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1979 DIGILAW 178 (CAL)

Pushpa Rani Roy v. Directorate of Food & Supplies, Government of West Bengal

1979-05-08

SABYASACHI MUKHARJEE

body1979
ORDER The subject matter of challenge in this application under Article 226 of the Constitution is an order dated 18th December, 1978 passed by the Director of Rationing. The said order reads as follows: "Whereas departmental proceedings have been drawn up against Sm. Puspa Rani Roy, Proprietor of A.R. Shop No. 638 of Baranagar Sub-Area under this Office Memo No. 350/DR/LL dated 19.7.78 and Memo No. 736/DR/LL dated 19.12.78. Whereas in view of the charges framed against you it appears necessary in the interest of the general public to suspend your appointment pending enquiry into the proceedings. Now, therefore, in exercise of the power conferred by provision to sub-paragraph (5) of paragraph 3 of the West Bengal Rationing Order, 1964-85 amended by the West Bengal Rationing (Amendment) Order, 1969 which has been delegated to me under sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 22 of the said order under Government Notification No. 3570-F.S. dated 31.5.69, I hereby suspend the appointment of Sm. Puspa Rani Roy as an Appointed Retailer No. 628 with immediate effect." 2. This order was passed under sub-paragraph (5) of paragraph 3 of the West Bengal Rationing Order, 1964. The said subparagraph reads' as follows ;- "(5) Whenever in the opinion of the State Government it is necessary or expedient so to do in the interests of the general public, the State Government may amend, vary, suspend or revoke any appointment made under this paragraph, after giving the holder of the appointment an opportunity of being heard either in person or by an agent and for reasons to be recorded in writing, and in every such case the holder of the appointment shall be bound to surrender, on demand, to the State Government, the order of the appointment for endorsement or cancellation, as the case may be." But there was an amendment of sub-paragraph (5) of paragraph 3 of the West Bengal Rationing Order, 1964 and I am not concerned finally with the other part of the amendment except the proviso that was added which reads as follows: "Provided that pending an enquiry into a charge against the holder of an appointment, the State Government may suspend his appointment. if in the opinion of the State Government immediate suspension is necessary in the interests of the general public." 3. if in the opinion of the State Government immediate suspension is necessary in the interests of the general public." 3. In this application under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has challenged that the order of suspension pending, enquiry on the ground that the order bad been passed without application of mind and there were no materials which necessitated the passing of such an order in the interest of general public. On behalf of the respondent explaining the circumstances under which the said order was passed, one Sri Pabitra Mohan Chakrabarty, who was the Rationing Officer Baranagar, in his affidavit affirmed on 13th February, 1976 has stated, inter alia. as follows: "The petitioner is an appointed retailer appointed by the Director of Rationing under West Bengal Rationing Order, 1964. Director of Rationing is the disciplinary authority, and he is empowered to draw proceedings and suspend functioning of the shop for the time being pending enquiry of the proceedings under the provisions of the West Bengal Rationing Order. There were number of serious irregularities found in her shop in course of different inspections made in her shop since February last. Director or Rationing after careful examination found that there were prima facie charges against the petitioner and drew up a proceeding against her. She was asked to show cause as to why suitable action should not be taken against her before the enquiring officer who was appointed by the Director of Rationing to enquire in the said proceedings. The Director of Rationing was also satisfied that the charges were of serious nature and the petitioner should not be entrusted with public distribution till the disposal of the proceedings in the interest of the general public. Accordingly be suspended the functioning of the petitioners shop for the time being which he is empowered to do under provisions of the West Bengal Rationing Order, 1964 as amended. The appointment of the petitioner has not been revoked, functioning of the shop has been suspended for the time being. She has been given liberty to appear before the enquiry officer to defend herself. During the course of enquiry she will have all opportunities as required to defend herself. All the Ration Cards attached to her shop have been delinked and transferred to the neighbouring shops so that card holders may not have any difficulty to receive their rations as usual. During the course of enquiry she will have all opportunities as required to defend herself. All the Ration Cards attached to her shop have been delinked and transferred to the neighbouring shops so that card holders may not have any difficulty to receive their rations as usual. The petitioner refused to receive both the proceedings and the suspension order, A copy of the suspension order was hung up in the shop in presence of witnesses. The suspension order (Annexure' A' of the Writ Petition) will show that the proceedings was drawn up against the petitioner in accordance with the provisions of the West Bengal Rationing Order. 9. Regarding paragraph 4 of the petition I state that the Rationing Officer, Baranagar visited the said area Ration Shop of the petitioner on the occasion and other inspecting officers also visited the shop on several occasions for the purpose of routine enquiry. There were number of serious irregularities found in course of different inspections since February, 1978. After careful examination it was found that there were prima facie charges against her. Accordingly proceedings were drawn up against her and she was asked to show cause as to why suitable action should not be taken against her before the enquiry officer appointed to enquire into the said proceedings. Being satisfied with serious nature of charges against her it was decided that ration shop of the petitioner should not be entrusted with the public distribution system till the disposal of the proceedings in the interest of the general public and the shop had to be suspended for the time being in accordance with the provision 3(5) of the West Bengal Rationing Order, 1965 (as subsequently amended). I deny that any vindictive attitude has been taken against the petitioner as alleged therein. I state that the explanation submitted by the petitioner was carefully examined and ultimately it was rejected under the Memo No. 350/DR/LL dated 19.7.78. Decision of the authority regarding other charges for her explanation could not be served upon the petitioner due to the reluctance and refusal at her end. I further state that the order or suspension under Memo No. 738/DR/LL dated 19.12.78 was affixed in a compicuous place of the said shop wall as she refused to accept service of the same, Each and every other allegation contained in paragraph 4 of the petition is denied and disputed" 4. I further state that the order or suspension under Memo No. 738/DR/LL dated 19.12.78 was affixed in a compicuous place of the said shop wall as she refused to accept service of the same, Each and every other allegation contained in paragraph 4 of the petition is denied and disputed" 4. Learned Advocate for the respondents drew my attention to several letters written to the petitioner from February to August, 1978, which are Annexures A to K as well as the letter dated 9th November, 1978. It may incidentally be mentioned in the letter dated 9th November, 1978, which is Annexure-I to the petition is not the subject matter of the show cause which had been subsequently issued. Be that as it may, the Government bas only to justify the action under proviso to sub-paragraph (5) of paragraph 3 of the aforesaid Order, as indicated above. This sub-paragraph, in my opinion, gives the Government an authority to act on certain conditions. It is, therefore, necessary in order to suspend, pending an enquiry, that the Government must form an opinion. It is secondly necessary that such opinion must be on the question that 'immediate suspension was necessary in the interest of general public." Therefore, when a challenge is thrown, it is necessary for the" Government to satisfy that there was some material upon which the Government could have formed an opinion or there was rational -connection between the materials in possession of the Government and the formation of the opinion that immediate suspension' in the interest of general public was necessary. It is well-settled that when an authority is enjoined to act or empowered to act on satisfaction or the formation of its opinion on fulfilment of certain conditions. its own conclusion is not conclusive in the matter and if a challenge is thrown it is subject to judicial review only to the extent of finding out if there was any rational connection between the material upon which the Government has formed the necessary opinion and the formation of the opinion. The Court, of course, is not empowered to substitute its own opinion and the Court is also not competent to judge as to the sufficiency of the materials. The Court is, however, authorised to examine whether there was any rational connection between the formation of the opinion and the materials in possession of the Government for the action taken. The Court, of course, is not empowered to substitute its own opinion and the Court is also not competent to judge as to the sufficiency of the materials. The Court is, however, authorised to examine whether there was any rational connection between the formation of the opinion and the materials in possession of the Government for the action taken. It is only to this limited extent that the Court is empowered to review the executive action when the Government is authorised to act of its own on fulfiment of certain conditions. It is also well-settled that this is not the final order and the final order would be passed after appropriate proceedings under paragraph 3(5) of the said Order. It has been held by the Division Bench of this Court, to which I shall presently refer and with which view I respectfully agree, that it is not a penal provision. But it has to be borne in mind that the suspension bas certain consequences, consequences grave in nature, for the person who carries on business. Therefore, the executive authority must act bona fide in the eye of law in tile sense that there must be materials which are germane or relevant to the formation of the opinion. 5. It is now well settled that where powers are conferred on public authorities to exercise the same when "they are satisfied" or "when it appears to them" or when "in their opinion" a certain state of affairs exists, or when powers enable public authorities to take such action as they think fit in relation to a subject matter the courts will not readily defer to the conclusiveness of the executive authorities' opinion as to the existence of a matter of law or fact, upon which the validity of the exercise of the power is predicated. Administrative decisions in exercise of powers even if conferred in subjective terms are to be made in good faith on relevant consideration See the observations of M.A. Rasheed v. State of Kerala AIR 1974 SC 2249 . 6. Learned Advocate for the respondents drew my attention to a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of State of West Bengal v. Kishori Mohan Saha & Ors. reported in 1978 (2) CLJ 285. 6. Learned Advocate for the respondents drew my attention to a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of State of West Bengal v. Kishori Mohan Saha & Ors. reported in 1978 (2) CLJ 285. There, the Division Bench observed that the terms and condition of appointment of the petitioner were, in that case, the West Bengal Rationing Order, 1964, as in this calc and sub-paragraph (5) of paragraph 3 of the said order, whenever in the opinion of the State Government it was necessary or expedient so to do in the interest of general public, the State Government might amend, vary suspend or revoke an appointment under paragraph 3 of the said Rationing Order after making an enquiry. The Division Bench, further, observed the State Government or the Government authority pending such an enquiry might suspend, if it was of the opinion that immediate suspension was necessary in the interest of the general public. The Division Bench, further, observed that suspension did not amount to penalty but was an interim order pending the enquiry contemplated under sub-paragraph (5) of paragraph 3. The Division Bench expressed the view that the expression "in the interest of general public" has prima facie a wide import but the Court should not substitute its own opinion for the opinion of the State Government. At the same time the Division Bench reiterated that the Court would be entitled to scrutinise whether the order of suspension was passed by a competent authority and secondly whether the authority had bona fide and upon consideration of the relevant materials formed the requisite information. Therefore, in my opinion, the Division Bench was reiterating that it was open to the Court to examine whether the materials were relevant for the formation of the opinion upon which alone the State Government could act. Now in the instant case. the opinion that is necessary is that immediate suspension ill necessary. Therefore, the materials must be to the extent of showing that the charges were of such a nature that immediate suspension was necessary in the interest of the general public. Even assuming that the respondent authority had acted in the interest of the general public. the opinion that is necessary is that immediate suspension ill necessary. Therefore, the materials must be to the extent of showing that the charges were of such a nature that immediate suspension was necessary in the interest of the general public. Even assuming that the respondent authority had acted in the interest of the general public. from the averments as set out in paragraphs 4 to 9 of the affidavit in opposition filed in answer to Rule Nisi issued in this case, I could not find any indication of the necessity of immediate suspension or in other words of the urgency of immediate action in the interest of the general public. Complaints undoubtedly were there from February to August upon which the petitioner had been charge sheeted. But in respect of complaints made from February to August, 1978 to pass and order of suspension after the middle of December. 1978 on the ground that immediate action was necessary it is difficult to appreciate that it was of such urgency or it was of such nature that immediate action was necessary. That rational connection, in my opinion, is not substantiated, between the material disclosed, and the formation of the opinion as to taking the grave step of immediate suspension. 7. In that view of the matter, in my opinion, the impugned order cannot be sustained. But I make it clear that this order will not in any way prevent the respondent authority from proceeding in accordance with law with the conduct of the enquiry initiated under sub-paragraph (5) of paragraph 3 of the West Bengal Rationing Order, 1964 or to pass such order or inflict such punishment or take such action against the petitioner as the respondent authority is entitled to take in accordance with the law. 8. The Rule is made absolute to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute.