ORDER V. K. Mehrotra, J. - Dalip Singh, the applicant is tenant of a shop of which Smt. Dropadi Devi, the opposite party is the owner. A suit, inter alia, for the ejectment of the applicant from the shop aforesaid was filed by the opposite party. It was alleged in the suit that apart from being in arrears of' rent with effect from April 1, 1969, the defendant-applicant had also materially altered the accommodation and caused substantial damage to it and had, therefore, rendered himself liable for ejectment from the shop. The applicant denied the allegations particularly in regard to material alteration and substantial damage to the shop. 2. The parties were at issue on the question as to whether the disputed shop was a pre-1951 construction or was constructed subsequent thereto. It was found by the Judge, Small Causes, who tried the suit that the shop in dispute was a post 1951 construction and that, therefore, the provisions of U. P. Act No. III of 1947 were not applicable to it. He also found that the applicant was in arrears of rent to an extent of Rs. 468.83. 3. The question about which there was real contest between the parties was as to whether the defendant-applicant had materially altered and caused substantial damage to the accommodation in suit and whether he was liable also for compensating the plaintiff-opposite party for the damage done to the building. 4. The plaintiff alleged that the staircase leading to the first floor of the building which was to the North of the shop was not included in the tenancy of the defendant. However, after having been let into the shop as a tenant, the defendant demolished the wail which separated his shop from the staircase and dismantled eight steps thereof and included the space so occupied by those steps in the shop. The plaintiff claimed that by so doing, the defendant had materially altered the accommodation and substantially damaged it so that he had incurred the liability of being evicted from the shop on that account apart from being liable to pay a sum of Rs. 100/- as compensation for the damage caused to the stairs. The defendant or the contrary, set up a case that originally the shop had been let out to him at the rate of Rs. 25/- per month. 100/- as compensation for the damage caused to the stairs. The defendant or the contrary, set up a case that originally the shop had been let out to him at the rate of Rs. 25/- per month. Later, the plaintiff herself got the staircase dismantled and the space included in the demised shop and enhanced the rent of the shop to Rs. 60/-per month. The trial Judge discussed the evidence on record in detail and disbelieved the case set up by the defendant. He came to the conclusion that the defendant dismantled the staircase and included the space in his shop without the consent of the plaintiff and that by doing so he had not only materially altered the accommodation but had also caused substantial damage to it. The plaintiff was, according to the trial Judge, entitled to a decree for the ejectment of the defendant on that ground and was also entitled to recover a sum of Rs. 100/-as damage for having dismantled the staircase. The suit was, consequently, decreed by the trial Judge. The defendant challenged the decree in a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The Additional District Judge, Bareilly who heard this revision took the view that the finding about the demolition of the mid-wall and dismantling of eight steps of the staircase and the inclusion of the space in his shop by the defendant was fully justified and that the trial Judge had rightly concluded that the defendant by so doing had materially altered the accommodation and substantially damaged it. He, therefore, refused to interfere with the decision of the trial Judge. Hence, the present application in revision by the defendant under Section 115 C. P. C. 5. The contention of the learned counsel for the defendant-applicant before.me in the main has been that even on the facts found by the trial Judge, a decree for his ejectment could not be sustained. The submission is that the alteration and damage having been caused to the building prior to the commencement of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972, the defendant cannot be said to have incurred liability for ejectment from the shop in dispute m which his possession was protected by the provisions of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 which admittedly, was applicable to it. Further, the alteration having been made in the premises which admittedly were not included in those let out to him, it could not be said that there was any material alteration or damage done to the building within the meaning of that term under the Act so as to incur liability for eviction therefrom. In any case according to the submission, it was not established that the alteration made was likely to diminish the value or utility of the building or to disfigure it or that the damage caused to the building was substantial and had been caused wilfully. It is the undisputed case of the parties before me that the shop in dispute which was not covered by provisions of U. P. Act No. Ill of 1947, is governed by the provisions of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. It is also not in dispute that the alterations in the building attributed to the defendant-applicant were all made prior to the commencement of the said Act which came into force from July 15, 1972. 6. The contention that since the structural alterations were made in a portion of the building which was not in the tenancy of the applicant and could not consequently, enable the plaintiff to seek his ejectment from the shop in dispute is misconceived. On the plaintiffs case, which has been accepted by the trial Judge on the evidence of record, it is clear that the wall which separated the shop under the tenancy of the applicant from the adjoining space in which stood the staircase was demolished it is clear that structural alteration was made by the applicant not only in that portion of the building which was not in his tenancy but also in the one which was demised to him. Likewise, the plea that the damage that was caused to the building on account of the structural alterations was not alleged to have been wilfully so caused by the defendant-applicant so that it could not furnish the plaintiff with any cause of action for seeking his ejectment also does not need any serious consideration. Likewise, the plea that the damage that was caused to the building on account of the structural alterations was not alleged to have been wilfully so caused by the defendant-applicant so that it could not furnish the plaintiff with any cause of action for seeking his ejectment also does not need any serious consideration. The finding that after being inducted into the premises as a tenant, the defendant caused the removal of the wall separating the shop under his tenancy from the staircase and of eight steps of the staircase, it is clear that the damage resulting from such structural alteration was caused by the applicant wilfully. 7. It is not necessary for the disposal of the present case to go into the question whether the structural alteration made in the building by the defendant was such as was likely to diminish its value or utility or to disfigure it on which there is no specific finding of the trial Judge, for in my opinion, the defendant rendered himself liable for ejectment for the shop in dispute on the basis that he had caused substantial damage to the building. It may, however, be observed that the learned counsel for the applicant is right in his submission that before a tenant can be said to have incurred liability for eviction under Section 20 (2) (c) of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972, it is necessary for the plaintiff to plead and prove by cogent evidence that the tenant had, without his permission in writing, made such structural alteration in the building which was likely to diminish its value or utility or to disfigure it. 8. As noticed earlier, the finding of the trial Judge with which the learned Additional District Judge did not rightly interfere is to the effect that the applicant had caused damage to the building by removing the mid-wall and dismantling eight steps of the staircase. The question which requires consideration, however, is whether the damage so caused can be said to be a substantial damage to the building so as to bring the case within the mischief of cl. (b) of Section 20 (2) of the Act. The argument of the learned counsel for the applicant is that on the own showing of the plaintiff, the damage cannot be said to be substantial for the plaintiff had himself claimed a paltry sum of Rs. (b) of Section 20 (2) of the Act. The argument of the learned counsel for the applicant is that on the own showing of the plaintiff, the damage cannot be said to be substantial for the plaintiff had himself claimed a paltry sum of Rs. 100/- only as compensation for the damage caused by the removal of eight steps of the staircase. Besides, the damage being of a nature which could easily be repaired could not be treated to be substantial one. The damage, according to the submission for being substantial must have correlation to the stability of the building and unless it was such which pre-judicially affected the same it could not be treated to be substantial damage. 9. The word 'substantial conveys the idea of real and not seeming or imaginary. It connotes the idea of something having actual existence. Websters third International Dictionary defines it as real. The concept of substantial damage in the case of premises let out to a tenant should, in my opinion, include the rea of the liability of the tenant to so keep the demised premises as to hand over the same substantially in the form in which it was let out at the end of the period of tenancy and any action on his part which results in the premises losing their basic character as at the time of the letting should be considered to be a substantial damage to it. In Marsden v. Edward Haves Ltd. (1927 LJR 410), the Court of Appeal recognised the continuing obligation of the tenant to keep the demised premises in such a manner which does not alter its character and throughout the continuance of the tenancy, the premises remained in the same condition as demised, reasonable wear and tear excepted. In that case, the defendants became tenants of dwelling house and shop but subsequently removed a partition wall, staircase and fire-places and converted the entire premises into a shop. They were held liable for damages for having committed breach of the implied obligation to deliver up the demised premises in a tenant like manner in the same form in relation to their physical condition as that in which they were let into. 10. They were held liable for damages for having committed breach of the implied obligation to deliver up the demised premises in a tenant like manner in the same form in relation to their physical condition as that in which they were let into. 10. In Corporation of Calcutta v. Raj Kumar Narsing Pratap ( AIR 1954 Cal 20 ) a Division Bench of that court while dealing with the phrase "substantial alterations and improvements in any building" in Section 131 (2) (c) of the Calcutta Municipal Act observed that the word "substantial" indicated that the alteration and improvement had neither been illusory nor inconsiderable; it was not merely nominal or flimsy but was an alteration and improvement which in comparison with the structure already standing can be deemed to have materially altered the previous disposition of the property, or the convenience which was available. It is not possible to lay down any clear and specific definition of the word "substantial". It must be a relative one. In Bhagwan Das Vani v. Rajendra Narain Bhatnagar (1978 All LR 940) : (1979 All LJ 216), K. N. Singh, J. observed, that "the expression "substantial damage to the building" further indicates that a mere ordinary damage to the building even if caused wilfully by the tenant is not sufficient for his ejectment. The damage must be substantial in nature. What is substantial damage is a question of fact in each case which must be determined on the appraisal of evidence on record. The scheme as laid down under Section 20 (2) is clear that the legislature intended that no tenant should be ejected merely if some damage is caused to the building due to the negligence of the tenant but in a case where a tenant deliberately caused or permitted to be caused substantial damage to the building, he is liable to ejectment." 11. In the instant case, the applicant is found to have included the space under the eight steps of the staircase dismantled by him in the shop demised to him by breaking the intervening wall. In the instant case, the applicant is found to have included the space under the eight steps of the staircase dismantled by him in the shop demised to him by breaking the intervening wall. Obviously, he not only failed to fulfil the implied obligation of maintaining the premises demised to him substantially in the same form and with same dimensions with which they were let out to him but also changed its character by adding additional space to it and adding also to the convenience on that account to which he was not entitled when let into them by the plaintiff. He has, thus, failed to maintain the premises in a tenant like manner and has clearly caused substantial damage to the same. The pecuniary value which the plaintiff put to the damage occasioned by dismantling of the eight steps of the staircase is not determinative of the question of there being substantial damage or otherwise to the building by the defendant in the circumstances of the instant case. Indeed, the question whether there has been substantial damage or not is dependent upon the circumstances of each case and the extent of pecuniary loss caused to the owner is by itself not the only test by which it may be held that the damage was not substantial as argued by the learned counsel for the applicant. 12. The premises in question not being governed by U. P. Act No. III of 1947, it is clear that it was open to the plaintiff to seek ejectment of the applicant therefrom in the year 1970 when the suit was filed by simply terminating his tenancy. The bar upon his right came to be imposed in respect of the demised premises by the provisions of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. On the finding that the applicant had substantially damaged the building, the bar became inoperative in the instant case on account of cl. (c) of Section 20 (2) of the 1972 Act. In such circumstances, it cannot successfully be urged on behalf of the applicant, as has been attempted in the instant case, that the substantial damage should have occurred on a date subsequent to the enforcement of the Act. An argument of the nature may, if at all, be justified in a suit filed after. the commencement of the Act of 1972. 13. An argument of the nature may, if at all, be justified in a suit filed after. the commencement of the Act of 1972. 13. In the result, I find no merit in-, the revision which is, accordingly, dismissed with costs.