JUDGMENT In the instant Rule, Railway Board's letter being No. E(NG) III-78 RRI/1l3 dated 30th June, 1978 issued by the Deputy Director (Establishment), Railway Board and the Office Circular No. E 740/C/Resv/Com/Line (1) dated 21st June, 1978 issued by the Chief Personnel Officer, Eastern Railway for filling up the posts of Enquiry-cum-Reservation Clerks in the scale of Rs. 330-560/- by women and the Employment Notice being No. 1/78 (ER) for recruitment of lady Enquiry-cum-Reservation Clerks and the Railway Board's Circular No. E (NG) 111-76/CD/40 dated August 5, 1976 to the General Manager, All India Railways on the subject :'Revitalising the cadre of Enquiry-cum-Reservation Clerks" are under challenge. 2. The petitioners in the instant Rule are Railway employees and all of them are at present working as Reservation Clerks at different booking offices of the Eastern Railway in Calcutta namely at Fairlie Place Reservation Office, Howrah Station Reservation Office and Sealdah Station Reservation Office. The petitioners case is that by a letter dated 29th February, 1964, the Railway authorities laid down the procedure for appointment to the post of Enquiry-cum-Reservation Clerks as also other posts in the Reservation cadre. A copy of such letter of the Railway Board dated 19th February 1964 has been annexed to the writ petition being annexure 'A'. It appears that the Chief Personnel Officer, Eastern Railway, Calcutta on 7th April 1978 issued a memo for formation of a panel for the post of Enquiry-cum-Reservation Clerk in the scale of Rs. 330-560/- (RS). By the aforesaid memo, staff eligible to be appointed as Enquiry-cum-Reservation Clerk in the said scale were advised to appear in a written test scheduled to be held on 23rd April, 1978. The petitioners contend that the petitioners volunteered to appear in the written test for their regular appointment in the post of Enquiry-cum- Reservation Clerk but for the reasons best known to the Railway administration, the proposed examination for formation of panel for the post of Enquiry-cum-Reservation Clerk was not held. Thereafter, on 28th June, 1978, the Chief Personnel Office, (Commercial) Eastern Railway issued a Circular being Circular No. 740/C/Resv/Com/Line (1) dated 21st June, 1978 for filling up the post of Enquiry-cum-Reservation Clerks in the scale of Rs. 330-560/- by women only. Thereafter, on 28th June, 1978, the Chief Personnel Office, (Commercial) Eastern Railway issued a Circular being Circular No. 740/C/Resv/Com/Line (1) dated 21st June, 1978 for filling up the post of Enquiry-cum-Reservation Clerks in the scale of Rs. 330-560/- by women only. It appears from the said Circular that the Eastern Railway Administration had decided to fill up to posts of Enquiry-cum-Reservation Clerks in Fairlie Place Reservation Office, Calcutta by lady employees and lady employees alone and for that purpose volunteers among lady employees of all categories (Class III) from all offices in Calcutta area were called for absorption by screening. A copy of the said letter has also been annexed to the writ petition being annexure 'C' to the application. The petitioners can tended that the said Circular dated 21st June, 1978 was neither bona-fide nor lawful and the same was issued in violation of the rules prescribed for appointment to the post of Enquiry-cum-Reservation Clerk as per Board's letter dated 29th February 1964. It is to be noted in this connection that in the said Circular calling lady employees of all categories for absorption by screening, no qualification whatsoever was laid down to enable a candidate to be eligible for such screening and for absorption and the petitioners contend that sex only was the criterion for such eligibility. The petitioners also challenged the legality and validity of the Railway Board's Circular No. E (NG) 63 PMI-52 to the General Manager, All India Railways regarding channel of promotion for Enquiry-cum-Reservation Clerks. The said Circular was annexed to the affidavit-in-opposition of the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 being annexure 'A' to the affidavit-in opposition. It will appear from the said Circular of the Railway Board that 25% of the post for Enquiry-cum-Reservation Clerks should be filed up by direct recruitment and women candidates if available should be favourably considered for absorption to the said cadre of Enquiry-cum-Reservation Clerks not only on promotion from other categories to the initial grade but also in the proposed direct recruitment quota. The petitioners further contend that such steps for filling up the posts of Enquiry-cum-Reservation Clerks by only women were taken on the basis of the statement made by the Hon'ble Railway Minister during his budget speech on 21st February, 1978. The petitioners further contend that such steps for filling up the posts of Enquiry-cum-Reservation Clerks by only women were taken on the basis of the statement made by the Hon'ble Railway Minister during his budget speech on 21st February, 1978. The petitioners state that from the news item published in the Statesman on 22nd February 1978 it appears that the Hon'ble Minister told the Lok Sabha that only women would be employed as Reservation or Booking Clerks and Supervisors in the major Railway Booking offices on the ground that they were less prone to corruption. The actual extract of the Speech of the Hon'ble Minister for Railways was, however, given in the affidavit-in-opposition on behalf of the Railway authorities and it appears from the said affidavit-in-opposition that the Railway Minister in his budget speech for the Railways stated before the Parliament on 21st February, 1978 to the following effect:- "Steps have also been taken to curb corruption in reservation and streamline the procedure. As a part of the drive to root out malpractices in booking and reservation offices, I have decided that, as a matter of general policy, only women should be employed as reservation/booking clerks and Supervisors in major booking offices, starting with the metropolitan cities. We may be accused of being partial to the fair sex but our experience has shown that the malpractices in reservations are comparatively less where women are employed at the counters. 3. The petitioners contend that the authorities of the Eastern Railway are taking steps to recruit only women candidates for the posts of Enquiry-cum-Reservation Clerks and such action was being taken in violation of the provisions contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. They also contend that the aforesaid illegal steps had been taken in order to implement the decision of the Hon'ble Minister for Railways to recruit only women candidates. The petitioners further contend that such decision was not taken by the Railway authorities out of their own accord but such decision was super imposed by the Hon'ble Minister and in order to give effect to the decision already taken by him, the subsequent Circulars by the Railway Board and by the Eastern Railway as stated hereinbefore had been issued. The petitioners further contend that such decision was not taken by the Railway authorities out of their own accord but such decision was super imposed by the Hon'ble Minister and in order to give effect to the decision already taken by him, the subsequent Circulars by the Railway Board and by the Eastern Railway as stated hereinbefore had been issued. The Railway Administration however denied the contention that it was only to implement the decision of the Hon'ble Minister for Railways that the said step to fill up the posts of Enquiry-cum-Reservation Clerks by women candidates only had been taken by the Railway administration. It was contended in the affidavit-in-opposition made by the Railway Board that the decision of the Railway administration to employ women only as Enquiry-cum-Reservation Clerks in four metropolitan cities is based on the following main reasons :- (i) The Railway Administration had been receiving complaints from the public of irregularities and malpractices in cases of reservations and the Railway administration had been considering measures to be taken for removing the cause of such public complaints. On an assessment of the situation on All India basis, it was found that such complaints were at the minimum in respect of reservations made from the Reservation centre at Church Gate, Bombay of the Western Railway where Reservation counters are operated exclusively by women employees. It also appeared to the Railway Administration that the work of Enquiry-cum-Reservation Clerks includes public relationship job and women employees are more suitable to such job. (ii) Due to the nature of work involving the performance of duties at all hours of the day and night and the physical exertion involved, many field jobs of the Railways suit only men, and in the advertisements issued for such recruitment it is specifically stated that "women need not apply". To make up such allocation of the vast majority of jobs on Railways to men and having regard to the provisions of Article 15(3) of the Constitution and Article 46 of the Directive Principles of State Policy as appearing in Part IV of the Constitution that the State shall promote with special care the economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, the Government had been considering whether certain jobs can be allocated to women. In the opinion of the Government, women are particularly suited for the work at the Reservation Offices which practically constitute reception centres for the travelling public. In all modern establishments the reception centres are operated by women. The employment of women in the Railway Reservation Office in metropolitan cities is in the nature of a "special provision for women" made by the State under Article 15(3) of the Constitution. 4. The Railway administration also contended that the decision to employ women candidates only in the reservation offices of the four metropolitan cities viz. Calcutta, Madras, Bombay and Delhi did not emanate from the Railway Minister's budget speech made on the 21st February 1978. It was contended by the Railway Administration that a decision to re-organise the Reservation-cum-Booking Offices on the Indian Railways was under consideration even long before the Railway Minister had made his budget speech. The Railway administration contended that organisation and re-organisation of Enquiry-cum-Reservation centres on the Indian Railways are done independently by the Railway Administration from time to time for the administrative reasons of the Railway and also for the benefit of the travelling public. The category of Reservation Clerk was first introduced on April 1, 1956 and prior to that the Ticket Collectors and Commercial Clerks used to work in the Reservation Offices at Fairlie Place, Howrah Station and Sealdah Station in Calcutta. By the Railway Board's Circular dated 29th February 1964 all reservation offices of the Zonal Railways were reorganised as separate cadre with effect from 1st April 1964 and the posts were made "Selection Posts". On 5th August, 1976 the Railway Board issued a Circular addressed to the General Managers, All Indian Railways on the subject "Revitalising to cadre of Enquiry-cum-Reservation Clerks" and it was decided the entire cadre should be headquarters controlled, 25% of the posts should be filled up by direct recruitment and women candidates should, if available, be favourably considered for absorption to the cadre of Enquiry-cum-Reservation Clerks not only on promotion from other categories to the initial grade but also in the proposed direct recruitment quota. On 28th April, 1978 the Railway Board issued a Circular addressed to the General Managers, All India Railways regarding employment of women all Reservation/Booking Clerks and Supervisors in the major Booking offices at metropolitan cities. On 28th April, 1978 the Railway Board issued a Circular addressed to the General Managers, All India Railways regarding employment of women all Reservation/Booking Clerks and Supervisors in the major Booking offices at metropolitan cities. It was decided that as far as possible, women should be employed as Reservation/Booking Clerks and Supervisors in the major booking offices in the metropolitan cities i.e. Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Delhi which may be declared as a separate unit of promotion, if not already done. It wall also provided in the said circular that the existing men in there offices should be replaced by women to the extent that women candidates are available both from serving staff and by direct recruitment. It was for this reason that on 21st June, 1978 the Chief Personnel Officer, Eastern Railway issued the said circular regarding employment of women as Reservation/Booking Clerks and Supervisors in the major Booking Offices at Metropolitan cities. It also appears from the affidavit-in-opposition of the Railway Administration that on 30th June 1978 the Railway Board issued a Circular No. E(NG) III-78 RRI 13 giving direction to take action to implement the Railway Minister's decision of employment of women as Reservation/Booking Clerks in the metropolitan cities. It was further stated that the male employees who volunteer to move out will be given full protection of the pay and grade both substantive and officiating in non-fortuituous arrangement. Subject to vacancies being available, they will also be given choice of the place of posting and for implementing such decision the advertisement for recruitment of lady employees as Enquiry-cum-Reservation Clerks were also given. 5. The case was argued at length by the learned Counsel appearing for both the parties and with the leave of the Court written arguments were also submitted on behalf of the both the parties. The petitioners contended that the points for decision involved in the instant Rule are :- (a) Whether or not the State has at all any power to make classification of citizens on the basis of sex with regard to matters of employment under the State. (b) Assuming that the State has such a power, whether or not there has been a bonafide exercise of that power which in its turn involves the consideration of reasonable nexus of the step taken, to the so-called objects sought to be achieved by the Railway administration. 6. Mr. (b) Assuming that the State has such a power, whether or not there has been a bonafide exercise of that power which in its turn involves the consideration of reasonable nexus of the step taken, to the so-called objects sought to be achieved by the Railway administration. 6. Mr. Sakti Nath Mukherjee the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners contended that Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution form part of a string of common code of constitutionally guaranteed rights and these rights supplement each other as has been observed by A.N. Ray C.J. in the case of (1) Thomas reported in AIR 1976 SC page 490. Similar view was also expressed by Gajendragadkar, J. (as his Lordship then was) in (2) Rangachari's case reported in AIR 1962 SC page 36 (paragraph 16). Mr. Mukherjee contended that the above observations merely recognise and emphasis the homogeneity of the substantive rights conferred by those Articles but it was never held by their Lordships in the aforesaid decisions that there was identity of those rights or the rights under the said Articles 14, 15 and 16 were co-extensive. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that Article 14 of the Constitution provides for equal protection of law and forbids class-legislation but Article 14 does not forbid reasonable classification under Article 14 itself. Mr. Mukherjee further submitted that Article 15 of the Constitution coming after Article 14 seeks to provide for something in addition to the provisions of Article 14 and it prohibits discrimination not only by the State under Clause (1) thereof but also by persons other than the State under clause (2) thereof. Mr. Mukherjee further contended that under Article even if something may be held to be a reasonable classification under Article 14, such classification becomes forbidden on the grounds specified under Article 15(1) and 15(2). Mr. Mukherjee also contended that Articles 14 and 15 are not co-extensive, Caste, religion, sex etc. could provide a basis for reasonable classification in the context of Article 14 alone but to exclude the scope of such classification, the provisions of Articles 15(1) and (2) were enacted. Mr. Mukherjee next contended that Article 16 coming after Articles 14 and 15 provides for giving effect to the principle of quality in the field of public employment. could provide a basis for reasonable classification in the context of Article 14 alone but to exclude the scope of such classification, the provisions of Articles 15(1) and (2) were enacted. Mr. Mukherjee next contended that Article 16 coming after Articles 14 and 15 provides for giving effect to the principle of quality in the field of public employment. While Article 14 is for the benefit of any person, Articles 15 and 16 are confined to citizens only indicating thereby that the three Articles are intended to cover their respective fields. Mr. Mukherjee contended that the said Articles 14, 15 and 16 may be over-lapping or that they may supplement each other but it cannot be contended that the said Articles are co-extensive. Mr. Mukherjee further submitted that Article 16 is confined to the narrower field of public employment and as such it cannot be held to be co-extensive with Articles 5(1) and 15(2). In clauses 1 and 2 of Article 16, additional grounds of "descent" and "place of birth" are specified and they do not occur in Article 15. Mr. Mukherjee contended that Article 15 may be wider in its application than Article 16 because the same is not confined to narrower field of public employment only but it cannot be held that substantive provisions of Article 16 qualified by its own clauses, will again come to be qualified either by substantive provisions or the special clauses of Article 15. Any interpretation that Article 16 is qualified by the substantive provision or special clauses of Article 15 will be contrary to the accepted principles of interpretation that a special provision excludes the general. Mr. Mukherjee also submitted that any interpretation to the effect that Article 16 is qualified by substantive provisions or special clauses of Article 15 will render the special and deliberate incorporation of Article 16 and its special features and clauses wholly meaningless and redundant. It was also submitted that Article 15 contains two special provisions under clauses 3 and 4 of the said Article. Clause 3 by its own terms "nothing in this Article shall prevent the State" indicate the purpose behind its incorporation and the field of its operation. Similarly Article 15(4) contains provisions relating to the field of its operation and indicating the purpose of its incorporation. It was further contended that Article 15(4) is wider in its application that Article 16(4). Clause 3 by its own terms "nothing in this Article shall prevent the State" indicate the purpose behind its incorporation and the field of its operation. Similarly Article 15(4) contains provisions relating to the field of its operation and indicating the purpose of its incorporation. It was further contended that Article 15(4) is wider in its application that Article 16(4). Any State action or any piece of legislation relating to public employment may not come within Article 16(4) either because the same, does not provide for reservation or because it is not for the benefit of any class of citizens not adequately represented in employment under the State. In view of wider amplitude of Article 15(4) and the absence of restrictions contained in Article 16(4) such action or legislation may come well within the provisions of Article 15(4). Article 16(4) has three distinct elements for its applicability viz.- (a) Reservation of posts and appointment; (b) Backward class of citizens, (c) Not adequately represented in public employment. 7. Article 15(4) has also its own distinctive features for its applicability viz.- (a) Any special provision for the advancement, (b) Any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Schedule Caste or Schedule Tribes; (c) Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of Article 29. 8. Tracing the history of amendment of the Constitution and incorporation of Article 15(4) of the Constitution Mr. Mukherjee contended that the said Article 15(4) was incorporated in the Constitution to override the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (3) State of Madras v. Champakaram reported in AIR 1951 SC page 226. It was held in the said decision that Article 29(2) is not controlled by Article 46 so as to justify reservation of seats in Educational Institution. Article 15(4) provides "nothing in this Article or in Clause 2 of Article 29" and leaves the expression "nothing in this Article" in 15(3) untouched. Mr. Mukherjee contended that the effect of amendment of the Constitution incorporating Article 15(4) is to recognise the principle that Article 15(4) by itself will not override Article 29(2) and will not exhaust the whole field of State action. Mr. Mr. Mukherjee contended that the effect of amendment of the Constitution incorporating Article 15(4) is to recognise the principle that Article 15(4) by itself will not override Article 29(2) and will not exhaust the whole field of State action. Mr. Mukherjee also contended that backwardness may be the common feature of Articles 15(4) and 16(4) but no action for reservation under Article 16(4) is permitted unless it is found that it is in favour of a backward class which is not adequately represented in public employment. For this contention, Mr. Mukherjee referred to the decision of the Supreme court made in (2) Rangachari's case reported in AIR 1962 SC page 36 (paragraph 26). Mr. Mukherjee contended that the clear provisions of Article 16(4) cannot be rendered nugatory by taking recourse to Article 15(4). Mr. Mukherjee also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of (1) Thomas reported in AIR 1976 SC page 490. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that in keeping with its earlier decisions, the majority Judges in the case of Thomas upheld the constitutionality of the impugned rules within the scope and ambit of Article 16 itself. If Article 15 can control Article 16, the validity of the rules in question in the case of Thomas would have been upheld by referring to Article 15(4) and there would not have been any necessity for such a lengthy discussion a bout the built-in-flexibility under Article 16 itself for up holding the said Rules. Mr. Mukherjee contended that it would be uncharitable to argue that reference to Article 15(4) was not made by any of the Judges of the Supreme Court in the laid case of Thomas because Article 15(4) was not referred to at the bar. Mr. Mukherjee contended that in the case of Thomas sustenance of the rules in question was found under Article 16 itself but such sustenance was not found in Article 15(4). Mr. Mukherjee further contended that even a comparison of the minority view of Khanna and Gupta JJ. with the majority view in the said case of (1) Thomas will show that the laid Honourable Judges of the minority group were not inclined to spell out such permissibility with Article 16, itself but majority view upheld such built-in-permissibility under Article 16. Mr. Mukherjee further contended that even a comparison of the minority view of Khanna and Gupta JJ. with the majority view in the said case of (1) Thomas will show that the laid Honourable Judges of the minority group were not inclined to spell out such permissibility with Article 16, itself but majority view upheld such built-in-permissibility under Article 16. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that a closer examination of the decision made in the case (1) Thomas reveals that the said decision is really an authority for the proposition that the ambit of Article 16 is not controlled by any other provisions of the Constitution. Mr. Mukherjee also submitted that Article 16(4) is an exception or proviso to Article 16(1) but no action under Article 16(4) can be taken so as to destroy the guarantee under Article 16(1). For this contention Mr. Mukherjee referred to paragraph 21 and 32 of the (2) Rangachari's case reported in AIR 1962 SC page 36, paragraph 16 of (4) Debadasan's case reported in AIR 1964 SC page 179, paragraph 6 of Rajendran’s case reported in AIR 1968 SC page 507 and paragraph 2 of Trilokinath's case reported in AIR 1969 SC page 1. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that recent Division Bench judgment of the Delhi High Court made in the case of (5) Charan Singh v. Union of India since reported in All India Services Law Journal page 26 has upheld the action of the Railway to recruit only women candidates for the Enquiry-cum-Reservation Clerks in the Banking offices in Delhi. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that in the said decision reliance was made by the Hon'ble Judges of the Delhi High Court to the decision made in the case of (6) Samsha Singh v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1970 Punjab and Haryana, page 372. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the scope of Articles 15 and 16 is not identical and had there been any identity, there would have been no necessity to make special provision for public employment under Article 16. Articles 15 and 16 are species of the genus article for equality viz. Article 14 but the said Articles 15 and 16 are not interchangeable. The opening words of Article 15(3) "nothing in this Article" show that Article 15(3) is an exception to Article 15(1) and (2) only and not exception to Article 16. Mr. Articles 15 and 16 are species of the genus article for equality viz. Article 14 but the said Articles 15 and 16 are not interchangeable. The opening words of Article 15(3) "nothing in this Article" show that Article 15(3) is an exception to Article 15(1) and (2) only and not exception to Article 16. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the minority view in the said decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court made in the case of (6) Samsher Singh appearing in the judgment of Narula J. (as his Lordship then was) is correct and should be followed. In this connection Mr. Mukherjee referred to the commentary of the Constitution of India, 6th Edition, 1975, Vol. B. pages 343-44 by D. Basu and submitted that the learned author had also recorded his dissent from the majority view and approved the minority view of Narula J. of the aforesaid decision reported in AIR 1970 Punjab and Haryana, page 272. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the Punjab Full Bench in the said decision referred to the decision of Chagla C.J. (7) reported in AIR 1953 Bombay, page 311. Mr. Mukherjee contended that in paragraph 11 of the majority judgment of the said Punjab Full Bench case; it was observed that Chagla C.J. held that Article 15(1) and 15(2) cover the entire field of State discrimination including the field of public employment. But a closer examination of the Bombay case shows that the said case was related to reservation of seats in Municipal election covered entirely by Article 15 and Chief Justice Chagla never held that article 15 covers the field of public employment also Narula J. in this dissenting judgment in paragraph 24 correctly explained the position. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that as a matter of fact Delhi High Court also disapproved the said majority view of the Punjab Full Bench case in the decision made in the case of (8) Walter Alfred Baid v. Union of India and Ors. reported in AIR 1976 Delhi, page 302. But the said recent decision of the Delhi High Court in Charan Singh's case up holding the recruitment of Enquiry-cum-Reservation Clerks from amongst women candidates only did not consider the said earlier decision of the Delhi High Court itself reported in AIR 1976 Delhi page 302, but placed reliance on the majority view of the said Punjab Full Bench case. But the said recent decision of the Delhi High Court in Charan Singh's case up holding the recruitment of Enquiry-cum-Reservation Clerks from amongst women candidates only did not consider the said earlier decision of the Delhi High Court itself reported in AIR 1976 Delhi page 302, but placed reliance on the majority view of the said Punjab Full Bench case. Commenting further on the said decision of Delhi High Court in Charan Singh’s case Mr. Mukherjee also submitted that in the said decision much reliance was also placed on the report of the Committee on the Status of Women of India named Towards Equality. The aforesaid Committee was appointed by the President to enquire into the status of women in India and relying on certain observations made in the said report, it was pointed out in the aforesaid judgment of the Delhi High Court that women were lagging behind the males in the sphere of employment. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that there is no doubt, so far as the ratio of men and women in various employments is concerned, that women are certainly lagging behind the men in the sphere of the employment but the actual recommendations made by the Committee was not noted by the Delhi High Court and certain observations devoid of their context were referred to and relied on by the Delhi High Court. In this connection, Mr. Mukherjee referred to the recommendations of the Committee under paragraphs 5.316 to 5.326 at pages 230 to 233 of the said "Report of the Committee on the Status of Women of India". The Committee after actual assessment of the situation made concrete recommendations in which there is no mention of any reservation of appointment or posts in favour of the women. On the contrary, the emphasis is on the removal of certain obstacles in the way of women in the field of employment. They are in the nature of prospective measures to secure advancement in the field of employment by removing obstacles. In paragraph 7.113 the Committee had also considered the reservation of seats for women in the State Assemblies and Parliament and rejected the claim, inter alia, with the following observations :- "(c) there is a fallacy in the entire argument for separate representation for women. Women's interest as such cannot be isolated from economic, social and political interests of groups, strata and classes in the society. Women's interest as such cannot be isolated from economic, social and political interests of groups, strata and classes in the society. In point of fact the problems connected with the status of women are linked with formulation, articulation and modalities of the realisation of other interests." "(g) the minority argument cannot be applied to women. Women are not a community, they are a category. Though they have some real problems of their own, they share with men, the problems of their groups, locality and community. Women are not concentrated in certain areas confined to particular fields of activities. Under these circumstances there can be no rational basis for reservation for women." 9. Mr. Mukherjee contended that on earlier occasion argument was advanced before the Supreme Court to the effect that if a matter comes under Article 15(4) that puts an end to the whole thing and nothing further is required to be examined. In other words, it was sought to be argued that Article 15(4) by itself and to the total exclusion of all other Articles, governs the entire field of State discrimination but such argument was not accepted by the Supreme Court in (9) Balaji's case reported in AIR 1963 SC page 649. It was observed by the Supreme Court in the said decision that even assuming that Article 15(3) is not relevant in construing the provisions of Article 16, only protective and beneficial action and not hostile discrimination will come under its terms. Mr. Mukherjee contended that even in the matter of construction of Article 15(3) or Article 15(4) or even Article 16(4) any classification based only on the grounds specified in Articles 15(1) and (2) and Articles 16(1) and (2) will not be permissible. In this connection, Mr. Mukherjee referred to the decision of the Supreme Court made in (10) Trilokinath's case reported in AIR 1969 SC page 1 (Paragraph 4). It was held in the said decision what Article 15(3) permits is beneficial or protective action in favour of women and children for their physical and social disabilities and not reservation of posts on the ground of sex only. Maternity leave may be justified under Article 16(1) or even Article 15(3) but reservation of posts on the ground of sex only, though not permitted under Article 16(4) as held in Trilokinath's case cannot become permissible under Article 15(3). Accordingly, Mr. Maternity leave may be justified under Article 16(1) or even Article 15(3) but reservation of posts on the ground of sex only, though not permitted under Article 16(4) as held in Trilokinath's case cannot become permissible under Article 15(3). Accordingly, Mr. Mukherjee contended that the said recent decision of the Delhi High Court should not be followed. As the impugned circulars clearly make hostile discrimination on the ground of sex only and as such offend Article 16(1) and (2), the said circulars are, therefore, ultra vires the Constitution and bound to be struck down. The unconstitutionality of the said circulars cannot be protected by reference to Article 15 or any other provisions of the Constitution. 10. Mr. Mukherjee next contended that the impugned circulars are also arbitrary, unreasonable and malafide and on that score also the said circulars should be struck down. Mr. Mukherjee referred to the observation of Gajendragadkar J. (as his Lordship then was) in (9) Balaji's case reported in AIR 1963 SC page 649 (paragraph 35) wherein his Lordship observed as follows :- "an executive action which is patently and plainly outside the limits of constitutional authority conferred on the state in that behalf is struck down as being ultra vires the State's authority. If, on the other hand, the executive action does not patently or overtly transgress the authority conferred on it by the constitution, but the transgression is covert or latent, the said action is struck down as being a fraud on the relevant constitutional power. It is in this connection that courts often consider the substance of the matter and not its form and in ascertaining the substance of the matter, the appearance or the cloak, or the veil of the executive action is carefully scrutinised and if it appears that notwithstanding the appearance, the cloak or the veil of the executive action, in substance and in truth, the constitutional power has been transgressed, the impugned action is struck down as a fraud on the constitution." 11. Mr. Mukherjee contended that in any event the impugned circulars were not issued bona fide but such circulars were issued with an intention to practise fraud on the constitution. Mr. Mukherjee referred to the impugned Circular of 1976 by the Railway Board being Annexure A(1) to the application for amendment of the writ petition. Mr. Mukherjee contended that in any event the impugned circulars were not issued bona fide but such circulars were issued with an intention to practise fraud on the constitution. Mr. Mukherjee referred to the impugned Circular of 1976 by the Railway Board being Annexure A(1) to the application for amendment of the writ petition. Clause (iii) of the said Circular provides as follows :- "Women candidates should be favourably considered for absorption in the cadre of E.C.R. Cs. not only on promotion from other categories to the initial grade but also in the proposed direct recruitment quota:" Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the direction for favourable consideration cannot obviously come under Article 16(4) which merely provides for reservation of appointments or posts. A direction for favourable consideration of women candidates only is an infringement of Article 16(2) which prohibits discrimination on the ground of sex only. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that this is precisely forbidden by Article 16(2) and not saved by Article 16(4) that a woman because she is a woman und irrespective of other consideration will be entitled to a favourable consideration and a man because he is a man will be disentitled to such favourable consideration. Mr. Mukherjee contended that even under Article 16(4) a classification based solely on the ground of sex is not permitted. Mr. Mukherjee further contended that possibly being conscious about the above difficulties, the respondent in both the affidavits-in-opposition and also in course of their arguments did not place any reliance upon Article 16(4) but sought to place their reliance upon Article 15(3) but as contended earlier, Article 15(3) cannot control the provisions of Article 16 nor can Article 15(3) nullify the substantive provisions of Articles 15 and 16. Mr. Mukherjee contended that in the application for amendment it was alleged that preference was given only on the ground of sex and there was no rational basis for discrimination between a male staff and female staff belonging to the cadre of Commercial Clerks or the cadre of Ticket Collectors. In the affidavit-in-opposition no real basis had been disclosed apart from sex to justify the classification. Any attribution of a virtue to a sex cannot make such virtue a basis for classification. Referring to the other impugned circular of 1978 being annexure 'D' to the writ petition. Mr. In the affidavit-in-opposition no real basis had been disclosed apart from sex to justify the classification. Any attribution of a virtue to a sex cannot make such virtue a basis for classification. Referring to the other impugned circular of 1978 being annexure 'D' to the writ petition. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that it will appear from the said circular that it refers to the points raised at the meeting of the Chief Commercial Superintendents held at Bombay on 13th/14th June, 1978 and directs action to be taken to implement the Minister's directive. Mr. Mukherjee contended that the Railway Board is the Rule making authority under paragraph 157 of the Railway Establishment Code, Vol. I. The impugned circular refers to the decision of the ministry of Railway and not of the Board itself and directs implementation of the Minister's directive. It is a settled law that a statutory authority cannot abdicate its statutory functions and act as mouth-piece of the Government. Mr. Mukherjee contended that in the instant case the Railway Board itself Prescribed rules in 1964 being annexure 'A' to the writ petition and in 1976 being annexure 'A' to the application for amendment of the writ petition and as such the said Rules have statutory force. It is not open to get such statutory Rules ignored or overruled on the basis of the direction of the Hon'ble Minister for Railways. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that it will appear from paragraph (1) of the impugned circular of 1978 by the Railway Board that a separate cadre for the reservation office in four metropolitan cities was constituted and it was further provided that it is the Government's intention to have in this unit only women employees as Reservation Clerk and in due course as supervisors". Mr. Mukherjee submitted that net effect under the circular is to constitute a separate service and to reserve the entire service for the women and not to provide for mere reservation of appointments or posts. Paragraph (iii) of the said circular of 1978 was also referred to and it was submitted that the said paragraph (iii) seeks to modify the quota rule and provides that all vacancies in the initial grade may be filled by volunteers from serving women staff or all categories on the Railway to the extent suitable candidates are available and the balance by direct recruitment of women". Mr. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the implications of the said paragraph (iii) are as follows :- Serving women staff of all categories on the Railway will be eligible for consideration and no male employee will be entitled to apply. Eligibility has been made to depend upon sex alone and there is no question of any other consideration affecting the eligibility of volunteers. For the eligibility to appear, experience, qualification, service record reflecting, efficiency, seniority and such other facts have been made wholly irrelevant. Mr. Mukherjee also referred to paragraphs (iv) and (v) of the said circular of 1978 and submits that the said paragraphs clearly reveal unreasonable haste on the part of the Railway administration for implementing the Hon'ble Minister's directive. Screening of volunteers and recruitment of direct recruits were directed to be held simultaneously though the extent of the latter is made to depend upon the shortfall in the former. The last two sentences of paragraph (v) of 1978 Circular provide that even where a panel has been prepared by the Railway Service Commission under the existing Rules, only women candidates irrespective of their merit are to be recruited in this unit and the male candidates, though higher in the merit order, will be relegated to other reservation offices which according to paragraph (5) sub-paragraph (ii) of the affidavit-in-opposition of the Railway Board are less important. Mr. Mukherjee contended that it is thus patent that male candidates though found to be more efficient and suitable according to selections held by the Railway Service Commission itself will be ineligible for the Reservation Offices in the four metropolitan cities viz. Calcutta, Madras, Delhi and Bombay. Mr. Mukherjee referred to the reasons for recruitment of women only in the affidavits-in-opposition and contended that the reason is to give effect to the decision of the Hon'ble Minister for Railways that only women should be employed as Reservation/Booking Clerks and Supervisors in the major Booking Offices starting with the metropolitan cities. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the said circulars were issued only for implementing the decision of the Hon'ble Minister for Railways and from the circulars question it will appear that the Railway administration proceeded in unseeingly hot has to give effect to the decision of the Hon'ble Minister. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the said circulars were issued only for implementing the decision of the Hon'ble Minister for Railways and from the circulars question it will appear that the Railway administration proceeded in unseeingly hot has to give effect to the decision of the Hon'ble Minister. The other reasons sought to be given namely that such decision was also made for the benefit of the women and the job suitability does not stand scrutiny. Mr. Mukherjee further submitted that it is unthinkable that such a step was taken to came benefit to the women when only about 620 posts are involved for Enquiry-cum-Reservation Clerks and Supervisors and there are several lakhs of other posts in different Railways and all the said posts have been left untouched. Mr. Mukherjee contended that this is really an attempt to practise fraud on the constitution. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that calling volunteers from serving employees of all categories in the Railways at the first instance reflects the anxiety of the department to fill up the posts by women only and not to create any additional opportunities for women. Hence the plea that impugned action was taken for creating avenue of employment for women is untrue and should be rejected. Mr. Mukherjee also submitted that it is nowhere stated that women volunteers serving other departments are suffering from any inconvenience in such other departments and as such they require to be posted as protective measure in the Reservation Offices. When a woman Commercial Clerk is taken over as Reservation Clerk, there would be no reservation of any post in the cadre of Commercial Clerk for woman. Hence, there is no question of any additional employment for the women. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the plea of benefit to women is not only factually incorrect but such plea is wholly illusory and has been put forward as a mere cloak to cover up the patently discriminatory step in favour of the fair sex as the Hon'ble Railway Minister himself candidly admitted in his budget speech. The other reason namely that women are particularly suited for the Enquiry-cum-Reservation Clerks is also more illusory than real. Mr. The other reason namely that women are particularly suited for the Enquiry-cum-Reservation Clerks is also more illusory than real. Mr. Mukherjee contended that the Railway Service Commission itself held a selection test but male candidates who were placed higher in the merit order for appointment to post of Enquiry-cum-Reservation Clerks have been treated as ineligible to be recruited for the said post in metropolitan cities. Accordingly, Mr. Mukherjee contended that the impugned circulars being wholly illusory and violative of Article 16 must be struck down. 12. Mr. R.C. Deb being ably assisted by Mr. R.N. Das appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that the impugned orders and/or notices have been challenged by the petitioners mainly on the grounds that the said orders and/or notices are violative of fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India and, the said impugned circulars and/or notices were issued on the basis of directives given by the Hon'ble Railway Minister in his budget speech on the 21st February, 1978 and such decision of the Railway administration to fill up the posts of Enquiry-cum-Reservation Clerks in four metropolitan cities in India by only women candidates was only to implement the Hon'ble Railway Minister's directives. Mr. Deb contended that the impugned circulars or directives did not violate any fundamental right guaranteed under Article 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India or any other Articles of the Constitution inasmuch as under the impugned orders and/or notices, no discrimination on the ground of sex as alleged by the petitioners. He referred to the reasons disclosed in the affidavits-in-opposition for taking the decision of employment of only women in the Enquiry-cum-Reservation offices in the four metropolitan cities at the first instance and submitted that the reasons clearly indicate that such decision to employ women was not taken on consideration of sex only. It was also contended on behalf of the respondents that the above decision of the Railway Board and the said notices and/or circulars issued in terms of such decision of the Railway Board did not emanate from the Railway Minister's budget speech. The decision to re-organise the Reservation-cum-booking offices on the Indian Railways was under consideration even long before the Railway Minister made his budget speech on 21st February 1978. The decision to re-organise the Reservation-cum-booking offices on the Indian Railways was under consideration even long before the Railway Minister made his budget speech on 21st February 1978. Organisation and re-organisation of Enquiry-cum-Reservation centres were done independently by the Railway administration from time to time for the Railway's own administrative reasons as well as for the benefit of the public. Mr. R.N. Das contended that as early as in 1950s, the reservation work at Fairlie Place, Howrah IInd Sealdah Station in Calcutta were done by Ticket Collectors and Commercial Clerks when the volume of work and the reservation facilities were meagre. In the year 1956, the category of reservation clerks was first introduced with effect from 1st April, 1956. On the 29th February, 1964, the Railway Board issued Circular No. E (NG) 63 PMI-52 to the General Managers, All Indian Railways regarding channel of promotion for Enquiry-cum-Reservation Clerks. By the said circular all Reservation offices of the Zonal Railways were re-organised as separate cadre with effect from 1st April, 1964. The posts were made "Selection Posts". On 5th August, 1976, the Railway Board issued another circular No. E (NG) III-76 CD/40 addressed to the General Managers, All Indian Railways on the subject "Revitalising the cadre of Enquiry-cum- Reservation Clerks" and it was inter alia provided therein that the women candidates, if available, should be favourably considered for absorption to the cadre of Enquiry-cum-Reservation Clerks not only on promotion from other categories to the initial grade but also in the proposed direct recruitment quota. Accordingly, Mr. Das contended that it is not correct to contend that because the Railway Minister took a decision as contained in his budget speech for employment of women candidates in the Enquiry- cum-Reservation offices, the said circulars were issued for implementing the said decision already taken by the Railway Minister. Mr. Das also contended that the Articles 14, 15 and 16 have to be read together to ascertain as to what are the fundamental rights guaranteed to any person or citizen of India and what are the exceptions permitted by the Constitution for making special provisions in respect of any special class of citizens or persons and what are the powers conferred on the Government to make provisions and/or impose restrictions or conditions that may curtail the wide ambit of the fundamental rights. Mr. Mr. Das referred to the decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of (2) General Manager, Southern Railway v. Rangachari, reported in AIR 1962 SC page 36, Mr. Das referred to paragraph 14 of the said judgment and contended that the Supreme Court held that in deciding the scope and ambit of fundamental rights of equality of opportunity guaranteed under these Articles, a technical or pedantic approach must be avoided. Mr. Das also contended that Article 16 prohibits discrimination on ground only of sex in the matter of employment. Therefore, there is some significance for the word 'only' used in Article 16. Mr. Das referred to Article 15(1) in this context and contended that in both the Articles the expression "only" is very significant. When the criterion or sex along with other factors and considerations form a basis for the object of classification, then the bar under Articles 15 and 16 cannot be attracted. Mr. Das referred to the decisions made in the case of (6) Samsher Singh v. State reported in AIR 1970 Punjab and Haryana 372 and submitted that for giving a harmonious construction and effect to Articles 14, 15 and 16 which form part of same string it must be held that if an action is protected under Article 15(3) of the Constitution such action cannot be struck down as violative of Article 16 of the Constitution because in so doing, the benefit given by one Article of the Constitution would be taken away by another Article and in that event such benefit will be only illusory. Mr. Das also referred to the decisions of the Bombay High Court made in the case of (11) Dattaraya Motiram More v. Stats of Bombay 8 reported in AIR 1963 Bombay 311 and also the decisions of Calcutta High Court made in the case of (12) Mahadev Jiew v. B.B. Sen and (13) Anjali Roy v. State of West Bengal respectively reported in AIR 1951 Calcutta 563 and AIR 1952 Calcutta 825 and contended that in order to give harmonious construction of the Articles 14, 15 and 16 it must be held that if an action is specifically permitted by one of the said Articles, such action cannot be held violative of the other articles. Mr. Mr. Das further submitted that Article 15(1) of the Constitution is wider in its application than Article 16(1) of the Constitution but even in respect of this wider provision in Article 15 (1) of the Constitution, power has been given to the State under sub-article (3) of Article 15 for making any special provision for women and children. Mr. Das contended that this power of the State to make special provision can also be exercised in appropriate cases even where Article 16(2) of the Constitution applies and in this context, Mr. Das referred to the decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of (14) D.N. Chanchala v. State of Mysore, reported in AIR 1971 SC 1762 . It was held in the said case by the Supreme Court that the power to lay down classification or categories of persons based on certain principles in one Article can be applied in appropriate case even where that Article is not applicable. Relying on the said decision of the Supreme Court, Mr. Das contended that the power of the State to make provisions for women and children conferred under Article 15(3) can also be exercised in appropriate cases where Article 16(2) is attracted. Mr. Das further submitted that a pedantic approach and a narrow construction of Articles 15(3) and 16(2) would lead to many serious consequences. For example, special provisions made for women attendants in Ladies’ waiting rooms, women employees in female wards in hospitals, women teachers in schools and colleges for girls and women, prohibition of child employment in factories and other establishments, prohibition of employment of women after certain hours at night in bars and restaurants would all become illegal. Mr. Das submitted that in the instant case, sex is not the only criterion for the Railway 'Administration's decision to employ women candidates in Reservation-cum-Booking centres in four metropolitan cities. The job suitability the advancement of employment to women, the public complaints against performances in major Booking Offices other than the Church Gate Booking Office and the efficient performance at the Church Gate Reception-cum-Booking Office controlled by women, are the major considerations for the issuance of the circulars and notices under challenge. Those considerations were made by the Railway Authorities even before the Railway Minister made his budget speech on 21st February 1978. Those considerations were made by the Railway Authorities even before the Railway Minister made his budget speech on 21st February 1978. After the said budget speech, the Chief Commercial Superintendents of the Railways met at Bombay on the 13th and 14th June, 1978 for considering this aspect and only after such deliberations find considerations, the directive from the Railway Board was issued. Mr. Das contended that in the facts and circumstances of the case it is quite evident that nothing was done by the Railway. Administration malafide and no action was taken either hastily or at the dictate of the Railway Minister. Mr. Das also contended that Article 19 of the Constitution guarantees to all citizens certain fundamental rights and Article 19(1)(g) includes right to hold office and the fundamental fight under Article 19(1)(g) is subject to provisions of clause 6 of the said Article 19 which grants power to the State Government to make reasonable restrictions on the exercise of such right to hold office in the interest of general public. This being the position, the equality rights under Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution must also mean equalities in respect of freedom guaranteed under Article 19 which are subject to reasonable restrictions that may be imposed by the State. Mr. Das also relied on the said recent decision of the Delhi High Court and the laid Full Bench decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court and submitted that the impugned circulars are not only just and fair but the same also do not violate the fundamental rights of equality, guaranteed by the Constitution. 13. In reply to the aforesaid contentions made on behalf of the respondents, Mr. Mukherjee submitted that from the facts and circumstances of the case, there cannot be any manner of doubt that the directives issued by the Railway Board did really emanate from policy decision taken by the Hon'ble Minister for Railways as contained in his aforesaid budget speech. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the Railway Minister himself stated in his budget speech before the Parliament that he had taken the decision to employ women candidates only although he was aware that he might be accused of being partial to fair sex. In the affidavit-in-opposition it was also admitted that the Railway Minister had taken such decision. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the Railway Minister himself stated in his budget speech before the Parliament that he had taken the decision to employ women candidates only although he was aware that he might be accused of being partial to fair sex. In the affidavit-in-opposition it was also admitted that the Railway Minister had taken such decision. It is only because the Railway Minister declared his own decision, the entire machinery was geared up and the impugned circulars and/or directives from the Railway Administration came. Accordingly, to implement the decision taken by the Railway Minister, the said circulars were issued in not haste. Mr. Mukherjee disputed the proposition made on behalf of the respondents that the power under Article 15(3) can be exercised in appropriate cases even where Article 16(2) applies. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the decision made in (14) D.N. Chanchala’s case ( AIR 1971 SC 1962 ) does not support the aforesaid contentions made by Mr. Das. In Chanchala's case, classification was not challenged as violative of Articles 15(1) and 15(2). There was no question in that case of discrimination on grounds expressly prohibited by the substantive provisions of Articles 15(1) and (2). The question involved in that case was whether or not the classification made was reasonable or such classification has any reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the Supreme Court also held in the case (1) Thomas ( AIR 1976 SC 490 ) that the substantive provisions prohibiting discrimination on specified grounds do not exclude the built-in-permissibility of reasonable classification where Article 16(4) does not by its own terms apply, Similarly, in Chanchala's case, the reasonableness of the classification was upheld on the basis of the principle involved in Article 15(4) to justify a classification, the validity of which was challenged under Article 15 alone. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the said decision is not an authority for the proposition that any exception or proviso to Article 15 should be treated as an exception or proviso to Article 16 also. Even under Article 15, there cannot be any question of reasonableness of any classification made on the ground of sex only. Similarly there cannot be any question of reasonableness of classification on the ground of sex under Article 16. Even under Article 15, there cannot be any question of reasonableness of any classification made on the ground of sex only. Similarly there cannot be any question of reasonableness of classification on the ground of sex under Article 16. On the contrary, such classification on the ground of sex is forbidden both by Articles 15 and 16 but there is an exception to such prohibition under Article 15(3) so far as operation of Article 15(3) is concerned, but there is no such exception to Article 16. Mr. Mukherjee contended that when the Supreme Court was adopting the underlying principal of Article 15(4) and extending or projecting it over new areas, it was doing so only for the purpose of upholding the reasonableness of the classification and not to permit a classification expressly prohibited by the substantive provisions of the Article concerned. Mr. Mukherjee in this connection referred to the decision of the Supreme Court made in the case of (15) Probhat Kiran v. Union of India reported in AIR 1977 SC 1553 . Referring to paragraph 5 of the said decision Mr. Mukherjee submitted that it was specifically held by the Supreme Court to the following effect :- "Moreover a discrimination which involves the invocation of Article 14, is not necessarily covered by Article 16." Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the proviso or exception to Article 15 must necessarily mean a proviso or exception to the said Article and it cannot be contended that a proviso or exception to the said Article 15 is also a proviso and exception to Article 16. Hence, there cannot be any question of giving any particular right under Article 15 and taking away of such right under Article 16 of the Constitution. Mr. Mukherjee contended that right to be given by any Article must be such right which does not infringe any other Article of the Constitution. Mr. Mukherjee also submitted that the respondents contended as a last resort that narrow and strict interpretation under Article 16 will create various complications and difficulties in several fields of employment. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that such assumption is absolutely incorrect and even assuming that such difficulties are created because of strict interpretation of Article 16, the Court cannot hastate to condemn one illegality on the ground of violation of Article 16 because other illegalities will stand condemned thereby. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that such assumption is absolutely incorrect and even assuming that such difficulties are created because of strict interpretation of Article 16, the Court cannot hastate to condemn one illegality on the ground of violation of Article 16 because other illegalities will stand condemned thereby. The plea of consequence cannot be justifications to override the express prohibition contained in Article 16. Any attempt for justification on the plea of consequence will be sitting in appeal over the wisdom of the framers of the Constitution. 14. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and giving my anxious consideration to the respective submissions made by the learned Counsel, it appears to me that the impugned Circulars and/or orders are violative of the provisions of Articles 16 and as such they are unconstitutional and should be struck down. It is true that Articles 14, 15 and 16 form part of a string or common code of constitutionally guaranteed rights and the rights guaranteed under the said Articles supplement each other, but none of the Articles control the provisions of the other Articles. Article 14 makes provision for equal protection of law and forbid class-legislation but there is a built-in-flexibility within the said Article itself and Article 14 does not forbid reasonable classification having nexus to the object of the impugned action but Articles 14 and 15 are not co-extensive and action which may well be protected within the built-in-permissibility of reasonable classification under Article 14 itself, becomes violative of Article 15 if any classification, even if reasonable, is made on the grounds of caste, sex, religion etc. as provided in Article 15. Article 16 is confined to a narrower field of public employment and obviously Articles 16 cannot be co-extensive with Articles 15(1) and (2). It is to be noted that some additional grounds viz. "descent" and "place of birth" have been specified in Clauses (1) and (2) or Article 16 although the said additional grounds do not find place in Article 15, but it can not be held that the substantive provisions of Article 16, since qualified by its own clauses, viz. clauses (3) and (4), are further qualified by the substantive provisions of Article 15 and/or clauses thereunder. Mr. clauses (3) and (4), are further qualified by the substantive provisions of Article 15 and/or clauses thereunder. Mr. Mukherjee, in my view, is justified in contending that the Articles 14, 15 and 16 although form part a common code of constitutionally guaranteed rights and the rights guaranteed under the said Articles, supplement each other and there may be overlapping of such fights guaranteed by the said Articles, but it cannot be held that the said Articles are co-extensive in their field of operation. In my view, Mr. Mukherjee is also right in his contention that the decision made by the Supreme Court in the case of Thomas ( AIR 1976 SC 490 ) has not laid down the proposition that Article 16 is qualified and controlled to some extent by the substantive provisions of Article 15 and/or clauses thereunder. The majority view in the said decision upheld the constitutionality of the impugned orders and/or actions challenged in the said case within the scope and ambit of Article 16 itself and it was held that within the built-in-flexibility of Article 16 the said impugned orders were protected. Mr. Mukherjee, in my view is also justified in contending that if Article 15 could have been brought in aid of the impugned orders, neither the Counsel appearing in the case nor the Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court would have taken so much pain to discuss the built-inflexibility in the said Article 16 and to hold that the impugned orders got substance under Article 16 itself. In my view, the scope of Articles 15 and 16 is not indentical and had the scope of Articles 15 and 16 been identical there would not have been any necessity to make special provision for public employment under Article 16. Both Articles 15 and 16 are species of the genus of equality viz. Article 14 but the said Articles are not coextensive and are also not interchangeable. In this context I respectfully differ from the majority view of the Full Bench decision of the Punjab High Court in (6) Samser Singh’s case reported in AIR 1970 Punjab and Haryana page 372. For the aforesaid reasons, I also respectfully differ from the Division Bench decision of the Delhi High Court made in the case of (5) Charan Singh and ors. v. Union of India and ors., since reported in 1979 All India Services Law Journal page 26. For the aforesaid reasons, I also respectfully differ from the Division Bench decision of the Delhi High Court made in the case of (5) Charan Singh and ors. v. Union of India and ors., since reported in 1979 All India Services Law Journal page 26. 15. So far as Circular of the Railway Board dated 5th August, 1976 being Annexure A-1 in the amendment petition is concerned, the direction for favourable consideration of women candidates in the cadre of Enquiry-cum- Reservation Clerks not only on promotion from other categories to the initial grade but also from the proposed direct recruitment quota cannot obviously come under Article 16(4) because Article 16(4) merely provides for reservation of appointments of post and any favourable consideration of women candidates cannot but be consideration of a qualification or virtue attributable to sex only and as such the said Circular is clearly violative of Articles 16(1) and (2) of the Constitution. Similarly in the other impugned Circulars, eligibility has been made to depend upon sex only and there is no question of any other consideration. Mr. Mukherjee is quite justified in contending that any attribution of a virtue on the ground of sex cannot make such virtue any basis for classification. A prohibition of a discrimination on the basis of sex includes a prohibition of a discrimination on the basis of the attributes or special features of sex. A classification on the basis of attributes of a sex, is therefore, nothing but or does not cease to be a classification only on the ground of sex. As the impugned Circulars art violative of Article 16 of the Constitution and as such liable to be struck down, it is not necessary to consider the allegations made by the petitioners since disputed by the respondents that the said Circulars were issued mala fide, and solely for implementing the decision already taken by the Railway Minister. It cannot be contended that men are not suitable for appointment to the posts of Enquiry-cum-Reservation Clerks and even assuming that women candidates may be more suitable for such posts because of some inherent qualities in women, any favourable consideration for a woman candidate cannot but be a discrimination or a favour shown on the basis of attributes or special virtue inherent in sex and such discrimination on the basis of attributes of a sex is clearly forbidden by Articles 16(1) and (2). 16. In the circumstances, the Rule is made absolute. Let a writ of mandamus be issued commanding the respondents to withdraw recall and/or cancel the impugned circulars and/or notices and forbearing the respondents, their officers, servants and agents from enforcing and/or giving any effect or further effect to the aforesaid Circulars and/or notices in any manner whatsoever. In the facts and circumstance of the case there will, however, be no order as to costs. On the prayer of the learned Counsel appearing for the Railway administration, let there be a stay of operation of this judgment for a period of four weeks from today.