B. K. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THE two appellants herein who were drivers under transfer from Mehsana Division of the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) at the time of impugned orders challenged in the two suits filed by them in the Court of Civil Judge (S. D.) Mehsana the orders of their termination of October 11 1974 passed by the General Manager of the respondent Corporation purporting to act under Regulation No. 61 of the Gujarat State Transport Employees Service Regulations inter alia on the grounds that they were void and ineffective since they were in effect and substance orders of dismissal though apparently appear in form of orders of termination and therefore in colourable exercise of powers and also because Regulation 61 under which the power was purported to have been exercised is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and in any case the General Manager was not the Competent Authority to make such orders under the said Regulation. It should be noted that the aforesaid second ground of challenge namely the vires of Regulation 61 and the competence of the General Manager to make the impugned orders was sought to be raised by seeking amendment in the plaint in course of hearing of these two second appeals before the learned Single Judge (Ahmedi J.) who permitted the amendment sought to be made in the plaint and remanded by his order of April 5 1978 both the matters to the trial Court for enabling the parties to lead evidence in support or rebuttal of the issues arising as a result of the said amendment and directing the learned Civil Judge to certify his findings after recording the evidence. Before the order of remand was made there was only one ground of challenge namely the orders were really orders of dismissal passed in colourable exercise of powers by the General Manager mala fide and the appellants had sought declaration that the impugned orders were void and ineffective and they continue to be in service 2nd also prayed for injunct on restraining the Corporation its officers Servants and agents from removing the appellants from the premises allotted to them by the Corporation. The learned Civil Judge original before the remand granted the decree as prayed for by his order of 9th July 1976 with the result that the Corporation carried both the matters in appeal before the District Court at Mehsana by its Regular Civil Appeal Nos. 119/76 and 183/76 which were heard and disposed of by the common judgment and order of the learned Extra Assistant Judge Mehsana reversing the decree granted by the trial Court and dismissing the suits. The two appellants have therefore preferred these appeals before this Court which while admitting the appeals formulated four substantial questions of law which inter alia included the question of vires of Regulation 61 and the order being in effect and substance an order of penalty without resorting to the disciplinary proceedings. In the course of hearing of these second appeals the amendments as stated above were sanctioned and the matters were remaanded for recording the evidence and certifying the findings. The learned trial Judge has after recording the evidence reported his findings to this Court by his order of 28th August 1978 where he has opined that Regulation 61 was ultra vires Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and the impugned orders were orders of penalty passed by an authority not competent to do it. One more question will have to be added to the following questions formulated at the time of admission of these second appeals as question No. 5. The additional question No. 5 will he in the following terms:- question No. 5:-5. Whether the General Manager was competent authority to pass the impugned orders ?this Court formulated the following questions:1. Whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to deal with this service matter of S. T. Corporation ?2. Whether Regulation 61 of the Gujarat State Transport Employees Service Regulation can be so construed as to empower the State Transport Corporation to terminate the services of a permanent employee without abolishing the permanent post occupied by the appellant?3. What is the true interpretation of Regulation 61 and whether it is ultra wires Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution ?4. Whether the impugned order is in purported colourable exercise of the powers under Regulation 61 looking to the facts and circumstances of this case ? What is the true interpretation of Regulation 61 and whether it is ultra wires Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution ?4. Whether the impugned order is in purported colourable exercise of the powers under Regulation 61 looking to the facts and circumstances of this case ? ( 2 ) AT the time of hearing of these appeals question No. 3 pertaining to the vires of the provision was vehemently debated since it was a matter of principle for the Corporation as well as the respondent drivers backed by their trade Union inasmuch as in submission of the Corporation the power of termination simpliciter is necessary concomitant of the employ ment of service while in submission of the respondent it is abominable in the present context of the rule of law in the status of a public servant inasmuch as it makes such an inroad in the irremovability of status of a permanent servant that it almost dangerously verges into a right of hire and fire enjoyed by a matter in the bygone days. The suggestion of the Court to sort out an amicable settlement between the parties therefore could not be responded to favourably by either side in spite of the efforts of the learned Advocates. We have therefore to examine the constitutional validity of the provision contained in Regulation 61 which in vests the Competent Authority to terminate the service of not only casual parttime or temporary worker but also permanent employee of the Corporation. ( 3 ) THE learned Civil Judge has been impressed with the contentions urged on behalf of the respondent-plaintiffs that the power continual in Regulation 61 is so uncanalized abridged and arbitrary in its nature inasmuch as not only it does not provide any classification on the face of it but there is no broad guideline which can be ascertained either by reference to that Regulation 61 or any other provisions of the aforesaid Service Regulations or the State Road Transport Corporation Act or the Rules framed thereunder and since it does not provide any procedural safeguards thereby ensuring the principles of fair play and natural justice to an employee whose services are sought to be terminated under the said Regulation the impugned Regulation is therefore ultra vires Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. ( 4 ) THE Corporation on the other hand seeks to justify the power invested in the Corporation of its Competent Authority under Regulation 61 contending that no question of application of Article 14 or 16 could arise where a termination of service takes place in terms of the contract of service or the relevant rules governing them and once the bona fide loss of confidence is claimed by an employer for exercise of the power and affirmed by the Court as is the case in the present appeals the impugned orders must be considered to be immune from any challenge. In submission made on behalf of the Corporation the challenge to Regulation 61 on the ground of it being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution is entirely misconceived since it does not seek to discriminate between the employees similarly situate nor does it confer an arbitrary and unguided discretion because in the very nature of the situation for which it is envisaged it is impossible to define before hand all the circumstances in which the discretion can be exercised which is necessarily to be left to the Corporation or the Competent Authority. These contentions were reiterated before us in details and a number of subsidiary contentions were advanced. We will deal with the subsidiary contentions at appropriate places while dealing with the major contentions which have been pressed into service. ( 5 ) IT would be profitable to refer to a few relevant provisions of the Road Transport Corporation Act 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act); the Regulations framed by the Corporation in exercise of the powers under sec. 45 thereof known as The Gujarat State Transport Employees Service Regulations (hereinafter referred to as the Service Regulations) as well as The Discipline and Appeal Procedure for the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation Employees (hereinafter referred to as the Discipline and Appeal Procedure) prescribed under Regulation 80 of the Service Regulations by the Corporation. The Corporation is established under sec. 3 of the said Act. The Corporation is established under sec. 3 of the said Act. Sec. 12 of the said Act empowers the Corporation to appoint a Committee of its members for performing such functions as may be specified in its resolutions; to delegate to any such Committee or to the Chairman or Vice Chairman such of its powers and duties as it may think fit and specify in the resolutions subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed; to authorise the Chief Executive Officer or the General Manager or any other Officer of the Corporation subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed such powers and duties as it may think necessary for efficient day to day administration of its business as may be specified in the resolutions made in that behalf. Sec. 15 of the said Act provides that the Chief Executive Officer or the General Manager will be the Executive Head of the Corporation and all Officers and servants of the Corporation are subordinate to him. Sec. 18 lays down general duties of the Corporation which comprise of providing securing or promoting efficient adequate economical and co-ordinated system of road transport service in the State or its parts. Sec. 19 lays down various powers of the Corporation which inter alia enjoins the Corporation to provide for its employees suitable conditions of service including fair wages establishment of Provident Fund living accommodation rest houses and recreation and other amenities. Sec. 44 empowers the State Government to make rules for effecting the provisions of the said Act which inter alia requires that the State Government may make rules for the conditions and the manner of appointment of the members of the Corporation and the scales of pay of the Chief Executive Officer or the General Manager Sec. 45 provides for a power to make regulations which are not inconsistent with the Act or the Rules made thereunder for the administration of the affairs of the Corporation. Clause (c) of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 45 empowers the Corporation to make Regulations so as to provide for the conditions of appointment and service and the scales of pay of officers and servants of the Corporation other than the Chief Executive Officer or General Manager and the Chief Accounts Officer. These are the few relevant provisions of the said Act. (2) of sec. 45 empowers the Corporation to make Regulations so as to provide for the conditions of appointment and service and the scales of pay of officers and servants of the Corporation other than the Chief Executive Officer or General Manager and the Chief Accounts Officer. These are the few relevant provisions of the said Act. ( 6 ) THE Corporation has enacted Regulations in exercise of its powers under sec. 45 (2) (c) of the said Act providing for the conditions of appointment and service of its employees known as the Gujarat State Transport Employees Service Regulations (Service Regulation ). Chapter I provides for general topics. Regulation 4 invests in the Corporation the right of interpreting the Service Regulations making its decision binding on its employees. Regulation 5 is an important Regulation since it has relevance to and bearing on the question raised in these appeals as to the competence of the General Manager to make the impugned orders. We therefore hereinbelow set out and will read the same at appropriate time while dealing with the said question:-"5. No person other than the Competent Authority prescribed under these regulations shall exercise or delegate powers under these regulations without specific or general orders from the Corporation. . . "chapter II deals with the definitions of various terms used in the Regulations. Similarly Regulation 10 provides as to who will be the Competent Authority for the various powers under the Service Regulations. It reads as under;"10. Competent Authority in relation to the exercise of any power means the Corporation or any other Authority duly notified to which power is delegated by the Corporation for the purposes of these regulations. "regulation 29 defines Permanent Post to mean a post sanctioned without limit of time while Regulation 39 defines the term Temporary Post to mean a post created temporarily for a specified period which may be extended from time to time. Chapter III deals with general conditions of service. Regulation 43 empowers the respective Competent Authority as declared by the Corporation from time to time with the power of appointment to a particular post or class of posts. Regulation 56 empowers the Corporation to frame Regulations applicable to the employees generally or to a particular class or classes of employees regarding working hours conduct discipline and appeals. Regulation 61 is the impugned Regulation. Regulation 56 empowers the Corporation to frame Regulations applicable to the employees generally or to a particular class or classes of employees regarding working hours conduct discipline and appeals. Regulation 61 is the impugned Regulation. We would therefore read this Regulation which provides as under:"61. The services of an employee who does not hold a permanent appointment in. State Transport or a lien on a permanent appointment in any Government Departs ment from which he is transferred are liable to be terminated by the Competent Authority by giving a calendar months notice or a calendar months pay in lieu:provided that the services of casual workers and parttime workers may be terminated without any notice:provided further that a permanent employee of State Transport shall be entitled to 60 days notice or 60 days pay in lieu. (NOTE :-For the purposes of this Regulation pay means the pay of the post held by the employee substantively. ). "chapter IV deals with the topic of pay of the employees. Chapter IV-A deals with Regulations regarding foreign service. Chapter V deals With the topic of disciplinary action and punishment. Regulations 80 and 8 are two Important Regulations in this Chapter having a great beating on the question of vires with which we are at present dealing. They read as under:"80. The Corporation may specify the acts of misconduct or omission which shall be liable to be treated as acts of misconduct or minor lapses or delinquencies and also prescribe a procedure for dealing with cases of acts of misconduct and minor lapses and delinquencies and shall appoint appropriate authorities to impose punishments and to hear appeals or order disciplinary action. 81 Notwithstanding the provisions of Regulation 61 the services of an employee if he has been convicted in a Criminal Court or has been declared insolvent by a Competent Court shall be liable to be terminated without notice. "the topics of leave contributory provident fund travelling allowance gratuity etc. are deat with in Chapter V1 to Chapter VIII-A. Chapter IX deals with miscellaneous topics. Chapter X deals with the topic of concession to certain employees to travel free in State Transport Buses. The topics of furnishing security payment of transportation charges and medical benefits are dealt with in Chapters XI Xli and XII while that of general amenities is dealt in Chapter XIV. Chapter X deals with the topic of concession to certain employees to travel free in State Transport Buses. The topics of furnishing security payment of transportation charges and medical benefits are dealt with in Chapters XI Xli and XII while that of general amenities is dealt in Chapter XIV. Appendix P gives a list of Competent Authorities prescribed under the aforesaid Service Regulations. The Competent Authority to make appointments to Class I and Class II posts under Regulation 43 is the Vice Chairman. It is the General Manager for Class III posts in Central Office and inter alia the Divisions the minimum of pay scale of which is above Rs. 150. 00. The Competent Authority for appointment to Class Ill and IV posts in Divisions the minimum of pay scales of which is Rs. 150/or less is the Divisional Controller. The power to terminate the services of employees of the Corporation or the temporary Government servants in the services of the Corporation under Regulation 61 is the same Authority as the one which is competent to fill in the post. For purposes of terminating the services of an employee of the Corporation under Regulation 81 is again the Appointing Authority. These are the few material relevant Regulations for purposes of these appeals. ( 7 ) THE material provisions of the Discipline and Appeal Procedure for the employees of the Corporation are framed by the Corporation in exercise of its power under Regulation 80 of the Service Regulations Clause 3 of the said Discipline and Appeal Procedure classifies the offense into acts of misconduct and minor lapses and delinquencies. The acts of misconduct are those which have been specified in Schedule A with such modifications as may be specified by the Corporation from time to time and for which the maximum penalty is as prescribed in Clause 7 according to the gravity of the misconduct. On the other hand minor lapses and delinquencies are those included in Schedule B with any modification that would be effected by the administration from time to time which may result in warning reprimand and fines upto the limit prescribed in Clause 7 Clause 4 provides for the procedure for dealing with minor lapses and delinquencies. Clause 5 provides elaborately for procedure for dealing with acts of misconduct. Clause 5 provides elaborately for procedure for dealing with acts of misconduct. Clause 5 (a) to (h) inter alia provides for suspension of an employee charged for an act of misconduct and the subsistence allowance during the said period; obligation to furnish to a workman against whom action is proposed a copy of the charge or charges together with the statement of allegations; opportunity to the workman charged to file his written statement of defence and making an oral statement and inspecting the relevant documents production of documents in support of his defence; examination of witnesses and the procedure thereof etc. Clause 5 (k) provides for recording of findings and the reasons therefor by the Inquiry Officer after completing the inquiry and giving the workman charged with a further opportunity of written or oral submissions. Clauses 5 (L) empowers the Competent Authority to pass final order imposing any of the penalties of dismissal removal or reduction on the basis of the report of the Enquiry Officer or its own findings. Clause 6 enumerates cases in which the procedure laid down by the aforesaid clause 5 need not be followed. Clause 6 (vi) dispenses with necessity of following the procedure prescribed in aforesaid Clause 7 when the Corporation decides to terminate the services of an employee in terms of Regulation 61 of the Service Regulations. Clause 7 provides for the punishment for minor lapses and delinquencies as well ai for acts of misconduct. For the later class of offences the punishment provided for are inter alia including termination of services removal discharge and dismissal. Clause 8 provides for a right of appeal to a workman against whom departmental proceedings have been taken in a manner provided for under the Discipline and Appeal Procedure and who has been awarded with any of the appealable penalties mentioned in Clause 7. Clauses 9 to 17 lay down the procedure for hearing of appeal. Clause 18 and 19 are two important Clauses which have some relevance for the purposes of these appeals. They are therefore set out in extenso as under:-"18. As a general rules the Appointing Authority or any higher authority is competent to initiate departmental proceedings and hold inquiry against the employee concerned and award punishment. Clause 18 and 19 are two important Clauses which have some relevance for the purposes of these appeals. They are therefore set out in extenso as under:-"18. As a general rules the Appointing Authority or any higher authority is competent to initiate departmental proceedings and hold inquiry against the employee concerned and award punishment. The Appointing Authority or any higher authority or the Competent Authority prescribed in Clause 19 may appoint an Enquiry Officer to conduct an enquiry and on the recommendation of the Enquiry Officer the Appointing Authority or the higher authority or the Competent Authority prescribed in Clause 1r as the case may be may award punishment or otherwise give a decision. 19 Without prejudice to the competence of the Appointing Authority or to the inherent Powers of any higher authority than the Appointing Authority to deal with minor lapses or acts of misconduct the officers mentioned in Schedule C are appointed to be the Competent Authority to deal with acts of misconduct of different Classes of employees and to inflict punishment as if they are the competent authority under Clause 18. In the case of any disagreement or difference of opinion between the Competent Authority indicated in clause 18 and that prescribed in clause 19 the decision of the General Manager in respect of class lii and IV employees and of the Motor Transport Controller in the case of Class I and II officers shall be treated as the decision of the Competent Authority without prejudice to the right of appeal to or of revision by the prescribed Appellate Authority. "schedule A specifies the acts of misconduct. while Schedule B specifies minor lapses and delinquencies. Schedule C specifies the Competent Authorities to award punishment and also the First and Second Appellate Authorities This is in short the broad outline of the Discipline and Appeal Procedure. 7a. We will first address ourselves to question No. 3 since it was hotly debated before us. Regulation 61 provides for termination of the services of an employee of the Corporation. We must admit at the outset that the structure of Regulation 61 is not very happily constructed. There are two provisos to the main enactment. It envisages by one calendar months notice or a calendar months pay in lieu thereof in case of termination of the services of an employee who does not hold a permanent appointment. We must admit at the outset that the structure of Regulation 61 is not very happily constructed. There are two provisos to the main enactment. It envisages by one calendar months notice or a calendar months pay in lieu thereof in case of termination of the services of an employee who does not hold a permanent appointment. The first proviso to Regulation 61 dispenses with the requirement of notice for the termination of the services of a casual or parttime worker. The second proviso lays down that a permanent employee of State Transport shall be entitled to 60 days notice or 60 days pay in lieu. In the first place it was therefore contended on behalf of the plaintiff-drivers that the main enactment of Regulation 6t empowers the Corporation to terminate the services of an employee who does not hold a permanent employment in the Corporation or does not hold a lien on a permanent appointment in any Government department from which he is transferred and the provisos therefore could not have enlarged the scope of main enactment since the proper function of a proviso is to accept and deal with a case which would be otherwise within the scope of the main enactment and its effect should be confined to that case only. It was therefore contended that the second proviso with which we are concerned in these appeals even does not provide for the termination of the services. ( 8 ) THE function and the role of a proviso is well recognized in the principles of Interpretation of Statutes and generally it carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted as a proviso (vide:- RAM NARAYAN and SONS V. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF SALES-TAX AIR 1955 SC 765 and ISHVERLAL THAKORLAL V. MOTIBHAI NAGJIBHAI A. I. R. 196 S. C. 459 This is not an invariable principle and in exceptional cases a proviso may be a substantive provision in itself (vide:- COMMISSIONER OF COMMERCIAL TAXES V. RAMKRISHAN SHRIKISHAN JHAVER AIR 1968 SC 59 ). It is no doubt true that no functional value can be assigned to a proviso; so as to provide something by way of an addendum or dealing with a subject which is alien to the main enactment (vide:- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX V. INDO MERCANTILE BANK AIR 1959 SC 730 ). It is no doubt true that no functional value can be assigned to a proviso; so as to provide something by way of an addendum or dealing with a subject which is alien to the main enactment (vide:- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX V. INDO MERCANTILE BANK AIR 1959 SC 730 ). The question whether a particular proviso is an exception or a condition to the substantive provision or whether it is in itself a substantive provision must be determined on the substance of the proviso and not its form (vide :- COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX V. NANDLAL BHANDARI and SONS 47 AIR 903 (M. P) In the STATE OF RAJASTHAN V. MRS. LEELA JAIN AND OTHERS AIR 1965 SC 1296 the Supreme Court ruled:-". . . SO far as a general principle of construction of a proviso is concerned; it has been broadly stated that the function of a proviso is to limit the main pare of the section and carve out something which but for the proviso would have been within the operative part. . . . the proviso now before us is really not a proviso in the accepted sense but an independent legislative provision by which to a remedy which is prohibited by the main part of the section an alternative is provided. . . " ( 9 ) THE legislative intent in Regulation 61 of the Service Regulations which is in the nature of a subordinate legislation appears to us to provide for a power in the Corporation for termination of the services of its employees. The Corporation could have framed this Regulation in a more satisfactory manner so as to bring out this legislative intent in a proper legal way. However this infirmity should not obscure our efforts in construing its true legal effect which in our opinion is to provide for a power in the Corporation for termination of the services of different classes of its employees namely those who are permanent those who are other than permanent and those who are casual and parttime. In case of permanent employee the intention is to empower the Corporation to terminate the services by 60 days notice or by paying for the same period in lieu thereof. In case of permanent employee the intention is to empower the Corporation to terminate the services by 60 days notice or by paying for the same period in lieu thereof. In case of the employees not holding permanent appointment in the Corporation or not being a transferred Government servant having a lien on a permanent post the Corporation is empowered to terminate the services of such an employee by giving a calendar months notice or by paying one months pay in lieu thereof. In case of casual and parttime workers there is no obligation on the Corporation to give any notice before terminating their services. It is no doubt true that the main enactment reads as if it provides for a power of termination of the services of an employee who does not hold a permanent appointment in the Corporation or in case of a transferred Government servant a lien on a permanent post and the first proviso is really an exception to the main enactment. However this truncated way of reading would obscure the true construction of Regulation 61. The main enactment together with the two provisos must be read as a whole and on so reading it appears that the second proviso is more in the nature of a substantive proviso than an exception. It empowers the Corporation to terminate the services of a permanent employee by giving 60 days notice or 60 days pay in lieu thereof. The attempt of the learned Advocate for the plaintiff-drivers to read this proviso as if it is an exception would result in truncating the power of the Corporation which cannot be the legislative intent in putting Regulation 61 on the statute book. If we restrict the main enactment to the services of the employees who do not hold permanent appointment or do not hold permanent lien the second proviso in that case would be otiose and that cannot be obviously the legislative intent. The grievance of the learned Advocate for the plaintiff-drivers is that the second proviso cannot be read as a substantive legislative provision because it does not provide for termination of services of a permanent employee. There is some force in this contention of the learned Advocate. The grievance of the learned Advocate for the plaintiff-drivers is that the second proviso cannot be read as a substantive legislative provision because it does not provide for termination of services of a permanent employee. There is some force in this contention of the learned Advocate. But the subordinate legislature namely the Corporation was not indulging in exercise in futility by enacting the second proviso and the intent could be only to provide that in case of termination of the service of permanent employee there was an obligation on the Corporation to serve 60 days notice or to pay 60days salary in lieu thereof instead of one months notice or one months pay as provided in the main enactment. We are therefore of the opinion that this first contention of the learned Advocate for the plaintiff-drivers should be rejected on this recognized principle of interpretation. ( 10 ) IT was then urged that in any case proviso 2 to Regulation 61 in so far as it empowers the Corporation to terminate the services of a permanent employee is ultra vires Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India since it discriminates between an employee holding a permanent post in the Corporation and an employee holding a lien on a permanent appointment in any Government Department from which he is transferred to the Corporation. In any case it does not lay down sufficient guideline which should be adhered to before the power can be exercised for termination of the services of a permanent employee. It is so arbitrary and naked a power that it can be easily abused by picking and choosing some of the inconvenient employees whose services can be terminated by 60 days notice or pay in lieu thereof without following the disciplinary proceedings. A serious grievance was made that there is no procedural safeguard provided in the said Service regulations before exercising the power of termination under Regulation 61. The power is delegated to a competent Authority who is in the present case a Divisional Controller or may be a Joint Divisional Controller or a Controller of Stores or a Director of Security Department in a given case and therefore it would not be an unjustified assumption to apprehend that the concerned authority would not exercise the power with all the seriousness of the situation. The power is likely to be abused more so because no opportunity of being heard is provided to an employee against whom the power is to be exercised or any appeal is provided to a Higher Authority from the said order of termination nor an obligation is cast upon the Corporation or the Competent Authority to give reasons in support of the exercise of the said power. The Corporation has not prescribed any period of service which a permanent employee must have put in before which or after which the power of termination cannot be exercised. The Second proviso to Regulation 61 empowering the Corporation or the Competent Authority to terminate the services of a permanent employee is a rule going against the irremovability of the status conferred on a public servant except in cases of disciplinary action and/or compulsory retirement and would therefore per se violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. In so far as a permanent employee of the Corporation is deprived of his right to continue in service till the age of supurannuation when the power of termination under the second proviso is exercised by the Corporation it would per se an order of penalty and therefore such an order could be made only after going through the gamut of the disciplinary proceedings. A number of authorities has been relied upon by the learned Advocate for the appellantdrivers in support of the above contentions and particularly the decision a seven Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in MOTI RAM DEKA V. GENERAL MANAGER NORTH EAST FRONTIER RAILWAY AIR 1964 SC 600 where a similar provision contained in Rules 148 (3) and 149 (3) of the Railway Establishment Code 1951 which empowered the appropriate authority to terminate the services of nonpensionable as well as other railway servants after giving them notice for a specified period or paying them their salary for the said period in lieu thereof was held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as it discriminated between Government servants in the employment of the Railways and those in the other Departments of the Central Government. Heavy reliance was placed on the concurring judgment of Das Gupta J. where he held the said provision to be violative of Article 14 also on the ground that they did not lay down any principle or policy for guiding the exercise of discretion of the authority concerned in the matter of selection or classification resulting in arbitrary and uncontrolled power being left in the authority to select at its will any person against whom action could be taken. ( 11 ) ON behalf of the Corporation these contentions were sought to be repelled by urging that no question of application of Art. 14 or Art. 16 could arise where a termination of service takes place in terms of the contract of service or the relevant rules regarding them and once the bone fide loss of confidence is claimed by an employer for exercise of the power and found by the Court to be justified there is no scope whatsoever for holding the power to be ultra vires Article 14 or Article 16 of the Constitution. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the Corporation placed reliance on a number of authorities of the Supreme Court which we will refer to at the appropriate stages while dealing with these contentions. ( 12 ) IT cannot be gainsaid that Regulation 61 investing the Corpora tion or the Competent Authority with the power of termination of service:- of a permanent employee is in the nature of discretionary power. Discretionary power however is not necessarily discretionary (vide:- In re Th Kerala Education Bill 1957 AIR 1958 SC 956 ). It is equally true that the first prerequisite of the rule of law is the absence of arbitrary power. The discretion invested in Executive Authority must be confined within the clearly defined limits. It is axiomatic to say that executive decision must be based on the known and recognized principles and they must be predictable. However it cannot be presumed unless the contrary is show that a particular enactment or a provision thereof would be administered with an evil eye and unequal hand (vide:- A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar M. Vankatachalam Potti AIR 1956 SC 246 j. It is no ground to quash i that it is capable of being abused. On the contrary abuse of power will not be lightly assumed (vide:- Kerala Education Bills case supra ). On the contrary abuse of power will not be lightly assumed (vide:- Kerala Education Bills case supra ). If discretionary power is used for oblique or ulterior purpose in a given case the arms of the Court are strong enough to overpower it and strike down the said action. Abuse of such discretionary power is not to be easily assumed particularly when discretion is vested in responsible and high executive authority which is always subject to judicial scrutiny and review (vide:- JOSEPH KURUVILLA V. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AIR 1962 SC 1371 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 13 ) ). At the outset it must be stated that State Road Transport Corporation is clearly within the term authority under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India and the rules and regulations framed by this statutory Corporation have the force of law (vide:- SUKHDEV SINGH V. BHAGATRAM AIR 1975 SC 1331 ). A Division Bench of this Court has in Letters Patent L Appeal No. 131 of 1974 with Second Appeal No. 41 of 1973 decided on May Z 76 (Per Thakkar J.) held that Gujarat State Road Transport Corpora tion is an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and its rules and regulations have the force of law and consequently therefore must satisfy the mandate of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The crux of the problem is whether the power invested in the Corporation or for that matter in the Competent Authority under Regulation 61 is an arbitrary and naked power without any guidelines policy or principle being prescribed therein or the other provisions of the Service Regulations so as to enable the Corporation or the Competent Authority to accord unequal or discriminatory treatment to the employees similarly situated. In other words does it clothe the authority with unguided and arbitrary power enabling it to discriminate ? At this stage it would be necessary to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Moti Ram Dekas case (supra) on which strong reliance has been placed by the learned Advocate for the appellant-drivers. In other words does it clothe the authority with unguided and arbitrary power enabling it to discriminate ? At this stage it would be necessary to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Moti Ram Dekas case (supra) on which strong reliance has been placed by the learned Advocate for the appellant-drivers. It should be noted that the decision in Moti Ram Dekas case (supra) was rendered by a seven Judges Bench of the Supreme Court where the majority Court constituting six Judges struck down Rules 148 (3) and 149 (3) of the Railway Establishment Code inter alia on the ground of they being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It would be profitable to recall that a contention was ad vanced in support of breach of equal protection clause that though the impugned rules may not in terms enact a discriminatory rule and in that sense may not patently infringe Article 14 it may nevertheless contravene the said Article if it is so framed as to enable an unequal or discriminatory treatment to be meted out to persons or things similarly situated and such a result would inevitably follow where the rules vest a discretion in an executive authority and do not lay down any policy or fail to disclose any intelligible or rational purpose. On the other hand on behalf of the Union Government the validity of the impugned provision was made out on the ground that the very purpose of the rules gives guidance to the appropriate authority which has to take into account all the relevant circumstances and to decide whether the services should be terminated. Gajendragadakar J speaking on behalf of himself and three other Judges did not express any opinion on this aspect of the question and kept it open by holding as under in paragraph 55:-". . . SINCE we have come to the conclusion that the second attack made against the validity of the Rule under Art. 14 ought to be sustained we do not propose to express any opinion on this part of the controversy between the parties. . . SINCE we have come to the conclusion that the second attack made against the validity of the Rule under Art. 14 ought to be sustained we do not propose to express any opinion on this part of the controversy between the parties. "the opinion of four Judges expressed by Gajendragadakar J. proceeded on the concession made on behalf of the Union of India that in no other branch of public service either in the States or in the Union the service rules contain any provision corresponding to the inapugned rules and that the affidavits filed by the Railway Administration or the Union of India afforded no material on which the framing of rules only in respect of one sector of public service can be justified. Gajendragadakar J. speaking on behalf of five Judges thereafter ruled as under:-". . . WE appreciate the argument that the nature of services rendered by employees in different sectors of public service may differ and the terms and conditions governing employment in all public sectors may not necessarily be the same so uniform; but in regard to the question of terminating the services of a civil servant after serving him with a notice for specified period we are unable to see how the Railways can be regarded as constituting a separate and distinct class by reference to which the impugned Rule can be justified in the light of Art. 14. If there is any rational connection between the making of such a Rule and the object intended to be achieved by it that connection would clearly be in existence in several other sectors of. public service. What has happened in that a provision like R. 148 (3) or R. 149 (3) was first made by the Railway Companies when employment with the Railways was a purely commercial matter governed by the ordinary rules of contract. After the Railways were taken over by the State that position has essentially altered and so the validity of the Rule is now exposed to the challenge under Art. 14 Therefore we are satisfied that the challenge to the validity of the impugned Rules on the ground that they contravene Art. 14 must also succeed. After the Railways were taken over by the State that position has essentially altered and so the validity of the Rule is now exposed to the challenge under Art. 14 Therefore we are satisfied that the challenge to the validity of the impugned Rules on the ground that they contravene Art. 14 must also succeed. "subba Rao J. in his concurring judgment did not think fit to say any thing more on Article 14 than what was said by Gajendragadkar J. However Das Gupta J. in his concurring but separate judgment with five Judges view opined that Rules 148 (3) and 149 (3) do not lay down any principle or policy for guiding the exercise of discretion by the authority who would terminate the services inter alia by selection or classification. Upholding the contention urged on behalf of the railway; employees that the impugned rules invested the appropriate authority with arbitrary power Das Gupta J. observed as under:-". . . . ARBITRARY and uncontrolled power is left in the authority to select at its will any person againstwhom action will be taken. The Rule thus enables the authority concerned to discriminate between two railway servants to both of whom R. 148 (3) equally applied by taking action in one case and not taking it in the other. In the absence of any guiding principle in the exercise of the discretion by the authority the Rule has therefore to be struck down as contravening the requirements of Art. 14 of the Constitution. "he, however, did not agree with five Judges view expressed by Gajendragadakar J that the impugned rules offended Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. The learned Advocate for the appellant-drivers urged that the opinion of Das Gupta J expressed in his concurring judgment that the impugned rules were violative of Article 14 as they did not provide any guideline in exercise of the discretion in the matter of termination of the services exercise resulted in a situation where the authority can discriminate between persons similarly situated was binding on this Court. The impugned Service Regulations with which we are concerned in submission of the learned Advocate of the appellant-drivers conter such an arbitrary power without any policy or principle to guide the exercise of discretion of the Corporation or the Competent Authority in the matter of termination of the services of permanent employees so that it enables them to discriminate between one set of employees against the other and invests them with the naked power to pick and choose which militates. against and constitutes an inroad into the irremovability of status conferred on a public servant holding permanent post. We are afraid we cannot agree with such a broad submission made by the learned Advocate for the appellant-drivers. No doubt Regulation 61 invests the discretion in the Corporation or the Competent Authority to decide about the termination of the services of a permanent employee giving him sixty days notice or pay in thereof. It is trite position of law that discretionary power is not necessarily discriminatory and the abuse of such power cannot be presumed lightly. It is a power which is vested in the first instance in the Corporation which is the highest authority. It is no doubt true that this power is delegated to various authorities under the Schedule to the Service Regulations. None the less the delegated authority exercises the power of the Corporation. Delegation of power is to the different authorities having regard to their power of appointment as provided in Appendix P prescribing lists of Competent Authorities under the various clauses of the Service Regulations. So far as Regulation 61 is concerned it is prescribed that the power to terminate the services of employees of the State Transport or temporary Government servants in the services of the State Transport is vested in the Authority competent to fill in the post. The authorities which are competent to fill up the posts under Regulation 43 are different having regard to the classes of posts. The Vice Chairman is the Competent Authority to make appointments of Classes I and II posts; the General Manager is the appointing authority for Class 111 posts in the Central Office or Central Stores or in the Divisions or Sub-Divisions or in the Central Workshop the minimum pay scales of which is Rs. 150. The Vice Chairman is the Competent Authority to make appointments of Classes I and II posts; the General Manager is the appointing authority for Class 111 posts in the Central Office or Central Stores or in the Divisions or Sub-Divisions or in the Central Workshop the minimum pay scales of which is Rs. 150. 00; the Controller of Stores is the appointing authority to make appointments on the posts of Senior Clerks in Central Stores. Chief Personal Officer is the appointing authority so far as Classes III and IV posts are concerned where the minimum pay scales is Rs. 150 or less in the Central Office. Divisional Controller or the Joint Divisional Controller is the appointing authority so far as Classes III and IV posts carrying pay scales of Rs. 150/or less in the Division or Subdivision are concerned. The Works Manager and the Senior Executive Engineer and the Director of Security are the appointing authorities for Classes III and IV posts carrying pay scales of Rs. 150/and less in respectively the Central Workshop the Civil Engineering Division or the Security Department. In our opinion therefore it cannot be contended that this power is delegated to a petty official who would exercise it regardless of its consequences or in a light and casual manner. It is a delegated power belonging to the Corporation and therefore it cannot be lightly assumed that the delegated authorities will abuse the same. The real question therefore is whether the guideline as to the policy and purpose of the power of termination can be spelt out from the impugned Regulation itself and/or the other operating provisions applicable to analogous or comparable situation or generally from the object sought to be achieved by the enactment (vide:- Jyoti Pershads case supra ). It cannot be urged successfully that any discrimination is intended in Regulation 61 by making it applicable to a particular class of employees. Regulation 61 provides for the termination of the services for all classes of employees in the employment of the Corporation save and except those who hold a lien on permanent posts in the Government department from where they are transferred. It is true that Regulation 61 ex facie does not provide for guideline to the authority exercising the power Conferred by the said Regulation. It is true that Regulation 61 ex facie does not provide for guideline to the authority exercising the power Conferred by the said Regulation. However the very purpose of the said Regulation in our opinion provides a sufficient indication to the Competent Authority exercising this power that it cannot be exercised at the sweet will of the said authority nor it can pick and choose between one set of employees against the other. The employees who are guilty of the acts of misconduct of those of minor lapses and delinquencies against whom action is proposed to be initiated for purposes of inflicting penalty prescribed in the Discipline and Appeal Procedure of the Corporation have to be treated as provided in the said Procedure. No penalty as prescribed in Clause 7 of the Discipline and -Appeal Procedure can be inflicted without going through the prescribed procedure in respect of different classes of offences by the authorities. The Corporation is empowered also to terminate the services of an employee if he has been convicted in a criminal Court or has been declared insolvent by the Competent Court without notice notwithstanding what is provided for in Regulatory 61. On conspectus of the provisions contained in Regulations 61 80 and 81 it is clear to us that the competent Authority cannot arbitrarily proceed against an employee by picking and choosing for exercise of the power under Regulation 61. The Competent Authority has to proceed under the Discipline and Appeal Procedure when it is competent to inflict penalty for any acts of misconduct or minor lapses and delinquencies. The power of termination without notice can be exercised only in cases of casual or parttime employees or where an employee is convicted by a Criminal Court or has been declared insolvent by a Competent Court. It is only in respect of those employees against whom no disciplinary proceedings prima facie competent for acts of misconduct or minor lapses and delinquencies which may invite penalty or those employees whose services are not sought to be terminated on the ground of conviction or insolvency that the power of termination under Regulation 61 can be exercised. This classification in our opinion is clearly discernible on conjoint reading of Regulations 61 80 and 81 of the Service Regulations of the Corporation. This classification in our opinion is clearly discernible on conjoint reading of Regulations 61 80 and 81 of the Service Regulations of the Corporation. It is not difficult to visualise that the Corporation or the Competent Authority may under the colourable exercise of the power under Regulation 61 terminate the services of permanent or temporary employees for those acts which may constitute misconduct or minor lapses and delinquencies or for some other ulterior purpose without going through the formality of Discipline and Appeal Procedure but that would be always open to challenge and judicial scrutiny and if the order of termination is in the nature of penalty in effect and substance it can always be struck down. However this is not tantamount to saying that there is no policy or principle for guidance of the exercise of this discretion or for that matter there is no intelligible and rational classification in the impugned enactment. A power to exercise discretion is not necessarily assumed to be a power to discriminate and apprehension of abuse of such a power would not invalidate the power itself. In this power of termination there is an inherent assumption of the duty to exercise it bona fide which means with due care and caution and if the policy as to when the services can be terminated simpliciter or by way of penalty or on some specified grounds is discernible in the enactment we do not think that a challenge under Article 14 on the ground of infringement of equality clause is open against such an enactment. The Competent Authority which under the present Service Regulations is no less an authority than a senior officer of the status of Divisional Controller or belonging to his equivalent cadre has been invested with discretion to terminate the services under Regulation 61 it is obligatory on his part before he exercises the said power that he would do so after taking into account all the relevant circumstances viz. the nature and quality of the work of the Road Transport Corporation the overall performance of a particular employee his suitability for the post occupied by him the availability of posts and the confidence which he may continue to enjoy of his employer etc. It is on the consideration of this totality of circumstances that the services of a permanent employee can be terminated. It is on the consideration of this totality of circumstances that the services of a permanent employee can be terminated. It is expected of such senior officers exercising this wide power of termination of the services which has far reaching consequences for a particular employee against whom action is proposed and his family that the over all consideration of public interest and exigency of service besides the factors indicated above should weigh with them. We do not think therefore that the power conferred by Regulation 61 can be attacked as an arbitrary and naked power without any classification or guideline for exercise of the discretion in the matter of selection of the employees for exercise of this power. The learned Advocate for the appellant-drivers was at great pains to emphasise that the decision of Das Gupta J. in Moti Ram Dekas case (supra) is binding to us since the ratio of the decision is that the power of termination in Rule 148 (3) or 149 (3) of the Railway Establishment Code is violative of Article 14 since it is arbitrary and uncanalized. The learned Advocate for the Corporation urged that as five Judges on one hand constituting majority opinion and one Judge on another concurring with that opinion gave different reasons for common conclusion no common reasons or principles can be deduced from the said decision and therefore the reasons given by Das Gupta J. in support of his opinion cannot be said to be ratio disdained of Moti Ram Dekas case (supra) since the other five Judges sharing the majority opinion kept that aspect of the question open and did not finally pronounce their opinion. In support of his contention the learned Advocate for the Corporation relied on the observation of Bose J in RAJNARAIN SINGH V. CHAIRMAN PATNA ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE AIR 1954 SC 569 . Apart from this larger controversy we do not appreciate how the decision of Das Gupta J in Moti Ram Dekas case (supra) that the power contained in Rule 148 (3) and Rule 149 (3) of the Railway Establishment Code is arbitrary and uncanalized power can be of any assistance to the cause of the appellants before us since the question of a particular enactment being violative Article 14 would depend on its particular set up and context. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 14 ) SO far as this Court is concerned it cannot ignore ) of Das C. J. expressing the majority opinion of the Court wherein been held that the right of a permanent servant to continue in the post is subject to the contrary position prescribed under the contract of employment or the rules in that behalf even if we bear in mind the criticism made in Moti Ram Dekas case (supra) on this aspect of the question because in any case they have been treated as obiter dicta. ( 15 ) IN view of this settled legal position we are therefore of the opinion that the challenge to the second proviso of Regulation 61 conferring the power of termination of the services of permanent employee as offending equal protection or equal opportunity clause of the Constitution under Art. 14 or 16 is misconceived. We are afraid we cannot accede to the submission of the learned Advocate for the appellant-drivers that Regulation 61 or for that matter second proviso to it confers an arbitrary and uncanalized power in the Competent Authority is devoid of merit since it is impossible to define before hand all the circumstances in which the discretion can be exercised. Whether the impugned order is a result of bona fide exercise of the discretion under Regulation 61 is a separate question by itself to which we will refer to when we will deal with that question. The learned Advocate for the appellant-drivers therefore attempted to persuade us that if the Court is inclined to uphold the validity of this power it can do so only if it reads down the proviso. In submission of the learned Advocate for the appellant-drivers the absence of procedural safeguards of not giving any opportunity to the concerned employee of being heard or absence of any right to prefer an appeal from such an order of want of obligation to give reasons makes the power obnoxious and this minimal of the safeguards of fair play and natural justice must be read in it. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 16 ) THE position which emerges from the review of the authorities which we have cited above that the principles which would given the question of the order of termination of the services of permanent Government servants as violative of Article 311 would stand on a slightly different footing and they cannot be wholly imported when the Court is considering the cases of industrial employees or the employees of commercial Corporations. Notwithstanding the power of termination an industrial employer cannot press his power of termination purely on the basis of contract of service and justify his unfettered right to hire and fire his employees. This light is subject to the industrial adjudication or other judicial scrutiny. However if the conditions and terms of employment permit an employer who believes or suspects that his employee has betrayed his trust or that there is a loss of confidence or that he cannot be continued in service due to exigncies of services he may terminate the employment and discharge him from the services with or without notice as provided in the rules in that behalf. But if such termination is effect and substance an order inflicting punishment or any stigma is attached thereby it can always be challenged and struck down if the proper procedure prescribed under the rules for inflicting punishment is not followed. An order of termination can always be challenged as being in colourable exercise of the power or made with some ulterior motive or on the ground of mala fides. Shortly the test is whether the act of the employer is bona fide or not. We are afraid we cannot agree with the learned Advocate for the appellant-drivers that if the rules and the Standing Orders providing for power of termination simpliciter do not prescribe for an opportunity of being heard to an employee concerned this requirement should be read into the provisions. This is too specious a contention to which we are afraid we cannot adhere to. This is too specious a contention to which we are afraid we cannot adhere to. Regulation 61 in terms does not require that any opportunity should be given to a concerned employee to show cause against the order of termination proposed to be passed against him. The said Regulation investing the Corporation with a power of termination of the services of a permanent or temporary employee by notice of a specified period or salary in lieu thereof is not intended for talking any penal action against the employee concerned. The aim of the rules of natural justice as observed in Karaipaks case (AIR 19 70 SC 150) is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice and they can supplement the law but not supplant it. Exercise of power under Regulation 61 without an opportunity to the concerned employee would not necessarily result in miscarriage of justice since colourable exercise of power is always open to judicial scrutiny as being ultra vires the powers under the Regulation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 17 ) WE are of the opinion that the submission of the learned Advocate for the appellant-drivers to persuade us to read into the impugned provisions the principles of natural justice of audi alteram partem is not well founded obviously for the following reasons:- In the first place the impugned provision is not intended for taking any penal action against the employees of the Corporation. The impugned provision in so far as it provides for termination of the services of a permanent employee or a temporary employee by a notice of a specified period or salary in lieu thereof by necessary implications excludes the application of any or all the rules of the natural justice and the Court would not therefore be justified in ignoring this mandate. The nature of the power is not penal as it does not attach any stigma to an employee concerned. The purpose of the power broadly stated is to put an end to the employment permanent or temporary in expediency of services or for larger public interest. The nature of the power is not penal as it does not attach any stigma to an employee concerned. The purpose of the power broadly stated is to put an end to the employment permanent or temporary in expediency of services or for larger public interest. It is no doubt true that the effect of exercise of such a power may entail certain consequences to an employee; but that would not by itself create an obligation on the authority exercising the power since the rules of service invest the said power in such authority. The contention of the learned Advocate for the appellant-drivers is that the absence of the provision of appeal in the Regulation against such an order of termination or absence of obligation on the part of the authority to give reasons in the order of termination would tend to make such a power devoid of procedural safeguards and therefore arbitrary. Right to prefer an appeal is not necessarily concomitant of principles of natural justice since it is more a creature of a statute under which an offending order has been made and in the absence of a statute none of these rights can be availed of by a party. Before we can read the principles of natural justice in the statute we must bear in mind the pragmatic approach suggested by Lord Reid in WISEMAN V. BORNEMAN (1971) A. C. 297. ". . . FOR a long time the courts have without objection from Parliament supplemented procedure laid down in legislation where they have found that to be necessary for this purpose. But before this unusual kind of power is exercised it must be clear that the statutory procedure is insufficient to achieve justice and that to require additional steps would not frustrate the apparent purpose of the legislation. " (Emphasis supplied by us) ( 18 ) IN PEARLBERG V. VARTY (1972) 1 W. L. R. 534 (H. L.) a question arose whether a taxpayer has a right of audience before or a right to make written representation to the Commissioner before he gives leave under sec. 6 (1) of the Income-tax Management Act 1964 to raise back assessments on the basis of natural justice. The following observation is pertinent in this behalf. ". . . . the courts will lean heavily against any construction of a statute which would be manifestly unfair. 6 (1) of the Income-tax Management Act 1964 to raise back assessments on the basis of natural justice. The following observation is pertinent in this behalf. ". . . . the courts will lean heavily against any construction of a statute which would be manifestly unfair. But they have no power to amend or supplement the language of a statute merely because on one view of the matter a subject feels himself entitled to a larger degree of say in the making of a decision that the statute accords him. Still less is it the functioning of the courts to form first a judgment on the fairness of an Act of Parliament and then to amend or supplement it with new provisions so as to make it conform to that judgment. "it is in this context that the Supreme Court speaking through Hegde J. in Karaipaks case (supra) held that the principles of natural justice are meant to supplement the law and not supplant it. It is for prevention of miscarriage of justice. The very nature of the power of termination under Regulation 61 postulates that it must be an honest or a bona fide decision which in its turn require to act in the words of Lord Parker C. J. in Re H. K. (An Infant) (1967) 2 Q. B. 617-". . . NOT merely impartiality nor merely bringing ones mind to bear on the problem but acting fairly; and to the limited extent that the circumstances of any particular case allow and within the legislative framework under which the administrator is working only to that limited extent do the socolled rules of natural justice apply which in a case such as this is merely a duty to act fairly. " (Emphasis supplied by us)IN our opinion it is only to this limited exent that the so called rules of natural justice will apply which in the context of Regulation 61 is merely a duty to act fairly. The contention was that inasmuch as the provision did not prescribe an obligation for giving reasons for the decision of terminal. tion the impugned provision should be held violative of Article 14 of the Constitution since the obligation to give reasons is a necessary concomitant of principles of natural justice. The contention was that inasmuch as the provision did not prescribe an obligation for giving reasons for the decision of terminal. tion the impugned provision should be held violative of Article 14 of the Constitution since the obligation to give reasons is a necessary concomitant of principles of natural justice. In any case it was urged that this obligation must be read in the provison otherwise the right of review by a Court or Industrial Tribunal and for that matter the judicial scrutiny would be rendered illusory. De Smith stated the position accurately when hg said that there is no general rule of English law that reasons must be given for administrative or judicial decision. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 19 ) IT should be clear from the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court that judicial and quasijudicial authorities are under obligation to make speaking orders in case when they are called upon to decide the lis between the parties (vide:- Siemens Engineerings case (supra ). It is however not necessary the the appellate authorities except specifically required by institute are bound to give reasons and make speaking orders the failure of which will render them void and ineffective ex facie (vide:- Som Dst Dattas case (supra ). The administrative authorities however must record their reasons in their proceedings to disclose how the mind is applied to the subject matter for a decision irrespective of whether it is administrative or quasijudicial. It may be that in a given case a particular order may be open to challenge on this ground. But that by itself would not affect the validity and constitutionality of the power itself. No doubt the administrative or the executive authorities before taking administrative decisions which affect the rights of parties must disclose reasons for their conclusions so as to disclose how the mind is applied to a subject matter for the decision. This is not tantamount to saying that invariably in every order communicating the decision of an administrative or executive authority to a person concerned reasons must be stated. This is not tantamount to saying that invariably in every order communicating the decision of an administrative or executive authority to a person concerned reasons must be stated. In order that an impugned administrative decision stands judicial scrutiny the administrative authority making the decision must be able to satisfy the Court that there were valid and proper reasons for taking such a decision. In the present case it cannot be contended successfully as we shall point out presently that the impugned orders of the General Manager were without any reasons. As a matter of fact the reasons on the basis of which the said orders were made have been very much relied upon by the plaintiff-drivers in support of their contention that the impugned orders of termination of their services were in effect and substance the orders of penalty. We have therefore to reject this entire contention of the learned Advocate for the appellant-drivers that since there is absence of procedural safeguards like opportunity of hearing or right to appeal or necessity of giving reasons the entire provision would be rendered invalid as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Question No. 3 should be answered in the negative and against the appellants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 20 ) IN SAMSHER SINGH V. STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER AIR 1974 SC 2192 a seven Judges Bench of the Supreme Court has elaborately discussed and reconciled its various earlier Decisions in connection with the question what is termination of service pure and simple and when it is punitive. The Supreme Court was concerned in the said case with the termination of services of a probationer. The Supreme Court was concerned in the said case with the termination of services of a probationer. In that context the majority opinion of five Judges was expressed by Ray C. J. (as he then Was and it was ruled that what is decisive in determining the real nature of an order of termination is whether it is one really by way of punishment or not and if the facts and circumstances of the case indicate that the substance0 of the order is that the termination is by way of punishment then a probationer is entitled to protection under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. In the majority opinion the substance of the order and not its form would be decisive. Ray C. J. speaking for the majority Court observed as under:"63. No abstract proposition can be laid down that where the services of a probationer are terminated without saying anything more in the order of termination than that the services are terminated it can never amount to a punishment in the facts and circumstances of the case. If a probationer is discharged on the ground of misconduct or inefficiency or for similar reason without a proper enquiry and without his getting a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against his discharge it may in. a given case amount to removal from service within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution. 64. . . . In the absence of any Rules governing a probationer in this respect the authority may come to the conclusion that on account of inadequacy for the job of for any temperamental or other object not involving moral turpitude the probationer is unsuitable for the job and hence must be discharged. No punishment is involved in this. . . . . . 65. . . . The fact of holding an inquiry is not always conclusive. What is decisive is whether the order is really by way of punishment. . . . . . 66. . . . If the facts and circumstances of the case indicate that the substance of the order is that the termination is by way of punishment then a probationer is entitled to attract Article 311. The substance of the order and not the form would be decisive. (See K. H. PHANDIS V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (4971) SUPP SCR 118- ( AIR 1971 SC 908 ) ). The substance of the order and not the form would be decisive. (See K. H. PHANDIS V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (4971) SUPP SCR 118- ( AIR 1971 SC 908 ) ). 67 An order terminating the services of a temporary servant or probationer under; the Rules of Employment and without anything more will not attract Article 31 1 Where a departmental enquiry is contemplated and if an enquiry is not in fact proceeded with Article 311 will not be attracted unless it can be shown that the order though unexceptionable inform is made following a report based on misconduct. " (Emphasis supplied by us ). Krishna Iyer J speaking for himself and Bhagwati J. observed as under:"the need in this branch of jurisprudence is not so much to reach perfect justice but to lay down a plain test which the administrator and civil servant can understand without subtlety and apply without difficulty. After all between unsuitability and misconduct thin partitions do their bounds divide. And over the years in the rulings of this Court the accent has shifted the canons have varied and predictability has proved difficult because the play of legal light and shade has been baffing. the learned Chief Justice has. in his judgment tackled this problem and explained the rule which must govern the determination of the question as to when termination of service of a probationer can be said to amount to discharge simpliciter and when it can be said to amount to punishment so as to attract the inhibition of Article 311. We are in agreement with what the learned Chief Justice has said in his connection. " . ( 21 ) IN view of this settled legal position we have therefore to find out in the present Case whether impugned orders were termination of the services pure and simple or were punitive in naturein our opinion the impugned orders are in substance and effect orders inflicting punishment under the guise of innocuous orders of termination. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 22 ) WE are of the opinion that the learned Appellate Judge has not applied the Correct test as laid down by the Supreme Court and. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 22 ) WE are of the opinion that the learned Appellate Judge has not applied the Correct test as laid down by the Supreme Court and. therefore he has committed substantial error of law which should be corrected by this Court by reversing the same and by confirming the order of the trial Court. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 23 ) THE result is that these appeals should be allowed and the orders of the Assistant Judge Mehsana should be set aside and the order of the trial Court holding the impugned orders to be bad in law void and ineffective should be restored for the reasons stated in this judgment. The plaintiffs shall be entitled to further declaration that they continue in service all along since the impugned orders were nullity and they would be entitled consequently to all their back wages and the other benefits which they might have earned during this period since the impugned orders have been held to be nullity and there are no justifying reasons for withholding all the back benefits to which the appellant-drivers are entitled to. The Corporation shall ply costs of these appeals to the appellants. Appeal allowed. .