative Society to a stranger, can be said to be the dispute touching the business of the Society. Considering several authorities and especially the decisions of the Supreme Court, the Division Bench has taken the view that a dispute, between the member of a Co-operative Housing Society and his licensee with regard to the possession of the flat, does not fall within the four corners of section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. The Bye-laws which have now been produced in the instant case are almost similar to the bye-laws in Kalawatis case. Mr. Gursahani, appearing on behalf of the landlord, has contended that the decision in Kalawatis case will not apply in the present case, because both the landlord and Mirchandani were members of the Co-operative Society and since they were members, the dispute must be said to be touching the business of the Co-operative Society. Mr. Gursahani, appearing on behalf of the landlord, has contended that the decision in Kalawatis case will not apply in the present case, because both the landlord and Mirchandani were members of the Co-operative Society and since they were members, the dispute must be said to be touching the business of the Co-operative Society. In our view, this is a distinction without any difference and having regard to the decision of the Supreme Court in Sabharwals case, it appears to be difficult so long as Kalawatis case stands to entertain the contention that any claim with regard to the possession by a member of Co-operative Society of the flat purchased from the Society, can be said to touch the business of the Society. The decision in Kalawatis case has been followed in Panjumals case where the Division Bench has rejected the argument that the matter required a reconsideration by a larger Bench. However, having regard to the view which was taken on the points earlier discussed, we do not think it necessary to discuss further the decision in Kalawatis case. 18. We may make it clear that so far as the petitioner was concerned, the matter was argued only with regard to the question as to whether the dispute touches the business of the Society and it was stated before us that the other finding? recorded by the High Court must be taken to be good as binding not only on the petitioner but even on the respondent. No other question on merits was argued for the petitioner. Since we have taken the view that all arguments were open in this petition and having regard to the view which we have taken with regard to the maintainability of the petition, it is not possible for us to interfere with the Award made by the Nominee as confirmed by the Co-operative Tribunal. The result, therefore, is that this petition must fail and is dismissed with costs. 19. Mr Shah for the petitioner requests for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We do not think that the questions decided by us are either so complicated or of such general importance that they need be decided by the Supreme Court. In any case, so far as section 91 is concerned, we have given effect to the earlier decision of the Division Bench. 20. The application for leave is, therefore, rejected. Mr. We do not think that the questions decided by us are either so complicated or of such general importance that they need be decided by the Supreme Court. In any case, so far as section 91 is concerned, we have given effect to the earlier decision of the Division Bench. 20. The application for leave is, therefore, rejected. Mr. Shah requests that some time may be given to them to approach the Supreme Court for obtaining necessary order. We stay the operation of the judgment for a period of six weeks. Petition dismissed. -----