JUDGMENT 1. - This writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the judgment dated 5-3-1976, by the Board of Revenue (hereinafter referred to as "the Board"). 2. The facts relevant for the disposal of this writ petition are that on 10-8-1967, one Radha Kishan filed an application before the Tehsildar, Phalodi, to the effect that in the precints of village Mayakoria, there is Government land khasra No. 33 measuring 358 Bighas and 5 biswa which, since times immemorial is being used as grazing land, but that, Kayamdin, Fateh Khan and Noor Mohammed (petitioners before us) had cultivated that land by illegally taking possession of the same. On the complaint, proceedings under Section 91 of the Land Revenue Act, were commenced, and after enquiry, the Tehsildar, by his order dated 31-3-1970 ordered the ejectment of Kayamdin, Fateh Khan and Noor Mohammed from the land. The ejectment order .was upheld by the Collector, but while an appeal was pending before the Revenue Appellate Authority, the three petitioners filed a suit under Sections 88 and 89 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act").in the court of the Assistant Collector, Phalodi, who decreed.the suit on 14-8-1973, declaring the petitioners to be khatedars.of khasra No. 33, area 358 Bighas and 5 Biswas in village Mayakoria, Tehsil Phalodi. Thereupon Radha Kishan lodged a complaint to the Collector, Jodhpur, disclosing the facts about the land being recorded as Gochar land, and the proceedings initiated under Section 91 of the Land Revenue Act. The matter came before the Additional Collector, Jodhpur, who, on examination of the record found the complaint to be true It also came to his notice that the fact .about the proceedings under section 91 of the Land Revenue Act, were concealed in the plaint and the Tehsildar, in his written statement also did not bring this fact to the notice of the court and gave a vague reply, and did not deny the facts and allegations of the plaint. The Additional Collector, having come to the .conclusion that the suit had been decreed through collusion made a reference to the Board of Revenue for setting aside the decree passed-by the Assistant Collector, Phalodi, dated 14-8-1973. The reference was accepted by the Board of Revenue by the impugned order, and the decree of the Assistant Collector dated 14-8-1973 was set aside. 3. The reference was accepted by the Board of Revenue by the impugned order, and the decree of the Assistant Collector dated 14-8-1973 was set aside. 3. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that section 232 of the Act empowers the Collector to make reference only in matters of legality and propriety of an order passed by the Revenue Courts, subordinate to him, and the irregularity of any proceedings Therein. It has been strenuously contended by the learned counsel that in the present case, the Assistant Collector had passed a decree in favour of the petitioners, and it was not within the powers of the Collector to make a reference for getting that decree set aside. Assailing the order of the Board, it has been stressed that Board has no revisional powers in matters where appeal lies to it. The argument advanced from the opposite sides that the Board has power of general superintendence and control over all the Revenue Courts, and if there is any miscarriage of justice, even the decrees of the subordinate courts can be set aside by the Board. 4. The question about the scope of section 232 of the Act came up for decision before this court in the case of Karan Singh v. State & others 1978 RRD 507 (H.C.) and the intention of the legislature in using the words "decree" and "order" in various Sections of the Act was discussed, and the omission of the word "decree" in Section 232, along with the word "order" was considered very significant, consequently the word "order" occurring in Section 232 was held not to cover "decree" and the Collector was not held competent to make reference for cancelling a decree under Section 232 of the Act, nor the Revenue Board was held competent to cancel the decree on such reference. So far as the scope of Section 232 of the Act is concerned, the position is clear that it is only with reference to orders and proceedings of the subordinate courts that the reference can be made by the Collector to the Board of Revenue, and not in respect of decrees. 5. The question calling for answer, now, is whether the order passed by the Board can be justified in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. Section 230 of the Act deals with the revisional jurisdiction of the Board. 5. The question calling for answer, now, is whether the order passed by the Board can be justified in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. Section 230 of the Act deals with the revisional jurisdiction of the Board. This section restricts the revisional power of the Board to cases in which no appeal lies either to the Board or to the Civil Court under Section 239. This section corresponds to section 115 of Civil Procedure Code, wherein, one of the preliminary conditions to be fulfilled is that no appeal should lie from that decision to the High Court. Thus, the revisional jurisdiction of the Board under Section 230 of the Act is not applicable to the present case. 6. Hence, the pertinent question for determination before us is whether there is any other provisions in the Act vesting jurisdiction in the Board to set aside orders and decrees where a clear breach of provision of law comes to its notice. Section 221 of the Act provides that "the general superintendence and control over all revenue courts shall be vested in and all such courts shall be subordinate to the Board,................". In Karan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (Supra) the question about the jurisdiction of the Board to set aside any illegal order or decree under its supervisory power, was not raised 7. In Harchand v. Rajasthan Revenue Board (1952 ILR 833) the Sub-Divisional Officer had passed a decree for ejectment in favour of the plaintiff. No appeal was filed against that decision. A revision application was moved by the aggrieved party in the Board of Revenue, and in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, the Board quashed the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer. Against that judgment, writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, was filed by the landlord in this Court. It was held that under section 26 of the Revenue Court (Procedure and Jurisdiction) Act (No. 1 of 1951), the Revenue Board had no revisional jurisdiction in the case, as second appeal against the decree lay to the Revenue Board. While making this pronouncement, it was held that the Revenue Board could, however, pass such an order under Section 12 of the Board of Revenue Ordinance (No. XXII of 1949) (hereinafter referred to as "the Ordinance"). While making this pronouncement, it was held that the Revenue Board could, however, pass such an order under Section 12 of the Board of Revenue Ordinance (No. XXII of 1949) (hereinafter referred to as "the Ordinance"). It was laid down that powers of general superintendence and control over all other revenue courts are vested in the Board, and if, therefore, any subordinate court disregards any specific provision of law, and does something illegal, it is open to the Board to interfere and to set the matters right. The decree passed by the Sub Divisional Officer being in clear disregard of the provision of Section 4 of the Protection of Tenants Ordinance, was set aside under the supervisory and controlling power of the Board, under section 12 of the Ordinance. This decision was relied upon in the case of Mana and others v. Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, another (1955 ILR 55) and it was held that the power of superintendence and control conferred on Board of Revenue, Rajasthan over all subordinate courts and officers under Section 12 of the Board of Revenue Ordinance, 1949, includes power to revise their judicial orders also, in appropriate cases. It was observed that such powers would generally not be exercised where a party had remedy by way of appeal or revision, and did not avail it. At the same time, it was laid down that the power is there, and it may be exercised sparingly in extraordinary cases where interest of justice requires that the Board should exercise the power. 8. Our attention was drawn by the learned counsel for the petitioners to the decision in the case of Karan Singh v. Board of Revenue, Rajasthan (1962 RRD 141 H.C.) . In that case, the Sub Divisional Officer had passed an order of ejectment unmindful of Section 181 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. The appeal being time barred, the Additional Commissioner dismissed the same and when second appeal was filed in the Board of Revenue, the learned members, while considering the decision of the Additional Commissioner, that the first appeal was time barred, set aside the order of ejectment, for the reason that the application for ejectment had been made in disregard of the provisions of Section 181 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. Implications of Section 230 of the Act restricting the revisional jurisdiction to cases where appeal to the Board does not He, were also discussed. The order of the Board was sought to be justified, by the respondent under the provisions of Section 9 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, which reads as under:- "Subject to other provisions of this Act, the general superintendence and control over all revenue courts and over all revenue officers shall be vested in, and all such courts and officers shall be subordinate to the Board." A distinction between the language of this section and that of Section 12 of the Ordinance was drawn inasmuch as the words "subject to other provision" to this Act finding place in Section 9 of the Land Revenue Act do not appear in Section 12 of the Ordinance. Section 221 of the Act is analogous to Section 12 of the Ordinance and the omission of words, "subject to other-provisions of this Act" differentiates these provisions from the provisions of Section 9 of the Land Revenue Act. 9. We are, therefore, of the opinion that even in cases where the Collector is not empowered to make reference under Section 232 of the Act, or the Board does not have the revisional jurisdiction, the Board is empowered to set aside the orders, if a clear breach of provisions of law' comes to its notice, and it considers it expedient to use its power of superintendence and control. Such power extends to setting aside illegal decrees also, as is clear from the decision in the case Harchand v. Rajasthan Revenue Board (Supra), wherein, decree by the Divisional Officer was set aside in exercise of powers under section 12 of the Ordinance. 10. Keeping this legal position in mind, it is to be seen whether in the instant case there were extraordinary circumstances, where the Board should have exercised its power under Section 221 of the Act The perusal of the impugned order discloses that the land in question was "Gochar land, for which khatedari rights cannot accrue to anybody." The suit was decreed because true facts about the land being Gochar Land, and the proceedings under Section 91 of the Land Revenue Act having been initiated by the Tehsildar and the order for ejectment being passed by him, were concealed from the Assistant Collector. Hence, the decision of the Assistant Collector declaring the petitioner khatedars of the disputed land was illegal. The conduct of the petitioners in concealing the true facts in the plaint and the irresponsibility displayed by the Tehsildar in filing a vague written statement was also an important factor which weighed with the Board to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. At any rate, the Board Had jurisdiction under Section 221 of the Act to set aside the illegal decree of the Assistant Collector. It is of no significance that the order was passed on a reference made by the Collector. In such circumstances, when the petitioners are guilty of playing fraud on tHe court by suppressing material facts and there has been no failure of justice by the impugned order, they cannot ask us to interfere by a writ of certiorari. The Board's order is just and proper. 11. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed summarily. *******