JUDGMENT Uday Sinha, J. This is an application under articles 226 and 227 or the Constitution for quashing Annexure 9 by which the presiding Officer, Labour Court, Patna declined to decide the preliminary points urged on behalf of the petitioner. The application arises in the following circumstances:- 2. Respondent No.2 G. L. Sharma was an employee of the petitioner. Finding some short-comings and delinquencies in respondent No.2, the Management framed charges against him. After domestic inquiry in which the charges were proved, the services of respondent No. 2 were terminated by order dated 24.12.1970 in terms of the service Rules of the Management. He was also directed to collect his one month's notice pay. Respondent No.2 being aggrieved by the order of termination of his service filed a complaint under section 26 of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act, 1953, before Presiding officer, Labour Court, Patna. The Presiding Officer having heard the parties at length found that upon the evidence the charges levelled against the employee had been fully proved. The presiding officer also held that G. L. Sharma was not entitled to any relief either by way of re-instatement or compensation. The complaint of respondent No.2 was thus dismissed by order dated the 17th/29th of June, 1972. Respondent No.2 challenged the correctness of the order of the presiding officer in a writ application before this Court in O.W.J.C. No. 1027 of 1972. It was dismissed in limine. An application for certificate under Articles 132 and 133 of the Constitution met a similar fate. That marked the end of the first round of the battle. G. L. Sharma, however, was not to be lightly daunted. He succeeded in persuading the State Government to make a reference to Labour Court under the Industrial Disputes Act. By notification dated the 11th of August, 1973 the State Government referred the matter relating to the dismissal of respondent no. 2 to Labour Court for adjudication. When the reference was taken up before the Labour Court, the petitioner raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the reference and the jurisdiction of the Court to adjudicate on the reference. By notification dated the 11th of August, 1973 the State Government referred the matter relating to the dismissal of respondent no. 2 to Labour Court for adjudication. When the reference was taken up before the Labour Court, the petitioner raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the reference and the jurisdiction of the Court to adjudicate on the reference. It was contended that the matter referred to for adjudication was barred by the principles of resjudicata, as the matter relating to the delinquency of G. L. Sharma and his dismissal had already been decided against him in a proceeding under section 26 of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act. The petitioner filed in this Reference Case No. 15 of 1973 the complaint of the respondent in the previous proceeding, the cause shown by the Management and the order of the Presiding Officer, the petitioner invited the Labour Court to decide the maintainability of the reference, as a preliminary issue before embarking upon an adjudication of the reference. The Labour Court after hearing the parties held that the matter in controversy between the parties would not be decided piece-meal and that the applicability of the principles of resjudicata would be taken up for consideration along with other matters referred to for adjudication. The order in this behalf dated 16.8.1976 is Annexure-9 to this application. The petitioner has moved this Court against the order of the Labour Court refusing to decide the preliminary objection on his behalf. 3. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that on the facts and circumstances of this case, the principles of resjudicata were fully applicable, as the matter relating to the dismissal of respondent No. 2 had already been decided against him in a proceeding under section 26 of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act, it was not urged before us that this Court should quash the reference made by the State Government. The only limited point urged was that upon the facts and circumstances of the case, the Labour Court, should have given its verdict on the preliminary objection raised by the petitioner before considering other matters referred to for adjudication. We have, therefore, been invited to quash Annexure-9 by a writ of certiorari and for issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the Labour Court to decide the preliminary objection in the first instance. We have, therefore, been invited to quash Annexure-9 by a writ of certiorari and for issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the Labour Court to decide the preliminary objection in the first instance. It is well settled that a writ of mandamus is discretionary. This discretion has to be exercised in the interest of justice and to avoid harassment to the parties (See The Municipal Corporation for Greater Bombay and another Vrs. The Advance Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. and others.) 4. It cannot be doubted that the principles of resjudlcata apply to all judicial proceedings. Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure may not apply in terms, but the principles of resjudicata apply to all judicial proceedings (see 1975 (2) LLJ 345 ). In order to attract the principles of resjudicata it is essential to ascertain, if the matters really and substantially in issue are the same which have already been decided. If they have been decided by judicial tribunal or Court, any legal restitution will not continence repeated adjudication of the same matter. Refusal to Act, upon the principles of resjudicata besides being harassing to a party, is bound to bring about a collapse of the adjudicatory machinary. The principle will certainly not be attracted, if the scope of enquiry in the subsequent proceeding is different from that in the earlier proceeding. Prima-facie, it appears that the matters relating to attraction of the principles of resjudicata appear to be sound. 5. In the instant case, the petitioner bas filed before the Labour Court all the necessary materials for deciding whet her the matters really and substantially In issue before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court under the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act, were the same as before the Labour Court under the Industrial Disputes Act. No further evidence is required to decide that issue. In that view of the matter, I do not see sufficient justification for keeping the matter hanging. Learned counsel correspondent Nos. 1 and 2 con tended that this Court should not determine the course to be adopted by the Labour Court. The power of this Court to direct the Labour Court to decide a preliminary issue cannot be disputed. In that view of the matter, I do not see sufficient justification for keeping the matter hanging. Learned counsel correspondent Nos. 1 and 2 con tended that this Court should not determine the course to be adopted by the Labour Court. The power of this Court to direct the Labour Court to decide a preliminary issue cannot be disputed. Between Express Newspapers, Ltd. V. Their workers and staff and othera, Gajendragadkar, J. observed as follows:- "Speaking generally, it would not be proper or appropriate that the initial jurisdiction of the special tribunal to deal with these jurisdictional facts should be circumvented and the decision of such a preliminary issue brought before a High Court in its writ jurisdiction. We wish to point out that in making these observations, we do not propose to lay down any fixed or inflexible rule; whether or not even the preliminary facts should be tried by the High Court in a writ petition must naturally depend upon the circumstances of each case and upon the nature of the preliminary issue raised between the parties. Having regard to the circumstances of the present dispute, we think the Court of appeal was right in taking the view that the preliminary issue should more appropriately be dealt with by the tribunal." From law laid down by Gajendragadkar, J. quoted above, it is obvious that a High Court in its writ jurisdiction may call upon a Labour Court to decide a preliminary question before deciding other matters. Whether such a course should be adopted by the High Court or not depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In the instant case, I am satisfied, is one in which this Court should call upon the Labour Court to decide the preliminary issue regarding the maintainability of the reference. I have refrained from expressing my view in regard to the submissions urged on behalf of the petitioner regarding application of the principles of resjudicata for fear of prejudicing the Labour Court. In my view, this submission is worthy of consideration and should be decided as a preliminary Issue. Annexure-9 to that extent must be quashed. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the reference was incompetent as the matter relating to dismissal of G. L. Sharma did not form part of any demand by the workman to the Company or to the State Government. Annexure-9 to that extent must be quashed. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the reference was incompetent as the matter relating to dismissal of G. L. Sharma did not form part of any demand by the workman to the Company or to the State Government. The dismissal of G. L. Sharma, therefore, could not be an industrial dispute which could be referred to for adjudication by the State Government to Labour Court. This matter is not open to challenge before this Court, as the State Government bas not been impldeld as a party to this writ application, despite the objection of learned standing Counsel No.3 on 31.8.1976 at the time of admission of this application. It will, however, be open to the petitioner to adjudicate this point before the Labour Court. 7. For the reasons stated above, the application is allowed. Let a writ of certiorari issue quashing Annexure-9. The Labour Court is hereby directed to decide the preliminary objection of the petitioner regarding the maintainability of the reference. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order for Costs. U. C. Sharma, J. I agree. Application allowed.