Jai Maruthi Motor Service v. Regional Transport Officer Kozhikode
1979-08-21
K.K.NARENDRAN, V.P.GOPALAN NAMBIYAR
body1979
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Gopalan Nambiyar, C. J. 1. These writ petitions have been referred to a Division Bench to consider the conflict of views that was felt to exist between the decision in K. T. Kathiri v. Regional Transport Officer (1965 K.L.T. 1206) and the judgment of our learned brother Eradi, J., in O.P. No. 3469 of 1976. In K.T. Kathiri v. Regional Transport Officer (1965 K.L.T. 1206) our learned brother Govindan Nair, J., only ruled that merely because a person is not entitled to the benefit of the exemption under section 5(2) of the Kerala Motor Vehicle Taxation Act, his liability for tax under section 3 does not automatically follow. The principle thus stated seems to be unexceptionable. Non-availability of the exemption from tax would not automatically attract liability to tax. That will have to be positively established on proof of the necessary ingredients. Our learned brother Eradi, J., in the Judgment in O.P. No. 3469 of 1976 has not referred to the decision of Govindan Nair, J. in K. T. Kathiri v. Regional Transport Officer. The facts before our learned brother Eradi, J., only warranted a consideration of the question whether the rejection of the petitioner's request for exemption was justified and proper. The learned Judge held it was. No further question arose for consideration, nor was it dealt with by the learned Judge. So, there seems really to be no conflict between the two decisions. Whatever that be, the questions that were urged before us in this case did not fall for consideration of either of the two decisions. 2. As representative of the facts and arguments before us we may refer to O.P. No. 4783 of 1976-C. The petitioner in this writ petition is a firm which owned two motor vehicles K.L.D. 3230 and K.L.D. 2937. The fitness certificate of the vehicles expired on 30th September 1974. Tax for the quarter ending 30th September 1974 was in arrear. Intimation of non-use of the vehicle was given on 30th September 1974, requesting exemption upto 31st August 1976. By Ext. P-1 dated 29th April 1976, the applicant was directed to send the application for exemption in Form G together with the registration certificate for the vehicle. By Ext.
Tax for the quarter ending 30th September 1974 was in arrear. Intimation of non-use of the vehicle was given on 30th September 1974, requesting exemption upto 31st August 1976. By Ext. P-1 dated 29th April 1976, the applicant was directed to send the application for exemption in Form G together with the registration certificate for the vehicle. By Ext. P-2 order dated 28th July 1976 the writ petitioner was informed that the registration certificate was received in the office only on 21st June 1976 after the prescribed period, and hence the request for exemption from 1st October 1975 to 30th June 1976 was rejected. In respect of the other vehicle, a similar order Ext. P-3 was passed. These are the two orders sought to be challenged in this writ petition. 3. Section 3(1) of the Act renders every motor vehicle liable to tax which is used or kept for use in the State. Under clause (3) of the section the registered owner or the person having control over the motor vehicle shall be deemed to use or keep for use the vehicle except during the period for which no tax is payable under section 5(1). Under section 4 the tax levied under section 3(1) shall be paid in advance within such period, and in such manner as may be prescribed, by the registered owner or person having control over the vehicle. Section 5 deals with the exemption from tax and the relevant provision reads: "5. Exemption from tax (1) In the case of a motor vehicle which is not intended to be used or kept for use during the first month or the first and second months of a quarter, or the whole of a quarter or year, as the case may be, the registered owner or the person having possession or control of such vehicle shall give previous intimation in writing to the Regional Transport Officer from whom the endorsement for tax has been obtained, that such vehicle would not be used for such period and thereupon, the registered owner or such other person shall not be deemed to have used or kept for use the vehicle for such period, and no tax shall be payable in respect of such vehicle for such period. ** ** **" Section 28 is the rule-framing section which allows rules to be framed for carrying out the purposes of this Act.
** ** **" Section 28 is the rule-framing section which allows rules to be framed for carrying out the purposes of this Act. Section 28(2) (a) and (d) read: "28. Power of Government to make rules" * * * * * (2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for (a) the manner in which tax shall be paid and the documents to be produced for the issue of tax licence; * * * * * (d) the manner in which refund or reduction or exemption may be claimed; * * * * * In accordance with these sections, Rules have been framed the Kerala Motor Vehicles Taxation Rules, 1975. Rule 10 of the Rules reads: "10. Exemption from tax. [Section 5(1)] (1) The previous intimation referred to in sub-section (1) of section 5 shall be made to the Regional Transport Officer concerned in Form G or in writing with the particulars required therein accompanied by the certificate of registration of the vehicle so as to reach him within one week from the date of commencement of the period for which exemption from payment of tax in respect of the vehicle is claimed due to non-use. * * * * *" In this case the dismissal was on the ground that the application was received after the prescribed period, (vide Exts. P-2 and P-3). This ground satisfies the requirement of section 5(1) of the Act. That should be sufficient to sustain the order of dismissal of the petitioner's application in this case, without getting into the nice and interesting question which has been agitated and which we shall notice in some of the other writ petitions heard along with this. The counter-affidavit filed in this writ petition has, in paragraph 4 stated that the stoppage intimations of both the vehicles involved in this writ petition were received as indicated in that paragraph, as follows: "11/75 27-10-1975 12/75 28-11-1975 1/76 27-12-1975 2/76 27-1-1976 3/76 27-2-1976 4/76 27-3-1976 5/76 20-4-1976 6/76 28-5-1976" No intimation at all was received for October 1975. Hence the petitioner is not entitled to exemption for the quarter ending 31st December 1975. For the rest of the period the petitioner is entitled to exemption only on previous intimation under section 5(1) in the manner prescribed.
Hence the petitioner is not entitled to exemption for the quarter ending 31st December 1975. For the rest of the period the petitioner is entitled to exemption only on previous intimation under section 5(1) in the manner prescribed. This had to be in Form G and has to be accompanied by the registration certificate. This was done only on 21st June 1976. These dates show clearly that there was no previous intimation in Form G as required by the terms of the rule. That was done only on 21st June 1976. The registration certificate did not accompany the application, but was sent in only on 21st June 1976. Exts. P-2 and P-3 orders were therefore correct and call for no interference. We dismiss this writ petition with no order as to costs. O. P. No. 4962 of 1976-G. The impugned order herein is Ext. P-2, which is the appellate order passed by the Deputy Transport Commissioner. The exemption prayed for was rejected on the ground that the non-use intimation was received only on 28th October 1975, that the registration certificate of the vehicle did not accompany the intimation, and that therefore the appellant was not entitled to exemption. As stated in the previous case, the rejection on the ground that the registration certificate did not accompany the application was correct and fully justified by the terms of section' 5 of the Act read with rule 10. We dismiss this writ petition with no order as to costs. O. P. No. 5422 of 1976-K. The impugned orders are Exts. P-2 and P-4, the latter being the appellate order. The quarters involved in the orders are different. The ground of dismissal in the case of Ext. P-2 was that the vehicle was removed from Gudalur to Calicut on 1st January 1976, and that this was admitted by the petitioner in his letter dated 15th January 1976. This being so, the petitioner was certainly not entitled to exemption on the ground of non-use of the vehicle during the quarter. The order was correct and calls for no interference. 2. Ext. P-4 order was in respect of the quarter ended 30th June 1976. The application for exemption was dismissed on the ground that it was not accompanied by the registration certificate. This is strictly in accordance with the provisions of section 5 of the Act read with rule 10.
The order was correct and calls for no interference. 2. Ext. P-4 order was in respect of the quarter ended 30th June 1976. The application for exemption was dismissed on the ground that it was not accompanied by the registration certificate. This is strictly in accordance with the provisions of section 5 of the Act read with rule 10. We are unable to find any ground for interference. O. P. No. 5384 of 1976-G. The impugned orders are Exts. P-1 and P-2. The ground for dismissal given in both these orders was that the applications for exemption were not accompanied by the registration certificate as required by section 5 read with rule 10. The reason thus given was proper and valid and calls for no interference. We dismiss this writ petition with no order as to costs. O.P. No. 5385 of 1976-G. The impugned orders are Exts. P-1, P-2 & P-3. Exts. P-1 and P-2 were on the ground that the registration certificate did not accompany the applications for exemption. Ext. P-3 was on the ground that the application was received after the prescribed period. Exts. P-1 and P-2 orders are correct and proper. But Ext. P-3 has given rise to an interesting question. The argument advanced was put thus: Under section 5 the obligation is only to give previous intimation in writing to the Regional Transport Officer that the vehicle would not be used for the specific period. Under section 28 (2) (d) of the Act the "manner" in which exemption may be claimed could be prescribed by the rules made under the Act. Accordingly rule 10 of the Motor Vehicles Taxation Rules, 1975 provided for the manner of claiming exemption. We have already quoted the relevant provision of the rule. That requires the application to be made in Form G accompanied by the registration certificate so as to reach the officer within one week from the date of commencement of the period to which the exemption relates. The argument was that specification of a time element is beyond the province of section 5 and section 28 (2) (d), and therefore to the extent to which the rule insists upon a time element with respect to the application, the same cannot be sustained.
The argument was that specification of a time element is beyond the province of section 5 and section 28 (2) (d), and therefore to the extent to which the rule insists upon a time element with respect to the application, the same cannot be sustained. The contention is no doubt supported by the recent decision of this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Shree Padmanabhaswamy Temple Trusti 1979 K.L.T. 594 and the decision of the Supreme Court in Sales Tax Officer v. Abraham 20 S.T.C. 367 referred to therein. These decisions have laid down that the expression "in the prescribed manner" is inadequate and incompetent to take in a time-element. Being so, the insistence on the time-elementat in Exts. P-1 and P-2 is not quite proper and valid. That cannot properly be made the ground for rejection. But, in substance, if not in fact, the ground means and involves that the Registration Certificate did not accompany the application for exemption as it should have, under section 5 of the Act read with rule 10. This is specifically so stated in Exts. P-1 and P-2 orders, viz., that the registration certificate did not accompany the application. In this view, interests of justice do not warrant our interference under Article 226 with these orders Exts. P-1 and P-2. 2. Counsel for the writ petitioners in all these cases raised one common question that by reason of the amendment effected to rule 10 in 1978, the requirement that the application for exemption must be accompanied by the registration certificate has been deleted and that the amendment was retrospective. He referred our attention to 1978 K.L.N. (Rules and Notifications) 56, where the amendment is seen printed. The argument was that this amendment must be treated as procedural in character and given retrospective operation so as to cover the applications for exemption involved in these cases, although in point of time the applications were all made before the amendment. It seems difficult, having regard to the nature and the purpose of the rule and its clauses, to treat the amendment as of a declaratory nature or purely procedural in character. Section 5 itself confers immunity on the giving of a previous intimation in writing to the Regional Transport Officer. We do not think that the 1978 amendment was intended to reopen all closed and final orders passed before the amendment came into effect.
Section 5 itself confers immunity on the giving of a previous intimation in writing to the Regional Transport Officer. We do not think that the 1978 amendment was intended to reopen all closed and final orders passed before the amendment came into effect. We are not, therefore, prepared to regard the rule as purely procedural. To so hold would involve the reopening of many completed orders of rejection of exemption. We cannot agree that the amendment deleting the requirement that the registration certificate should accompany the application has retrospective operation. We therefore dismiss all these writ petitions with no orders as to costs.