ORDER J.P. Bapai, J. 1. This revision is at the instance of the accused seeking interference with the order made by the Sessions Court setting aside the order of dismissal of a complaint under the provisions of section 203 Cr. P.C. and directing further inquiry. 2. The short point on which the order impugned is sought to be assailed is that the Sessions Court could not pass such order which directs further inquiry without notice and an opportunity of hearing being given to the present applicant. Shri N.P. Mittal, learned counsel appearing for the applicant, placed reliance on the contents of the proviso added to section 398 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, as reproduced below :- "398. power to order inquiry On examining any record under Sec. 397 or otherwise, the High Court or the Sessions Judge may direct the Chief Judicial Magistrate by himself or by any of the Magistrates subordinate to him to make and the Chief Judicial Magistrate may himself make or direct any Subordinate Magistrate to make, further inquiry into any complaint which has been dismissed under Sec. 203 or sub-section (4) of Sec. 204, or into the case of any person accused of an offence who has been discharged: Provided that no Court shall make any direction under this section for inquiry into the case of any person who has been discharged unless such person has had an opportunity of showing cause why such direction should not be made." 3. After hearing the learned counsel for both sides and on perusal of the record, this Court is of the opinion shat the contention raised on behalf of the applicant cannot be accepted. It is not disputed that earlier the complaint lodged by the non-applicant against the present applicant alleging certain offences punishable under sections 452, 323, 504 and 506 (b) of the Indian Penal Code had been dismissed by the Magistrate in accordance with the provisions of section 203 of the new code by holding that there was no sufficient ground for proceeding with the same. The applicant-accused was thus never summoned by the Magistrate because the Magistrate refused to take cognizance of the matter and to direct issuance of the process under section 204 of the Code. The applicant-accused was thus never summoned by the Magistrate because the Magistrate refused to take cognizance of the matter and to direct issuance of the process under section 204 of the Code. From the perusal of the language used in the proviso to section 398 of the Code, it is apparent that the requirement of notice and giving an opportunity of being heard before making any direction for further inquiry is applicable only to such cases in which the accused persons have been discharged. 4. Thus, the question which arises for determination is whether in cases where the Magistrate dismisses the complaint under section 203 of the Code on being satisfied that there was no sufficient ground to proceed and does not direct issuance of process in accordance with the provisions of S. 204, the person against whom the complaint was lodged can be said to have been discharged, If the dismissal of she complaint under S. 203 amounts to discharge, then naturally the Sessions Court will be bound to give an opportunity of being heard to the accused before making any direction for further inquiry, But if it is not a case of discharge, then no notice will be required to be issued to the accused by the Sessions Court while directing further inquiry. In the opinion of this Court, the accused person can be said to be discharged within the meaning of the proviso added to section 398 of the new Code corresponding to S. 436 of the old Code when the case against him terminates in accordance with the provisions of S. 245, 249 or in accordance with any other provisions of the new Code providing for the discharge of the accused. Section 245 (1) provides when an accused shall be discharged. It lays down that if, upon taking all the evidence referred to in section 244, i.e., after the appearance of the accused before the court, no case is made out against the accused which, if un-rebutted, would warrant his conviction, the Magistrate shall discharge him. Sub section (2) of S. 245 further provides that the Magistrate may also at any previous stage of the case, for reasons to be recorded discharge the accused on finding the charge to be groundless. Sub section (2) of S. 245 further provides that the Magistrate may also at any previous stage of the case, for reasons to be recorded discharge the accused on finding the charge to be groundless. Similarly, section 249 provides for the discharge due to the absence of the complainant in certain cases involving the offences which may be lawfully compoundable or may not be cognizable. Thus, the expression 'any person who has been discharged' as used in the proviso to S. 398 refers to only such person who has been discharged in accordance with the above referred provisions corresponding to S. 209, S. 253 or S. 259 of the old Code, but not in the case of a person against whom no process at all has been issued and the complaint happened to be dismissed under section 203. 5. According to the scheme of the new Code also it stands to reason that when the provisions of the Code do not provide for any notice being, issued at the preliminary stage of taking cognizance and before taking a decision to issue process under section 204, all proceedings in revision continued to the similar stage at the instance of the aggrieved complainant when his complaint has been dismissed can also be dealt and disposed of without notice to the accused. To insist for a notice by the Sessions Court to such a person against whom no process at all had been issued and the only direction which is to be given by the Sessions Court is of further enquiry will be very undesirable. The accused person has no locus standi prior to issuance of process in enquiries under Chapter 16 of the old Code corresponding to the relevant provisions contained in Chapter 15 of the new Code, and the same principle would be equally applicable where the order in such an inquiry is under revision. 6. It is true that sometimes Sessions Judges had issued notices to the opposite party, i.e., the persons sought to be prosecuted before making any direction for further inquiry under section 436 of the old Code corresponding to section 398 of the new Code. 6. It is true that sometimes Sessions Judges had issued notices to the opposite party, i.e., the persons sought to be prosecuted before making any direction for further inquiry under section 436 of the old Code corresponding to section 398 of the new Code. But since it is not the requirement of law, and the proviso appended to S. 398 applies only to such cases in which the accused having been summoned is thereafter discharged, the order made by the Sessions Court even without notice can not be held to be bad in law. It is true that there may be such exceptional cases where the Sessions Judge would like to hear the accused before making an order for further inquiry or may ask the Magistrate also to call for certain information from the other side before issuing the process. But all this may be as a rule of prudence, but not legally necessary. Therefore, ordinarily no notice is required to be issued by a Sessions Judge to the accused, before making a direction for further inquiry on an application entertained under S. 436 of the old Code or section 398 of the new Code. 7. No other point was pressed on merits. 8. The order impugned made by the Sessions Court appears to be quite reasonable and proper. This revision, therefore, fails and is dismissed.