JUDGMENT B.N. Sapru, J. - This is a defendants appeal arising out of a suit for ejectment, arrears of rent, and damages for use and occupation. The plaintiff filed the suit with the allegation that the defendant was his tenant and that he was in arrears of rent for more than three months and that despite the service upon him of a notice of demand and termination of tenancy the defendant had neither paid the arrears of rent nor had he vacated the accommodation within a period of one month of the service of the notice of demand. 2. The two courts below have decreed the suit. 3. It has been held by the lower appellate court that the notice sent by the plaintiff to the defendant which was a composite notice of demand of arrears of rent and terminating the tenancy, was duly served and that the defendant was in arrears of rent for more than three months and that despite the service of the notice of demand on him the defendant had not vacated the accommodation in his possession. 4. The lower appellate court has further held that the notice under Section 106 of the T. P. Act was valid determining the tenancy of the tenant. The learned counsel for the appellant has challenged this finding of the lower appellate court. The notice has been read over in this Court. No such defect has been pointed out in this notice which would lead this. Court to the conclusion that the tenancy of the defendant was not properly terminated. It is accordingly held that the lower appellate court rightly came to the conclusion. that the notice under Section 106 of the T. P. Act was valid. 5. It has been found as a fact that the aforesaid notice which was a composite notice, was duly served on the defendant. It has further been found as a fact that the defendant was in arrears of rent for more than three months and that he had not paid the same within a period of one month of the service upon him of the aforesaid notice. The defendant had set up a plea that he had paid a certain sum of money to the plaintiff landlord without obtaining a receipt. The lower appellate court has negatived this plea. The defendant had set up a plea that he had paid a certain sum of money to the plaintiff landlord without obtaining a receipt. The lower appellate court has negatived this plea. It has also negatived the plea of the defendant that he had with the consent of the landlord spent money on the repairs of the accommodation which was adjustible as against the rent due by the defendant. 6. The aforesaid are findings of fact which are binding in second appeal and have to be accepted. 7. During the pendency of the appeal an application was filed on 18-8-1972 praying that the appellant be given the benefit of the provisions of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction Act, 1972 (U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972). 8. The pleadings of the parties on the evidence on record clearly indicate that the building was constructed before 1951 to which the provisions of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. 1947 applied. 9. Sri Swami Dayal appearing on behalf of the appellant urges that even though a building is held to have been one to which the provisions of U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, apply neverthless, he is entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Section 20 (4) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 read with the provisions of Section 43 (h) thereof. Section 43 (h) of the aforesaid Act reads as follows: - "any court or authority before which any suit or other proceeding relating to the recovery or determination or fixation of rent or eviction from any building is pending immediately before the commencement of this Act may, on an application being made to it within sixty days from such commencement, grant leave to any party to amend its pleading in consequence of the provisions of this Act." As mentioned earlier, the application claiming the benefit of the aforesaid Act was filed on 16-8 - 1972, i. e. within 60 days of the commencement of the aforesaid Act. It is true that the appellant did not in so many words ask for the amendment of the pleadings, but the effect of the application is clear inasmuch as the application stated that the defendant was entitled to the protection of the aforesaid Act. 10. It is true that the appellant did not in so many words ask for the amendment of the pleadings, but the effect of the application is clear inasmuch as the application stated that the defendant was entitled to the protection of the aforesaid Act. 10. The application is being treated as one to amend the pleadings despite the fact that the pleadings have not been sought to be amended in so many words. 11. Both Sections 39 and 40 of the aforesaid Act are clearly not applicable to the instant case as on the facts found it is clear that the old Act namely U. P. Act III of 1947 applied to the accommodation in dispute in the present case. 12. Section 20 (1) provides as follows: - "Save as provided in sub-sec. (2) no suit shall be instituted for the eviction of a tenant from a building notwithstanding the determination of his tenancy by efflux of time or on the expiration of a notice to quit or in any other manner." It is clear that sub-sec. (1) of Section 20 is prospective in the sense that it bars the institution of a suit except on any of the grounds laid down in sub-section (2) of Section 20 itself. Sub-section (2) of Section 20 thereafter gives the grounds on which a suit for the ejectment may be instituted. 13. Thereafter sub-section (4) of Section 20 provides as follows: - "In any suit for eviction on the ground mentioned in cl. (a) of sub-section (2), if at the first hearing of the suit the tenant unconditionally pays or tenders to the landlord or deposits in court the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation of the building due from him (such damages for use and occupation being calculated at the same rate as rent) together with interest thereon at the rate of nine percent per annum and the landlords costs of the suit in respect thereof after deducting therefrom any amount already deposited by the tenant under sub-sec. (1) of Section 30, the Court may, in lieu of passing a decree for eviction on that ground, pass an order relieving the tenant against his liability for eviction on that ground." Sub-sec. (4) speaks of deposits made by a tenant under sub-sec. (1) of Section 30. (1) of Section 30, the Court may, in lieu of passing a decree for eviction on that ground, pass an order relieving the tenant against his liability for eviction on that ground." Sub-sec. (4) speaks of deposits made by a tenant under sub-sec. (1) of Section 30. The deposits can obviously be made by a tenant in the circumstances and in the manner provided in Section 30 of the aforesaid Act. The provisions of Section 30 on the face of it are prospective and apply only to cases of tenants making deposits after the coming into force of the aforesaid Act. 14. Section 20 (2) (a) of the Act Act specifies the condition in which a suit for eviction can be filed by a landlord against a tenant on the ground of arrears of rent. Sub-sec. (4) of Section 20 is meant to provide relief to the tenants against eviction, where the landlords have instituted suits on the ground of non-payment of rent, as provided in S 20 (2) (a) of the Act. 15. The provisions of sub-sec. (h) of Section 43 have already been quoted above. The other provisions relevant for the determination of the question involved in the case are Secs. 43 (2) (r), (rr) and (s) which are reproduced below: - "(r) any suit for the eviction of a tenant instituted with the permission referred to in Section 3 of the old Act or any proceeding arising out of such suit, pending immediately before the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972 (U. P. Act 37 of 1972) may be continued and concluded in accordance with the old Act which shall for that purpose be deemed to continue to be in force. "(rr) where any permission referred to in Section 3 of the old Act has been obtained on any ground specified in sub-sec (1) or sub-sec. "(rr) where any permission referred to in Section 3 of the old Act has been obtained on any ground specified in sub-sec (1) or sub-sec. (2) of Section 21, and has become final, either before the commencement of this Act, or in accordance with the provisions of this sub-section, after the commencement of this Act, whether or not a suit for the eviction of the tenant has been instituted the landlord may apply to the prescribed authority for his eviction under Section 21, and thereupon the prescribed authority shall order the eviction of the tenant from the building under tenancy, and it shall not be necessary - for the prescribed authority to satisfy itself afresh as to the existence of any ground as aforesaid, and such order shall be final and shall not be open to appeal under Section 22. "(s) any suit for the eviction of tenant instituted on any ground mentioned in sub-sec. (1) of Section 3 of the Old Act, or any proceeding out of such suit pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, may be continued and concluded as if this act has not been passed". The provisions of Section 43 (2) (h) are general and on its face the provision applies to all suits relating to recovery or determination or fixation of rent or eviction from any building pending immediately before the commencement of the Act. 16. The provisions of S 43 (2) (r), (rr) and (s) are in a sense exceptions to the generality of the provisions contained in Section 43 (2) (h) of the Act. 17. On this interpretation whenever a case falls within the scope of Section 43 (2) (s), it is necessarily excluded from the generality of the provisions contained in Section 43 (2) (h). 18. It is well settled that a statute should be so construed that its various provisions should harmonise with each other. So by treating the provisions of Section 43 (2) (r), (rr) and (s) as in a sense exceptions to the generality of the provisions contained in Section 43 (2) (h) of the Act, no conflict between them arises. 19. 18. It is well settled that a statute should be so construed that its various provisions should harmonise with each other. So by treating the provisions of Section 43 (2) (r), (rr) and (s) as in a sense exceptions to the generality of the provisions contained in Section 43 (2) (h) of the Act, no conflict between them arises. 19. The suit out of which this appeal has arisen was filed on one of the; grounds mentioned in Section 3 (1) of the I U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and J Eviction Act for the eviction of a tenant and it was pending immediately before the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Lei ting. Rent' and Eviction) Act in 1972. Therefore, it: is clear that the provisions of Section 43 (2) (s) of the Act apply in the instant case. 20. As t tie provisions of Section 43 (2) (s) of the Act apply, the appeal has to be decided treating the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 as still in force. The tenant appellant haw been found to be in arrears of rent for more than three months which he is found not to have paid despite the service of a notice of demand, and it has been found that his tenancy has been validly terminated. In this view of the matter the appeal cannot succeed. 21. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The interim order of this Court dated 29-10-1971 is vacated.