JUDGMENT R.C. Srivastava, J. - Proceedings under U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) were started against the Petitioner after issuing a notice u/s 10(2) of the Act in the year 1974. He filed objection and alleged that his son Mahendra Singh was major. It was also alleged therein that the land which has been transferred through sale deeds has been erroneously clubbed with his holding and that his share mentioned therein has been wrongly shown. The Petitioner led evidence and established his claim before the Prescribed Authority which was accepted by him. The Prescribed Authority specifically held that the son of the Petitioner was major and that the sale deeds were executed in good faith and for adequate consideration. He further held that the share of the Petitioner was 1/4th and declared 0.47 acres as surplus area by his order dated 26-10-1974. Neither the Petitioner nor the State preferred any appeal against the order of the Prescribed Authority which became final. 2. The Prescribed Authority issued a fresh notice u/s 10(2) of the Act which was served upon the Petitioner some where in the year 1975. He filed objection contending that his son was major and the land already transferred has been erroneously clubbed with his holding and further that his share has been wrongly shown. The objection of the Petitioner was rejected by the Prescribed Authority. He held that the son of the Petitioner was not major. He further held that the transfers made after 24-1-1971 were liable to be ignored. Against the order of the Prescribed Authority the Petitioner went in appeal. Before the appellate authority apart from raising other questions it was also urged that the judgment given by the Prescribed Authority in the earlier ceiling proceedings would operate as res judicata. The appellate authority repelled all the contentions and held that the earlier order would not operate as res judicata in view of Section 38-B of the Act. Aggrieved, the Petitioner has come to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has urged that provisions of Section 38-B of the Act were not applicable in the present case and the judgment given by the Prescribed Authority in the earlier ceiling proceedings was binding upon the ceiling authorities in the subsequent proceedings and would operate as res judicata. 4. 3. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has urged that provisions of Section 38-B of the Act were not applicable in the present case and the judgment given by the Prescribed Authority in the earlier ceiling proceedings was binding upon the ceiling authorities in the subsequent proceedings and would operate as res judicata. 4. The Chief Standing Counsel Sri S.N. Upadhya and Standing Counsel Sri S.R. Singh addressed on behalf of the State. It was urged on behalf of the State that Section 38-B of the Act is attracted even to the decisions given by the ceiling authorities in the earlier proceedings. 5. I have considered the arguments of the learned Counsel for the parties. The question for consideration in the present petition is whether the amending Act given an unfettered power to the Prescribed Authority to redetermine surplus area irrespective of an earlier determination under the Principal Act or not. In order to appreciate the controversy it is necessary to refer Section 9 of Act II of 1975 and Section 31 of Act XX of 1976. Section 9 of Act II of 1975 is reproduced below: Where an order determining the surplus land in relation to a tenureholder has been made under the principal Act, before the commencement of this Act, the Prescribed Authority may at any time within a period of two years from the commencement of this Act, redetermine the surplus land in accordance with the principal Act as amended by this Act. 6. This provision gives power to the Prescribed Authority to redetermine the surplus area in accordance with the principal Act as amended by Act II of 1975. This shows that redetermination is confined to those matters which are effected by the amending Act and that it has to be done within a period of two years from the commencement of the amending Act. This section, therefore, clearly envisages that the power of redetermination by the Prescribed Authority is confined to the cases which are affected by amending Act and the redetermination must be done within a period of two years from the commencement of the amending Act. This further finds support from Section 31 of U.P. Act XX of 1976. This section, therefore, clearly envisages that the power of redetermination by the Prescribed Authority is confined to the cases which are affected by amending Act and the redetermination must be done within a period of two years from the commencement of the amending Act. This further finds support from Section 31 of U.P. Act XX of 1976. Section 31 of U.P. Act XX of 1976 is reproduced below: (1) All proceedings under Sub-sections (3) to (7) of Section 14 of the Principal Act, as it stood immediately before the commencement of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Admendment) Ordinance, 1976, pending before any court or authority immediately before the date of such commencement shall be deemed to have abated on such date. (2) Where an order determining the surplus land in relation to a tenure-holder has been made under the principal Act before January 17, 1975 and the Prescribed Authority is required to redetermine the surplus land u/s 9 of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1974, then notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (2) of Section 19 of the Uttar Pradesh imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1972, every appeal u/s 13 of the Principal Act or other proceedings in relation to such appeal, preferred against the said order, and pending immediately before the tenth day of October, 1975, shall be deemed to have abated on the said date. (3) Where an order determining surplus land in relation to a tenure-holder has been made under the principal Act before the tenth day of October, 1975, the Prescribed Authority (as defined in the Principal Act) may, at any time within a period of two years from the said date, redetermine the surplus land in accordance with the Principal Act as amended by this Act, whether or not any appeal was filed against such order and notwithstanding any appeal (whether pending or decided) against the original order of determination of surplus land. (4) The provisions of Section 13 of the Principal Act shall mutatis mutandis apply to every order redetermining surplus land under Sub-section (3) of this Section or Section 9 of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1974. (4) The provisions of Section 13 of the Principal Act shall mutatis mutandis apply to every order redetermining surplus land under Sub-section (3) of this Section or Section 9 of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1974. Provided that the period of thirty days shall, in the case of an appeal against the order referred to in Section 9 of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1974 be computed from the date of such order or October 10, 1975 whichever is later. (5) The provisions of Section 13-A of the Principal Act shall mutatis mutandis apply to every determination of surplus land under this section or u/s 9 of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1974. (6) Where any Assessment Roll has become final under Sub-section (4) of Section 21 before the sixteenth day of February, 1976, the same shall not be reopened, notwithstanding any amendment made in Chapter III of the principal Act read with the Schedule thereof by this Act. 7. Sub-section (1) of Section 31 provides that the proceeding under Sub-sections (3) to (7) of Section 14 of the Principal Act shall be deemed to have abated. This provision was incorporated because by the amending Act Sub-sections (3) to (7) of Section 14 were deleted. Sub-section (2) of Section 31 provides that where the determination has been made and redetermination is sought the appeal pending in relation to such proceedings shall be deemed to have abated on the said date. This Sub-clause also envisages a situation where the determination has to be made in accordance with the amending Act. Sub-section (3) also provides that notwithstanding the earlier order determining surplus land the Prescribed Authority may redetermine the same in accordance with the provisions of the Principal Act as amended by U.P. Act XX of 1976. This redetermination is notwithstanding any appeal (whether pending or decided) against the original order of determination of surplus land. By the analysis of these provisions it becomes imperative and beyond any doubt that the Prescribed Authority has power to redetermine the surplus area under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act if the earlier determination is effected by the U.P. Amending Act XX of 1976. By the analysis of these provisions it becomes imperative and beyond any doubt that the Prescribed Authority has power to redetermine the surplus area under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act if the earlier determination is effected by the U.P. Amending Act XX of 1976. The other condition which had to be fulfilled is that the same can be done only within a period of two years from the commencement of the amending Act. It means if any judgment has been given by the Prescribed Authority or appellate authority and if it has become final under the principal Act unless the determination is effected by amending Act the orders so passed will be binding on the ceiling authorities in subsequent proceedings and the ceiling authorities will have no jurisdiction to reopen the matter. Similar view has been expressed by this Court in Ghana Ram v. State of U.P. 1977 AWC 415 and Ram Lal v. State of U.P. 1978 AWC 713 . 8. The next question to be considered is whether the aforesaid decisions stand overruled by implication in view of the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Ram Charan Vs. State of U.P. and Others, AIR 1979 All 114 . The question for determination before the Full Bench was: Whether proceedings under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as the Ceiling Act) are maintainable and can continue during the pendency of proceedings under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as the Consolidation Act). 9. The aforesaid question clearly shows that the question involved in the present case was not at all for consideration before the Full Bench. Apart from it, the Full Bench also no where laid down that the earlier judgment given under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act will not be a bar to the fresh determination. Issuance of fresh notice and the proceedings in consequence to that notice are in no way covered under the amending Act. Learned Counsel for the State has placed reliance on paragraph 42 of the Full Bench decision in Ram Charan v. State of U.P. referred to above, which reads as follows: Section 38-B of the Ceiling Act is entitled "Bar against res judicata". Learned Counsel for the State has placed reliance on paragraph 42 of the Full Bench decision in Ram Charan v. State of U.P. referred to above, which reads as follows: Section 38-B of the Ceiling Act is entitled "Bar against res judicata". It provides that no finding or decision given before the commencement of this section in any proceeding or any issue (including any order, decree or judgment) by any Court, Tribunal or authority in respect of any matter governed by this Act, shall bar the retrial of such proceeding or issue under this Act, in accordance with the provisions of this Act as amended from time to time. A finding or decision given in consolidation proceedings prior to 10-10-1975, when Section 38-B came into force, is of no worth in respect of matters governed by the Ceiling Act. The issues are liable to be retried under the Ceiling Act. 10. This clearly shows that the Full Bench has held that the finding or decision given by any other court or tribunal prior to 10-10-1975 is of no consequence in respect of the matters covered under the Ceiling Act. In paragraphs 44 and 45 it has further been laid down that: 44. Every person who claims rights in land as a tenure holder must get his rights settled under the Ceiling Act. He is not to wait for adjudication of his rights either in the civil or revenue courts or in consolidation proceedings. 45. The principle of comity of courts applies where the decision of one is to operate as res judicata in the other court. As shown above, in matters governed by the Ceiling Act decisions by other courts or authorities have no binding efficacy. On the principal of comity of courts, the proceedings under the Ceiling Act are not liable to be stayed. 11. The observations made by the Full Bench also in no way suggest any different view than taken earlier by this Court in the aforesaid cases. In the present case the transfers made by the Petitioner were accepted by the Prescribed Authority on earlier occasion. Similarly the share alleged by the Petitioner and further that Mahendra Singh was major was also accepted. In the present case the transfers made by the Petitioner were accepted by the Prescribed Authority on earlier occasion. Similarly the share alleged by the Petitioner and further that Mahendra Singh was major was also accepted. U.P. Act XX of 1976 does not provide any amendment in the aforesaid provisions with the result that the Prescribed Authority had no jurisdiction to reopen the matter and redetermine surplus area of the Petitioner. The judgment given by the Prescribed Authority in the earlier proceedings will operate as a bar to the subsequent redetermination by the Prescribed Authority. Firstly, the Prescribed Authority had no jurisdiction to issue a fresh notice for redetermination as the redetermination was not sought under any of the provisions covered under the amending Act, secondly, the judgment in the earlier proceedings will also be a bar in the present proceedings and the bar cannot stand removed by enforcement of Section 38-B of U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act. 12. Lastly it has been urged by the learned standing counsel that there was no determination in the earlier decision, so far as the question of single crop land was concerned. 13. This fact is clearly borne out from the earlier judgment of the Prescribed Authority. The question whether the land was single crop land or not was not at all determined. In the present proceedings the Prescribed Authority held the land to be single crop land because the Petitioner did not file Khasra extracts. The same view was affirmed by the appellate authority irrespective of the fact that this question was raised before the appellate authority that there was no source of irrigation from any State or private irrigation work. The approach of the appellate authority was not correct. In order to hold the land to be single crop land unless the land falls within the category of Section 4 of the Act the land cannot be held to be single crop land. There is no finding by any of the authorities below that single crop was grown over the land in consequence of assured irrigation from any State irrigation work or private irrigation work. In the absence of such finding the land could not be held to be single crop land. There is no finding by any of the authorities below that single crop was grown over the land in consequence of assured irrigation from any State irrigation work or private irrigation work. In the absence of such finding the land could not be held to be single crop land. As there is no proper determination the case has to be sent back to the appellate authority for deciding the question about the single crop land only. 14. The result is, that this writ petition is allowed and the judgment of the Prescribed Authority dated 24-6-1976 and that of the appellate authority dated 22-7-1977 are hereby quashed. The case is sent back to the appellate authority only to decide the limited question whether the land is single crop land or not. In the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs. The stay order shall stand discharged.