Judgment :- 1. State has come up in appeal challenging an order of acquittal in a case under the Abkari Act (Act I of 1077), hereinafter called the Act. The accused, the respondent herein, was convicted by the judicial Magistrate of I.Class Ponnani, for an offence punishable under S.55(g) of the Act for having possessed fermented wash and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 6 months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/- or in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 6 months. On appeal, the Court of Session, Manjeri, acquitted him. 2. The case against the accused was that on October, 25,1976 at about 5 p. m., while pw.1, Excise Inspector, and his party including pw. 2, Preventive Officer, were moving round on patrol duty, they found the accused stirring wash kept in a tin at the foot of a palmyra tree at the south-western corner of Manakattu paramba belonging to one Vasudevan. pws.1 and 2 along with the party rushed upto the place, detained the accused and on examining the place found there a tin containing about 18 litres and a plastic container containing 20 litres of fermented wash fit for illicit distillation. The accused was arrested and the contraband articles were seized, and a mahazar (Ex. P2) was prepared in the presence of two. independent witnesses, pws 3 and 4. A sample of the wash kept in the containers was taken and sent to the Chemical Examiner. As per Ex. P1, report of the Chemical Examiner the sample contained 10.69% by volume of ethyl alcohol. 3. The plea of the accused was one of complete denial. He had no witness to be examined on his side. 4. The trial court found that the evidence of pws.1 and 2 was reliable and safe to be acted upon. But it was on the ground that their evidence cannot be considered as "disinterested" and that "when the persons whose signatures obtained in the mahazar had turned hostile", it is difficult to find that "the accused was arrested with liquor in his possession" and that the evidence adduced does not show that the accused was "in possession of any of the materials, referred to in S.55 (g) of the Act that the Appellate Court acquitted the accused". Both these grounds are filmsy and unsustainable in law and on the facts. Both these grounds are filmsy and unsustainable in law and on the facts. The very approach made by the appellate court to the material point involved in the case is wrong and this has seriously vitiated the appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence in the case. The following is the point formulated in Para.9 of the judgment: "the short question for consideration is whether the evidence is sufficient to hold that the accused was in possession of liquor." The learned Sessions Judge is labouring under a serious mistake that what is punishable under S.55 (g) of the Act is possession of 'liquor'. 5. The appellate court grievously erred in holding that what the prosecution has to prove in a case under S.55 (g) of the Act is that the accused is in possession of 'liquor'. 'Liquor' has been defined under the Act. Possession of liquor in violation of the provisions of the Act is an offence punishable under S.55 (a) of the Act. What is punishable under S.55 (g) of the Act is using, keeping or having possession of any materials, still, utensil, implement or apparatus, for the purpose of manufacturing liquor. The charge against the accused was that he was found in possession of wash fit for distillation of illicit arrack and not that he was found in possession of liquor. Offences punishable under S.55 (a) and 55 (g) of the Act are different and distinct. Wash is not liquor but is only a material fit for the purpose of distillation of arrack. The prosecution demands a conviction relying on the direct testimony of pws.1 and 2 and Ex. P1 to P3. 6. It was argued on behalf of the accused that pws.1 and 2 being Excise Officers stand on the same footing as Police Officers; that their evidence is highly interested and therefore a conviction based on their testimony uncorroborated by independent evidence will be illegal and unsustainable. 7. There is no legal bar for entering a conviction on the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, if on scrutiny the court is satisfied that it is wholly reliable. Where corroboration is not insisted upon by statute, courts should not insist on corroboration except in cases where the nature of the evidence of a single witness requires, as a rule of prudence, that corroboration should be insisted upon. Where corroboration is not insisted upon by statute, courts should not insist on corroboration except in cases where the nature of the evidence of a single witness requires, as a rule of prudence, that corroboration should be insisted upon. Whether corroboration is necessary or not necessary in the case of a particular witness depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. No inflexible or universal rule can be laid down in this regard. As a general rule, a court can act on the testimony of a single witness even if it is not corroborated. All depends upon the judicial discretion of the presiding judge before whom the case comes. No doubt this discretion should not be exercised capriciously or arbitrarily. It is a well settled golden rule that evidence is to be weighed and not counted. 8. It is not correct to say that an Excise Officer is a Police Officer for all purposes. An Excise Officer under the Abkari Act (Act 1 of 1077) does not have many of the powers of a police officer conferred under the Code of Criminal Procedure. An Excise Officer under the Act is not a police officer for the purposes of S.25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. The evidence of an Excise Officer or Police Officer stands oh the same footing as that of any other witness. In other words, it must rank like any other evidence and their evidence has to stand or fall by the strength or the weakness of their testimony subjected to cross-examination. Evidence of such officers must be considered on its own merits and its own inherent improbabilities. It was also argued that of late, due to various reasons, there has been a general deterioration among some of the officers of these departments. This may or may not be true. But to state that the evidence of any Excise Officer or a Police Officer must be discarded or disbelieved is to deprive the courts of the means of knowing the truth of the case from the available evidence or materials on record. It may be said that such officers who detected the crime, or investigated the case or conducted search and effected recovery will be or are likely to be interested in the successful termination of the prosecution and as such their evidence has to be considered as partisan or interested witnesses which require corroboration. It may be said that such officers who detected the crime, or investigated the case or conducted search and effected recovery will be or are likely to be interested in the successful termination of the prosecution and as such their evidence has to be considered as partisan or interested witnesses which require corroboration. In such circumstances, it may be said that their evidence is not entirely disinterested, although it cannot be said that their evidence is entirely unsatisfactory. The acceptability of their evidence would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case and the quality of the evidence they give before court. There is no rule of law or rule of practice that the evidence of a partisan or interested witness cannot be accepted without corroboration by independent witnesses. It is not the law that such evidence is prima facie unacceptable or the same cannot be made the basis of conviction. The true rule of prudence is that if a witness is found to be partisan or interested, their evidence must be scrutinised with care and caution and if it is found unreliable after such scrutiny it should not be accepted. This rule of corroboration is only a rule of prudence. There may be cases where a complainant is the sole witness to the actual commission of the offence. Where the evidence of the complainant is found to be wholly reliable and acceptable, there is no legal impediment for entering a conviction solely on the basis of that testimony. There is no provision in the Evidence Act which insists that more than one witness is required for the proof of a relevant fact. When a court after a careful scrutiny applying its mind to the circumstances stated above is satisfied that the evidence of a Police Officer or Excise Officer is true and reliable, a conviction can be entered solely basing on such testimony. It has been held in Kochan Velayudhan v. State of Kerala (1960 KLT. 753) by a Full Bench of this Court that it would be open for the court to convict the accused on the evidence of police officers if after examining that evidence carefully the court feels satisfied that it is true. The presumption that a person acts honestly applies as much in favour of police and excise officers as of other persons. The presumption that a person acts honestly applies as much in favour of police and excise officers as of other persons. It is not a judicial approach to distrust them without good grounds therefor. In Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra (AIR. 1956 SC. 217 at p. 230), Venkatarama Ayyar J., while considering a similar argument against the evidence of police officers, observed as follows: 'When at the trial, it appears to the Court that a police officer has, in the discharge of his duty, abused his position and acted oppressively, it is no doubt its clear duty to express its stern' disapproval of his conduct. But it is equally its duty not to assume such conduct on the part of the officer gratuitously and as a matter of course, when there is, as in this case, no reasonable basis for it in the evidence or in the circumstances." 9. In the case on hand, the accused was caught red-handed while he was stirring the wash kept in a tin. Even though he made an attempt to run away and escape, he was surrounded and caught by the Excise party. It is true that the two independent witnesses have turned hostile to the prosecution, and did not fully support the prosecution case. Nowadays invariably in cases under the Abkari Act, independent witnesses turn hostile to the prosecution. But that is no ground to place implicit reliance on the evidence of the Excise Officers. Their evidence must be scrutinised with care and caution. 10. pws. 3 and 4, attestors to Ex. P2 mahazar, turned hostile to the prosecution and were permitted to be cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution. Both the witnesses admitted their attestation of Ex. P2 and also the recovery of the articles; but they stated that the accused was not present there at that time. It is clear from their evidence that they are not desirous of speaking the entire truth with a view to support the accused. Their evidence, in the circumstances, cannot be relied on for any purpose." 11. Pw.1 has sworn to the entire incident in necessary details and his evidence is corroborated on all material particulars by the evidence of pw. 2 and the mahazar Ex. P2. No striking improbability or any inherent defect or material contradiction or discrepancy has been brought out in their evidence. 12. S.55 of the Act reads: "55. Pw.1 has sworn to the entire incident in necessary details and his evidence is corroborated on all material particulars by the evidence of pw. 2 and the mahazar Ex. P2. No striking improbability or any inherent defect or material contradiction or discrepancy has been brought out in their evidence. 12. S.55 of the Act reads: "55. For illegal import, etc. whoever in contravention of this Act or of any rule or order made under this Act or of any licence or permit obtained under this Act. (g) uses, keeps, or has in his possession any materials, still, utensil, implement or apparatus whatsoever for the purpose of manufacturing liquor other than toddy or any intoxicating drug; shall on conviction before a Magistrate be punished," What was recovered was wash and the evidence shows that it was fermented and was fit for distillation of arrack. Ex. P1 shows that the sample liquid contained 10.69% by volume of ethyl alcohol. There is also the evidence of pws.1 and 2, who are Excise Officers of considerable experience that they tested the contents found in the tins in the presence of witnesses by testing and smelling the same and they were satisfied that it was fermented wash fit for distillation. They have also deposed to the various ingredients with which it was prepared. All these have been stated in Ex. P2. What was recovered and found in the possession of the accused was a material which was used for the purpose of manufacturing liquor other than toddy and the same clearly comes within the ambit of S.55(g) of the Act. 13. Finally an attempt was made to sustain the order of the appellate court contending that no sample of the wash was given to the accused. As in Prevention of Food Adulteration Act there is no provision, either in the Act or in the Rules framed thereunder, which enjoins or compels an Excise Officer or Police Officer to give a sample of the contraband article seized or recovered by them or a portion of the sample taken by them, to the accused. The accused in a case under the Act is not, as of right, entitled to a sample of the contraband article in respect of which he or she has been charged with under the Act. The accused in a case under the Act is not, as of right, entitled to a sample of the contraband article in respect of which he or she has been charged with under the Act. The appellate court has not even discussed the testimony of pws.1 and 2 on its own merits: It is only on the ground that there is no independent corrobation that their evidence was rejected. There has been no proper reappraisal of the evidence. The evidence of pws.1 and 2 is reliable and clearly establishes that the accused was found in possession of certain quantity of wash and it was while he was stirring the same with his hand for the purpose of busing it for distillation that he was caught and subsequently arrested. The views and conclusions of the appellate court on the evidence on record, are wrong, unreasonable and perverse. The prosecution has proved the case against the accused beyond any reasonable doubt. The conviction of the accused by the trial court was right and his acquittal by the appellate court was clearly wrong. 14. Regarding sentence, a fervent appeal was made by the counsel appearing for the accused, that this is a fit case for application of S.360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The counsel submitted that the accused is a first offender with good antecedents and with a fixed place of abode within the limits of the trial court; that he is infirm and sickly; that he is now fully repenting for what has happened and he wants to reform himself if he is given an opportunity. No previous conviction has been proved against the accused. The learned Public Prosecutor did not dispute the correctness of the submissions made in this regard on behalf of the accused. Although in cases of this nature where a minimum sentence has been prescribed, provisions of S.360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should not be liberally applied, taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of the case and the submissions made on either side and also the fact that the accused is now fully repenting for what has happened, I think this is a fit case where S.360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be applied. In the result, this appeal is allowed, the order of acquittal is set aside and the accused is found guilty under S.55 (g) of the Act and convicted thereunder. But instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment, I hereby direct that he be released on his entering into a bond for Rs. 2000/- with two sureties each in the like sum to the satisfaction of the trial court, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during the period of one year and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour. The bonds have to be executed within a reasonable time from the date of receipt of records by the trial court. Allowed.