Judgment Hari Lal Agrawal, J. 1. This application has been filed by the defendant against an order of the trial court passed under section 13 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1977 (hereinafter called the act)corresponding to section 1 l-A of the old Act. 2. The plaintiffs opposite party filed a title suit on 25.1.1977 in the court of Munsif, Khagaria, for eviction of the petitioner from suit premises on the ground of personal necessity. It is not disputed that the petitioner had been paying rent at the rate of Rs, 50/- per month and that he paid rent at this rate upto the month of May, 1976. Thereafter he instituted a proceeding before the House Controller for fixation of fair rent of the premises. The controller by his order, dated 8,1.1977 fixed the Mr rent at the rate of Rs.36/-per month with effect from June, 1976. In other words, the fair rent of the premises in question had already been fixed prior to the institution of the suit. When the fair rent was fixed, the petitioner tendered rent at the rate of the fair rent but the plaintiffs refused to accept the same and thereafter the petitioner remitted the rent by postal money order. The plaintiffs, however, refused that tender as well. The petitioner went on remitting the rents by postal money orders regularly every month. 3. The plaintiffs, however, alleged in the plaint that the rate of rent was rs.50/- per month. On 20.1.1978 the plaintifts filed an application under section 13 of the new Act. In his rejoinder, one of the pleas set up by the petitioner was that in view of the fixation of the fair rent of the premises in question the petitioner was not liable to pay the demand of the rent at a rate more than the fair rent. The trial court, however, on reference to a Full Bench decision of this court in the case of N. M. Verma V/s. Upendra Narain Singh ( 1977 BBCJ 662 ), rejected the petitioners contention and directed him to pay the rent at the rate of Rs.50/- per month as that was the "last paid" rent by him. The petitioner has accordingly come up to this Court. 4. Mr. The petitioner has accordingly come up to this Court. 4. Mr. Parmanand Sharan Sinha, appearing in support of this application, contended that the ratio of the above Full Bench case will have no application to this case inasmuch as here the fair rent had already been fixed by the Controller much before the institution of the suit and rents had been regularly tendered by the tenant to the plaintiffs-landlords at that rate all through, and, therefore, the trial court was not correct in directing the petitioner to make the deposits of the arrears and current and future rents at a rate different than the fair rent. 5. In order to appreciate the question canvassed before me, it would be necessary first to discuss the Full Bench case itself. It is, no doubt, true that in the above decision it was observed that the words used in section 11-A (now section 13) of the Act were "unambiguous and upon its plain meaning, a landlord can require deposit of rent at which it was last paid and the court can determine what was the rent last paid. " It was further observed that in a case where fair rent had been fixed under the provisions of the Act at a rate different than that at which rent had been last paid, it was of no consequence, and in that view of the matter an earlier Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of mahabir Ram V/s. Shiv Shankar Prasad, AIR 1968 Patna 415, was overruled, taking the view that an order passed under section 11-A (now section 13) of the act was subject to variation so as to make it consistent with the fair rent fixed by the Controller. In Mahabir Rams case (supra) the question was as to whether after an order passed under section 11 A of the Act, if the rent of the premises in question was determined by the House Controller at a different rate, could the order under section 11-A be varied to make it consistent with the fair rent fixed by the Controller In N. M. Vermas case (supra) the question was not of fixation of any fair rent, but was as to whether in spite of the fact that the tenant was paying rent at the rate of Rs.200/- per month for more than two years prior to the institution of the suit, which of course was enhanced from rs.160/- per month, the same could be made the basis for passing an order under section 11-A of the Act (old ). That case had earlier come before me sitting singly and, I, in view of certain conflicting decisions, had referred the matter for consideration by a larger Bench which was ultimately heard by a Full Bench consisting of five Judges of this Court. This Full Bench approved the view of this Court in the case of S. M. Khalil V/s. Akhaari Sita Ram, AIR 1958 Patna 103, where it was held by a Bench of this Court that the only enquiry which a Court should make while disposing of an application under section 11-A of the Act was as to what was the rent which was last paid by the tenant and the quantum of rent according to the rate of rent last paid by the tenant. In that view of the matter, this Full Bench further held that the cases of Manoranjan Nath Patra v. Kashi Prasad Sah, 1974 BLJR 140 and Sashidhar Das V/s. Harihar Prasad, 1973 BBCJ 401 : AIR 1973 Patna 361, where a contrary view was taken, were not correctly decided. 6. In that view of the matter, this Full Bench further held that the cases of Manoranjan Nath Patra v. Kashi Prasad Sah, 1974 BLJR 140 and Sashidhar Das V/s. Harihar Prasad, 1973 BBCJ 401 : AIR 1973 Patna 361, where a contrary view was taken, were not correctly decided. 6. I, sitting singly being bound by the above decision, am called upon to examine as to whether on the facts of this case, what should be deemed to be the last paid rent, i. e. , whether the tender by the petitioner at the rate of Rs.36/-per month by postal money order before the institation of the suit can be held to be the rate of rent at which it was last paid, or it should still be held that the rate was Rs.50 per month. 7. In order to answer this question reference has got to be made to some other provisions of the Act. Sec.12 deals with "eviction of Tenants" and clause (l) (d) thereof lays down that "where the amount of two months rent lawfully payable by the tenant and due from him is in arrears by not having been paid within the time fixed by contract or, in the absence of such contract, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable or by not having been validly remitted or deposited in accordance with section 16", was a ground for the eviction of the tenant. 8. From a reading of the above provision it is clear that non-payment of two months rent lawfully payable by the tenant exposes him to the consequences of being evicted ; from the premises under his occupation. The mode and time for payment, however, have also been enumerated in ihis clause and they are : (a) not having been paid within the time fixed by contract, or (b) in the absence of such contract, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable, and (c) by not having been validly remitted or deposited in accordance with section 16. It is obvious, therefore, that one of the modes of paying the rent which a tenant is bound to pay to a landlord and which would absolve him from the risk of being evicted, under this clause is by remitting or depositing the same in accordance with section 16. It is obvious, therefore, that one of the modes of paying the rent which a tenant is bound to pay to a landlord and which would absolve him from the risk of being evicted, under this clause is by remitting or depositing the same in accordance with section 16. 9. This at once brings us to the consideration of section 16. The relevant provision for our purposes is sub section (1) thereof which provides that where a landlord refuses to accept rent lawfully payable to him by a tenant, he may remit such rent and continue to remit any subsequent rent which becomes due in respect of such building, by postal money order to the landlord. It cannot be disputed that the fair rent which was fixed by the Controller in this case by his order dated 8.1.1977 with effect from 1.6.1976 at the rate of Rs.36/- per month, was the rent which was lawfully payable to the plaintiffs-landlords and that it was this rent which the tenant-petitioner was bound to remit to the landlord which, however, the landlord went on refusing for more than a year. Can it, therefore, be said that still the landlord can say that the last rent that was paid to him was at the rate of Rs.50/- per month In my considered view, the answer must bo against him, as one of the modes for paying the rent to a landlord on his refusal, is a tender or remittance by postal money order. It does not matter whether the landlord accepts or refuses the same. In the eye of law, the refusal would be deemed to be a valid payment to the landlord and absolve the tenant from his obligation to pay the rent to the landlord. The substance of section 16 (1) and the real intention behind it obviously is that once the rent is remitted by postal money order within the time mentioned in section 12 (l) (d)of the Act the landlord cannot claim eviction of the tenant on the ground of default in the payment of rent. The law, therefore, does not make any distinction between a rent actually paid to the landlord hand to hand or by remitting to him by postal money order. The law, therefore, does not make any distinction between a rent actually paid to the landlord hand to hand or by remitting to him by postal money order. It would, therefore, hold that on the facts of this case the last paid rent was Rs.36/- per month and not Rs.50/- as held by the trial court. I would accordingly set aside the order of the learned munsif and direct the petitioner to deposit the arrears of rent from the date of institution of the suit till December, 1978 at the rate of Rs.36/- per month within 15 days from today and the current and future rents at the same rate by the 15th day of each succeeding month, failing which the consequences contemplated under section 16 of the Act will follow. The petitioner will be entitled to adjust from the same, if any deposit has already been made by him in pursuance of this courts order dated 13.4.1978. 10. In the result, the application succeeds as indicated above, but on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, I shall make no order as to costs. Application allowed.