Order Proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were instituted by the Sub-Inspector of Police, Channapatna, on 31st December, 1975, against the petitioners as also the 3rd respondent in respect of the schedule properties before the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate Ramanagaram Sub-division, Ramanagaram, in C.Mis. No. 120 of 1975-76. The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate after observing the necessary formalities passed a preliminary order under section 145 and thereafter, on 12th June, 1978 passed an order purported to be under section 146 (1), Criminal Procedure Code, which is challenged by the petitioners in this revision petition. 2. The first party M. Thimmegowda is the elder brother of the first member of the second party Honnegowda. The second member of the second party is the wife of the first member of the second party. There was a dispute in respect of the family properties and the first party is purported to have filed a petition before the Land Tribunal, Ramanagaram, under section 48-A (1) of the Land Reforms Act requesting the Tribunal to declare him to be as an occupant of the land in question. That petition was rejected on the ground that he has failed to prove that he was a tenant and on the other hand, he was a member of the joint family and in that capacity he was cultivating the lands in question as the manager of the family and as there was no question of tenancy, the Tribunal rejected his prayer. Against the said order, he preferred a writ petition in Writ Petition No. 5689 of 1975, on the file of this Court and the Honourable Court also dismissed the above petition observing that it is open to the petitioner to approach a Civil Court for relief in so far as his half-share in the family properties is concerned. 3. In the meanwhile, as aforesaid, section 145 proceedings were instituted and the Sub-Divisional Magistrate after having passed a preliminary order under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, further proceeded to attach the properties and appoint the Tahsildar of Channapatna as the receiver in respect of the schedule properties. Thereafter, the parties were called upon to put in their statement as also the affidavits and adduce evidence in respect of their claims to the properties. Thereafter, the parties were called upon to put in their statement as also the affidavits and adduce evidence in respect of their claims to the properties. The first member of the second party on 29th May, 1978 filed an application questioning the jurisdiction of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate on the ground that under section 132 (1) and (2) of the Land Reforms Act he cannot decide the matter in question. The order-sheet dated 29th May, 1978 indicates that the matter was posted to 12th June, 1978 for orders on interlocutory application and for final orders. Then the case was posted to 12th June, 1978 and the order-sheet of 12th June, 1978 reads thus: “Case called. 1st party members present 1st member of 2nd party present. Counsel for 1st party present. The additional documents are filed by the 1st member of 2nd party. These documents are the 12/R.R. which have no relevance to the possession aspect of the land. The order that the 1st party should be in possession of the land is pronounced in open Court.” 4. As could be seen from the order-sheet dated 12th June, 1978, the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate passed the impugned order holding that the first party to be in possession of the land. Aggrieved by the said order, the second party have challenged the legality and propriety of the said order in the above petition. 5. Sri S. Ramaprasad, learned advocate for the petitioners, among other contentions, mainly relied upon his application filed on 29th May, 1978 on the fact that the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate did not pass any orders on his application filed under section 132 (1) and (2) of the Land Reforms Act and and in his opinion it goes to the very jurisdiction of the said Magistrate and without deciding that point it is illegal to have assumed jurisdiction which was not vested in him to proceed to pass an order under sections 145 and 146 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The second contention of Sri Ramaprasad is to the fact that he has prayed in his application filed on 12th June, 1978 that the witnesses of both contending parties must be summoned and an opportunity should be given for them to examine the witnesses and without complying with their request the learned Magistrate has passed the impugned order even without adverting to the same during the course of his order. What he submitted was that the learned Magistrate has shut out the parties from adducing evidence in support of their case and thereby contravened the mandatory provisions of section 145 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. There is some force as far as the second submission of Sri Ramaprasad, that is, with regard to the examination of the witnesses of both the parties before a final order is passed in that behalf. But, as far as the first submission with regard to jurisdiction of the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate is concerned, I do not think there is any force in it. This is so because of the purpose and nature of these two independent bodies, who are required to pass orders under two enactments under the circumstances which has been reinforced by two decisions of our own High Court which would be referred to hereinafter. In Appajappa and another v. Lakshmirama Singh and others1 this is what is observed: “The inquiry contemplated under section 145 , Criminal Procedure Code is a limited one, i.e., with regard to the actual possession of the land in dispute at the material time and not with regard to the question whether the person claiming to be in possession is or is not a tenant of such land; and the provisions of either sub- section (1) or sub- section (2) of section 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act cannot be taken to have curtailed the power conferred by section 145 , Criminal Procedure Code, on the Court to embark upon such inquiry; and the provisions of section 133 (1) and (2) Land Reforms Act are not applicable to proceedings under section 145, which are intended to achieve a special object, viz., to prevent breach of peace arising from such dispute and to afford protection to the person found in possession on the material date.” The same proposition of law is reinforced by another pronouncement of our own High Court in Lakshmiah and others v. State and others2 which reads thus: “The dispute mentioned in section 145, Criminal Procedure Code is not in fact a dispute concerning any land, but rather it is a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace that exists concerning any land. The decision of the Magistrate is always subject to the decision of a Tribunal or Court to decide any question of title in respect of the land. The decision of the Magistrate is always subject to the decision of a Tribunal or Court to decide any question of title in respect of the land. Therefore it would not be correct to say that the proceeding before the Magistrate is ‘a proceeding concerning a land’ as contemplated in section 133(1)(i) of Land Reforms Act. Under section 133 (1) (i) Land Reforms Act, the decision is with reference to 1st March, 1974 and in a proceeding under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, the date 1st March, 1974 has absolutely no significance. The proceeding under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, is a proceeding in respect of a matter other than that referred to the Tribunal. That being so, section 133 , Land Reforms Act will not be a bar to a proceeding before a Magistrate under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code”. Following the pronouncement of our own High Court, it is too much to say that the application filed by the first member of the first party before the learned Magistrate under section 132 (1) and (2) of Karnataka Land Reforms Act would oust the jurisdiction of the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate. section 132 reads thus: “ Bar of jurisdiction: (1) No civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by, the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner, the Tribunal, the Tahsildar, the Revenue Appellate Tribunal or the State Government in exercise of their powers of control. (2) No order of the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner, the Tribunal, the Tahsildar, the Revenue Appellate Tribunal, or the State Government made under this Act shall be questioned in any Civil or Criminal Court.” A reading of the said section clearly indicates that what is prohibited by the civil Court is to settle, to decide or to deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with……in exercise of their powers of control. What is required to be decided by the Land Tribunal is the question whether a particular person is in possession of the land as a tenant. That is not a matter which is required to be settled by the Magisrate. He is not empowered to decide whether such particular person is in possession of the land as a tenant or not. That is not a matter which is required to be settled by the Magisrate. He is not empowered to decide whether such particular person is in possession of the land as a tenant or not. On the other hand, section 145 is abundantly clear that what he is empowered to decide under section 145 is that if he is satisfied from a report of a police officer or on other information that a dispute is likely to cause breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof, within his jurisdiction, he shall make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his Court in person or by pleader, on a specified date and time, and to put in written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. Therefore, it is clear that this provision confers power in the Executive Magistrate to intervene and pass a temporary on order in a dispute between the parties regarding possession of land which threatens to develop into use of force causing a breach of the peace and to prevent such danger this kind of speedy remedy is provided in drawing up of proceeding by passing a preliminary order under sub section (1) of section 145 against all the parties concerned in the dispute calling upon them to appear on a specified date and time, and to put in written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession. Sub- section (6) of section 145 thereafter empowers a Magistrate to pass a final order after hearing the parties and their evidence declaring and maintaining the possession of that party who in his position was in actual possession or who was dispossessed from such possession within two months next before the date of report of the police officer and forbidding disturbances until evicted in due course of law. Sub- section (8) of section 145 further empowers a Magistrate to act in case of emergency and if on an inquiry he decides that none other party was in possession or if he is unable to decide who was in actual possession, he may attach the property under section 146 until a competent Court has determined the rights of the parties which person is entitled to be in actual possession. Therefore, the power of the Magistrate in these proceedings to assume jurisdiction are: (a) That there shall be a dispute; (b) relating to possession of a land; (c) likely to cause breach of the peace and then only he could act if he is satisfied with these above pre-elements exist. Therefore, it is crystal clear that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate who acts under section 145 would in no way overlap or take away the jurisdiction of the Land Tribunal to act under section 132 (1) and (2) or under section 133 (1) and(2) of the Land Reforms Act in which case it is too much to accede to the submission of Sri Ramaprasad that this matter should be left to be decided by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Ramanagaram. 6. But, however, as already stated there is considerable force in the submission of Sri Ramaprasad with regard to the fact that the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate did not afford sufficient opportunity to both the parties to adduce evidence in support of their respective claims. A perusal of the order-sheet indicates that for the first time, that is on 20th March, 1978, the Magistrate posted the case for evidence on 3rd April, 1978. On 3rd April, 1978, as the Presiding Officer was otherwise engaged, the case was posted to 10th April, 1978. On 10th April, 1978, as the parties prayed for time for examining the parties and their witnesses, the case was again adjourned to 24th April,1978. Again on 24th April 1978, at the request of the parties for cross-examination of the witnesses, the case was posted to 1st May, 1978. On 1st May, 1978, case was adjourned for cross-examination of the witnesses to 29th May, 1978. It is on that day the members of the second party filed a petition challenging the jurisdiction of the learned Magistrate to proceed with the case. On 1st May, 1978, case was adjourned for cross-examination of the witnesses to 29th May, 1978. It is on that day the members of the second party filed a petition challenging the jurisdiction of the learned Magistrate to proceed with the case. The learned Magistrate posted the case to 12th June, 1978 for orders on the interlocutory application and also final orders on which day the impugned order was passed. On 12th June, 1978, the members of the second party filed an application requesting the Court to admit few of the documents filed by him in evidence as also to permit them to examine the witnesses of both the parties. Thereafter, the learned Magistrate seems to have passed the impugned order in question. The perusal of the order-sheet of the above days clearly indicates that the learned Magistrate has not followed the mandatory provision of sub- section (4) of section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and has not given opportunity to both the contending parties to adduce evidence in support of their claims. It is clear that the Magistrate before passing any order under section 145 is enjoined to hear the parties and receive all such evidence as may be produced by them,take such further evidence, if any,as he thinks necessary and, if possible, decide whether any and which of the parties was, at the date of the order made by him under sub- section (1), in possession of the subject of dispute. As already stated, the Magistrate has not given opportunity even though they were asked for by the parties concerned. This clearly violates the mandatory provision in addition to his violating the principles of natural justice. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the parties should have been afforded sufficient opportunity to examine themselves and also their witnesses in proof of their respective claims regarding possession. 7. In the result, this petition is allowed and the entire case is remanded to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Ramanagaram Sub-Division, Ramanagaram, with a direction that he should provide opportunities to both the contending parties to adduce evidence regarding their respective claims to the possession of the properties in question and thereafter to pass suitable orders according to law. The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate is also directed, in view of the pendency of the case for a long time, to dispose of the case as early as possible. The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate is also directed, in view of the pendency of the case for a long time, to dispose of the case as early as possible. Till then, the Tahsildar who is already appointed as receiver by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate shall continue to be in possession of the properties and take such steps, as are deem fit, necessary, to see that the properties are properly cultivated. With these observations, this petition is allowed, and the case remanded to the Court below for disposal according to law in the light of the observations made above. S.V.S. -----Petition allowed.