Judgment : Both these Civil Rules are directed against Order No. 4/78/11/48 dated 3rd May, 1978 passed by Sri S.K. Bhattacharya, 1st Land Acquisition Collector under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948. In both the said Civil Rules, the respective petitioner is tenant in the respective portion of premises No. 73A, Sarat Bose Road, CaIcutta-26. By the aforesaid impugned order, the Collector under Act II of 1948 requisitioned the eastern portion premises No. 73A, Sarat Bose Road, measuring .0042 acre. It was stated in the said impugned order of requisition that the portion of the said premises was required for the purpose of providing proper facilities for transport and communication viz. for improvement of Sarat Bose Road from Lala Lajpat Sarani to Southern Avenue. The legality and validity of the said order of requisition were challenged by the respective petitioner mainly on the ground that there was no necessity for requisition of the said portion of the premises No. 73A, Sarat Bose Road and that such requisition could not have been made without providing the respective petitioner with alternative accommodation and without giving the petitioners any reasonable opportunity to arrange for alternative accommodation. It was also contended that the impugned order of requisition was bad as the same violated the principle of natural justice. Subsequently with the leave of the Court at the time of hearing, the principal point which was urged by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners was that the impugned order of requisition was illegal and without jurisdiction inasmuch as such order of requisition was made for a permanent purpose and from the very' beginning the authority was aware that the requisitioned portion of the premises was required for permanent purpose and as a matter of fact, the said portion was intended to be demolished for broadening the existing road viz. Sarat Bose Road. 2. Mr. Sarat Bose Road. 2. Mr. Bhaskar Bhattacharjee the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner however very fairly conceded at the time of hearing of the Rule that although it is desirable on the part of the Requisitioning Authority to give reasonable opportunity to the affected persons of hearing before passing the order of requisition but the vires of the West Bengal Act II of 1948 and/or the validity of the order of requisition simply on the ground that prior to the order of requisition an opportunity of being heard was not given, cannot be urged by the petitioners in the instant Rule in view of the decision at the Supreme Court made in the case of (1) Sachindra Mohan Nandi v. Stale of West Bengal, reported in AIR 1965 SC page 963. It was decided by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision that the West Bengal Act II of 1948 was quite intra vires although there was no provision for giving an opportunity of hearing to the affected party before passing the order of requisition. The Supreme Court observed in the said decision that the affected party could very well make representation before the State Government even after the order of requisition was made and it was reasonably expected that the State Government would consider such representation of the aggrieved party Mr. Bhattacharjee however contended that requisition, unlike acquisition, is of temporary nature and even if requisition extends over a number of years the temporary character of requisition is not changed. The requisition has basically an element of temporariness and not the element of permanance as in the case of acquisition. For this contention Mr. Bhattacharjee referred to the decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of (2) The Commissioner of Income-tax v. Mama Ramji & Co., reported in AIR 1973 SC 515 . Mr. Bhattacharjee contended that the West Bengal Act II of 1948 was enacted for the purpose of speedy requisition of the land for the purposes mentioned in the said Act. It was also provided in the said Act that of during the continuance of requisition the authorities feel that the said land is permanently required for a public purpose, the requisitioned land can also be acquired under section 4 of the West Bengal Act II of 1948. Mr. It was also provided in the said Act that of during the continuance of requisition the authorities feel that the said land is permanently required for a public purpose, the requisitioned land can also be acquired under section 4 of the West Bengal Act II of 1948. Mr. Bhattacharjee also contended that if from the beginning it appears to the authority concerned that the land is not at all required for temporary purpose but the land is really required to be utilised permanently, then it is a case of acquisition from the very beginning and in such case, the authorities are not permitted to requisition the land simply for the purpose of acquiring the same under the West Bengal Act II of 1948 subsequently. According to Mr. Bhattacharjee, in such circumstances, the Requiring and/or Acquiring authority must proceed under the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 which is the parent Act for acquisition of land for public purpose. Mr. Bhattacharjee contended that the impugned order of requisition of the portion of premises No. 73A, Sarat Bose Road under the West Bengal Act II of 1948 is nothing but an attempt to practise fraud on the Statute. Mr. Bhattacharjee contended that the Collector under Act II of 1948 acted in colourable exercise of power in purporting to pass the impugned order of requisition when he knew fully well from the nature of requirement that the said portion of the premises No. 73A, Sarat Bose Road was required permanently and as a matter of fact, the said portion of the premises was to be demolished for broadening of Sarat Bose Rood. Relying on the aforesaid decision reported in AIR 1973 Supreme Court page 515, Mr. Bhattacharjee contended that the requisition has no element of permanance, but by the impugned order, the Requiring Authority intended to utilise the requisitioned portion permanently by changing the nature and character of the subject matter of requisition. Mr. Bhattacharjee also contended that when an order of requisition is passed in respect of certain land under the said West Bengal Act II of 1948, the ownership still remains with the owner and he is entitled to compensation under the provisions of the Act itself for the use and occupation of the Requiring Authority. Mr. Bhattacharjee submitted that if the requisitioned premises is demolished and is made part of a widened road viz. Mr. Bhattacharjee submitted that if the requisitioned premises is demolished and is made part of a widened road viz. Sarat Bose Road, then there is no question of retaining the ownership in respect of the requisitioned premises by the admitted owner and in such circumstances, an order of requisition cannot be passed. 3. Mr. Bhattacharjee next contended that the order of requisition is also bad because the said order suffers from vagueness. The boundary of the requisitioned portion of the premises was not properly given and extent of the eastern portion which is intended to be requisitioned cannot be definitely fixed up because the boundary of the eastern portion is quite vague. Mr. Bhattacharjee next contended that the order of requisition is also bad because there was no urgency for requisitioning the said premises. Mr. Bhattacharjee contended that it must be established by the Requiring Authority that there was urgency for passing the order of requisition but it does not appear from the impugned order that the authority concerned was satisfied that there was urgency for passing the order of requisition under the West Bengal Act II of 1948. Mr. Bhattacharjee also contended that from the facts and circumstances of the case it will also appear that there was no urgency for passing the order of requisition. It will appear from the materials on record that after 13 months from the date of proposal by the concerned department, the said order of requisition was made. The said fact establishes that the Requisitioning Authority was not satisfied that there was any urgency in the matter. Accordingly, Mr. Bhattacharjee contended that even assuming that an order of requisition can be made in respect of a land which is required permanently for public purposes mentioned in Act II of 1948, such order could not have been made in the instant case in the absence of any urgency. 4. Mr. Sarkar the learned Junior Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the State respondents submitted that the West Bengal Act II of 1948 was enacted for requisition and speedy acquisition of land for certain purposes and such statement is embodied in the Act itself. Mr. 4. Mr. Sarkar the learned Junior Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the State respondents submitted that the West Bengal Act II of 1948 was enacted for requisition and speedy acquisition of land for certain purposes and such statement is embodied in the Act itself. Mr. Sarkar drew the attention of the Court to the Preamble of the said West Bengal Act II of 1944 which runs to the following effect :- "Whereas it is expedient to provide for requisition and speedy aquisition of land for the purposes." Mr. Sarkar submitted that it is thus quite clear that the West Bengal Act II is intended for taking steps for requisition and speedy acquisition. It does not provide that the Act is intended for speedy requisition. Mr. Sarkar contended that as such, the petitioners are not entitled to contend that unless there is urgency, an order of requisition cannot be made under the said West, Bengal Act II of 1948 although the land in question is required for the purposes mentioned in the Act itself. Mr. Sarkar contended that the very purpose of the Act is to requisition lands for specified purposes under the said Act II of 1948 and thereafter to acquire the said lands speedily. Mr., Sarkar contended that it takes time to process a request for requisition and acquisition by the requiring department and it cannot be contended that simply because the Collector under Act II of 1948 passed the order of requisition after several months, the said order of requisition will be bad and of no consequence only on the ground of delay. Mr. Sarkar also contended that public purpose is justiceable but once it is established before a Court that the public purpose referred to in the impugned order of requisition was the public purpose within the meaning of Act II of 1948, it is no longer open to the Court to make further investigation whether the requisition was for temporary period or for a permanent user. Mr. Sarkar contended that the order of requisition remains a valid order of requisition if the lawful authority has passed the order of requisition for the public proposes referred to in West Bengal Act II of 1948. Mr. Mr. Sarkar contended that the order of requisition remains a valid order of requisition if the lawful authority has passed the order of requisition for the public proposes referred to in West Bengal Act II of 1948. Mr. Sarkar contended that in the instant case, the purpose mentioned in the impugned order' is a public purpose within the meaning of West Bengal Act II 1948 and such order was lawfully passed by an authority empowered to pass such order and as such the validity of the order of requisition cannot be challenged on the ground that such order of requisition was intended to serve a permanent purpose and not a temporary purpose. For this contention, Mr. Sarkar referred to the Bench decision of this Court made in the case of (3) Mihir Kumar Sarkar v. State of West Bengal reported in 75 CWN page 831. Mr. Sarkar also contended that acquisition of a land for a public purpose, can be made both under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and also under the West Bengal Act II of 1948 in certain circumstances. But for acquiring a land under the West Bengal Act II of 1948 the land must first be requisitioned on the grounds referred to in the said Act II of 1948. If a particular land can be acquired for a public purpose under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and also under the West Bengal Act II of 1948 after requisitioning the land under the said Act II of 1948, the election to follow the procedure either under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or under the West Bengal Act II of 1948 for ultimate acquisition is entirely on the authority concerned "and if the authority concerned feels that there is necessity for speedy acquisition for which the land intended to be acquired should be requisitioned first under Act II of 1948 and then be acquired under the said Act, the authority concerned is quite free to take recourse for such acquisition through requisition under the West Bengal Act II of 1948 and it cannot be contended that such action on the part of the acquiring authority is illegal or malafide because the acquisition could also have been made under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Mr. Mr. Sarkar contended that if an authority intends to acquire a land under Act II of 1948 through requisition made under the said Act, the authority must satisfy the court that the order of requisition has been validly made in respect of the land in question for the purposes mentioned in the said Act II of 1948 and the necessity of permanent acquisition for a public purpose under the said Act is also there. Mr. Sarkar contended that in the instant case, the order of requisition has been made for a purpose specified in Act II of 1948 and in the facts and circumstances of the case it is also quite clear that there is also requirement of the said land for permanent user and as such the order of requisition made under Act II of 1948 in aid of speedy acquisition under the said Act is quite legal and valid and the petitioners are not entitled to challenge the legality and validity of the order of requisition made in aid of acquisition of the said land permanently. 5. Mr. Sarkar also submits that section 3(1) of the West Bengal Act 11 of 1948 gives sufficient indication that the requisition can be made for permanent user. He says that the requisition can be made for maintaining supplies and services essential for the life of community or for providing proper facilities of transport, communication, irrigation, drainage and/or for creation of better living condition in rural and urban areas. It is, therefore, quite evident that the land can be required under section 3(1) of the said Act for the public purposes referred to in the said section and for the user of the said land for such public purposes, the nature and character of the land is very often required to be changed completely. For example, if a land is required for irrigation purpose and for excavating a canal, the very nature and character of the land is got to be changed by excavating the canal and as such it cannot be contended that since the order of requisition is basically for a temporary purposes any change of the nature and character of the land permanently for proper and effective utilisation of the land cannot be resorted to. Mr. Mr. Sarkar contended that the decision of the Supreme Court referred to by the learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioners in the said case of (2) The Commissioner of Income-tax v. Mama Ramji & Co, AIR 1973 SC page 515 is entirely for a different purpose and the said decision has no manner of application in the facts and circumstances of the instant Rules. Mr. Sarkar also contended that although the West Bengal Act II of 1948 is a temporary Act but an order of requisition to be followed by an order of acquisition can be made under the said temporary Act. In this context, Mr. Sarkar referred to the decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of the Collector of (4) Akola v. Ramchandran and ors, reported in AIR 1968 SC page 244. In the said decision, the Bombay Land Requisition Act (Act XXIII of 1948) was under consideration of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court took into consideration the import of section 5(1) of the said Act and held that the expression any land for any public purpose" as appearing in Section 5(1) of the said Act was wide enough to include any public purpose whether temporary or otherwise. The Supreme Court negatived the contention that there was limitation under section 5(1) of the said Act to require any land for permanent purpose as the life of the Act itself was temporary. The Supreme Court held that the expression "public purpose" appearing in section 5(1) of the said Act was sufficiently wide enough to include not only public purpose of temporary nature but other public purposes also. It was held by the Supreme Court that it is for the Requisitioning Authority to judge and not for a Court of law to decide how best the land is to be used. If the Requisitioning Authority uses the land for a purpose which is not a temporary purpose, such as, setting up a new village site and for construction of houses as was the fact in the said case before the Supreme Court, it is for the Government or those who put up such structures to contemplate the possibility of having to return in future the land to the owner in its original state, but that does not mean that the power is restricted to a temporary purpose only. Mr. Mr. Sarkar contended that it is thus quite evident that the power is not restricted to a temporary purpose only and an order of requisition can be made even for permanent purpose provided such order of requisition is passed by the lawful authority for the purposes mentioned in Act II of 1948. Mr. 8arkar also contends that the impugned order of requisition in the instant case even stands on a stronger footing because under the West Bengal Act II of 1948 and order of requisition can also be validly made in aid of a speedy acquisition for a permanent purpose. Accordingly, Mr. Sarkar contended that the petitioner's contention that the order of requisition could not have been passed as the authority concerned was aware from the very beginning that the land was needed permanently cannot be sustained. So far as the question of vagueness of the description of requisitioned premises is concerned. Mr. Sarkar produced a map of the requisitioned premises in Court and also gave inspection to the learned Counsel for the petitioners and contended that the measurement of the eastern portion sought to be acquired was given and it cannot be contended that the authority concerned was really proceeding vaguely without knowing the subject matter of requisition. In my view, in the facts of the present case, it cannot be contended that the order of requisition is really suffering from vagueness and on that score the order of requisition is liable to be quashed. I am also inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Sarkar that if a particular land is really intended to be acquired speedily and the said land can also be requisitioned for a public purpose referred to in section 3(1) of the West Bengal Act II of 1948, the order of requisition is a valid order of requisition and such order of requisition cannot be struck down on the footing that the order of requisition was not made for a temporary purpose but for a permanent purpose. I also agree with the contention of Mr. Sarkar, the learned Counsel for the State. I also agree with the contention of Mr. Sarkar, the learned Counsel for the State. that it is entirely an election of the concerned authority as to whether the acquisition should be made under the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 or such acquisition should be made under the speedier and less stringent provisions of West Bengal Act II of 1948 through the process of requisition under the said Act. In the circumstances, both the Rules fail, but I make no order as to costs. All interim orders passed in the Rules stand vacated.