JUDGMENT - V.S. KOTWAL, J.:---A symbol or a picture of Globe at the background with a six-letter word ORIENT may appear to be artistic to a layman, but, those have created difficulties for the parties and have given rise to several litigations, including the one that is being impugned before me. 2. In the year 1963, a firm came into existence under the name and style of Orient Export Corporation, having the strength of five partners, out of whom, one happened to be the complainant and other the petitioner, in this case. The other three partners were related inter se and were also related to the Complainant. The said firm dealt in Electrical goods and accessories. On March 20, 1973, three out of the said five partners retired leaving behind the complainant and the present petitioner. The said partnership was con­tinued between the said remaining partners alongwith two others and also continued in the same dealing. On October 22, 1973, the petitioner filed an application before the Registrar of Trade Marks for registering a particular trade mark with a global design and the word ORIENT. It was obviously done on behalf of the said existing firm. This application is admittedly sig­ned by the present petitioner. On the basis of the said application, the trade mark came to be published in two Journals circulated and known as Trade Mark Journals. However, a further development created further difficulties. On the 19th August, 1975, the petitioner retired from the said partnership and he joined the firm of other persons, who were originally partners in this firm and all of them constituted one firm which was known as M/s. Oriental Pro­ducts in the trade world, and were also dealing in Electrical goods and accessories. It will also be pertinent to note at this juncture that even though the application was made before the Registrar and notwithstanding the pub­lication in the concerned journals which was apparently before acceptance, the petitioner intervened by retiring from the partnership and the deed of partnership was produced before the Registrar. Both the parties lodged their claims and ultimately, the matter came to be heard by the Registrar. Both the parties lodged their claims and ultimately, the matter came to be heard by the Registrar. After a full hearing and after perusal of the documents, including the deed of retirement of the present petitioner, the Deputy Registrar came to the conclusion that in view of the rival claims, it was not possible for him to uphold the claim of either of the parties and he directed the parties to get a decision from a competent Court as to who was entitled to the user of the said trade mark and till then, the matter was kept pending. This, in my opinion, will assume quite some importance when other items of evidence are considered. 3. Sometime after, the complainant learnt that the petitioner was actually using the same trade-mark and was selling his goods under the said trade name and therefore, there was infringement of the trade-mark on the part of the petitioner, which the complainant felt, caused damage to his rights. Con­sequently, he filed a private complaint on March 12, 1976 before the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 38th Court, Ballard Estate, Bombay on the ground that the petitioner had committed offence punishable under sections 78 and 79 of the Trade Marks Act and also under Section 420 I.P.C, though the latter section under the Penal Code has, somehow or the other, disappeared from the proceedings. The learned Magistrate felt that the mat­ter required some enquiry or investigation at the hands of the police and therefore, it was referred to the police attached to General Branch, C.I.D. The Sub-Inspector attached to the said Branch enquired into the matter and actually seized certain goods from the office and the godown of the petitioner and also recorded the statements of certain witnesses and ultimately forwar­ded the documents as well as the seized articles to the learned Magistrate alongwith his own report, or about 21st May, 1976. It may be mentioned that the petitioner moved the learned trial Magistrate for the return of the goods which met with no success. The petitioner, therefore, moved this Court by way of a criminal application for the return of the goods, having been aggrieved by the learned Magistrates order. This Court allowed the said application and directed return of the seized goods on the petitioner executing a bond for production thereof, as and when directed. The petitioner, therefore, moved this Court by way of a criminal application for the return of the goods, having been aggrieved by the learned Magistrates order. This Court allowed the said application and directed return of the seized goods on the petitioner executing a bond for production thereof, as and when directed. This also will have some relevance when, I consider the rival contentions. 4. After receiving the report from the police wherein it has also been mentioned that even the police were unable to decide as to which of the parties laid the proper claim over the trade-mark, it was found significant that even that forum indicated its inability. The complainant, therefore, filed a fresh complaint on the same facts and cause of action on 16th August, 1976, on the basis of which process came to be issued by the learned Magistrate. 5. On behalf of the complainant, evidence of complainant himself, S.I. Ghorpade who investigated into the matter, and Advocate Shah was tendered and certain documents were produced. It appears that after the evidence of these three witnesses was over, the Complainant informed the Court that he closes his case so far as that stage was concerned and invited the Court to frame a charge. It was argued on behalf of the defence to pass an order of discharge in favour of the accused on the ground that even prime facie the case was not made out. Detailed arguments were adverted and the learned Magistrate passed a well-considered order discharging the petitioner as well as the accused No. 1, namely, the firm, by his order dated 30th January, 1978. The learned Magistrate considered all the documents and also the oral evidence. He also examined in detail the deed of dissolution as well as the application of the petitioner and he himself realised that it is not estab­lished by the Complainant that either he was the Proprietor or the inventor of the trade-mark or was the exclusive user thereof since long. 6. Being aggrived, the Complainant took the matter to the Sessions Court for Greater Bombay, in Criminal Revision Application No. 179 of 1978 and was able to persuade the learned Additional Sessions Judge to upset the order of discharge. It may be mentioned that no body had appeared on behalf of the petitioner in the said Revision application. 6. Being aggrived, the Complainant took the matter to the Sessions Court for Greater Bombay, in Criminal Revision Application No. 179 of 1978 and was able to persuade the learned Additional Sessions Judge to upset the order of discharge. It may be mentioned that no body had appeared on behalf of the petitioner in the said Revision application. The learned Additional Sessions Judge was of the view that the recitals in Clause 6 of the Deed of Retirement and the application made by the petitioner himself were enough to record a finding prima facie in favour of the complainant about the genuineness of his claim over the trade-mark. Consequently, the petitioner stated that the order of Additional Sessions Judge directing the learned Magistrate to frame a charge and to proceed with the trial according to law, was not proper. It is this order that is being impugned before me by the petitioners. 7. At the threshold, it must be stated and which has been vary fairly brought to my notice by Shri Desai, the learned Counsel for the petitioners that really speaking, the matter in question is a summons trial and therefore, he contended that the petitioners would have been acquitted. However, at the Bar, I am told by both the learned Counsel that the case was, to their own knowledge, tried as a warrant trial and it is fairly conceded by both the Counsel in these proceedings also, that they are not raising any issue in that behalf. Apart from this, such a course is permissible under section 259 Cri.P.C. This has not caused prejudice to anyone and this also appears to have been carried through with the consent of the parties. The course of progress in the trial also indicates that the learned Magistrate was satisfied that he should invoke provisions contained in section 259 Cri.P.C. 8. As regards the merits of the case, as indicated earlier, the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge rests entirely on two counts only about the interpretation of Clause 6 of the Deed of Retirement and the factum of the petitioner having applied to the Magistrate. As regards the merits of the case, as indicated earlier, the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge rests entirely on two counts only about the interpretation of Clause 6 of the Deed of Retirement and the factum of the petitioner having applied to the Magistrate. As against this, I find that the learned Magistrate has considered all the facts in proper perspective and after going through the order which is fairly supported by the documents and the evidence and also supplemented by cogent reasons I am of the view that the order of the learned Magistrate, must be restored. It is true, that this is an application in revision and there are certain limitations on the powers of this Court. However, as has been rightly contended by Shri Desai that the learned Additional Sessions Judge has not applied his mind to several facts and consequently, he has persuaded me to interfere in the revisional jurisdiction also. Certain uncontroverted facts can be safely enunciated at this juncture and in my opinion, it is not necessary to go into other contro­versial aspects, inasmuch as, the admitted facts themselves are enough to conclude this proceeding. Initially, a partnership firm came into existence in 1973 with the Complainant and the petitioner No. 2 being the partners alongwith three others and it continued for quite some time. Thereafter, the three other partners retired and the partnership continued between the Com­plainant and the petitioner No. 2 alongwith two other partners. It is also a common ground that on October 22, 1973, the second petitioner filed an application with the Registrar of trade-Marks for registering the trade-mark in question and that application is Exhibit P-25. 9. It is equally a common ground that the Registrar refused to pass any favourable orders though there was advertisement in the journals. It is equally a common ground that a Civil Suit on the Original Side of this Court, being High Court Civil Suit No. 780/76 was already filed by the Complainant wherein, a Notice of Motion was taken out, which was decided on 1st Febr­uary, 1972 being Notice of Motion No. 638/76. It is equally a common ground that a Civil Suit on the Original Side of this Court, being High Court Civil Suit No. 780/76 was already filed by the Complainant wherein, a Notice of Motion was taken out, which was decided on 1st Febr­uary, 1972 being Notice of Motion No. 638/76. It is further a common ground that the goods were seized by the police and the claim of the peti­tioner for return of the goods was rejected by the trial Magistrate and this Court upset that order and directed that the goods be handed over to the petitioner on his executing the requisite bond. It also appears from the record and in my opinion, is also a matter of common ground that the second peti­tioner has raised a dispute about the registration of the trade-mark in question. 10. It is clear from the record that Criminal Application No. 426 of 1977 was filed by the petitioners against the order of the learned trial Magis­trate in which he had refused, return of the goods and that order was set aside on 28th March, 1977. Now, it is clear if one peruses the said order that all these aspects, atleast to some extent, were argued before this Court for an obvious reason that the issues were common. The Complainant had endea­voured to satisfy this Court that the petitioners had not even the semblance of right over the trade-mark, and, therefore, the goods could not be returned to the petitioners. I find from the said order that this contention or atleast part of that did not find favour with this Court. It is observed in the said order as : "The subject-matter is the use of trade-mark and the export of certain electrical goods. With the same subject-matter in a civil dispute, export is permitted with the same trade-mark only on the condi­tion that accounts may be maintained to ascertain the damages payable to the plaintiff." The order also indicates about the development in the Civil Suit pending on the Original Side. It is further indicated therein that the Notice of Motion taken out by the Complainant, who is the plaintiff in that suit, for injunction was rejected. It is further indicated therein that the Notice of Motion taken out by the Complainant, who is the plaintiff in that suit, for injunction was rejected. It is thus manifest that this Court was certainly conscious of the rival contentions and of the development and progress of the proceedings as there is also a reference to the criminal case and the Civil Suit. Inspite of that, the said order came to be passed and it was also indicated that the matter can be fought properly on the civil forum where the civil suit was pending. 12. Civil Suit No. 780/76 was filed by the Complainant on 10-6-76 . The relevant claims in the said suit are extremely relevant. If one peruses the said plaint, it leaves no manner of doubt that all these aspects, which are being argued before this Court in this proceeding, have been completely relied upon by the plaintiff including the original deed of partnership, the deed of retirement as well as the application of petitioner No. 2 before the Registrar. The grievance to which a reference is made in this proceeding is sought to be relied upon by the plaintiff. The relief claimed is to the effect that the defen­dants themselves, their agents and servants be restrained by perpetual injunction from using in relation to electrical fittings etc., the trade-mark Orient or any other trade-mark deceptively similar to the trade-mark Orient so as to pass off or likely to pass off or enable others to pass off defendants products as and those of the plaintiffs, and the second relief is suggested on the same lines to the effect that they should be restrained from using the word Orient as their trade name or trading style or any other word deceptively similar to the word Orient which forms, prominent and dominant feature of the trade-name of the plaintiff and for grant of interim injunctions, a Notice of Motion was taken out on 21-6-76. It is thus clear that not only the recitals are identical, but even the reliefs are extremely identical and also germane to the issues involved in this proceeding. 13. It is thus clear that not only the recitals are identical, but even the reliefs are extremely identical and also germane to the issues involved in this proceeding. 13. The Notice of Motion, I am told at the Bar, was also hotly contested wherein the plaintiff had prayed for an ad interim injunction, it came to be deposed on 1-2-77 and the order passed therein, was to the effect that no order in Motion was necessary on the defendants giving an undertaking to this Court to maintain accounts in respect of sales and to deposit the said statement of sale in a sealed cover with the Prothonotary and Senior Master Opportunity was granted to the plaintiff to take inspection of such statement deposited with the Prothonotary. The defendants were also further directed to deposit similar statements of sale for the other parties. With these directions the said Notice of Motion came to be dismissed and disposed of and there does not appear to be further development in that behalf. It is thus clear from this also that the same issues were hotly contested and canvassed in the said Civil Suit as well as the Notice of Motion and inspite of that this Court was pleased not to grant relief of injunction even though there was allegation of the infringement of the trade-mark and the only relief granted was that certain liabilities were put on the defendants. 14. It is significance to note that this Court while dealing with the criminal matter, allowed the petitioners to take back the goods and to trade with them on executing a bond. In respect of civil forum, this Court refused to grant injunction and the only liability imposed was to maintain the accounts and to file the statement thereof with the Prothonotary, meaning thereby that both the forums allowed the petitioners to carry on trade with the same very name or the trade-mark. In my opinion, this is extremely damaging to the Complainants case. I may incidentally observe that the complainant did make an unsuccessful attempt to move the Supreme Court by filing Special Leave Application against the order of this Court under which the goods were directed to be returned to the petitioners on bond, and the said Special Leave Application was rejected as is appearent from the certified copy of the order. There is no dispute in this behalf. 15. There is no dispute in this behalf. 15. It is equally manifest that the police, who were seized of the matter in view of the order of the learned Magistrate, when they enquired into the same, after careful scrutiny of the statements and documents, opined that they were unable to decide as to which party had a better claim. Therefore, there was an obvious hesitancy on the part of the police. The forum of the Magistrate was equally hesitant. The order of the Registrar is already exhibited on record and it clearly mentioned that the order of the Assistant Registrar was kept in abeyance and the parties were directed to get an appropriate order from the competent Court about their right or claim over the trade-mark and till then, the matter was not to be disposed of. The Magistrate himself was not able to decide and that too inspite of hotly contested hearing and also after perusal of the documents in question and the significant feature in my opinion is that the Deed of Retirement around which the controversy revolves, was also presued by the Magistrate. It is not disputed before me that the only competent Court which could decide as stipulated by the Registrar is a Civil Court and at present, in the circumstances, the only competent forum wherein the issues can be sought to be decided is in the civil suit filed by the Complainant on the Original Side. 16. Reliance was placed on the interpretation of Clause 6 of the Deed of Retirement of petitioner No. 2 Shri Daruwala, the learned Counsel for the Complainant wanted me to interpret the document in a particular manner to spell out that the trade mark in question in respect of which the matter was pending before the Registrar for registration purpose, was the exclusive property and right of the Complainant, as against which, Shri Desai contended that the portion which has been substituted after striking off one line leaves the matter not only in doubt, but, the Complainants right over the trade-mark is not established, or, at any rate, it wipes out the exclusiveness of the right of the Complainant. It is true that there is some scoring off of some sentence in Clause 6 and the original sentence was : "Partnership including the Orient brand name and trade-mark shall belong to the continuing partners alone". It is true that there is some scoring off of some sentence in Clause 6 and the original sentence was : "Partnership including the Orient brand name and trade-mark shall belong to the continuing partners alone". The words : "Orient brand name and trade-mark" have been struck off and have now been substituted by other words making the reading of the sentence as "All other rights of the partnership including trade name and trademark or brand which are or may be pending registration, shall belong to the continuing partners alone." It was argued by Shri Desai that the effect of striking off the words : "Orient brand trade-name and trade­mark" completely wipes off the contention of the Complainant, inasmuch as, really speaking, by such striking off he was authorised to use the trade name as "Orient brand trade name and trade-mark and this would conclude the controversy. Shri Daruwala, on the other hand, contended that the substituted portion is more spacious and seems to be more clear, in that, whatever appli­cation for the registration of the trade-mark is pending before the Registrar is covered by the said substituted portion and he further contended that the only application that was pending before the Registrar, pertains to the trade­mark in question. By this process of reasoning he wants me to hold that he has exclusive right over the trade-mark in question which is pending before the Registrar. It is true that, prima facie, at the first flush, the interpretation sought to be put by Shri Daruwala may appear to be attractive. However, on a deeper probe, one cannot say with the same certainty that the interpre­tation sought to be put forth by Shri Desai is unjustified. Really speaking, in my opinion, I am not called upon to decide this controversy vis-a-vis the said substituted portion, more so, when the matter is already pending before this Court on a proper forum and this will be properly decided by this Court in the Civil Suit filed by the Complainant, inasmuch as, one of the issues involved therein will be about the interpretation of this Clause itself. In my opinion, therefore, not only it would be improper to decide that aspect in this proceeding, but it is really not necessary to go into that matter, inasmuch as, it is not so germane as sought to be pointed out. In my opinion, therefore, not only it would be improper to decide that aspect in this proceeding, but it is really not necessary to go into that matter, inasmuch as, it is not so germane as sought to be pointed out. It is, however, sufficient to note that the two interpretations sought to be placed before me in this proceeding, is a surer ground to hold that the dispute does arise about the said clause also. 17. Shri Daruwala then contended that the application of petitioner No. 2 was accepted by the Registrar and not only that but the application was also made in the two journals relating to Items 9 and 11 of the commo­dities and that having once accepted the said application and when this is an admitted position and there has not bean any opposition on the part of the petitioner within the stipulated period of 3-4 months, it could be held in favour of his client that the matter was confirmed by the Registrar. In other words, his argument is that the Registrar had option to decide the matter in his favour. I am afraid, such a sweeping conjecture is not permissible in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case. It may be that a formal op­position or protest has not been made in writing by the petitioner as is contemplated by Section 21 of the Trade and Merchandise Markets Act, 1958. However, there is a very peculiar feature which unfortunately has been over­looked. It is an accepted position that the three months period prescribed under the law would have been over by 16th August, 1977. It is clear that the Registrars order came to be passed on 16th June, 1977 and both these dates which would cover the statutory period of raising opposition or protest, are after the order of the Registrar. It is further clear from the record that on the 16th June, the Registrar had already concluded the matter, in that he had expressed not to register trade-mark or to give any decision and directed the parties to get a decision from a competent Court. In my opinion, in the face of this order, which was prior to the expiry of the stipulated time, it was absolutely redundant and not necessary for the petitioner to raise a formal protest. In my opinion, in the face of this order, which was prior to the expiry of the stipulated time, it was absolutely redundant and not necessary for the petitioner to raise a formal protest. Viewed from another angle, it is also clear that the very fact that the petitioner intervened and there was hotly contested hearing before the Regis­trar, is tantamount or equivalent to the raising of the protect or opposition by the petitioner. In addition, I find that there is a letter dated 31st May, 1976 addressed by the learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioner to the Registrar, wherein, in terms, he has raised a dispute about the complainants claim. In my opinion, in view of this glaring evidence, it is futile for the complainant to contend that there has been no protest on the part of the petitioner. 18. It was contended by Shri Daruwala that the very fact that the petitioner No. 2 was the signatory to the application Exh. P-25 indicates that he has accepted that the complainant is the proprietor. It is significant to note that the publication in the journals was admittedly before acceptance. It is also clear that in respect of that application, dispute was raised by the petitioner. It is, in my opinion, therefore, futile to contend on behalf of the complainant that the fact that the Registrar accepted the application and there has been publication in the journals should conclude the matter. As indicated earlier, the publication is obviously before acceptance and the final order of the Registrar really concludes the entire issue. No further comments are really necessary. In my opinion, therefore, the learned Additional Ses­sions Judge, who has based his entire judgment on these two grounds, was not justified on merits to upset the order of the learned Magistrate, who was careful enough to consider all other facts. 19. Incidentally, I my refer to a couple of circumstances based on evi­dence by way of illustration to reinforce my view point: It is clear from the record that another third firm known as Shantilal Brothers, prominently figures in this case. The complainants father and the accused Nos. 2 to 4 were the partners of the said firm. It is also accepted by the complainant that he used to sit in the office of the said firm and also on some occasions used to sit at the counter. The complainants father and the accused Nos. 2 to 4 were the partners of the said firm. It is also accepted by the complainant that he used to sit in the office of the said firm and also on some occasions used to sit at the counter. It is also clear that the office of the said firm is located in the same building. It is further clear and accepted by the com­plainant in terms that the said Shantilal Bros., firm was dealing in the electri­cal goods of the similar kind and were actually using the identical trade-mark with the picture of globe and the word ORIENT and that has been going on for several years. A very futile and unsuccessful attempt was made by the complainant that he was not aware of those dealings. This denial is to be rejected for obvious reasons for which also comments are not necessary. It is further significant to note that a complaint was filed by the complainant against the said Shantilal Bros. firm for the infringement of the trade-mark and for reasons best known to the complainant, he was kind enough to the said firm to withdraw the said complaint. This kind gesture extending benefit to M/s. Shantilal Bros. has proved to be a pit-fall for the complainant, in­asmuch as, he has permitted other firm to utilise the same or identical trade mark in the electrical goods with the full knowledge that it was so being done. It is further interesting to note that the complainant has made a deli­berate statement to the effect that he has no objection if the entire world uses the said trade-mark with the word ORIENT, but, he has strong objec­tion if the same is utilised by the ex-partners. The matter does not depend on his likes and dislikes. He is obviously allowing the world at large to uti­lise the same which is also apparent from the fact that the other Orient Com­pany which deals in electrical fans which are known as Orient Fans, are using the trade-mark as ORIENT and the complainant has no objection to that course. Reliance is placed by Shri Daruwala to show that he has ex­clusively using this trade-mark for years together on the basis of a produced at the trial. The catalogues did make a very pictoral appearance. Reliance is placed by Shri Daruwala to show that he has ex­clusively using this trade-mark for years together on the basis of a produced at the trial. The catalogues did make a very pictoral appearance. However, in so far as the point in question is concerned, these catalogues are of less assistance to the complainant. He has put in ink or pencil the year on each catalogue indicating that he was utilising the said brand name in his trade from the year mentioned therein. In the first instance, this can hardly be the evidence of user and secondly, as rightly contended by Shri Desai that it was easy to put the year on the catalogues at the time of filing of the documents in the Court Shri Desai has contended that no date is put or printed on the catalogues in any manner. In my opinion, these catalogues are hardly of any assistance to the Complainant. The Complainant has further admitted in terms that apart from his board and the said catalogues, he has no other document or thing whatsoever in his possession to establish his claim for user for longer time. It is, however, clear from the record that the Complain­ant does not claim to be or atleast proved to have been the inventor of the trade-mark in question. He is not shown to be the originator of the said trade-mark. This is apparent from the fact that the firm Shantilal Bros. was the oldest of the three firms and was in existence since 1935 and obviously, the complainant could not be the originator of this trade-mark. There was obviously no evidence at all worth the name to hold that the complainant is either the proprietor of the trade-mark in question or has been using the same to the exclusion of the world at large or he was inventor or the originator of the said trade-mark. 20. It is also brought to my notice by the learned Counsel for the peti­tioner that the complainant has, in terms, admitted that he was asked to tender certain goods in the Court to show the user of the trade-mark. The said goods are produced at Exhibit D-12 to D-17. On some items, the trade-mark is not put and to get over this difficulty, the complainant came out with the case that the trade-mark is mentioned on the carton or package. The said goods are produced at Exhibit D-12 to D-17. On some items, the trade-mark is not put and to get over this difficulty, the complainant came out with the case that the trade-mark is mentioned on the carton or package. He was, however, confronted with the fact that on some cartons or packages, there is no such trade mark. To this, the complainant came out with a clever an­swer which may be reproduced in his own words : Question : Besides your bare word, there is nothing to show from Exhibit D-12 to D-17 that these goods belong to your firm. Answer : The public know my trade-mark very well and it is on the boxes. Ultimately, the complainant was forced to give an admission as : "There is no name of Orient Export Corporation on any of my goods. I say that it is not necessary." The complainant has also accepted that most of the items manufactured by his firm have embossed thereon either the word ORIENT with or without the picture of globe. He has further stated as I claim that the Orient trade-mark is my exclusive property. Orient fan people use Orient trade-mark but that is for fans and without globe device....I have no ob­jection if any body also except my ex-partners uses the word Orient or Oriental on a trading style." 21. The Complainant was also cross-examined with reference to Clause 6 in the said Deed of Retirement. It is not necessary to go into the details, but suffice it to observe that certain questions put and the answers elicited in the cross-examination in that behalf, do to some extent atleast support in­terpretation sought to be placed by Shri Desai on the said substituted portion of Clause 6 of the agreement. Similar cross-examination was also directed in respect of other witness Advocate Shah, (P.W. 3), Shri Dessi has rightly contended that in view of this controversy, it was incumbent on the part of the Complainant to examine the writer concerned in whose presence the re­levant sentence was scored off and was substituted by the other sentence. There is enough force in this submission also. Shri Daruwalla had a grie­vance that the learned Magistrate could not have recorded a positive finding on the said Clause in the agreement. Whether that grievance is genuine or not, is not the main question. There is enough force in this submission also. Shri Daruwalla had a grie­vance that the learned Magistrate could not have recorded a positive finding on the said Clause in the agreement. Whether that grievance is genuine or not, is not the main question. I would, therefore, refrain from giving out a definite opinion on that piece of evidence for the reasons stated earlier that the dispute between the parties even on the basis of the said interpretation is enough for the accused to earn the order of discharge in their favour. 22. The matter can, therefore, be legitimately contested on the proper forum where the suit has been filed by the complainant. As this has been treated as a warrant case, the Complainant is enjoined under law to lead such evidence to make out a prima facie case, so that, being unrebutted, would warrant a conviction. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, no doubt, has held that a prima facie case was made out by the Complainant, though, I cannot concur with that finding. However, with respect to the Additional Sessions Judge, the further requirement of law that the said prima facie case if unrebutted would result into conviction is unfortunately negatived. In my opinion, it was incumbent on the part of the Complainant to lay a proper foundation and to lead all the necessary evidence to cover no ingredients as contemplated under sections 78 and 79 of the Act and it, then and then only that he could have prayed before the learned Magistrate to frame a charge. In the face of glaring infirmities in the evidence and other documents, I am of the opinion that the Complainant has not discharged the burden cast on him and therefore, the order of the learned Magistrate which is a well-considered one, deserves to be upheld. 23. Shri Deshmukh, the learned Public Prosecutor for the State did make an attempt to justify the order of the learned Sessions Judge and joined hands with the Complainant in his contention of placing reliance on Clause 6 of the Deed of Retirement. However, as I have already discussed that matter in details, repetition is avoided. 24. No other point is urged before me. 25. I may incidentally observe that in fact the parties have led all the necessary and relevant evidence at that stage itself including the oral and documentary evidence. However, as I have already discussed that matter in details, repetition is avoided. 24. No other point is urged before me. 25. I may incidentally observe that in fact the parties have led all the necessary and relevant evidence at that stage itself including the oral and documentary evidence. Several documents are produced by the Complainant and many more are produced by the defence in the cross-examination. Other documents were also forwarded by the Police to the learned Magistrate. The relevant correspondence is also on record. The material witnesses are also examined. Consequently, the question did not arise of the complainant desiring to produce any further evidence. I have, however, held on merits that no case has been made out by the Complainant on any count. 26. As indicated earlier, several facts are not properly considered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and therefore, I am justified in invoking even the revisional jurisdiction for interfering with the said order, on merits. 27. In the result, the Rule in made absolute. The order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay dated 1-9-78 in Criminal Revision Application No. 179 of 1978 on his file, upsetting and setting aside the order of the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 38th Court, Ballard Estate, Bombay under which the petitioners were discharged, is set aside and the said order of the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magis­trate dated 30-1-78 is restored and the order of discharge recorded by him is hereby confirmed. ------