Judgment :- 1. This case is concerned with the scope and content of R.114 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969 (shortly the 'Rules'). 2. The facts are not in dispute. The petitioner against whom an award was passed under the relevant provisions of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act preferred an appeal before the first respondent, which is the Co-operative Tribunal, Trivandrum. That appeal was posted to 5-12-1973 for hearing. On that date neither the appellant nor his counsel was present. The Tribunal thereupon posted the case to 3-1-1974 for pronouncing the judgment. On that date also the appellant and his counsel were not present. Then there was an application for restoration at the instance of the petitioner which was dismissed for default. There was a further application to restore the restoration application, which also did not succeed. The petitioner also tried his fortune before this Court through O. P. No. 2342 of 1976. This Court directed the Tribunal to reconsider the restoration application. The first respondent-Tribunal passed Ext. P4 order holding that the restoration application cannot be allowed in View of the plain wording of R.114 of the Rules. 3. R.114 of the Rules may be read: "114. Restoration of appeals and applications: (1) Where a principal application is disposed of ex-parte any absentee party, if aggrieved, may apply to the Tribunal, within 30 days from the date of communication of the order, for restoring such proceeding to the file and where it is shown to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that he was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the proceedings was called on for hearing, the Tribunal shall restore the same and proceed with it: Provided that where the other party had appeared at the hearing such party shall be given notice and an opportunity of being heard before the order for restoration of the appeal or application is made. (2) The provisions of these rules relating to appeals or applications shall mutatis mutandis apply to application for restoration". The words "he was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the proceedings was called on for hearing" constitute the basis of the contention of the petitioner to the effect that the posting of the appeal to 2-1-1974 for judgment also is a posting for hearing. The words "he was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the proceedings was called on for hearing" constitute the basis of the contention of the petitioner to the effect that the posting of the appeal to 2-1-1974 for judgment also is a posting for hearing. It is fairly conceded by the learned counsel for the petitioner that unless the posting to 311974 was a posting for hearing, R.114 cannot be of any assistance. The only argument advanced before me is that the expression "hearing" occurring in the Rule shall not be understood in a restricted sense and that it shall necessarily extend to the stage of pronouncement of the order or the judgment, as the case may be. In Support of that contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to a decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in Baldeo and others v. The State and another (AIR. 1954 Allahabad 650). In that case the court was considering the scope of S.77-A of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act (26 of 1947). The Section dealt with the result of the absence of one of the Panchas at the time of the hearing of the case. Incidentally the learned judge also observed that there is no good reason to restrict the scope of the word 'hearing' to the proceedings in the case up to the stage of the delivery of the judgment and not to include the stage of the delivery of the judgment itself. Perhaps, that observation may have some relevancy considering the Statute, which was considered by that Court in that case. If, on the other hand, that observation has to be treated as laying down a general principle regarding the scope and amplitude of the expression 'hearing', I, most respectfully, disagree 4. Even if the observations of the Allahabad High Court are to be taken into consideration, I do not think that as far as the proceedings under the Rules are concerned, any difficulty will arise because there are positive provisions in the Rules themselves which definitely indicate as to what constitutes 'hearing'. R.113 of the Rules reads as follows: "113. Hearing: (1) Where on the date fixed for hearing or on any other date to which the hearing may be adjourned, any party does not appear when the proceedings is called on for hearing, the Tribunal may dispose of the proceedings ex-parte. R.113 of the Rules reads as follows: "113. Hearing: (1) Where on the date fixed for hearing or on any other date to which the hearing may be adjourned, any party does not appear when the proceedings is called on for hearing, the Tribunal may dispose of the proceedings ex-parte. (2) On the date fixed for hearing or on any other date to which the hearing may be adjourned, the appellant or applicant shall ordinarily be heard first in support of the appeal or application. The respondent, if necessary, shall be heard next and in such a case the party beginning shall be entitled to reply". Though R.113 is not a definition as such, as understood in law, of the expression 'hearing', in substance it lays down what constitutes 'hearing' for the purpose of the Rules R.116 of the Rules also has some relevancy in this context. Sub-rule (1) of R.116 may be read: "116. Order of the Tribunal:- (1) After the final hearing of every proceedings the Tribunal shall pass an order, whether immediately or on some subsequent date". By the plain wording of that provision it is apparent that after the final hearing of every proceeding, the Tribunal can pass an order forthwith or on a subsequent date. The postponement of the pronouncement of the order does not mean the continuance of the hearing. Thus, by the provisions of the Rules, there cannot be any doubt that the expression 'hearing' referred to in R.114 is confined to the stage which precedes the actual pronouncement of the order and that the pronouncement of the order is not part of the hearing. 5. If one is to approach the dispute from the point of view of ordinary common sense, I do not think that there can be any controversy regarding the true import of the term 'hearing' before a judicial or a quasi-judicial body The hearing is by the presiding officer and what he hears is what the party or the parties have to say regarding their respective cases. When, after hearing the concerned parties, the case is posted to a date for pronouncement of the judgment or the order, as the case may be, on the later date the presiding officer is not hearing anything, but pronounces the judgment or the order. When, after hearing the concerned parties, the case is posted to a date for pronouncement of the judgment or the order, as the case may be, on the later date the presiding officer is not hearing anything, but pronounces the judgment or the order. Perhaps, it can be said that it is the party who hears the judgment that is pronounced on that date. I am, therefore, unable to extend the scope of the expression 'hearing' to the stage when judgment alone remains to be pronounced by the authority which tried the case. Viewed from the angles indicated above, it cannot be said that Ext. P4 suffers from the vices pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner. This Original Petition, therefore, fails and it is hereby dismissed. No costs.