JUDGMENT S.K. Jha, J, The short and simple question for determination in this application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is as to the correct interpretation of Section 26 (2) read with the proviso thereto of the Urban hand (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (Act No. 33 of 1976) hereinafter to be referred to as the Act. 2. The petitioner feeling oppressed by two documents, which are incorporated in annexures 5 and 7 respectively, to the writ application, has moved for an appropriate writ quashing the communication/order as contained in those two documents. Annexure 5 incorporates a communication dated 21-2-77 under memo no. 683 from the Officer in charge, District Revenue Branch, Dhanhad, to the Headmistress of a school commonly known as Sri Lakshmi Narayan Trust Vilika Vidyalay, Dhanbad. The impugned order as contained in annexure 7 is dated 2.5.77 of the Deputy Commissioner, respondent no. 2 (herein after to be referred to as the competent authority under the Act) as communicated to the petitioner by the Officer-in-charge, aforementioned (respondent no. 3), by which permission has been denied to the petitioner for the sale of a vacant piece or land measuring about 13 Kathas as comprised in plot nos. 1050 and 1032 appertaining to Khata nos. 34 and 120 respectively to mauza Dhanbad no. 51. The site in question is undoubtedly situate in an urban agglomeration within the meaning of the Act. 3. The facts relevant for the disposal of the controversy are more or less admitted. On 1.7.76 a notice was given by the petitioner, who was the owner of the land in question, to the Deputy Commissioner, respondent no. 2, who, as already stated, is the competent authority under the Act, under the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 26 of the Act. A true copy of the notice has been marked annexure 1 to the writ application. It was in due form and in accordance with the guidelines given by the Ministry of Works and Housing of the Government of India, the form of notice being annexure A to the guidelines under section 26 of the Act. 4. Before we proceed to the further narration of facts, I think it worthwhile to quote the provisions of section 26 (1) of the Act here, which runs thus:- “26. 4. Before we proceed to the further narration of facts, I think it worthwhile to quote the provisions of section 26 (1) of the Act here, which runs thus:- “26. Notice to be given before transfer of vacant lands.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no person holding vacant land within the ceiling limit shall transfer such land by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise except after giving notice in writing of the intended transfer to the competent authority.” It will thus be seen that before alienation any piece of vacant land, even though within the ceiling limit under the Act, the owner there of must serve a notice under sub-section (1) of section 26 to the competent authority. Accordingly, the notice (annexure 1) was served on respondent no.2 intimating thereby that the petitioner intended to transfer by way of sale the lands in question in favour of Sanwar Prasad Agrawal and Prabhas Kumar Agrawal, sons of Sri Balakram Agarwalla of Jharla (Dhanbad). The area of the land mentioned was about 13 kathas measuring 183 feet east to west and annexure 1 were also sworn to in an affidavit by the petitioner when the notice was issued to the competent authority, namely, respondent no. 2. The petitioner had stated on oath that she held a vacant land within the ceiling limit as laid down under the Act. The affidavit also forms part of annexure 1. Thereafter, on the basis of the notice under section 26(1) of the Act, a case was registered in the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Dhanbad, respondent no. 2, as Case no. 8 of 1976-77. A copy of the Order sheet dated 1.7.76 has been marked annexure 2 to the petition, which goes to show that notice was received by respondent no. 2, the competent authority, on 1.7.76. Annexure 2 further goes to show that the Deputy Commissioner, respondent no. 2, sent the original notice to the Anchal Adhikari, Dhanbad, for making an enquiry and submitting a report. It was directed that the report should be submitted within a week and the record of the case be put up on 15.7.76. The Anchal Adhikari, Dhanbad, submitted his report dated 14.7.76 where in he bad recommended that the petitioner be permitted to sell the total area of 13 kathas of land as comprised in khata no. It was directed that the report should be submitted within a week and the record of the case be put up on 15.7.76. The Anchal Adhikari, Dhanbad, submitted his report dated 14.7.76 where in he bad recommended that the petitioner be permitted to sell the total area of 13 kathas of land as comprised in khata no. 34 plot no. 1050 and khata no. 120 plot no. 1032. A copy of the report has been marked annexure 3. It seems as is the case of the respondents, that there was some inter-departmental communications between the Headmistress of the school aforementioned and the Deputy Commissioner through the officer in charge Revenue, respondent no. 3, where by the Deputy Commissioner had taken an initiative that the Headmistress of the school should approach the Education Department for acquisition of the land on question for the purpose of extension of the school building. Be that as it may, nothing seems to have been done vis-a-vis the petitioner till a copy of the communication as contained in annexure 5 was sent to the petitioner, which merely goes to show that the officer-in-charge, District Revenue Section, Dhanbad, had written to the Headmistress of the Girls school aforementioned with reference to her letter no. 1049 dated 23.12.76, that it had been directed by the Deputy Commissioner that, as the land in question was useful for the school, it ought to be obtained for the school itself. The Headmistress was, accordingly, requested in annexure 5 to get the approval from the Education Department for the purpose of obtaining the land which would cost about Rs.40,000/. Ultimately, by the other impugned order dated 2.5.77 as contained in annexure 7 the permission sought for by the petitioner for the sale of the land in question was refused to her by the Deputy Commissioner (the competent authority.) 5. The whole question is as to whether in view of the provisions of sub section (2) of section 26 of the Act, this action on the part of the Deputy Commissioner, respondent no. 2, can be sustained in law or not. The whole question is as to whether in view of the provisions of sub section (2) of section 26 of the Act, this action on the part of the Deputy Commissioner, respondent no. 2, can be sustained in law or not. It is, therefore, necessary to quote section 26 (2) of the Act, which runs thus:- "(2) Where a notice given under sub-section (1) is for the transfer of the land by way of sale the competent authority shall have the first option to purchase such land on behalf of the State Government at a price calculated in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) or of any other corresponding law for the time being in force and if such option is not exercised within a period of sixty days from the date of receipt of the notice, it shall be presumed that the competent authority has no intention to purchase such land on behalf of the State Government and it shall be lawful for such person to transfer the land to whomsoever he may like. Provided that where the competent authority exercises within the period aforesaid the option to purchase such land the execution of the sale deed shall be completed and the payment of the purchase price thereof shall be made within a period of three months from the date on which such option is exercised." While, on the one hand, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the period of 60 days for the exercise of the option by the competent authority is imperative and cannot be stretched and further, Mr. Gadodia, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents on the other, vehemently asserted that the provision with regard to the time limit was merely enabling or directory. We are, therefore, called upon to decide as to the nature of the statutory time limit fixed by section 26(2) for the exercise of the option whether it is obligatory or merely directory. In other words, whether irrespective of the period fixed by sub-section (2) of section 26 of the Act, the option may be exercised even after the period of 60 days and before a sale deed has been executed and registered by the owner of the land in favour of a third party. In other words, whether irrespective of the period fixed by sub-section (2) of section 26 of the Act, the option may be exercised even after the period of 60 days and before a sale deed has been executed and registered by the owner of the land in favour of a third party. In my view, the contention of the learned Standing Counsel must be rejected as being obviously absurd on the express language of not only section 26 (2) but construing the Act as a whole. 6. On an analysis of the provisions of the Act, it is clear that the scheme requires- (i) the determination and acquisition by the State of the excess vacant land and payment of amount for the excess land acquired, (ii) regulation of transfer of vacant land and urban property, (iii) regulation of construction of buildings with dwelling units in future and restricting their plinth areas to the prescribed ceiling limits and (iv) grant of so-called pre-emptive right in favour of the State to purchase the land intended to be sold even within the ceiling area as if exercising its power under the Land Acquisition Act. It will be noticed from the language of section 26 (2) that it has been expressly laid down that the option to be exercised by the Competent authority has to be so done within a period of 60 days from the date of receipt of the notice. In the event of the failure of intimation to exercise that option to the owner who has served the notice under section 26(1), the statute prescribes that it shall be presumed that the competent authority has no intention to purchase such land on behalf of the State Government. It has further been enjoined that after the period of 60 days it shall be lawful for such person (the owner who has served the notice) to transfer the land to whomsoever he may like. The proviso to sub-section (2) of section 26 makes the matter even worse for the respondents. It has further been enjoined that after the period of 60 days it shall be lawful for such person (the owner who has served the notice) to transfer the land to whomsoever he may like. The proviso to sub-section (2) of section 26 makes the matter even worse for the respondents. The proviso says that even where the competent authority exercises such an option within the period aforesaid, namely, 60 days from the date of service of notice to purchase such land, the execution of the sale deed must be completed and the payment of the purchase price thereof must be made within a period of three months from the dine on which such option is exercised. Lest I be misunderstood. I at once want to make it clear that I am not endeavoring to construe the effect of the proviso by itself for the simple reason that it may even be susceptible to a construction that if the execution of the sale deed is not completed and the payment of the purchase price thereof has not been made within a period of 3 month from the date on which the option is exercised the remedy open to the State Government or the competent authority may be for compelling the owner of the land, namely, the person who has served the notice under section 26 (1) by way of a suit to specifically perform his part of the contract, for the proviso may be said to merely lay down that a right to the property in question shall vest in the State Government only after execution of the document and payment of the consideration money. If, inspite of the payment of the consideration money the sale deed is not executed by the owner [the person who has served notice under section 26 (1)]. He may be compelled to do so by a decree in a suit for specific performance of a statutory contract. That, however, is not the question which falls for our determination and, therefore, I have not applied my mind fully to the construction of the proviso by itself. Suffice it to say that the substantive part of section 26 (2) of the Act read with the proviso leaves no room for doubt that the period of 60 days as prescribed in the substantive portion is obligatory and not merely directory, as contended by learned Standing Counsel. Suffice it to say that the substantive part of section 26 (2) of the Act read with the proviso leaves no room for doubt that the period of 60 days as prescribed in the substantive portion is obligatory and not merely directory, as contended by learned Standing Counsel. This is further re-enforced by reference to the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 27 of the Act. Section 27 deals with transfer of any urban or urbanisable land with building or a portion only of such building. Sub-section (1) of section 27 lays that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force but subject to some provisions, namely, sub-section (3) of section 5 and sub-section (4) of section 10 of the Act, with which we are not concerned because they relate to a property beyond the ceiling limit, no person shall transfer except with the previous permission in writing of the competent authority. Sub-section (2) of section 27 provides that any person so desiring to make a transfer may make an application in writing to the competent authority in the manner and within the time as proscribed. Sub-section (3) of that section says that when the competent authority receives an application under sub-section (2), he may make such enquiry as he deems fit and by order in writing grant or refuse to grant the permission applied for. A proviso has been appended to sub-section (3) of section 27 which lays down that the competent authority shall not refuse to grant the permission applied unless it bas recorded, in writing, the reason for doing so and a copy of the same has been communicated to the applicant. Sub-section (4), which has an important bearing on the legal aspect under consideration, prescribes that where within a period of 60 days of the receipt of the application under section 27 the competent authority docs not refuse to grant the permission applied for or does not communicate refusal to the applicant, the competent authority “shall be deemed to have granted the permission applied for”. If for the purpose of section 27 a refusal is not made or communicated to the applicant within 60 days, a legal fiction is introduced so as to make the non-communication of the order of refusal to the applicant equivalent to a positive grant of the permission applied for, there is absolutely no reason why, for the purpose of sub-section (2) of seed on 26, the period of 60 days shall not be held to be mandatory. But that is not the end of the matter. Let us loot to the provisions of section 28 of the Act. Section 28 prescribes the regulation of registration of document in certain cases. It is worthwhile to quote in extenso the provisions of section 28. "28. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, where any document required to be registered under the provisions of clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (1) of section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908, (16 of 1908) purports to transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any land or any building (including any portion thereof),-- (a) in the case of any transfer referred to in section 26, no registering officer appointed under that Act shall register any such document unless the transferor produces before such registering officer evidence to show that he has given notice of the intended transfer to the competent authority under that section and, where such transfer is by way of sale, the period of sixty days referred to in sub-section (2) of that section has elapsed. (b) in the case of any transfer referred to in section 27, no registering officer appointed under "that Act shall register any such document unless the transferor produces before such registering officer the permission in writing to the competent authority for such transfer or satisfies the registering officer that the period of sixty days referred to in sub-section (4) of that section has elapsed." The provisions of section 28 quoted above bring out two facts of the problem at hand. One is that no distinction is made so far as the time limit is concerned between the provisions of section 26 (2) and section 27 (4) of the Act. One is that no distinction is made so far as the time limit is concerned between the provisions of section 26 (2) and section 27 (4) of the Act. Secondly, if a notice has been served under section 26 (1) of the Act and 60 days have expired without any intimation of exercise of option by the competent authority to purchase the land for the State Government, there is no option left for the registering authority but to register the document transferring the land in favour of any third party to whom the owner [the notice given under section 26 (1)] may choose to transfer. This at-once re-inforces the language of the last part of sub-section (2) of section 26 of the Act, namely, that "it shall be presumed that the competent authority has no intention to purchase such land on behalf of the State Government and it shall be lawful for such person to transfer the land to whomsoever he may like" (the underlining is mine for the sake of emphasis). There is thus no escape from the conclusion that the time limit of 60 days fixed for the exercise of option by the competent authority under sub-section (2) of section 26 and the deemed permission under sub-section (4) of section 27 are equally mandatory in nature. 7. The learned Standing Counsel placed great reliance on a full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Shiveshwar Prasad Sinha V. The District Magistrate AIR 1966 Pat 144 , wherein the question for consideration was whether the time limit fixed by section 11 (2) (a) of the Bihar Buildings (lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (Act 3 of 1947), namely, "within a week of the receipt of the notice" was obligatory or directory. The Full Bench held on a construction of the statutory provisions of that Act that it was merely directory, and for that purpose reliance was placed by the full Bench in Shiveshwar's case (supra) on the case of Montreal Street Railway Co. V. Normandin (1917 AC 170) where the principle enunciated at page 175 was relied upon which ran thus. The Full Bench held on a construction of the statutory provisions of that Act that it was merely directory, and for that purpose reliance was placed by the full Bench in Shiveshwar's case (supra) on the case of Montreal Street Railway Co. V. Normandin (1917 AC 170) where the principle enunciated at page 175 was relied upon which ran thus. "When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience, or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty, and at the same time would not promote the main object of the Legislature, it has been the practice to hold such provisions to be directory only, the neglect of them, though punishable, not affecting the validity of the acts done. The reliance on this case by the learned Standing Counsel is wholly misconceived for the reasons hereinafter enumerated. 8. It is impossible to lay down any general rule for determining whether a provision is imperative or directory. "No universal rule said Lord Campbell, L.C.," can be laid down for the construction of statutes as to whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory with an "implied nullification for disobedience. It is the duty of the courts of justice to try to get at the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed" (underlining is mine for the sake of emphasis) [vide Liverpool V. Borough Bank v. Turner (1860) 2 De G. F. J. at pp. 507-508,]. Where the whole aim and object of the legislature would be plainly defeated if the command to do the thing in a particular manner did not imply a prohibition on doing it on any other, no doubt can be entertained as to the intention. But the question in every case depends on the wording of the Act. I am tempted to quote a passage from Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edition page 62. But the question in every case depends on the wording of the Act. I am tempted to quote a passage from Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edition page 62. "When a statute is passed for the purpose of enabling something to be done, and prescribes the formalities which are to attend its performance, those prescribed formalities which are essential to the validity of the thing when done are called imperative or absolute, but those which are not essential, and may be disregarded without invalidating the thing to be done, are called directory." This being the well-settled principle of law when section 28 of the Act makes it imperative that the registering authority shall not refuse registration of a document after 60 days of the service of notice under section 26 (1) within which the option to purchase for the State Government is not exercised by the competent authority, it needs no persuation or argument to hold that the time limit of 60 days prescribed in section 26 (2) is nothing but obligatory and mandatory, no option can thereafter be exercised by the competent authority for purchase on behalf of the State Government. 9. Coming to the case of Shiveshwar (supra) relied upon vehemently by Mr. Gadodia for the respondents, the answer to his submission is to be found in that very judgment where Narasimham, C. J., speaking for the Full Bench made reference to Sutherland's Statutory Construction, 3rd Edition, Volume 3, at page 102, and quoted the law enunciated therein as follows:- "A statute specifying a time within which a public officer is to perform an official act regarding the rights and duties of others is directory unless the nature of the act to be performed, or the phraseology of the statute, is such that the designation of time must be considered a limitation on the power of the officer." Can it be said that the phraseology of the Act in question is such that the designation of time fixed under section 26 (2) or, for that matter, section 27 (4) does not impose a limitation on the power of the officer. The answer, in my view, is plainly that a limitation has been imposed. The answer, in my view, is plainly that a limitation has been imposed. Then, further, quoting from Crawford on Statutory Construction, Article 269 at page 535, in Shiveshwar's case (supra) Narasimham, C. J,, has laid down the law succinctly, if I may say so with great respect, thus:- "Following the aforesaid authorities it appears that the under-mentioned factors have to be considered in deciding whether the time limit provided is directory or mandatory. (1) The general scheme of the Act and the context of the other provisions. (2) Whether the time limit is insisted upon as a protection for safeguarding the right of property of a person, "(3) Whether the statute relates to the performance of a public duty by a public officer. (4) Whether serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty would arise if the provision is held mandatory and not directory. (5) Whether such a decision would not promote the main object of the legislature. (6) Where the statute itself expressly provides for the result of non-compliance with the statutory provision, what can reasonably be held to be the intent of the Legislature ?" The instant case falls squarely within principle nos. 6 enunciated hereinbefore. The time limit in sub-section (2) of section 26 or for that matter In section 27 (4) has been insisted upon by the Legislature as a protection for safeguarding the right to a property of a person and further the statute itself expressly provides for the result of the non-compliance with the statutory provision, namely, that the registering authority has no option but to register the document after lapse of 60 days under the provisions of section 28 of the Act. I am, therefore, clear I, of the view that the Full Bench judgment in Shiveshwar's case (supra) has not been rightly pressed into service by the learned Standing Counsel in support of his contention. 10. It was faintly suggested in course of the argument on behalf of the respondents that the notice as originally served under section 26(1) of the Act was not in consonance with law as some formalities in it were lacking. We have not been told as to in what material particulars the formalities were lacking. 10. It was faintly suggested in course of the argument on behalf of the respondents that the notice as originally served under section 26(1) of the Act was not in consonance with law as some formalities in it were lacking. We have not been told as to in what material particulars the formalities were lacking. I have already stated above that the form, in which the notice was served, was the same as is contained in annexure A to the guidelines prescribed by the Government of India under section 26 of the Act. Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that there were some formalities yet to be completed by the petitioner to make the notice valid for the purpose of section 26(1), admittedly according to the Standing Counsel, such a notice was validly served on 11.7.76. Admittedly, again, he fairly accepted the factual position that if at all it can be said to be an exercised of option, such an option was exercised by the competent authority by the order dated 2.5.77, as communicated to the petitioner by the Special Officer, respondent no. 3 (as contained in annexure 7). He further submitted that that in one sense read with the order dated 2.5.77 (annexure 7) the communication from the Special Officer to the Headmistress of the school herein before mentioned, dated 21.2.77 as incorporated in annexure 5, may also be deemed to have been a step in aid of the exercise of the option. I am afraid, the contention that communication dated 21.2.77 (annexure 5) was a step-in-aid for the purpose of exercise of option by the competent authority is wholly misconceived and clearly fallacious. There is no express or unequivocal declaration by the competent authority to the owner, namely, the petitioner who has served a notice under section 26(1), expressing the intention of the competent authority to purchase the land on behalf of the State Government in annexure 5. So also is the case with the order dated 2.5.77 (annexure 7). There is no express or unequivocal declaration by the competent authority to the owner, namely, the petitioner who has served a notice under section 26(1), expressing the intention of the competent authority to purchase the land on behalf of the State Government in annexure 5. So also is the case with the order dated 2.5.77 (annexure 7). Accepting for the sake of argument, however, that the language of the order dated 2.5.77 (annexure 7) may be stretched in favour of the respondents, to indicate an intention to exercise the option, though not expressly communicated that such an option was to be exercised by the competent authority, yet it will be seen that the impugned order was passed on 2.5.77 much beyond the period of 60 days, even from 1.7.76. 11, In enacting the Act in question the Legislature never intended that the competent authority should be clothed with sufficient power to harass the private citizens in matter affecting their right to property in such a manner. It does not stand to reason as to why when the notice of the intention of sale of plots of land in question to the two intending purchasers was served on the competent authority by the petitioner as far back as on 1.7.76, the competent authority, namely, the Deputy Commissioner, respondent no. 2, should have kept the petitioner at bay for one reason or the other, although it may possibly be for no ulterior motive, for such a long time and without exercising the right of statutory option conferred upon the competent authority by section 26(2) of the Act, to have communicated to the petitioner by annexure 7 dated 25.77 that permission to sell had not been accorded. The intention of the Legislature merely was, as already indicated earlier, to see firstly that no person held land or building in excess of the ceiling limit filed by the Act and, secondly, to regulate the construction of buildings in urban agglomeration and further to grant to the State Government through the competent authority as right of statutory pre-emption. These being the purposes, it does not stand to reason as to why the competent authority should have acted in such a manner causing so much hardship & harassment to the petitioner. 12. These being the purposes, it does not stand to reason as to why the competent authority should have acted in such a manner causing so much hardship & harassment to the petitioner. 12. In this context, I feel tempted to make reference to the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Bishan Singh V. Khazan Singh AIR 1958 S.C. 838 , and Radhakishan Laxminarayan Toshniwal V. Shridhar Ramchandra Alshi AIR 1960 S.C. 1368 wherein it has been laid down that the right of pre-emption is a weak right and is not looked upon with favour by courts and, therefore, the courts cannot go out of their way to help the pre-emptor which in the present case is the State through the competent authority, namely, Deputy Commissioner, respondent no. 2. 13. For the aforesaid reasons, I am constrained to allow this application and quash the order dated 2.5.77 as contained in annexure 7 and the communication for whatever worth it is dated 21.2.77 as contained in annexure 5. I further issue writ of mandamus restraining the respondents from interfering with the petitioner's right to transfer the land in question to whomsoever she may like. In the circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to cost. Gobind Mohan Misra, J.--I agree. Application allowed.