S. H. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) ). This group of 52 appeals arises out of as many suits filed in the City Civil Court Ahmedabad. They were filed by shareholders of corporate employers in which they challenged the vires of secs. 3 and 6 of the Bombay Labour Welfare Fund Act 1953 and Rules 3 and 4 of the Labour Welfare Fund (Gujarat) Rules 1962 They contended that the aforesaid provisions were ultra vires Art. 19 (1) (f) and Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution of India. Some of the suits were instituted in 1975 and others were instituted in 1976. No evidence was led in the suits. They were decided on the basis of legal arguments advanced before the learned trial Judge. On 2nd September 1978 they were decided by the learned trial Judge by a common judgment. He turned down the conten- tions raised by the plaintiffs and dismissed the suits. Decrees passed by him in all the suits are challenged by the plaintiffs in these appeals. ( 2 ) BEFORE we enter upon the examination of the contentions raised by the plaintiffs before us it is necessary to set out the history of the litigation relating to the impugned provisions. The Bombay Labour Welfare Fund Act 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Labour Wefare Act for the sake of brevity was enacted by Bombay Legislature in 1953. Sec. 3 as it was then was challenged in a group of writ petitions before the High Court of Bombay on the ground that it was ultra vires Art. 31 (2 ). Sec. 3 as it was then read as follows: (1 ). There shall be constituted a fund called the Bombay Labour Walfare Fund and notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force the sums specified in sub-sec. (2) shall be paid into the Fund. (2 ). The Fund shall consist of (a) all fines realised from the employees; (b) all unpaid accumulations; (c) any voluntary donations; (d) any fund transferred under sub-sec. (5) of sec. 7; and (e) any sum borrowed under sec. 8. (3 ). The sums specified in sub-sec. (2) shall be collected by such agencies and in such manner and the accounts of the Fund shall be maintained and audited in such manner as may be prescribed. (5) of sec. 7; and (e) any sum borrowed under sec. 8. (3 ). The sums specified in sub-sec. (2) shall be collected by such agencies and in such manner and the accounts of the Fund shall be maintained and audited in such manner as may be prescribed. Sec. 7 (1) Provided: The Fund shall vest in and be held and applied by the Board as Trustees subject to the provisions and for the purposes of this Act sub-sec. (2) of sec. 7 provided as follows: "without prejudice to the generality of sub-sec. (1) the moneys in the Fund may be utilised by the Board to defray expenditure on the following: (a) community and social education centres including reading rooms and libraries. (b) community necessities; (c) games and sports; (d) excursions tours and holiday homes; (e) entertainment and other forms of recreations; (f) home industries and subsidiary occupations for women and unemployed persons- (g) corporate activities of a social nature; (h) cost of administering the Act including the salaries and allowances of the staff appointed for the purposes of the Act; and (i) such other objects as would in the opinion of the State Government improve the standard of living and ameliorate the social conditions of labour. Provided that the Fund shall not be utilized in financing any measure which the employer is required under any law for the time being in force to carry out provided further that unpaid accumulations and fines shall be paid to the Board and be expended by it under this Act notwithstanding anything contained in the Payment of Wages Act 1936 (IV of 1936) or any other law for the time being in force". Sub-sec. (10) of sec. 2 defined the expression Unpaid accumulations in the following terms: unpaid accumulations means all payments due to the employees but not made to them within a period of three years from the date on which they became due whether before or after the commencement of this Act including the wages and gratuity legally payable. ( 3 ) THE writ petitions were heard by Chagla C. J. and Tendolkar J who dismissed them by their order dated 14th September 1953. The reasons which weighed with the learned Judges were as follows. ( 3 ) THE writ petitions were heard by Chagla C. J. and Tendolkar J who dismissed them by their order dated 14th September 1953. The reasons which weighed with the learned Judges were as follows. When the State acquires the property of a private citizen for a public purpose it does so in the exercise of the right which it has by reason of the principle of eminent domain. Therefore in the context of Art. 31 (2) under which challenge was raised to sec. 3 the learned Judges observed that they must be first satisfied that the legislation which they were considering acquired or took possession of the property belonging to the petitioner They further observed that on analysis of the impugned legislation the substance thereof was that the State directed the petitioner who was the debtor of his employees to pay to the State the debt due instead of paying it to his creditors. Therefore in the opinion of the learned Judges no property of the petitioner was involved in the impugned legislation and all that the law did was to substitute one creditor in place of another. They were of the opinion that the impugned legislation did not fall under Art. 31 (2 ). However in the alternative they observed that if the case fell under Art. 31 (2) there could be no doubt that the petitioner must succeed because obviousy no compensation was provided for acquisition or taking possession of the property of the petitioner. Howerver since the case did not fall under Art. 31 (2) the question of considering the challenge under that provision did not arise. The learned Judges also felt inclined to consider whether apart from Art. 31 (2) the State Legislature was competent to enact the impugned legislation and whether it contravened any fundamental right other than one specified in Art. 31 (2 ). ( 4 ) NOW the legislative competence of the State Legislature to enact the impugned provision was not challenged. They also did not consider the question whether any right of the petitioner other than one specified in Art. 31 (2) was violated because the petitioner had not raised any such challenge. ( 4 ) NOW the legislative competence of the State Legislature to enact the impugned provision was not challenged. They also did not consider the question whether any right of the petitioner other than one specified in Art. 31 (2) was violated because the petitioner had not raised any such challenge. On analysis of the impugned provisions the learned Chief Justice observed that all that the Legislature had done was to substitute one creditor in place of another and that when one remembered that the moneys were to be paid into a Fund which was going to be administered for the welfare of labour and for most laudable objects it was impossible to urge that the restriction placed by the Legislature upon the right of the employer (if he had any right in that case) under Art. 19 (1) (f) was not a reasonable restriction. Mr. Justice Tendolkar who delivered a concurring judgment expressed the view that all that the impugned provision did was to direct the employer to pay into the Fund the moneys which belonged to the employers. In the opinion of the learned Judge to that extent the employers were deprived of their moneys. However in the opinion of the learned Judge it was not a case of taking possession or acquisition of property at all. Analysing the concept of taking of possession the learned Judge observed that it implied transfer of beneficial interest and that no beneficial interest in those moneys was sought to be transferred to the State. All that was sought to be done was that the Fund would be utilized for the welfare of the very class of people who were the original creditors of the employer and to whom the amount was admittedly due. He therefore expressed the view that it was not a case of taking possession or acquisition of moneys at all. He further observed that it was a case of deprivation of property under Art. 31 (1) and that such a deprivation could be done under the authority of law. The impugned Act according to him supplied that authority. He therefore expressed the view that it was not a case of taking possession or acquisition of moneys at all. He further observed that it was a case of deprivation of property under Art. 31 (1) and that such a deprivation could be done under the authority of law. The impugned Act according to him supplied that authority. It is clear therefore that the High Court of Bombay turned down the challenge under Art. 31 (2) on the ground that money was not the property and also observed that the deprivation of moneys did not offend Art 19 (1) (f) because the purpose for which the State wanted to utilize them constituted a reasonable restriction. It may also be noted that the learned Judges assumed that unpaid accumulations constituted a debt due by the employer to his employees. It appears that the question as to how the dispute if any which an employer might raise by contending that they were not the accumulations due to his employees would be decided was not raised before them. This decision of the High Court of Bombay is reported in Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. . The State of Bombay 60 Bom. L. R. 731 (S. C. ). The judgment of the High Court of Bombay we may add is reported along with the decision of the Supreme Court in the reporter referred to above. ( 5 ) THE petitioner in that case was given certificate under Art. 132 to appeal to the Supreme Court against that decision. On 20th December 1957 the Supreme Court decided the appeal and struck down sec. 3 partly. The decision of the Supreme Court has been published in the same report along with the judgment of the High Court of Bombay. It has also been reported in Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bombay and others AIR 1958 S. C. 328. The Supreme Court inter alia held that Arts. 31 (1) and 31 (2) were not mutually exclusive and that transfer of title to the State was not an essential requisite of acquisition under Art. 31 (2 ). It was further held that deprivation of property and substantial abridgement of the rights of the owner fell within Art. 31 (2) and that the law which produced those results must in order to be valid satisfy the conditions laid down in that Article. It was further held that deprivation of property and substantial abridgement of the rights of the owner fell within Art. 31 (2) and that the law which produced those results must in order to be valid satisfy the conditions laid down in that Article. It was next observed that Art. 31 (1) and Art. 31 (2) covered the same ground and that substantial interference with right to property fell within the operation of Art. 31 (2 ). Having so laid down in regard to the width and amplitude of clauses (1) and (2) of Art. 31 the Supreme Court held that sub-sec. (1) of sec. 3 in so far as it related to payment of unpaid accumulations to the Board specified in sec. 3 (2) (b) infringed Art 31 (2) because it deprived an employer of his moneys without paying him any compensation. The question whether the acquisition contemplated by clause (2) of Art. 31 was not confined to cases of transfer of ownership to the State and that even deprivation of the property would fall within it was left unexamined. It was further observed in that decision that even if it was assumed that sub-sec. (1) of sec. 3 was not within the prohibition enacted by clause (2) of Art. 31 because it operated only on money and money was not the property for the purposes of that Article the protection against the deprivation of money could be sought in Art. 19 (1) (f) because the word property used therein had a wider connotation than it had in Art. 31 (2 ). Art. 19 (1) (f) embraced within its sweep money. It was therefore observed that the citizens had the right to hold moneys subject only to law such as one which could be saved by Art. 19 (5 ). It was held that sec. 3 (1) in so far as it related to sec. 3 (2) (b) was not saved by Art. 19 (5) and that therefore it contravened Art. 19 (1) (f ). It was next held that sec. 3 (1) in so far as it related to sec. 3 (2) (b) did not relate to abandoned property. It was held that sec. 3 (1) in so far as it related to sec. 3 (2) (b) was not saved by Art. 19 (5) and that therefore it contravened Art. 19 (1) (f ). It was next held that sec. 3 (1) in so far as it related to sec. 3 (2) (b) did not relate to abandoned property. If it related to abandoned property it by its very nature could not be held to violate the rights of any person either under Art. 19 (1) (f) or Art. 31 (2) because only a person who had some interest in the properly could complain that the impugned legislation invaded his right whether under Art. 19 (1) (f) or Art. 31 (2) In abandoned property ex hypothesi no one had any interest. The Supreme Court further observed that the Labour Welfare Act could not be regarded as one relating to abandoned property. A legislation with respect to abandoned property must in the first instance safeguard the property for the benefit of its true owner and the State could take it over only in absence of any claim to it. Sub-sec. (1) of sec. 3 in its relation to sec. 3 (2) (a) was held to be valid. The observation made by the High Court of Bombay that the Act merely provided for a substitution of creditors was turned down by the Supreme Court because when an employee did his work the wages earned by him became a debt due to him from his employer. They could be assigned under law. However if the employee had assigned the debt to the Board constituted under the Act the latter would be entitled to recover it from the employer. What could be done by an act of parties could also be done by a legislation. The Supreme Court therefore proceeded to examine the question whether under the provisions of the impugned statute it could be held that there was a statutory transfer of wages earned by the workmen to the Board. It was contended that the Act made no provision for transfer of debt to the Board and that there was only a provision for the payment of the amounts. The Supreme Court in that context observed that that contention canvassed only a narrow view of the true scope of the impugned provisions. It was contended that the Act made no provision for transfer of debt to the Board and that there was only a provision for the payment of the amounts. The Supreme Court in that context observed that that contention canvassed only a narrow view of the true scope of the impugned provisions. Looking at the substance of the matter the Supreme Court was of the opinion that sec. 3 (1) did operate to transfer the debts due to the employees to the Board. The question as to who could make a grievance against the impugned legislation was also raised before the Supreme Court. In that contest it was observed that a question as to the constitutionality of a statute could be raised only by a person who was aggrieved by it. The impugned statute dealt with rights arising out of contrast which presupposed at least the existence of two parties with mutual rights and obligations. It was therefore difficult the Supreme Court observed further to see how when the rights of one party to a contract were interfered with those of the other could remain unaffected by it. On the provisions of the Labour Welfare Act as they then stood the Supreme Court felt that even if an employer made payment to the Board under sec. 3 (1) on the footing that the law was not unconstitutional as against him there was nothing which prevent an employee from suing his employer to recover the same amount on the ground that the Act was unconstitutional. That the employer had already paid the amount to the Board in pursuance of the provisions of the statute could not furnish any answer to the claim made by an employee. Therefore the Supreme Court observed that the fact that a statute which operated on a contract must affect all the rights of the parties to a contract and that if it was bad as regards one of them it should be held to be bad regards others as well. However that question was not further pursued by the Supreme Court because the Labour Welfare Act was held unconstitutional even as regards the employers (paragraph 28 of the report ). ( 6 ) AFTER the Supreme Court declared sec. 3 (1) in so far as it related to sec. However that question was not further pursued by the Supreme Court because the Labour Welfare Act was held unconstitutional even as regards the employers (paragraph 28 of the report ). ( 6 ) AFTER the Supreme Court declared sec. 3 (1) in so far as it related to sec. 3 (2) (b) unconstitutional Gujarat Legislature enacted The Bombay Labour Welfare Fund (Gujarat Extension and Amendment) Act 1961 which came into force on 1st July 1962. It inter alia made amendments to the preamble and the long title to the Act. It also amended sec. 2 (10) and sec. 3 and inserted sec. 6a. Sub-sec. (10) of sec. 2 was amended by adding to it certain words. The amended sub-sec. (10) of sec. 2 reads as follows:"unpaid accumulations means all payments due to the employees but not made to them within a period of three years from the date on which they became due whether before or after the commencement of this Act including the wages and gratuity legally payable but not including the amount of contribution if any paid by an employer to a provident fund established under the Employees Provident Funds Act 1952"the words commencing from but not including. . . . . . . . . . . and ending with Employees Provident Funds Act 1952 were inserted by Gujarat Act 47 of 1961. The amendment made to see. 3 by Gujarat Act 47 of 1971 inserted sub-sec. (4) and modified sub-see. (1) of see. 3. Sub-sec. (4) provides as follows: notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or any contract or instrument all unpaid accumulations shall be collected by such agencies and in such manner as may be prescribed and be paid in the first instance to the Board which shall keep a separate account therefor until claims thereto have been decided in the manner provided in sec. 6a. Sub-see. (1) of see. 3 as amended by Gujarat ACt 47 of 1961 reads as follows:"the State Government shall constitute a fund called the Labour Welfare Fund and notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force the sums specified in sub-sec. (2) shall subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (4) and sec. 6a be paid into the Fund". It may be noted at this stage that the Act was further amended by Gujarat Act 29 of 1973. (2) shall subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (4) and sec. 6a be paid into the Fund". It may be noted at this stage that the Act was further amended by Gujarat Act 29 of 1973. We are not concerned in this case With the validity or otherwise of the amendments made by Gujarat ACt 29 of 1973. In order to remove the constitutional vice which the Supreme Court bad discovered in sec. 3 (1) in so far as it related to See. 3 (2) (b) the Gujarat Legislature by Gujarat Act 47 of 1961 inserted see. 6a. It reads as under:"6 (1) All unpaid accumulations shall be deemed to be abandoned property. (2) Any unpaid accumulations paid to the Board in accordance with the provisions of sec. 3 shall on such payment discharge an employer of the liability to make payment to an employee in respect thereof but to the extent only of the amount paid to the Board; and the liability to make payment to the employee to the extent aforesaid shall subject to the succeeding provisions of this section be deemed to be transferred to the Hoard. (3) As soon as possible after any unpaid accumulation is paid to the Board under sub-sec. (4) of sec. 3 the Board shall by a public notice call upon interested employees to submit to the Board their claims for any payment due to them. (4) Such public notice shall contain such particulars as may be prescribed and it shall be (a) affixed on the notice board or in its absence on a conspicuous part of the premises of each establishment in which the unpaid accumulations were earned; (b) published in the Official Gazette and (c) published in any two newspapers in the language commonly understood in the area in which such establishment is situated and circulating therein or in such other manner as may be prescribed regard being had to the amount of claim. (5) After the notice is first affixed and published under sub-sec. (4) it shall be again affixed and published from time to time for a period of three years from the date on which it was first affixed and published in the manner provided in that sub-section in the months of June and December each year. (6) A certificate of the Board to the effect that the provisions of sub-secs. (4) it shall be again affixed and published from time to time for a period of three years from the date on which it was first affixed and published in the manner provided in that sub-section in the months of June and December each year. (6) A certificate of the Board to the effect that the provisions of sub-secs. (4) and (5) were complied with shall be conclusive evidence thereof. (7) Any claim received whether in answer to the notices or otherwise within a period of four years from the date of the first publication of the notice in respect of such claim shall be transferred by the Board to the Authority appointed under sec 15. of the Payment of Wages Act 1936 having jurisdiction in the area in which the factory or establishment is situated and the Authority shall proceed to adjudicate upon and decide such claim. In hearing such claim the Authority shall have the powers conferred by and shall follow the procedure (in so far as it is applicable) followed in giving effect to the provisions of that Act. (8) If in deciding any claim under sub-sec. (7) the Authority allows the whole or part of such claim it shall declare that the unpaid accumulation in relation to which the claim is made shall to the extent to which the claim is allowed cease to be adandoned property and shall order the Board to pay to the claimant the amount of the claim as allowed by it; and the Board shall make payment accordingly: provided that the Board shall not be liable to pay any sum in excess of that paid under sub-sec. (4) of sec. 3 to the Board as unpaid accumulations in respect of the claim. (9) An appeal shall lie in the City of Ahmedabad to the Court of Small Causes and elsewhere to the District Court against a decision under sub-sec. (7) rejecting any claim or part thereof if made within a period of sixty days from the date of such decision. (10) The Board shall comply with any order made in appeal. (9) An appeal shall lie in the City of Ahmedabad to the Court of Small Causes and elsewhere to the District Court against a decision under sub-sec. (7) rejecting any claim or part thereof if made within a period of sixty days from the date of such decision. (10) The Board shall comply with any order made in appeal. (11) The decision of the Authority subject to an appeal as aforesaid and the decision in appeal of the Court of Small Causes or as the case may be the Disttrict Court shall be final and conclusive as to the right to receive payment the liability of the Board to pay and also as to the amount if any. (12) If no claim is made within the time specified in sub-sec. (7) or a claim or part thereof has been rejected under the foregoing provisions then the unpaid accumulations in respect of such claim shall accrue to and vest in the State as bona vacantia and shall thereafter without further assurance be deemed to be transferred to and form part of the Fund. Thereafter by Gujarat Act. 8 of 1963 sub-sec. (13) was added to sec. 6a. It provides as follows:" (13) Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this section shall apply to unpaid accumulations not already paid to the Board. (a) in respect of which no separate accounts have been maintained so that the unpaid claims of employees are not traceable. or (b) which are proved to have been spent before the sixth day of December 1961 and accordingly such unpaid accumulations shall not be liable to be collected and paid under sub-sec. (4) of see. 3. "sec. 2 of the Amending Act by which sub-sec. (13) was inserted in sec. 6a expressly made sub-sec. (13) retrospective with effect from the date on which the Labour Welfare Act carne into force. ( 7 ) IT is necessary to refer at this stage to sec. 13 of the Gujarat Act 47 of 1961 which amended the Labour Welfare Act. It provides as follows: The amendments made in the principle Act by see. 2 (b) 6 and 9 of this Act shall be deemed always to have been made in the principal Act. Sec. 2 (b) of the Amending Act amended the long title of the preamble. Sec. 6 of the Amending Act amended sec. 3 (1) and inserted sub-sec. It provides as follows: The amendments made in the principle Act by see. 2 (b) 6 and 9 of this Act shall be deemed always to have been made in the principal Act. Sec. 2 (b) of the Amending Act amended the long title of the preamble. Sec. 6 of the Amending Act amended sec. 3 (1) and inserted sub-sec. (4) in sec. 3. Sub-sec. (1) of sec. 3 and the provisions of sub-sec. (4) of sec. 3 were given retrospective effect from the date on which the Labour Welfare Fund came into force. By sec. 9 of the Amending Act sec. 6a was inserted. ( 8 ) ON 2nd August 1962 the Welfare Commissioner appointed under the Labour Welfare Act sent notice to the employers to pay up all unpaid accumulations which were classified by him into two parts: (1) all unpaid accumulations as found on 24th June 1953 and (2) unpaid accumulations during the period from 25th June 1953 to 31st June 1962. On 24th August 1962 the employers replied to the Welfare Commissioner. On 9th October 1962 sub-secs. (1) (2) and (4) of sec. 3 and 6 A were challenged by some of the employers in Special Civil Application No. 836 of 1962 (The Arvind Mills Ltd. v. The State of Gujarat and Ors. 7 GLR 156) which was instituted in this Court. On 19th 20 and 21st July 1965 a Division Bench of this Court consisting of P. N. Bhagwati J. (as he then was) and N. G. Shelat J. decided it. Several contentions were raised before this Court. Except two all were negatived by this Court. It was held against the employer that the unpaid accumulations as defined in sec. 2 (10) were regarded as abandoned property and that therefore the State was entitled to take them over by virtue of its prerogative right. Before it did so it would take possession of the unpaid accumulations and give opportunity to the true owners to make their claims to them. If no claim was made within the specified period or if a claim was made but was rejected wholly or in part the State could appropriate the unpaid accumulations to it. The unpaid accumulations did not become bona vacantia on the expiration of the specified period. If no claim was made within the specified period or if a claim was made but was rejected wholly or in part the State could appropriate the unpaid accumulations to it. The unpaid accumulations did not become bona vacantia on the expiration of the specified period. They could not become bona vacantia unless an opportunity was given to the true owner to come forward to claim them and no claim was made or if the claim was made it was rejected partly or wholly. It was further observed that what the Act provided in respect unpaid accumulations was a transfer of debts or claims from the employer to the Board and that such a transfer was subject to the provisions of sub-secs. (3) to (13) of sec. 6a. It was further observed in that decision that within the meaning of sec. 2 (10) the unpaid accumulations included not only such payments as were admittedly due the employees but not made to them but they also included payments which were in fact due to the employees but which were not made to them for any reason whatever. Whether payments have not been made because the employees did not come forward to claim them or because the employer disputed them was not a matter of substance. The Labour Welfare Act was principally and primarily a legislation for welfare of labour. Unpaid accumulations was one of the several items which would go to make up the Fund. The unpaid accumulations in regard to which provision was made in the Labour Welfare Act were debts or claims due by the employer to the employees who had not claimed them for a period of three years. The impugned legislation merely tried to prevent unjust enrichment of the employer which would otherwise result from non-interference by the State at least in those cases in which the employees would not come forward to claim the unpaid accumulations. Even if in these circumstances the unpaid accumulations were taken over by the State for the purpose of employing them for the benefit of labour generally it could not be successfully contended that such a legislation was not incidental or ancillary to the true subjects of welfare of labour. Even if in these circumstances the unpaid accumulations were taken over by the State for the purpose of employing them for the benefit of labour generally it could not be successfully contended that such a legislation was not incidental or ancillary to the true subjects of welfare of labour. It was therefore held that the impugned legislation being an incidental and ancillary legislations was within the legislative competence of State Legislature under Entry 24 in List III in seventh schedule to the Constitution. It is therefore clear that the challenge to the constitutional competence of the State Legislature to enact the impugned provision was turned down by this Court. ( 9 ) IT was also contended that the Labour Welfare Act was extra-territorial in operation because some of the employees to whom the employers owed wages might have gone outside the State. This Court negatived that challenge on the ground that the employees had earned their wages within the State and that the situs of unpaid accumulations was within the State. These two facts constituted sufficient territorial nexus to entitle the State Legislature to make the impugned law. Such a legislation could not be regarded as extra-territorial in operation. ( 10 ) THE next contention which was raised before this Court was that sec. 6a of the Labour Welfare Act a State legislation was repugnant to sec. 33c (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 a Central legislation. This Court on an analysis of the provisions of these two statutes found that there was no conflict between the provisions of sec. 6a of the Labour Welfare Act and sec. 33c (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Sec. 6a (2) of the Labour Welfare Act statutorily assigned to the Board the debt due from the employer. Therefore the Board was the statutory assignee of the employee and that statutory assignment was subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (3) to (13) of sec. 6a which inter alia provided as a condition of statutory assignment that the employee shall be entitled to recover the amount of his claim from the Board in the manner specified in those sub-sections. If further provided that if an employee failed to do so his debt would be extinguished. To such cases sec. 33c (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act could not apply. Therefore it was observed by this Court that there was no direct conflict between sec. If further provided that if an employee failed to do so his debt would be extinguished. To such cases sec. 33c (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act could not apply. Therefore it was observed by this Court that there was no direct conflict between sec. 6a of the Labour Welfare Act and sec. 33c (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Whereas sec. 33c (2) in terms enacted a remedy which could be pursued by an employee who wanted to enforce his claim against his employer sec. 6a provided remedy to the employee which he could enforce against the Board which was the statutory assignee of the employee in respect of his unpaid wages or other dues. Therefore the aforesaid two pieces of legislation dealt with entirely distinct and separate matters and did not occupy the same field. Doctrine of repugnancy therefore as held by this Court did not apply. ( 11 ) SO far as challenge under Art. 31 (2) was concerned it was observed by this Court that the relevant provisions of the Labour Welfare Act brought about a statutory novatio which could not be regarded as a compulsory acquisition of money belonging to the employer. If the State Legislature made a provision under which money was taken from the debtor in discharge of the debt owed by him such a statutory provision could not be regarded as a law for compulsory acquisition of money. Therefore the employer could not complain of any violation of his fundamental rights under Art. 31 (2) because what was taken away from him was money belonging to him and that money was not the property for the purpose of Art. 31 (2 ). It was further held by this Court that the impugned provisions could not be regarded as violative of the fundamental rights of the employees under Art. 31 (2) because what was taken away from them as a result of the operation of the impugned provisions were their actionable claims and that the actionable claims did not come within the prohibition of Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution. ( 12 ) IT was next contended before this Court in that case that except for the provisions of the Labour Welfare Act an employee could enforce his debt against his employer without any limitation of time. ( 12 ) IT was next contended before this Court in that case that except for the provisions of the Labour Welfare Act an employee could enforce his debt against his employer without any limitation of time. As a result of the operation of the impugned provisions he could make a claim before the Board only within a period of four years from the date of the first publication of notice under sec. 6a (3 ). If he failed to do so his debt would be extinguished. Answering the contention this Court held that the effect of the impugned provisions on the right of the employee was not only to introduce the period of limitation but also to extinguish the right on the expiration of such period of limitation. However it was not an unreasonable restriction under Art. 19 (5) because even total prohibition and extinction were included within the connotation of the expression restriction contemplated by clause (5) of Art. 19. Therefore in the opinion of this Court the impugned provisions merely imposed a reasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the employee to acquire hold and dispose of his debt under Art. 19 (1) (f ). ( 13 ) A law which recognises the debt of an employee and provides for its payment but insists on the proof of the debt before a judicial authority before it is paid to him cannot it was held by this Court be regarded as unreasonable. The retrospective operation given to a statute is indeed a relevant factor but it does not per se make the restrictive provisions of the statute unreasonable. ( 14 ) IT was also contended in the name of the employees that the notice provided by the impugned provisions for inviting claims from the employees was inadequate and unreasonable inasmuch as the impugned provisions only provided for a public notice and not a personal notice to the employees even though the permanent addresses of the employees might be known to the Board. It was also contended that the impugned provisions were unconstitutional inasmuch as they imposed an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of an employee under Art. 19 (1) (f) because a public notice to workmen who are generally illiterate migratory and drawn from outside the State is no notice at all. Answering this contention this Court held that the public notice provided by sec. Answering this contention this Court held that the public notice provided by sec. 6a was merely a pretence or an eye-wash because it would not ordinarily reach the employees and that under such circumstances the debts of the employees would be lost very often without their knowing that the debts were due to them and that they were entitled to claim them. It was next observed by this Court that it was unreasonable to regard that a property was an abandoned property merely because it was not claimed within a period of three years. Such a period of time in the opinion of this Court could not be regarded as adequate for the purpose of raising such a presumption in regard to unpaid accumulations. Therefore on the grounds that public notice to workmen was not an adequate notice and that on the expiry of the period of three years unpaid accumulations could not be regarded as abandoned property this Court held that the impugned provisions violated the fundamental right of the employees under Art. 19 (1) (f) and were therefore void. ( 15 ) SO far as the right of the employer under Art. 19 (1) (f) was concerned it was observed by this Court that under the impugned provisions even if the claim of an employee was rejected on merits and after it was found that there was no debt or claim due to the employee the amount paid to the Board in respect of such claims was not required to be returned to the employer but it became vested in the State. In the opinion of this Court it clearly amounted to deprivation of the employers moneys without payment of compensation. It was further observed that under sec. 3 it was the Welfare Commissioner who was given the power to determine what were unpaid accumulations after making such enquiry as he deemed fit. According to this Court it only amounted to an exparte subjective determination of the Welfare Commissioner which would not be liable to be tested in appeal. The result would be that the employer would be clearly deprived of his moneys on an exparte subjective determination by the Welfare Commissioner. Therefore this Court held that the impugned provisions clearly imposed unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the employees under Art. 19 (1) (f) and were therefore void. The result would be that the employer would be clearly deprived of his moneys on an exparte subjective determination by the Welfare Commissioner. Therefore this Court held that the impugned provisions clearly imposed unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the employees under Art. 19 (1) (f) and were therefore void. ( 16 ) THIS Court upheld the challenge raised by the employer under Art. 14 and declared the impugned provisions void. In that behalf it was observed by this Court that there was no rational basis or classification between a factory and an establishment carrying on other business or trade for the purpose of the applicability of the Act. The introduction of an establishment carrying on a tramway or motor omnibus service within the definition made it impossible to find a rational principle underlying the classification which has any relation to the object of the Act. This Court also found hostile discrimination under Art. 14 between Government factories and Government establishments other than factories. Whereas Government factories fell within the definition of the establishment as given in sub-sec. (4) of sec. 2 the Government establishments other than factories did not fall within the definition. It was observed by this Court that if there were establishments of the Government however few they might be they could not be excluded on any valid principle of classification having regard to the consideration underlying the enactment of the impugned legislation once Government factories were included. Therefore the conclusion which this Court recorded was that the discrimination was writ large in the definition of establishment and that since the definition permeated through every part of the provision and was an integral part thereof the impugned provisions were violative of Art. 14 and they were therefore declared void. ( 17 ) THE petitioner in that case was an employer company or a corporate employer. It was not a citizen employer. The maintainability of the petition was therefore challenged on the ground that a corporate employer not being a citizen could not complain of violation of fundamental rights. Answering that contention in favour of the petitioner this Court observed that if the impugned provisions infringed the fundamental right of the citizen employers under Art. 19 (1) (f) so much of the impugned provisions as contravened that fundamental right would be void. Answering that contention in favour of the petitioner this Court observed that if the impugned provisions infringed the fundamental right of the citizen employers under Art. 19 (1) (f) so much of the impugned provisions as contravened that fundamental right would be void. However it would not be correct to say that they would be void only so far as citizen employers were concerned and that they would have life and force in so far as non-citizen employers were concerned. The effect of taking such a view would certainly be that even non-citizen employers would be entitled to contend that the impugned provisions would be void though they have no fundamental right under Art. 19 (1) (f ). However such a result was brought about not by the interpretation of Art. 13 (2) but by reason of the fact that the Legislature whilst enacting the impugned legislation had chosen to make it generally applicable to citizens and non-citizens alike. ( 18 ) IT may be noted that the constitutional challenge raised by a non-citizen employer was upheld by this Court on the ground that it violated Art. 14 and that it also violated Art. 19 (1) (f ). Since the impugned provisions were made applicable to citizens as well as to non-citizens even a non-citizen could successfully raise a challenge under Art. 19 (f ). Therefore in the view which this Court took it struck down the impugned provisions. ( 19 ) THIS decision was challenged in the Supreme Court by the State of Gujarat. The decision of the Supreme Court is reported in State of Gujarat and another etc. v. Shri Ambica Mills Limited Ahmedabad etc. A. I. R. 1974 S. C. 1300. The Supreme Court reversed the finding recorded by this Court under Art. 14 and held that the impugned provisions were not discriminatory. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to analyse in details the reasons which weighed with the Supreme Court in recording that conclusion. So far as the finding under Art. 19 (1) (f) was concerned though the Supreme Court meticulously analysed the impugned provisions it held that the writ petitions filed by corporate employers or non-citizen employers were not maintainable because they did not have any fundamental light under Art. 19 (1) (f ). So far as the finding under Art. 19 (1) (f) was concerned though the Supreme Court meticulously analysed the impugned provisions it held that the writ petitions filed by corporate employers or non-citizen employers were not maintainable because they did not have any fundamental light under Art. 19 (1) (f ). Therefore the Supreme Court after having reversed the two findings recorded by this Court in favour of the employers dismissed the petitions. The Supreme Court did not record any final conclusion in regard to the infringement of the fundamental right of citizen employers because no citizen employer bad filed any petition. ( 20 ) SINCE the Supreme Court refrained from recording any final conclusion in regard to the alleged violation of fundamental rights of citizen-employers shareholders of corporate employers as citizens enjoying fundamental rights under the Constitution filed the present suits in the City Civil Court at Ahmedabad and invoked the provisions of Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In these suits they challenged the constitutional validity of sec. 3 (as amended by Gujarat Act 47 of 1961) and sec. 6a of the Labour Welfare Act and Rules 3 and 4 of The Labour Welfare Fund (Gujarat) Rules 1962 on the ground that they contravened their fundamental rights under Art. 19 (1) (f) and Art. 31. It was inter alia contended before the learned trial Judge that the decision of this Court in Arvind Mills case (supra) was impliedly overruled in so far as it related to the violation of the fundamental rights of the citizen-employers by the decision of the Supreme Court in appeal which arose from that case. The learned trial Judge held that the decision of this Court in Arvind Mills case (supra) was impliedly overruled by the Supreme Court. He therefore examined the constitutional challenge de novo and recorded the conclusion that the impugned provisions did not offend Art. 19 (1) (f) and Art. 31. He thereupon dismissed all the suits. . ( 21 ) THE plaintiffs having been aggrieved by the decrees passed by the learned trial Judge have filed these appeals. Before we proceed to examine the contentions raised by Mr. I. M. Nanavaty it is necessary to note that he has expessly given up the constitutional challenge raised by the plaintiffs to sec. 6a (13) of the Labour Welfare Act. Before we proceed to examine the contentions raised by Mr. I. M. Nanavaty it is necessary to note that he has expessly given up the constitutional challenge raised by the plaintiffs to sec. 6a (13) of the Labour Welfare Act. ( 22 ) THE first contention which is required to be examined immediately is whether the decision of this Court in Arvind Mills (supra) has been impliedly overruled by the Supreme Court in so far as it relates to the fundamental rights of citizen-employers. This question has arisen in the following context. The earlier writ petition was filed in this Court by a corporate employer. Even though the corporate employer did not have any fundamental right and therefore could not complain of its breach this Court allowed the petition because the fundamental right conferred upon the citizen employers under Art. 19 (1) (f) and Art. 31 (2) was violated. In the opinion of this Court if a fundamental right conferred upon a citizen by the Constitution was violated by the impugned provisions it would not be correct to say that it would be void only as regards citizen employers and would have life and force as regards non-citizen employers. We have summarized the decision of this Court in extenso in the foregoing parts of this judgment. To recapitulate Art. 19 (1) (f) was violated because the determination of unpaid accumulations which an employer was called upon to part with was left to the exparte subjective satisfaction of the Welfare Commissioner. In other words the Labour Welfare Act provided no machinery to determine what would be the unpaid accumulations which an employer owed to his employees in case the employer raised a dispute in that behalf. It was ultra vires Art. 31 (2) because the unpaid accumulations in regard to which an employer disputed his liability to pay would remain the property of the employer and he could not be deprived of them without paying compensation to him. Now; when this decision was challenged in appeal before the Supreme Court the Supreme Court in terms held that the impugned provision violating the fundamental right of a citizen would be void as regards the citizen employers only hut that it would not be so as regards those who did not have the fundamental rights. Now; when this decision was challenged in appeal before the Supreme Court the Supreme Court in terms held that the impugned provision violating the fundamental right of a citizen would be void as regards the citizen employers only hut that it would not be so as regards those who did not have the fundamental rights. In other words if a law is otherwise good and does not contravene any of the fundamental rights of non-citizens the non-citizens cannot take advantage of the voidness of the law as against the fundamental right of the citizen employer and claim that there is no law at all. The before the Supreme Court reversed the decision of this Court and dismissed the writ petition not because no fundamental light of a citizen employer was violated but because no writ petition was filed by a citizen-employer who could invoke his fundamental right against the impugned provision. In other words what was regarded by this Court as inseverable was regarded by the Supreme Court as severable. It is not wholly true to say that the Supreme Court has not expressed any opinion on the violation of the rights of citizen-employers by the impugned provisions. The Supreme Court has made certain observations. They were made not for the purpose of deciding the appeal but because the scheme of the impugned provisions was examined in order to decide the maintainability of the writ petitions. Under these circumstances can it be said that what was not expressly reversed by the Supreme Court was impliedly overruled ? Whereas Mr. Nanavaty has contended that it has not been impliedly overruled the learned Government Pleader has contended that it has been impliedly overruled. ( 23 ) IN support of his argument Mr. Nanavaty has invited our attention to the decision of this Court in Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality and others AIR 1968 Gujarat 124. The facts in that case were as follows. Broach Borough Municipality was governed by Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 until 31st December 1964. It was replaced by Gujarat Municipalities Act 1963 which came into force on 1st January 1965. The Municipality came to be governed by the new Act. It had earlier levied housetax which was continued from time to time. It was permanently imposed under sec. 73 of the Bombay Municipal Borough Act with effect from 1st April 1959. It was replaced by Gujarat Municipalities Act 1963 which came into force on 1st January 1965. The Municipality came to be governed by the new Act. It had earlier levied housetax which was continued from time to time. It was permanently imposed under sec. 73 of the Bombay Municipal Borough Act with effect from 1st April 1959. The Municipality for that purpose framed House Tax Rules under sec. 58 (j) of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act. The petitioner in that case owned lands and buildings which were situated within the limits of the Municipality. The house-tax was paid every year upon the presentation of the bill by the Municipality. Thereafter the Supreme Court decided the case of Patel Gordhandas Hargovindas and others v. The Municipal Commissioner Ahmedabad and another AIR 1963 S. C. 1742 (IV G. L. R 973 ). A tax designated as a rate imposed by the former Municipal Borough of Ahmedabad under sec. 73 of Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act was challenged on two grounds. One of the grounds was that Ahmedabad Municipality had introduced a rate and that therefore the impost could be levied only on the annual letting value of the open land and not on its capital value. Th Supreme Court upheld that contention by a majority judgment. Broach Borough Municipality had also levied house-tax on the basis of the capital value of the lands and buildings situated within its limits. The petitioner in that case came to know of the decision of the Supreme Court and entered into correspondence with Broach Borough Municipality It was contended on its behalf that the house-tax imposed by Broach Borough Municipality was illegal and that the petitioner was under no obligation to pay the amount of house-tax claimed from him. The Broach Borough Municipality did not stay its hands and resorted to coercive machinery to recover the house-tax in that case. Therefore the petitioner filed in that case Special Civil Application No. 846 of 1963. Thereafter the Broach Municipality presented two sets of bills one dated 11 September 1963 and another dated 1st August 1964. In respect of the self-same properties of the petitioner and certain other properties which had been constructed by the petitioner a little more than a sum of Rs. 23 0 was claimed from the petitioner in two sets of bills presented by the Municipality. They included the arrears. In respect of the self-same properties of the petitioner and certain other properties which had been constructed by the petitioner a little more than a sum of Rs. 23 0 was claimed from the petitioner in two sets of bills presented by the Municipality. They included the arrears. The petitioner resisted the claim on the same ground on which he had resisted the previous demand. The petitioner therefore filed a second petition-Special Civil Application No. 765 of 1964 Before the second petition was filed the Gujarat State Legislature passed Gujarat Imposition of Taxes by Municipalities (Validation) Act 1963 which came into force on 26th January 1964 By that Act the State Legislature purported to validate the imposition collection and recovery of taxes and rates assessed inter alia under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act and sought to confer authority on the Municipalities to collect and recover such taxes. After the two petitions were filed Gujarat State Legislature passed Gujarat Municipalities Act which came into force on 1st January 1965. Sec. 99 of this Act was suitably amended to enable the Municipality to impose a tax on the capital value of the lands and buildings in order to enable the Municipalities to Act over the decision of the Supreme Court in Gordhandas case (supra ). The Gujarat Municipalities Act repealed the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act but incorporated a clause which saved the House Tax Rules and the tax imposed thereunder. Thereafter both the petitions were amended by the petitioner. By amendment the petitioner challenged the validity of Gujarat Imposition of Taxes by Municipalities (Validation) Act 1963 and the relative position under the Gujarat Municipalities Act which either purported to save the house-tax or to confer power on the Municipalities to get over the law pronounced by the Supreme Court in Gordhandas case (supra ). ( 24 ) IN Municipal Commissioner The Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Gordhandas Hargovandas Patel 55 Bom. L. R. 1028 under sec. 73 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1925 Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation had framed Rule 350a under which rate on open plots of land at a certain percentage was levied on the valuation based on capital. It was therefore contended on behalf of the taxpayer that the rate on the basis of which tax was levied amounted to a capital levy and that therefore rule 350a was ultra vires. It was therefore contended on behalf of the taxpayer that the rate on the basis of which tax was levied amounted to a capital levy and that therefore rule 350a was ultra vires. The Bombay High Court held that rule 350a was ultra vires the powers of the Municipality. If further held that the tax levied by the Muncipal Corporation on the open land was a tax falling under Entry 42 in List II of Schedule VII to the Government of India Act 1935 and that it could not be treated as trespassing upon Entry 55 in List I of Schedule VII to the Government of India Act on the assumption that it amounted to a tax on the capital value of the assets. Therefore it was held that the rule was not ultra vires. It was also contended that the State Legislature did not have legislative competence to enact the provision impugned in that case. That contention was negatived by Bombay High Court. ( 25 ) THIS decision of the High Court of Bombay was challenged by the tax-payer in appeal to the Supreme Court. By its decision (reported in Gordhandas case (supra)) the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the High Court of Bombay. In the view of the majority rule 350a framed by the Municipal Corporation Ahmedabad for rating open lands read with rule 243 was ultra vires secs. 73 and 75 inasmuch as it permitted the fixation of rate at percentage of capital value of the lands and not on their annual value. Therefore the assessment list prepared in that manner under rule 350a was also struck down as ultra vires the Act. The decision of the High Court of Bombay was reversed on the merits of the case. That part of the decision of the High Court of Bombay which upheld the legislative competence of the State Legislature was left untouched by the Supreme Court. ( 26 ) IT was contended in the case of Prithvi Cotton Mills (supra) before this Court on behalf of the petitioner that the view expressed by the High Court of Bombay on the question of legislative competence of the State Legislature was impliedly overruled by the Supreme Court. It was otherwise contended on behalf of the respondents. ( 26 ) IT was contended in the case of Prithvi Cotton Mills (supra) before this Court on behalf of the petitioner that the view expressed by the High Court of Bombay on the question of legislative competence of the State Legislature was impliedly overruled by the Supreme Court. It was otherwise contended on behalf of the respondents. This Court upheld the contention that since the Supreme Court had not expressed any opinion on the decision of the High Court of Bombay in so far as it upheld the legislative competence of the Provincial Legislature that part of the decision of the High Court of Bombay was not overruled or displaced. It was also contended before this Court that when a decision of one Court is reversed in appeal by another Court the decision of the appellate Court is substituted for the decision of the subordinate Court and that the decision of the subordinate Court which has been reversed has no legal existence. This Court turned down that contention. This Court laid down that it could not uphold the contention that the principle of substitution would apply to a part of the judgment solemnly pronounced by a Court and not overruled or reversed by the superior Court but kept expressly open. Therefore as long as that part of the decision remained intact it was binding upon all Courts and Tribunals which are subordinate or coordinate to the Court which recorded that decision. This Court also turned down the submission made on behalf of the petitioner that that part of the decision of the High Court of Bombay was robbed of its binding character. ( 27 ) RELYING upon this decision Mr. Nanavaty has argued that the decision of this Court in Arvind Mills case (supra) in so far as it relates to the violation of the fundamental rights or citizen-employers is binding upon this Court. It is not necessary for us to express any opinion on this aspect of the case for two reasons. The first reason in this. This Court held that the impugned provision was ultra vires the fundamental rights of a citizen under Art. 19 (1) (f) and Art. 14. However so far as Art. 19 (1) (f) was concerned it could not be void merely as regards the citizen- employers but it would be wholly void. The first reason in this. This Court held that the impugned provision was ultra vires the fundamental rights of a citizen under Art. 19 (1) (f) and Art. 14. However so far as Art. 19 (1) (f) was concerned it could not be void merely as regards the citizen- employers but it would be wholly void. That according to this Court was the interpretation to which Art. 13 (2) lent itself. It was on this assumption that this Court struck down at the instance of corporate-employers the impugned provisions. The Supreme Court in appeal found that it was an erroneous view. According to the Supreme Court a single provision which is impugned under the Constitution can be ultra vires the fundamental rights of a citizen and yet can be effective and can remain in force against non-citizens or corporate employers. Judging the value of the decision of this Court in Arvind Mills case (supra) in light of this proposition laid down by the Supreme Court it can be said without any fear of contradiction that the view which this Court expressed in regard to violation or infringement of the fundamental rights or citizen-employers was obiter dicta. In other words on an erroneous assumption this Court expressed a view and decided a contention which it was not necessary for it do decide in that case because no writ petition was filed by a citizen-employer. Therefore we must partly uphold the contention raised by the learned Government Pleader and hold that the view expressed by this Court in Arvind Mills case (supra) in the matter of violation of the fundamental rights of a citizen-employer is not binding upon this Court which is a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction because that view in light of the decision of the Supreme Court in appeal is obiter dicta. ( 28 ) HOWEVER an obiter dictum pronounced by this Court is also entitled to great respect though it does not have the binding value. In ordinary course therefore we would have with great respect examined the reasoning which led this Court to express the view which it did in the matter of violation of fundamental rights of a citizen-employer by the impugned provisions. In ordinary course therefore we would have with great respect examined the reasoning which led this Court to express the view which it did in the matter of violation of fundamental rights of a citizen-employer by the impugned provisions. However it is not necessary for us in this case to do so because the question relating to violation of the fundamental rights of citizen-employers has been examined by the Supreme Court in the appeal which was carried to it from the decision of this Court in Arvind Mills case (supra ). ( 29 ) NOW so far as the view of the Supreme Court on this aspect is concerned it is not conclusive because after having elaborately examined the contention the Supreme Court has left it inconclusive which is borne out by the fact that paragraph 22 of the report opens with expression Be that as it may and then it is stated in paragraph 23 that the Supreme Court assumes that the impugned provisions abridge the fundamental rights of a citizen-employer and a citizen-employee under Art. 19 (1) (f) and proceeds to decide the question whether the impugned provisions are void as regards non-citizen employers or corporate employers under Art. 13 (2 ). Therefore we must say that the observations made by the Supreme Court in Ambica Mills case (supra) are also obiter dicta. But the obiter dicta expressed by the Supreme Court are binding upon this Court. ( 30 ) LET us now turn therefore to what the Supreme Court has stated on the subject. Unpaid accumulations represent the obligation of the employers to the employees and they are the property of the employees. What is treated as abandoned property is the obligation to the employees owed by the employers. It is the property from the standpoint of employees. The scheme of legislation from a practical point of view disclosed that what was treated as abandoned property was the money which the employees were entitled to get from the employers. What the Labour Welfare Board took over was the obligation of the employers to pay the amounts due to the employees in consideration of the moneys paid by the employers to the Board. The State after it took over the moneys became liable to make payment to the employees to the extent of the amount received. What the Labour Welfare Board took over was the obligation of the employers to pay the amounts due to the employees in consideration of the moneys paid by the employers to the Board. The State after it took over the moneys became liable to make payment to the employees to the extent of the amount received. Whether the liability which the State assumed to the employees was an altogether new liability or an old liability of the employers was more a matter of academic interest than of practical consequence. When unpaid accumulations were paid by the employers to the Board the liability of the employers to make payment to the employees in respect of their claims was discharged to the extent of the amount paid to the Board. And on the transfer of such liability to the Board the debts or claims to that extent could not be enforced against the employers. The Supreme Court has further observed that if unpaid accumulations transferred to the Labour Welfare Board under the Act were not claimed within the total period of seven years the inactivity on the part of the employees would furnish adequate basis for the administration by the State of the unascertained claims or demands. It could not be said that the period of seven years allowed to the employees for the purpose of claiming unpaid accumulations was an unreasonably short period and that therefore it would result in infringement of any constitutional rights of the employees. The Supreme Court also could not think that the State would be in fact less able or less willing to pay the amounts to the employees after it had taken them over. It could not be assumed that the mere substitution of the State as the debt or would deprive the employees of their property or impose on them any unconstitutional burden. Unless an injury actual or threatened was shown no constitutional argument could be raised against the taking over of unpaid accumulations by the State. Since the employers are the debtors of the employees they can interpose no objection if the State is lawfully entitled to demand the payment because in that case payment of debt to the State under the statute releases the employers of their liability to the employees. The various modes of notice prescribed in sec. Since the employers are the debtors of the employees they can interpose no objection if the State is lawfully entitled to demand the payment because in that case payment of debt to the State under the statute releases the employers of their liability to the employees. The various modes of notice prescribed in sec. 6a of the Labour Walfare Act were sufficient to give reasonable information to the employees within the State and outside it to come forward and demand the amount if they really wanted to do so. These observations made by the Supreme Court should really have concluded the question before this Court. We find from these observations that what now the employers regard as their property is really their liability and that the transfer of such liability from the employers to the Labour Welfare Board does not violate any fundamental right of theirs. ( 31 ) HOWEVER it has been argued by Mr. Nanavaty that a disputed debt which has not been adjudicated upon and which has not become the judgment-debt continues in so far as the moneys are concerned to be the property of the employers which the employers are entitled to use for their benefit. According to him it is only the judgment-debt which creates the liability and brings about the cessation of the employers interest in the moneys payable under such a judgment-debt. In this context it has been further argued by him that since there is no machinery provided under the Act to adjudicate upon the disputed accumulations which have remained unpaid what the Act seeks is to deprive the employers of their moneys before their liability to pay them to their employer is adjudicated upon. Relying upon a decision of the Supreme Court to which we shall presently refer it has been argued by Mr. Nanavaty that the maximum that can be said against the employers in respect of disputed accumulations which have remained unpaid to their employees is that there is an outstanding credit-debt of the employers. According to him such a credit-debt cannot be used as a weapon or instrument to deprive the employers of their moneys because a debtor is under no obligation to pay his debt to his creditor unless the debt has been adjudicated upon by a Court of law and decree has been passed in favour of the creditor. According to him such a credit-debt cannot be used as a weapon or instrument to deprive the employers of their moneys because a debtor is under no obligation to pay his debt to his creditor unless the debt has been adjudicated upon by a Court of law and decree has been passed in favour of the creditor. Though we feel that we are bound by the obiter dicta expressed by the Supreme Court in Ambica Mills case (supra) in regard to the nature of unpaid accumulations we propose to answer this contention raised by Mr. Nanavaty in order to finally put an end to the controversy so far as this Court is concerned. ( 32 ) THE learned Government Pleader has contended that by Forty-Fourth Constitutional Amendment Art. 19 (1) (f) and Art. 31 have been repealed and that therefore they cannot now be invoked for challenging the constitutional validity of the impugned provisions of the Labour Welfare Act. He has cited several decisions in support of his contention. None of them is applicable to the instant case. We are however making a brief reference to each one of them. ( 33 ) THE first decision is in Union of India v. Madan Gopal Kabra AIR 1954 S. C. 158. It was a case under the Income-tax Act 1922 (as amended by Finance Act 1950 The principle which has been laid down in that decision is that the Constitution has no retrospective operation except where a different intention clearly appears. Where new Legislatures are brought into existence and certain powers of legislation are conferred upon them it is not correct to say that the Constitution operates retrospectively. The legislative powers which are conferred upon Parliament under Art. 245 and Art. 246 read with List I of the Seventh Schedule could obviously be exercised only after the Constitution came into force and no retrospective operation of the Constitution was involved in the conferment of those powers. However it is quite a different thing to say that the Parliament while exercising the powers thus acquired is precluded from making a retroactive law. The question must depend upon the scope of the powers conferred and it must be determined with reference to the terms of the instrument by w hich affirmatively the legislative powers have been created and by which negatively they have been restricted. The question must depend upon the scope of the powers conferred and it must be determined with reference to the terms of the instrument by w hich affirmatively the legislative powers have been created and by which negatively they have been restricted. It was a case in which Income-tax Act 1922 was made applicable to United State of Rajasthan where it did not apply earlier. This is a case in which the application of a law acted retroactively. We are concerned with a case in which the question which has arisen is whether certain fundamental rights which were in force in the country prior to their repeal by the Forty-Fourth Constitutional Amendment can be said to be of 40 consequence during the period of their operation on account of their subsequent and prospective repeal. ( 34 ) THE next decision to which reference has been made is in Bhikhaji Narain Dhakars and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh and another AIR 1955 S. C. 781. It was a case under C. P. and Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act 1947 The constitutional validity of that legislation was challenged on the grounds that it violated Art. 19 (1) (g) and (6) and Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution. Now on 18th June 1951 by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1951 clause (2) of Art. 19 was amended and a new clause was introduced. It was expressly made retrospective. However clause (6) of Art. 19 which was amended was not made retrospective. It was contended that although the Amending Act became on and from 26th January 1950 void as against the citizens to the extent of its inconsistency with the provisions of Art. 19 (1) (g) nevertheless after 18th June 1951 with the amendment of clause (6) the Amending Act ceased to be inconsistent with the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (g) read with Clause (6) of the amended Article because that clause as it then stood created by State law the monopoly in respect inter alia of motor transport business and it became operative again even as against the citizens. It was contended that the law was void for its unconstitutionality and was therefore dead and could not be vitalized by subsequent amendment to the Constitution removing the constitutional objection unless it was re-enacted. It was contended that the law was void for its unconstitutionality and was therefore dead and could not be vitalized by subsequent amendment to the Constitution removing the constitutional objection unless it was re-enacted. It is in that context that the Supreme Court construed the word void used in Art. 13 and observed that the question of its interpretation was concluded by the majority decision of the Supreme Court in Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay AIR 1951 S. C. 128. The Supreme Court therefore proceeded to apply the ratio decidendi in that case to the facts of the case which they were deciding. The Supreme Court took the view that the C. P. and Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act 1947 was an existing law when the Constitution came into force. It imposed on the exercise of the right guaranteed to the citizens of India by Art. 19 (1) (g) restriction which could not be Justified as reasonable under Clause (6) as it then stood and therefore under Art. 13 (1) that law became void to the extent of such inconsistency. Relying upon the principles laid down in Keshavan Madhava Menons case (supra) the Supreme Court further observed that such a law became void not in toto or for all purposes or for all times or for all persons but only to the extent of such inconsistency. Secondly it did not become void independently of the existence of the rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution on and after the commencement of the Constitution the impugned law as a result of its becoming inconsistent with the provisions of Art. 19 (1) (g) read with Clause (6) as it then stood could not be permitted to stand in the way of the exercise of that fundament right. Upon the interpretation and application of clause (1) of Art. 13 the Supreme Court observed that by reason of the language used in that Article the entire operation of the inconsistent law could not be said to have been obliterated or wiped out. It existed for all past transactions and for enforcement of rights and liabilities which accrued before the Constitution came into existence. It continued in force even after the commencement of the Constitution with respect to persons who were not citizens and who could not claim the fundamental right. It existed for all past transactions and for enforcement of rights and liabilities which accrued before the Constitution came into existence. It continued in force even after the commencement of the Constitution with respect to persons who were not citizens and who could not claim the fundamental right. Clause (1) of Art. 13 had the effect of nullifying or rendering the existing law which had become inconsistent with Art. 19 (1) (g) read with clause (6) as it then stood ineffectual nugatory and devoid of any legal force or binding effect only with respect to the exercise of the fundamental right on and after the date of the commencement of the Constitution. Therefore between 26th January 1950 and 18th June 1951 the impugned Act could not stand in the way of the exercise of the fundamental right of the citizens under Art. 19 (1) (g ). Proceeding further the Supreme Court has observed that the true position is that the impugned law became eclipsed for the time being by the fundamental right. The effect of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1951 was that it removed the shadow and made the impugned Act free from all blemish or infirmity. If it was not so then it was not intelligible what existing law could have been sought to be saved from the operation of Art. 19 (1) (g) by the amended clause (6) in so far as it sanctioned the creation of State monopoly because ex hypothesi all existing laws creating such monopolies had become void at the date of the commencement of the Constitution in view of clause (6) as it then stood. All laws existing or future which were inconsistent with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution were by the express provision of Art. 13 rendered nugatory to the extent of such inconsistency. Such laws were not dead for all purposes. They existed for the purpose of pre-Constitution rights and liabilities and they remained operative even after the Constitution as against non-citizens. Against the citizens they remained in a dormant or moribund condition. However after the amendment of clause (6) of Art. 19 on 18th June 1951 the impugned Act ceased to be unconstitutional and became revivified and enforceable against citizens as well as against non-citizens. Against the citizens they remained in a dormant or moribund condition. However after the amendment of clause (6) of Art. 19 on 18th June 1951 the impugned Act ceased to be unconstitutional and became revivified and enforceable against citizens as well as against non-citizens. It was true that as the amended clause (6) was not made retrospective the impugned Act could have no operation as against citizens between 26th January 1950 and 18th June 1951 and that no rights and obligations could be founded on the impugned Act during the said period whereas the amended clause (2) by reason and on account of its being made retrospective had the effect during that period. The learned Government Pleader has invoked from this decision the doctrine of eclipse and tried to argue that what could not be recovered under the provisions of the Labour Welfare Act by virtue of the provisions of Art. 19 (1) (f) and Art. 31 (2) assuming that it was so could now be recovered because all that could be said now was that unpaid accumulations even if they were irrecoverable before Forty-Fourth Constitutional Amendment came into force lay in dormant and moribund condition and that they could now be recovered on account of the removal of the shadow of eclipse produced on them by Art. 19 (1) (f) and Art. 31 (2 ). We are unable to uphold the argument which the learned Government has based upon this decision because when Arts. 19 (1) (f) and 31 (2) were in operations no liability inconsistent with those Articles could be created by any law Such statutory liability as was consistent with those Articles-could alone be enforced. Merely because Art. 19 (1) (f) and Art. 31 have been repealed now it cannot be said that the liability which was hit by Art. 19 (1) (f) and Art. 31 when they were in force can now be enforced. To accede to the argument which the learned Government Pleader has raised is to hold that even though Art. 19 (1) (f) and Art. 31 have been repealed prospectively they had never been in force since the Constitution came into effect. ( 35 ) THE next decision to which our attention has been invited is in M. P. V. Sundararamier and Co. v. The State of Andhra Pradesh and another AIR 1958 S. C. 468. ( 35 ) THE next decision to which our attention has been invited is in M. P. V. Sundararamier and Co. v. The State of Andhra Pradesh and another AIR 1958 S. C. 468. It was a case under Madras General Sales Tax Act 1939 as applied to the State of Andhra Pradesh. The learned Government Pleader has relied upon the observations made in paragraph 42 of the report. It has been observed by the Supreme Court that unconstitutionality of an impugned provision may arise either because the law is in respect of a matter not within the competence of the Legislature or because the matter itself being within its competence its provisions offend constitutional restrictions. In a Federal Constitution where the legislative powers are distributed between different bodies the competence of the legislature to enact a particular law must depend upon whether the topic of that legislation has been assigned by the Constitution Act to that Legislature. Therefore a law made by a State on an Entry in List I of VII Schedule in the Constitution shall be wholly incompetent and void. However the law may be made on a topic within its competence as for example an entry in List II but it may infringe restrictions imposed by the Constitution on the character of the law to be passed as for example limitations enacted in Part III of the Constitution. A legislation on a topic which is not within the competence of a legislature and a legislature which is within the competence of Legislature but which violates the constitutional limitations have both the same reckoning in a Court of law. Both of them are unenforceable. The Supreme Court therefore proceeded to examine the question as to whether both the laws were of the same quality and character or stood on the same footing for all purposes. The Supreme Court noted that the preponderance of authority was in favour of the view that the law on a matter not within the competence of the Legislature is a nullity and a law on a topic within its competence but repugnant to the constitutional prohibitions is only unenforceable. This distinction has a material bearing on certain situations. The Supreme Court noted that the preponderance of authority was in favour of the view that the law on a matter not within the competence of the Legislature is a nullity and a law on a topic within its competence but repugnant to the constitutional prohibitions is only unenforceable. This distinction has a material bearing on certain situations. If a law is made on a field not within the domain of the Legislature it is absolutely null and void and subsequent cession of that field to the Legislature will not have the effect of breathing life into what was a still-born piece of legislation and a fresh legislation on the subject would be the requisite. In paragraph 47 of the report the Supreme Court has summarised its conclusions as follows: Where an enactment is unconstitutional in part but valid as to the rest assuming of course that the two portions are severable it could not be said to have been wiped out of the statute book because it must remain there for the purpose of enforcement of the valid portion thereof. Since it continues on the statute book even that portion which is unenforceable on the ground that it is unconstitutional will operate proprio vigore. In such a case there will be no need for a fresh legislation to give effect to it. ( 36 ) THE next decision is in Deep Chand v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others AIR 1959 S. C. 648. The Supreme Court was called upon in that case to consider the effect of the provisions of Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act 1955 The Supreme Court has in that case considered when doctrine of eclipse can be applied. It has been observed by the Supreme Court that a Legislature has no power to make any law in derogation of the injunction contained in Art. 13. The Supreme Court has also considered the distinction between clause (1) and clause (2) of Art. 13 Whereas under clause (1) a pre-Constitution law subsists except to the extent of its inconsistency with the provisions of Part III no post-Constitution law can be made contravening the provisions of Part III and therefore the law to that extent though made is a nullity from its inception. Clause (2) of Art. 13 says in clear and unambiguous terms that no State shall make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III. A constitutional prohibition against a State making certain laws cannot be whittled down by analogy or by drawing inspiration from decisions on the provisions of other Constitutions. A plain reading of the clause indicates without any reasonable doubt that the prohibition goes to the root of the matter and limits the States power to make law; the law made inspite of the prohibition is a still-born law. It has next been observed that the doctrine of eclipse has no application to post-Constitution laws infringing the fundamental rights as they are ab initio void in toto or to the extent of their contravention of the fundamental rights. It is therefore clear that whereas under clause (1) of Art. 13 pre-Constitution laws are void to the extent of their inconsistency with the provisions of the Constitution a post-Constitution law made in infringement of the fundamental rights is ab initio void in toto or to the extent of the contravention of the fundamental rights. To such a law doctrine of eclipse does not apply. In other words the Supreme Court has observed that the doctrine of eclipse can be invoked only in case of a law which is valid when made but a shadow is cast on it by supervening constitutional inconsistency or supervening existing statutory inconsistency. Once the shadow is removed the impugned Act is freed from all blemish or infirmity. ( 37 ) THE argument which has been advanced on the basis of this decision is that unpaid accumulations which suffered an eclipse cast by Art. 19 (1) (f) and Art. 31 (2) now become revivified on account of repeal of Art. 19 (1) (f) and Art. 31. ( 38 ) THE next decision is in Mahendra Lal Jaini v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others AIR 1963 S. C. 1019. The principles which have been laid down by the Supreme Court in that case are as follows. The doctrine of eclipse applies to pre-Constitution laws which are governed by Art. 13 (1) and does not apply to post-Constitution laws which are governed by Art. 13 (2 ). The words to the extent of in Art. 13 do not import any idea of time. The doctrine of eclipse applies to pre-Constitution laws which are governed by Art. 13 (1) and does not apply to post-Constitution laws which are governed by Art. 13 (2 ). The words to the extent of in Art. 13 do not import any idea of time. They only import the idea that the law may be void either wholly or in part and that only such portions will be void as are inconsistent with Part III or have contravened Part III and no more. The pre-Constitution laws which were perfectly valid when they were passed and the existence of which was recognised under Art. 13 (1) revived by the removal of the inconsistency in question. There is a difference between the language and scope of Art. 13 (1) and (2 ). A plain reading of the words in Art. 13 (1) and (2) brings out a clear distinction between the two. Art. 13 (1) declares such pre-Constitution laws as are inconsistent with fundamental rights void. Art. 13 (2) consists of two parts. The first part imposes an inhibition on the power of the State to make a law contravening fundamental rights and the second part which is merely a consequential one mentions the effect of the breach by providing that such law is void to the extent of the contravention. In view of this clear position unlike a law governed by Art. 13 (1) which was valid when made the law made in contravention of the prohibition contained in Art. 13 (2) is a still-born law either wholly or partially depending upon the extent of the contravention. Such a law is dead from the beginning and there can be no question of its revival under the doctrine of eclipse. The application of the doctrine of eclipse in one case and not in the other case does not depend upon giving a different meaning to the word void in the two parts of Art. 13. The meaning of the word void is for all practical purposes the same in both the clauses namely; that the law is ineffectual and nugatory and devoid of any legal force or binding effect. However there is one vital difference in this matter. The voidness of the pre-Constitution laws is only from the date when the Condition came into force. Therefore they existed and operated for sometime and for certain purposes. However there is one vital difference in this matter. The voidness of the pre-Constitution laws is only from the date when the Condition came into force. Therefore they existed and operated for sometime and for certain purposes. The voidness of post-Constitution laws is from their very inception and they cannot therefore continue to exist for any purpose. This distinction between the voidness in one case and the voidness in the other arises from the circumstance that one is a pre-constitution law and the other is a post-Constitution law. The application of the doctrine in one case and not in the other case arises from the inherent difference between Art. 13 (1) and Art. 13 (2) arising from the fact that one is dealing with pre-Constitution laws and the other is dealing with post- Constitution laws with the result that in one case the law being not still born the doctrine of eclipse will apply while in the other case the laws being still-born there will be no scope for the application of the doctrine of eclipse. ( 39 ) THE next decision is in The State of Punjab v. M/s. Sansari Mal Puran Chand AIR 1968 S. C. 331. It was a case under the East Punjab General Sales Tax Act 1948 In that case constitutional validity inter alia of sec. 5 was challenged. The Supreme Court held that sec. 5 as originally enacted in 1948 was void. But merely because sec. 5 was void. it did not render secs. 4 and 6 and the other sections of that Act void. They remained only unenforceable until new sec. 5 was inserted. Sec. 5 as amended by East Punjab Act 19 of 1952 was not invalid on the ground of excessive delegation of legislative authority nor was it invalid on the ground that Act 19 of 1952 purported to amend a still-born law. Insertion of amended sec. 5 with retrospective effect was held valid. However the amended sec. 5 could not take effect either prospectively or retrospectively in respect of sales and purchases of essential goods because of the ban of Art. 286 (3) as it was in force then. It could however take effect in respect of sales and purchases of other goods. 5 with retrospective effect was held valid. However the amended sec. 5 could not take effect either prospectively or retrospectively in respect of sales and purchases of essential goods because of the ban of Art. 286 (3) as it was in force then. It could however take effect in respect of sales and purchases of other goods. With the admendment of clause (3) of Art. 286 by the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act in 1956 the restriction placed by Art. 286 (3) prior to its amendment in respect of essential goods was lifted and the amended sec. 5 took effect thereafter in respect of all such goods also. ( 40 ) IN State of Mysore and another v. D. Achiah Chetty etc. AIR 1969 S. C. 477 the Supreme Court was considering the scope and effect of Bangalore Acquisition of Lands (Validation) Act. By enacting the Validating Act the Mysore Legislature tried to make a single law retrospectively for acquisition of land made prior to its enactment for the purpose of improvement expansion or development of the city of Bangalore. The Validating Act provided that no acquisition shall be called in question on the ground that the State Government was not competent to make the acquisition. No claim based upon the failure to observe the provisions of the Improvement Act could therefore be heard. The Supreme Court held that the State Legislature had the power to make a law with retrospective effect getting over discrimination caused by two different procedures. . ( 41 ) THE next decison is in L. Jagannath etc. v. The Authorised Officer Lands Reforms. Madurai and another etc AIR 1952 S. C. 425. In that case the validity of Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act 1961 was challenged. That Act was struck down as unconstitutional in A. P. Krishnaswamy Naidu v. State of Madras AIR 19645. C. 1515. It was thereafter included in the Ninth Schedule. It was contended that since it was declared invalid it had become non est and was void ab initio. It was thereupon contended that Art. 31-B could not become valid merely on account of its inclusion in the Ninth Schedule. In nother words it was argued that since that Act was void under Art. 13 (2) it was dead and could not be revivified by subsequent amendment to the Constitution but had to be re-enacted. It was thereupon contended that Art. 31-B could not become valid merely on account of its inclusion in the Ninth Schedule. In nother words it was argued that since that Act was void under Art. 13 (2) it was dead and could not be revivified by subsequent amendment to the Constitution but had to be re-enacted. The Supreme Court held that apart from the question as to whether fundamental rights originally enshrined in the Constitution were subject to the amendatory process of Article 368 it must be held that Art. 31-B and the Ninth Schedule have cured the defect if any in the various Acts mentioned in the said Schedule as regards any unconstitutionality alleged on the ground of infringement of fundamental rights and that by the express words of Art. 31-B such curing of the defect took place with retrospective operation from the dates on which the Acts were put on the statute book. Therefore such Acts even if void or inoperative at the time when they were enacted by reason of infringement of Art. 13 (2) of the Constitution assumed full force and vigour from the respective dates of their enactment after their inclusion in the Ninth Schedule read with Art. 31-B of the Constitution. The States could not at any time cure a defect arising from the violation of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution and therefore the objection that the said Madras Act should have been re-enacted by the Madras Legislature after the Seventeenth Constitutional Amendment came into force was not accepted. ( 42 ) THE next decision is in Hari Singh and others v. The Military Estate officer Delhi Circle Delhi Cantt. and another AIR 1972 S. C. 2205. In that case the Supreme Court was examining the provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act 1971 Under the provisions of this Act discrimination resulting from two procedures provided under an earlier Act was retrospectively removed. It was held by the Supreme Court that it was within the legislative competence to enact such a validating Act. ( 43 ) THE next decision to which our attention has been invited is in The Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society and another etc. v. State Gujarat and another AIR 1974 S. C. 1389. It was held by the Supreme Court that it was within the legislative competence to enact such a validating Act. ( 43 ) THE next decision to which our attention has been invited is in The Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society and another etc. v. State Gujarat and another AIR 1974 S. C. 1389. All that has been pointed out from this decision is that if a provision is enacted to check the abuse of power of administration it does not offend the constitutional provision. ( 44 ) ALL these decisions have been pressed into service by the learned Government Pleader to drive home to us two propositions The first relates to the doctrine of eclipse and the second relates to the retroactive character of a prospective legislation. We cannot apply to the instant case the doctrine of eclipse and hold that the provisions as to unpaid accumulations which were eclipsed by Art. 19 (1) (f) and Art. 31 now emerge if they were otherwise void under the Constitution as a good law. Doctrine of eclipse applies to a pre-Constitution law which was valid before the Constitution came into force and was found to be inconsistent with it after the Constitution came into force. The law with which we are dealing is not a pre-Constitution law but a post-Constitution law. It is therefore governed by clause (2) of Art. 13 which provides for voidness on the ground of constitutional contravention and not on the ground of constitutional inconsistency. Therefore if sec. 3 contravened Art. 19 (1) (f) and and Art. 31 it was void ab initio and could not be revivified merely because Art. 19 (1) (f) and Art. 31 have now been repealed. Secondly the question of retroactive character of the repeal of Art. 19 (1) (f) and Art. 31 does not arise in the instant case. Admittedly the repeal is not retrospective. We are unable to unhold the argument that though the State Legislature could not otherwise legislate in respect of unpaid accumulations before Forty-Fourth Constitutional Amendment came into force it can now do so because the embargo placed by those two Articles has now been removed. Since the Labour Welfare Act is a post-constitution law if sec. 3 contravened Art. 19 (1) (f) and Art. 31 it was dead ab initio and non-est. It cannot be revivified now unless it is re-enacted. Since the Labour Welfare Act is a post-constitution law if sec. 3 contravened Art. 19 (1) (f) and Art. 31 it was dead ab initio and non-est. It cannot be revivified now unless it is re-enacted. If it is re-enacted with retrospective effect it will be open to the plaintiffs to challenge it on the ground that the past liability which accrued from such an enactment could not be enforced because during the period in respect of which liability accrued it contravened Art. 19 (1) (f) and Art. 31 (2) which were in force then. The problem which the learned Government Pleader has presented for our consideration cannot be solved with reference to any decisions because it is a novel problem. It also cannot be said that the impugned provision should be tested on the anvil of the constitutional provisions as they now exist. In our opinion it is an error to argue that if the Legislature enacts such law now when Arts. 19 (1) (f) and 31 (2) are no longer in existence and have been replaced by Art. 300a the impugned provisions will be valid. It is no test at all. So far as extra-legal point of view is concerned we cannot assume that the State Legislature will enact such a law now. It is a matter of legislative will. Composition of the State Legislative goes on changing periodically. Therefore in our opinion the constitutional validity of the impugned provisions can be tested on the anvil of Art. 19 (1) (f) and Art. 31 (2) because during the period they were in force the liability which the impugned provisions produced for the employers must be consistent with those constitutional provisions. To take any other view is to make their repeal retrospective even though the Parliament has not repealed them with retrospective effect. We are therefore unable to uphold the preliminary contention raised by the learned Government Pleader. ( 45 ) WE now turn to the merits of the case. Sec. 3 (1) directs every employer to make over to the Labour Welfare Fund inter alia all unpaid accumulations as defined by sec. 2 (10 ). Unpaid accumulations are payments due to the employees but not made to them. There is no doubt about the fact that all unpaid accumulations represent moneys. Sec. 3 (1) directs every employer to make over to the Labour Welfare Fund inter alia all unpaid accumulations as defined by sec. 2 (10 ). Unpaid accumulations are payments due to the employees but not made to them. There is no doubt about the fact that all unpaid accumulations represent moneys. It cannot be gainsaid that moneys are property within the meaning of Art. 19 (1) (f) as well as Art. 31 (2 ). It is not necessary to illustrate this proposition with reference to any decision of the Supreme Court. However if any authority for this proposition is required it is firstly found in the case of Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Company Ltd. (supra ). The principle has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of Shree Ambica Mills Ltd. (supra ). ( 46 ) THE last decision to which our attention has been invited is in Madan Mohan Pathak and another v. Union of India and others AIR 1978 S. C. 803. It was a case under the Life Insurance Corporation (Modification of Settlement) Act 1976 The Supreme Court has observed in that decision that the property cannot have one meaning in Art. 19 (1) (f) and another in Art. 31 (1) and still another in Art. 31 (2 ). Property must have the same connotation in all the three Articles and since they are constitutional provisions intended to secure a Fundamental right they must receive the widest interpretation and must be held to refer to property of every kind. Property within the meaning of Art. 19 (1) (f) and C1. (2) of Art. 31 comprises every form of property tangible or intangible including debts and choses in action such as unpaid accumulations of wages pension cash grant and constitutionally protected Privy Purse. While coming to that conclusion the Supreme Court has referred to several earlier decisions. It cannot therefore be gainsaid that unpaid accumulations are the property which originally belonged to the employer. While directing the employer to make over unpaid accumulations to the Labour Welfare Fund no compensation as contemplated by Art. 31 12) has been provided This is an undisputed proposition. The only serious question which we are in this context called upon to decide is whether the unpaid accumulations are the property of the employer. ( 47 ) MR. While directing the employer to make over unpaid accumulations to the Labour Welfare Fund no compensation as contemplated by Art. 31 12) has been provided This is an undisputed proposition. The only serious question which we are in this context called upon to decide is whether the unpaid accumulations are the property of the employer. ( 47 ) MR. Nanavaty has argued that if an employer disputes his liability to pay unpaid accumulations to his workmen they are his moneys. They cannot cease to be his moneys unless his liability to pay unpaid accumulations has been determined or adjudicated upon by some one. In other words according to Mr. Nanavaty to deprive an employer of his moneys without adjudication of his liability is an unreasonable restriction within the meaning of Art. 19 (5) as it was in force at the relevant time upon his fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (f ). Secondly to do so without paying the employer compensation is to violate Art. 31 (2 ). Unpaid accumulations according to Mr. Nanavaty are essentially and basically moneys belonging to the employer. If the employees to whom they are due do not claim them and if the employer disputes the liability to pay them they continue to be the employers moneys or his property. He is entitled to use and enjoy them. ( 48 ) NOW these unpaid accumulations can be divided in two classes. Unpaid accumulations admittedly due to workmen and not paid to them form one class. In our opinion they are not employers moneys or property. Accumulations admittedly due to the employees and not paid to them are employers moneys in the hands of the employer. They stand on par with judgment-debt because no adjudication in respect of such admittedly undischarged liability is required. The second class consists of disputed unpaid accumulations. In such a case the employer disputes his liability to pay such accumulations to the workmen. The question which therefore arises for our consideration is whether there is any machinery to determine the employers liability in respect of unpaid accumulations in case he disputes it ? If the Act provides for such a machinery the determination recorded as a result of adjudication will create for the employer a judgment-debt and the employers interest in those unpaid accumulations shall cease to exist. ( 49 ) IN reply to this contention raised by Mr. If the Act provides for such a machinery the determination recorded as a result of adjudication will create for the employer a judgment-debt and the employers interest in those unpaid accumulations shall cease to exist. ( 49 ) IN reply to this contention raised by Mr. Nanavaty the learned Government Pleader has principally relied upon two arguments. The first argument centres round Rule 4 of The Labour Welfare Fund (Gujarat) Rules 1962 It appears that this rule was not pointed out to this Court when it decided Arvind Mills case reported in 7 GLR 156. This Court in that decision has in terms laid down that the determination of unpaid accumulations due from and payable by an employer was left to the subjective determination of the Welfare Commissioner. With great respect we do not agree with that proposition. Rule 4 requires the Welfare Commissioner to make such enquiry as he may deem fit. It has got to be read in light of sec 3 (4) which was inserted by Gujarat Act 47 of 1961. It lays down that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or any contract or instrument all unpaid accumulations shall he collected by such agencies and in such manner as may be prescribed and be paid in the first instance to the Board which shall keep a separate account therefor until claims thereto have been decided in the manner provided in sec. 64. Rule 4 has reference to sub- sec. (4) of sec. 3 The expression after making such enquiries as he may deem fit used in rule 4 does not give the Welfare Commissioner unfettered and arbitrary discretion to hold an enquiry or not to hold one The scheme of rule 4 has got to be read in light of sec. 12 of the Act which inter alia empowers the State Government to appoint Inspectors to inspect records in connection with the sums payable into the Fund. Such an Inspector has the power to enter at any reasonable time any premises for carrying out the purposes of the Act. He may exercise such other powers as may be prescribed. 12 of the Act which inter alia empowers the State Government to appoint Inspectors to inspect records in connection with the sums payable into the Fund. Such an Inspector has the power to enter at any reasonable time any premises for carrying out the purposes of the Act. He may exercise such other powers as may be prescribed. Rule 19 empowers every Inspector for carrying out the purposes of the Act to require any employer to produce any document for inspection to supply him a true copy of any such document and to give him a statement in writing Rule 19a requires every Inspector to visit all establishments at least once in every six months to verify whether the statements required to be submitted by an employer under the rules have been submitted and if so whether the information submitted is complete and correct. It is clear therefore that under sec. 12 and the relevant rules made under the Act an Inspector has the authority to gather material from every establishment in order to find out what are inter alia unpaid accumulations which are lying with the employers. He then reports to the Welfare Commissioner to which reference has been made in rule 4. In our opinion the scheme of rule 4 is as follows. On the receipt of the report of the Inspector or otherwise the Welfare Commissioner comes to a tentative conclusion as to that are unpaid accumulations which an employer is liable to pay to the Labour Welfare Board. Having recorded such a tentative conclusion he gives notice to the employer to find out whether there is any dispute about the tentative conclusion which is recorded in regard to the employers liability. If the employer disputes the liability he is bound to hold an enquiry. It is wrong to say that under rule 4 to hold an enquiry or not to hold an enquiry is a matter of his arbitrary choice. Thereafter the Welfare Commissioner holds an enquiry and determines on evidence the liability of an employer in respect of unpaid accumulations due from him. The Welfare Commissioner cannot in a matter of this type but act on the evidence before him. What the Welfare Commissioner does is to record an objective determination on evidence s)f an objective fact. There is no element of subjective satisfaction in this case. The Welfare Commissioner cannot in a matter of this type but act on the evidence before him. What the Welfare Commissioner does is to record an objective determination on evidence s)f an objective fact. There is no element of subjective satisfaction in this case. Since the Welfare Commissioner is recording an objective determination on evidence he is bound to make a reasoned order showing how he has arrived at his conclusion in regard to unpaid accumulations which an employer is liable to pay. Thereafter he serves a notice of demand upon the employer. In our opinion this determination is also not final under the Act or the rules because no provision has been pointed out which bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in the matter or makes the determination of the Welfare Commissioner final. Therefore if an employer is aggrieved by the objective determination recorded by the Welfare Commissioner? it is open to him to challenge it in a Civil Court whose decision indeed as it should be shall be final and shall hold the field. In our opinion therefore rule 4 provides adequate machinery for judicial determination of unpaid accumulation which an employer owes to his employees and which are liable to be made over to the Labour Welfare Fund under the Act. ( 50 ) IT is not only rule 4 to whom the role of protecting the Act against the constitutional vice can be assigned. It is quite probable that the rule-making authority in future may amend rule 4 and rob it of its real value. Does in such a case an Act which was valid become invalid ? Even if rule 4 is modified in future the impugned provisions of the Act will not be rendered void because neither the Act nor the rules made thereunder make the determination of the Welfare Commissioner final and bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to examine it. We are therefore of the opinion that a notice of demand issued by the Welfare Commissioner can be challenged in a Civil Court. Unpaid accumulations which are collected by the Board shall vest in the Board after the adjudication by the Civil Court in case of dispute has become final. We are therefore of the opinion that a notice of demand issued by the Welfare Commissioner can be challenged in a Civil Court. Unpaid accumulations which are collected by the Board shall vest in the Board after the adjudication by the Civil Court in case of dispute has become final. Otherwise also where there is a dispute which has gone to the Civil Court the Board may not recover them voluntarily or can be restrained from recovering them under the force of an interim injunction which the Civil Court may issue. However if the Board has recovered them the Board is bound to hold them subject to the determination of the dispute by the Civil Court. If the Board has recovered unpaid accumulations during the pendency of the litigation before the Civil Court the Board is bound to hold them on behalf of the employer in case the employer succeeds. Therefore if such a holding amounts to vesting the Board shall be divested of them if the Civil Court decides in favour of the employer. If it does not amount to vesting the Board holds them on behalf of the employer subject to the result in civil litigation. If the Board loses the litigation it is bound to return the unpaid accumulations to the employer with interest. If it succeeds in it they finally vest in it. After having scanned the provisions of the Labour Welfare Act we are unable to come to the conclusion that it is a complete code. ( 51 ) MR. Nanavaty has then invited our attention to sec. 17 which provides as under: "any sum payable into the Fund under this Act shall without prejudice to any other mode of recovery be recoverable on behalf of the Board as an arrear of land revenue". Ordinarily resort to sec. 17 will be had only after the Civil Court has finally decided the dispute where one exists in relation to the determination recorded by the Welfare Commissioner. However if the provisions of sec. 17 are invoked during the pendency of the litigation the injury likely to be caused by it can be averted by applying for an interim injunction. 17 will be had only after the Civil Court has finally decided the dispute where one exists in relation to the determination recorded by the Welfare Commissioner. However if the provisions of sec. 17 are invoked during the pendency of the litigation the injury likely to be caused by it can be averted by applying for an interim injunction. If the Civil Court does not issue it even then no irreparable injury is likely to be caused to the employer because as observed above the Board is bound to hold them in trust for the employer and return them to the employer with interest in case the employer succeeds ( 52 ) MR. Nanavaty has also argued that the impugned provisions make abandoned property what is not abandoned property. In other words according to him what is not an abandoned property cannot be artificially made abandoned property by the Legislature and then cannot be taken over. In light of the conclusions which we have recorded this question hardly survives. After the Welfare Commissioner has recorded an objective determination on evidence in regard to the unpaid accumulations which an employer is bound to make over to the Labour Welfare Fund they cease to be the employers property. Thereafter if an employee claims them he will subject to proof of his claim between him and the Board get them. If he does not claim them within the stipulated time or fails to prove his claim then it can certainly by regarded by the Act as abandoned property and the State is entitled to take them over. That is what the Supreme Court has stated in Ambica Mills case (supra ). The argument which Mr. Nanavaty has in this context raised is that failure to prove his claim by an employee or omission on the part of an employee to claim his dues must necessarily result in such unpaid accumulations finally becoming the property of the employer. This argument presupposes a tripartite determination in respect of unpaid accumulations which are disputed. According to Mr. Nanavaty the determination must be between the Labour Welfare Board on one hand the employer on the other hand and the employee on the third hand. This argument presupposes a tripartite determination in respect of unpaid accumulations which are disputed. According to Mr. Nanavaty the determination must be between the Labour Welfare Board on one hand the employer on the other hand and the employee on the third hand. In our opinion in a case of this type a tripartite determination is not necessary particularly when the employees residing in different parts of the country have not thought fit to claim their wages and other dues It there are two bipartisan determinations it is enough and protects the rights of all. The first bipartisan determination shall be in case of a dispute between an employer and the Labour Welfare Board. The second bipartisan determination shall be between an employee who claims his unpaid accumulations and the Labour Welfare Board. We see nothing wrong in such two bipartisan determinations. It is difficult to hold that in a matter of this type an employee his employer and the Board must be brought together in order to record a single determination. Once a determination has been recorded in case of a dispute between an employer and the Labour Welfare Board and once the liability of the employer has been determined the employer goes out of picture and he must make over all unpaid accumulations to the Labour Welfare Board. Thereafter if an employee claims his unpaid accumulations he may approach the Labour Welfare Board or sue it. On proof of his claim the Board is bound to pay him. It may happen in a given case that whereas a in dispute between an employer and the Labour Welfare Board it has been shown that employer owes to workman A a certain amount workman A may not be in a position to prove it against the Board when he tries to recover it from the Board after the Board has received it from the employer. This hiatus cannot be taken advantage of by the employer. Nor can he be permitted to argue that even though his liability to the Board has been proved in judicial proceedings his fundamental right is violated because the employee has failed to prove his claim against the Board. If an employee fails to prove his claim against the Board it is the employees inability and not the employers right. Nor can he be permitted to argue that even though his liability to the Board has been proved in judicial proceedings his fundamental right is violated because the employee has failed to prove his claim against the Board. If an employee fails to prove his claim against the Board it is the employees inability and not the employers right. The right to the moneys which the employer had would come to an end as soon as it was proved between him and the Board that he owed a certain amount to his particular employee or employee A. No such hiatus is likely to arise where an employee does not choose to make any claim against the Board. Therefore we cannot permit an employer who has lost his right in litigation against the Board to claim it again when the concerned employee tries to prove his claim against the Board. In other words the right which an employer had to hold the moneys was reduced to ashes upon the judicial determination of the liability of the employer in litigation between him and the Board. When an employee fails to make good his claim against the Board his right is also reduced to ashes out of the ashes of the employees right the employer cannot revivify his right nor can he retrieve it after having lost against the Board. ( 53 ) IT cannot be gainsaid that within the meaning of sec. 3 read with sec. 2 (10) all unpaid accumulations initially are the employers property it has been argued by Mr. Nanavaty. In our opinion except admittedly unpaid accumulations they are his property only at an initial stage but they cease to be his property after the judicial determination of his liability in that behalf has been recorded. We are therefore unable to uphold the argument raised by Mr. Nanavaty that when the employer is deprived of them he is deprived of his property without compensation. We are also unable to uphold for the reasons stated above that there is no machinery for adjudication of disputes in the Labour Welfare Act and the rules. In our opinion since the determination recorded by the Welfare Commissioner is an objective determination on evidence of an objective fact subject to the final determination by the Civil Court the question of subjective satisfaction as recorded by this Court in Arvind Millscase (supra) does not arise. In our opinion since the determination recorded by the Welfare Commissioner is an objective determination on evidence of an objective fact subject to the final determination by the Civil Court the question of subjective satisfaction as recorded by this Court in Arvind Millscase (supra) does not arise. In that view of the matter we are unable to uphold the argument raised by Mr. Nanavaty that in the guise of discharging an employer of his liability under sec. 6a what is done is to deprive the employer of his property. Once we view in this light the provisions of the Labour Welfare Act it is difficult to uphold the argument raised by Mr. Nanavaty that sec 17 provides a drastic remedy for recovery of unpaid accumulations. The conclusion which we have recorded is also fortified by the language of sec. 2 (10) which defines unpaid accumulations. They are payments due to the employees but not made to them. Due in our opinion means what is found due to an employee by the Welfare Commissioner on holding an objective enquiry in the first instance where he is bound to hear the employer and then by the Civil Court if the dispute still continues after the Welfare Commissioner has recorded his determination ( 54 ) LOOKING at it from another angle we can classify the unpaid accumulations into four divisions. (i) Unpaid accumulations credited by an employer in his books of accounts to the employees accounts. Ordinarily there is likely to be no dispute in regard to such unpaid accumulation. However if there arises one the Welfare Commissioner is bound to determine it as laid down by us subject to the final determination by the Civil Court if the dispute is taken there. (ii) The second division consists of unpaid accumulations not credited by the employers in their books of accounts to the accounts of their employees and not claimed by the employees but shown generally in the balance sheet. In case of such unpaid accumulations ordinarily there is bound to be a dispute between the employer and the Welfare Commissioner. (ii) The second division consists of unpaid accumulations not credited by the employers in their books of accounts to the accounts of their employees and not claimed by the employees but shown generally in the balance sheet. In case of such unpaid accumulations ordinarily there is bound to be a dispute between the employer and the Welfare Commissioner. In such a case the dispute will be decided in the first instance by the Welfare Commissioner whose decision shall be subject to the decision of the Civil Court if the dispute is carried there (iii) The third division will consist of unpaid accumulations in respect of which the employees have made claims within a period of three years as contemplated by sec. 2 (10) and they have been rejected. In such a case moneys indeed go back to the employers and the Board cannot claim them because the employee In a dispute between him and his employer raised within the specified period has failed to prove his claim. (iv) The fourth and the last devision consists of claims made by the employees within the time specified in sec. 2 (10) of Labour Welfare Act and upheld against the employer. In such cases an employer is bound to pay unpaid accumulations to his employee and the Board cannot claim them. However if they are not paid to the employee even after adjudication he is bound to make them over to the Board. There is little scope for dispute in a case of this type. ( 55 ) IN order to show that the State under the force of a law can take over only judgment-debt and nothing more Mr. Nanavaty has cited before us the decision of the Supreme Court in H. H. Maharajadhiraja Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur and others v. Union of India AIR 1971 S. C. 530. In that case Chief Justice Hidayatullah speaking on behalf of the majority of the Supreme Court meticulously and minutely contradistinguished the character of judgment-debt from other debts. In case of a debt or a liability to pay moneys it has to pass through four stages. First there is a debt which is not yet due. It has not become a part of the obligors things because no debt liability has arisen. When the liability may have arisen but is not either ascertained or admitted it passes through the second stage. First there is a debt which is not yet due. It has not become a part of the obligors things because no debt liability has arisen. When the liability may have arisen but is not either ascertained or admitted it passes through the second stage. The amount due even at this stage does not become a part of the obligors things. When the liability is both ascertained and admitted the third stage is reached. Then it becomes the property proper of the debtor in creditors hands. The law begins to recognise such property in insolvency in dealing with it in fraud of creditors fraudulent preference of one creditor against another subrogation equitable estoppel stoppage in transit etc. At the third stage it becomes a credit-debt which is fully provable and absolutely owing. The last stage is reached when the debt becomes a judgment-debt by reason of a decree of a Court. ( 56 ) MR. Nanavaty has argued that unless the liability of an employer to pay unpaid accumulations to his employees is either ascertained or admitted it does not become a credit-debt much less a judgment-debt. According to him a credit-debt is one which an employer is entitled to hold and enjoy. As already stated above when the Welfare Commissioner on evidence determines the employers liability to pay unpaid accumulations they become the judgment-debt subject indeed to the decision of the Civil Court if the dispute is taken there by an aggrieved party. Such a debt in our opinion is a judgment-debt which the Legislature can transfer to the Board directing the employer to make over the amount to the Board and directing the Board to take over the liability. The Legislature can statutorily discharge the employers from their obligation. Therefore what the Legislature has done is nothing but a substitution of creditors. ( 57 ) MR. Nanavati has further argued that if we discover in S. 4 the machinery for adjudication of disputes in regard to unpaid accumulations it will lead to conflicting adjudications. He developed his argument thus. The first adjudication will be before the Payment of Wages Authority between an employer and his employee. Another adjudication will be between the Labour Welfare Board and the employer. He developed his argument thus. The first adjudication will be before the Payment of Wages Authority between an employer and his employee. Another adjudication will be between the Labour Welfare Board and the employer. It is quite probable according to him that what is found by Payment of Wages Authority as not due to an employee may be found to be due to the Board and the employer will in such a case be required to pay the amount to the Board. This apprehension expressed by Mr. Nanavati is in our opinion totally unfounded. We say so because the adjudication before the Payment of Wages Authority between an employer and his employee is for the purpose of deciding the dispute between them. If the Payment of Wages Authority decides in favour of an employer the dispute which has been raised within 3 years by holding that he owes no unpaid accumulations to his employee the employer will have no liability in respect of such an amount to pay it over to the Board. If the Payment of Wages Authority decides such a dispute in favour of an employee ordinarily the employee will recover the moneys from his employer. If the employee does not take them 2way from his employer then it remains the judgment-debt of the employer and the employer will be under a statutory obligation to transfer it to the Board by paying over the amount to it. The adjudication before the Payment of Wages Authority is bound to be within a period of three years as contemplated by sec. 2 (10) of the Labour Welfare Act before the Board comes into picture. To repeat if an employee has succeeded before the Payment of Wages Authority and taken away his dues from his employer the Board cannot claim them from the employer. If he has not taken them away the Board has a statutory right to demand it from the employer and the employer has no property therein because it has become a judgment-debt. If he has not taken them away the Board has a statutory right to demand it from the employer and the employer has no property therein because it has become a judgment-debt. In case oaf unpaid accumulations which are disputed and which have not been adjudicated upon before the Payment of Wages Authority or any other judicial or quasi-judicial forum it will be open to the employer to seek an objective determination of his liability from the Welfare Commissioner and to challenge the determination recorded by the Welfare Commissioner on evidence before a Court of Law if he still disputes it. Once the dispute is decided between the employer and the Board by the Welfare Commissioner or by the Civil Court as the case may be the employer loses his property in those moneys and he merely owes a judgment-debt to his employee which can be taken over by the Board. Such an adjudilcation in our opinion need not necessarily be in the presence of an employee. ( 58 ) THE learned Government Pleader has tried to show us FORM C to The Labour Welfare Fund (Gujarat) Rules 1972 It prescribes a Register of particulars of employees in whose respect the unpaid accumulations are held by an employer. It is a statutory obligation of the employer to maintain such a register and it is bound to furnish very good evidence to find out what unpaid accumulations are due from an employer to his employees. FORM A to the said Rules is the Register of Wages which an employer is required to maintain under rule 21. Next piece of evidence which will be of very great significance in case of a dispute will be furnished by the account books of the employer. ( 59 ) THE learned Government Pleader has invited our attention to the unreported decision of the Supreme Court in Writ Petition No. 4319 of 1978 decided on 23rd July 1978. In that case the determination of damages was left to an Executive Officer. The question arose in the context of sec. 143 of The Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 1952 the constitutional validity of which was challenged in that case. The determination of damages under sec. 14b was left to the Central Provident Fund Commissioner or such other officer as might be authorised by the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette in that behalf. 143 of The Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 1952 the constitutional validity of which was challenged in that case. The determination of damages under sec. 14b was left to the Central Provident Fund Commissioner or such other officer as might be authorised by the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette in that behalf. The section was held to be valid. Therefore the Legislature may in its wisdom authorise an executive officer to perform judicial or quasi-judicial functions of adjudication. It cannot always be said in such a case that there is want of machinery for adjudication and that therefore the statute is unconstitutional. A given statute may be unconstitutional if Civil Courts jurisdiction has been expressly or by necessary implication ousted and the entire determination has been left to the subjective satisfaction of an executive officer. We therefore safely rely upon this unreported decision and uphold the constitutional validity of the impugned provisions in light of Rule 4 because there is no ouster of Civil Courts jurisdiction and Rule 4 provides quasi-judicial authority for adjudication. In order to explain to us the scope of an enquiry such as one which is contemplated by rule 4 our attention has been invited by the learned Government Pleader to the decision of the Supreme Court in The Commissioner of Coal Mines Provident Fund Dhanbad and others v. J. P. Lalla and Sons AIR 1975 S. C. 676 and also to the decision of the Delhi High Court in Wire Netting Stores v. Regional Provident Funds Commissioner and others AIR 1970 S. C. 143. It is not necessary to make a detailed reference to these decisions in light of the view which we have expressed. ( 60 ) UPON the analysis of the impugned and other relevant provisions it is clear that the Labour Welfare Act lays down no penal Consequences for non-compliance with the demand made by the Welfare Commissioner. Secondly it does not accord finality to the determination given by the Welfare Commissioner objectively and on evidence. Thirdly no interest is payable by an employer on unpaid accumulations. Secondly it does not accord finality to the determination given by the Welfare Commissioner objectively and on evidence. Thirdly no interest is payable by an employer on unpaid accumulations. We are therefore of the opinion that since there is no bar to invoking the machinery of the plenary Court to have the dispute between the employer and the Board adjudicated upon and secondly since machinery has been provided by rule 4 and since no such drastic consequences as specified above ensue from non-compliance with the determination recorded by the Welfare Commissioner we are of the opinion that the impugned provisions are reasonable and since what an employer is required to make over to the Board is judgment-debt the employer is not deprived of his property. . ( 61 ) THE learned Government Pleader has also invited our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Pathumma and others v. State of Kerala and others AIR 1978 S. C. 771. In that decision the Supreme Court has laid down that Courts should interpret the constitutional provisions against the social setting of the country so as to show a complete consciousness and deep awareness of the growing requirements of the society the increasing needs of the nation the burning problems of the day the complex issues facing the people which the legislature in its wisdom through benefical legislation seeks to solve. It has also been laid down that the judicial approach should be dynamic rather than static pragmatic and not pedantic and elastic rather than rigid. The Supreme Court has also laid down that while determining the reasonableness of a statute guidelines can be inferred from the Directive Principles laid down in the Constitution. ( 62 ) THE last argument which Mr. Nanavaty has raised is whether machinery for adjudication can be provided by a rule. In other words can the constitutional validity of the impugned provisions of the Labour Welfare Act be upheld in light of the rule or rules made thereunder? Can a rule render an otherwise unconstitutional Act constitutional? He has in terms conceded that if the Act and the Rules came into force simultaneously then resort to rules could be made for the purpose of upholding the constitutional validity of an impugned statute. Can a rule render an otherwise unconstitutional Act constitutional? He has in terms conceded that if the Act and the Rules came into force simultaneously then resort to rules could be made for the purpose of upholding the constitutional validity of an impugned statute. He has in the context of this case tried to point out that the Labour Welfare Act and the Rules made thereunder originally by Government of Bombay did not come into force simultaneously. The Labour Welfare Act came into force on 24th June 1953 Government of Gujarat originally made Rules thereunder and brought them into force on 30th June 1953. Rule 4 was in 1953 in the same form in which it is now. Basing his argument upon these two dates Mr. Nanavaty has argued that the Rules came into force six days after the Act came into force. Therefore resort to rules cannot be had for determining the constitutional validity of the impugned provisions. It is necessary to remember in this context that the material provisions of the Labour Welfare Act as originally enacted were held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. The scheme therefore which the original Act incorporated failed. It was revived in a different form when Gujarat Legislature passed the Amending Act which came into force on 1st July 1962. Indeed the amended provisions were given retrospective effect from the date on which the Act came into force. That is the effect of sec. 13 of the Amending Act. Irrespective of the back date with effect from which the amended provisions were brought into force the fact remains that the Amending Act itself came into force on 1st July 1962. On that day rule 4 upon which we have placed reliance was in force. In our opinion therefore it is open to us to rely upon rule 4 in order to determine the constitutional validity of the provisions of the Labour Welfare Act. Mr. Nanavaty has invited our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in The State of Bombay and another v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. and other AIR S. C. 252. The principle which Mr. Nanavaty has tried to enunciate before us has been laid down in that decision. Mr. Nanavaty has invited our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in The State of Bombay and another v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. and other AIR S. C. 252. The principle which Mr. Nanavaty has tried to enunciate before us has been laid down in that decision. Since in our opinion 1 July 1962 when the Amending Act came into force is the material date and since on that date rule 4 was in force the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision has no application to this case. ( 63 ) IT is necessary to repeat that we are not upholding the constitutional validity of the impugned provisions only on the strength of rule 4. If rule 4 was the sole prop upon which the impugned provisions could have rested we would have considered the argument raised by Mr. Nanavaty in greater details. In our opinion as held above the impugned provisions of the Labour Welfare Act are not only valid on account of the existence of rule 4 but also on account of the fact that machinery provided by the Civil Court can be resorted to by an employer for adjudication of the liability which he disputes and no penal consequences flow from non-compliance with the objective determination recorded by the Welfare Commissioner on evidence. ( 64 ) IN light of the reasons which we have stated the impugned provisions of the Act did not offend Art. 19 (1) (f) because what the State tries to take over from an employer under the Labour Welfare Act is a judgment-debt and nothing more. Secondly since the judgment-debt alone is taken over by the State the question of paying compensation to the employer under Art. 31 (2) could not arise. It is only a statutory substitution of creditors. The Act directs an employer to part with his liability and gives him a statutory discharge from that liability. ( 65 ) WE may record that Mr. Nanavaty has not challenged the legislative competence of the State Legislature to enact the impugned provisions because according to him he has nothing to say against the finding recorded by this Court in that behalf in the case of Arvind Mills Ltd. (supra ). We therefore do not propose to re-examine that question. Nanavaty has not challenged the legislative competence of the State Legislature to enact the impugned provisions because according to him he has nothing to say against the finding recorded by this Court in that behalf in the case of Arvind Mills Ltd. (supra ). We therefore do not propose to re-examine that question. ( 66 ) IN view of the reasons which we have recorded the constitutional challenge raised by the plaintiffs to the imgugned provisions of the Labour Welfare Act fails. ( 67 ) IN the result all the appeals fail and are dismissed. Decrees passed by the trial Court are confirmed. We direct that in the circumstances there shall be no order as to costs in each one of the appeals. ( 68 ) MR. I. M. Nanavaty who appears on behalf of the plaintiffs applies orally for certificate of fitness under Art. 133 (1) of The Constitution in order to enable the plaintiffs in each case to appeal to the Supreme Court against this decision. In our opinion the questions which we have decided are questions of very great importance. They should therefore be finally decided by the Supreme Court. Accordingly we grant certificate of fitness under Art. 133 (1) to the plaintiffs in each case for appealing to the Supreme Court against this decision. ( 69 ) MR. I. M. Nanavaty also requests that the recoveries which are to be made under the Bombay Labour Welfare Fund Act 1953 be stayed for some time in order to enable the plaintiffs to obtain an appropriate interim relief from the Supreme Court. We have heard the learned Government Pleader on this request made by Mr. Nanavaty. We direct that the recoveries to be made under the said Act shall be stayed until 5th of November 1979 in order to enable plaintiffs in each case to obtain appropriate interim relief from the Supreme Court. Appeals dismissed: Leave to appeal granted. .