( 1 ) AT Shivasamudram of Kollegal taluk, which was formerly a part of erstwhile State of Madras but now part of Mysore District, there is a mousoleum or a Dargah called as Dargah-e-Hazrath Maxdane Gaib (hereinafter referred to as the Dairgah) which attracts devotees from many parts of Squth India, in considerable numbers particularly dulring the month of Ramzan when a Urus is held at that place. ( 2 ) THE petitioner claims to be, the 'sajjada Nashin, Muthwalli and mujawar of the Dargah by heredity. Tn the survey of wakfs in Karnataka, state undertaken and published on the introductiqn of the Wakf Act of 1954 (Central Act No. 29 of 1954) (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the Dargah is registered as a Wakf and the petitioner is recognised as its muthwalli on hereditary basis, Evidently on complaints made by certain persons on the alleged mis-management of the affairs of the Dargah by the petitioner, Government in its letter No. RD 150 CWF 72 dated 22nd january, 1973, directed respondent No. 1 to investigate the affairs of the dargah and its management by a committee consisting of Sriyuths: (a) a. Sattar Abba Sait, (b) S. A. Rahman, (c) Syed Noor Ahmed and (d) ilyas Ahmed. In pursuance of the said letter, respondent NO. 1 by its order no. MYW 24 LSM 73/812-17 dated 12 13th March, 1973 (Exhibit R13) appointed the aforesaid persons as a Committee of enquiry (hereinafter referred to as the Committee to inquire into the following matters:1. Whether ali the properties movable and immovable properties endowed to the Dargah have been notified as Wakfs? 2. Whether any of the propel ties have been unauthorisedly mortgaged, sold, leased or gifted away or in any other manner alienated and if so on whom the responsibility can be fixed? 3. Whether any of the properties have been unauthorisedly occupied by any trespassers and if so, what action, if any has been taken toy the Sajjada to recover them? 4. What is the total income from all the endowed properties itemwise and on what objects that income is being used? 5. (a) How many Goluks are kept in the Dargah and when are they opened and by whom? (b) Whether any account of the collections in the Goluks have been maintained and if so, the annual accounts for the period from 1-4-1970 to 31-3-73 should be furnirhed. 6. 5. (a) How many Goluks are kept in the Dargah and when are they opened and by whom? (b) Whether any account of the collections in the Goluks have been maintained and if so, the annual accounts for the period from 1-4-1970 to 31-3-73 should be furnirhed. 6. Whether any action has been taken by the management to develop the properties of the Dargah? 7. Whether the Dargah is being maintained and managed properly? 8. What facilities and amenities have, been provided to the visitors? 9. How did the present Sajjada come to be appoineitd as such. Is the office of Sajjada of this institute hereditary? 10. Whether there is any scheme of management of the institution on hand. Was there any such scheme when Kollegal Taluk was the part of the erstwhile Madras State if so the details may be furnished. 11. Any other matter of mismaragement or improper dealing with the finance of the Dargah which the committeie would like to bring it to the notice of the, Board. In pursuance of the said order, the committee visited the Dargah on 8. 4. 1973, recorded the statements of the, petitioner and certain others and submitted a report on 12-3-1973 (Ext. R-14) inter alia recommending to manage the affairs of the Dargah by a committee of management. On the basis Of the said report, respondent No. 1 made an ordeer on 25-9-1973 appointing nine persons as an ad hoc Committee to manage the affairs of the Dargah which was affirmed by the Government on 16-10-Y3 in an appeal filed by the petitioner which were challenged by him in W. P. No. 3455 of 1973 before this Court. On 19th June, 1975 Venkataramiah, J. holding that the decision had, not been taken by not less than three fourths ot the members, of the Wakf board, allowed the said writ petition and quashed the impugned Orders. In the course of his order, the learned Judge observed and directed as follows:"liberty is however, reserved to take action against the petitioner in accordance with law, if it desires to do so. When any action is taken against the petitioner, it is open to him to raise all contentions before the Board, including the contention that the inquiry so far held is not in accordance with law. When any action is taken against the petitioner, it is open to him to raise all contentions before the Board, including the contention that the inquiry so far held is not in accordance with law. Since the, impunged orders have been set aside, the petitioner is entitled to get back the possession of af the properties, moveable and immovable, of which he has been dispossessed by thei members of the adhoc committee, pursuant to the impugned orders. The members of the ad hoc committee are directed to return all these properties to the petitioner within fifteen, days. "against the sajd order, some of the repondents in that writ petition, though not respondent No. 1 filed an appeal in W. A. No. 393 of 1975 which was dismissed on 18-9-1975 by a Division Bench consisting of Chandrashekhar, j. as he then was and Venkataswami, J. (Exhibit-C ). While dismissing the said appeal, the Division Bench granted four weeks time from the date of it order for complying with the direction made for the return of the properties to the petitioner. ( 3 ) ON the termination of the aforesaid proceedings before this Court, the committee did not hold any further inquiry much less the Board carried the proceedings to their logical conclusion, but commenced fresh proceedings against the petitioner. Apparently the Board cecided to drop those proceedings. On 27|29th September, 1975, respondent no. 1 ifsued a fresh show cause notice (Ex. E) to the petitioner under S. 13 (4) of the Act proposing to hold an enquiry into the following matters. "you have failed to comply with the provisions of the Wakf Act viz. , (1) to submit to the Board the Budget estimates of the institution for any of the period from 1961-62 to 1973-74 as required under Section 31 of the Wakf Act; (2) to submit to the Board the statement of accounts of the institution for any of the) period fro. m 1961-62 to 1972-73 as required under Section 32 (2) of the Wakf Act; (3) to maintain regular account? as required under Section 32 (1) of the Wakf Act; (4) to pay contrioution under Section 46 of the Wakf Act; (5) You have improperly dealt with the properties; (6) You have allowed the safe of liquor within the premises of of Dargah during Urus, thus violating the sanctity of the religious character. as required under Section 32 (1) of the Wakf Act; (4) to pay contrioution under Section 46 of the Wakf Act; (5) You have improperly dealt with the properties; (6) You have allowed the safe of liquor within the premises of of Dargah during Urus, thus violating the sanctity of the religious character. (7) You have not beep performing the services of Dargah satisfactorily. "in response to the said notice, the petitioner appeared before, respondent no. 1 and filed a memo on 15. 10. 1975 inter alia stating that the aforesaid charges were vague and indefinite and definite charges be framed and supplied to file his objections. On being directed to his written statement, the petitioner filed his detailed written statement on 11. 11. 75 denying every one of the charges levelled against him. After a series of adjournments, the case was set down for hearing on 3. 11. 1976 by which time respondent No. 1 was under the management of an Administrator appointed by Government. Before the Admininistrator on, that day, the inspector-cum-Auditor, District Wakfs, Mysore (hereinafter referred to as the I. C. A) was present and the petitioner and his learned counsel were absent. In that view, the Administrator hoard the Inspector and made an order on 18. 11. 1976 (Ext. K) holding thar charges NOS. 1 to 5 were proved. He therefore, ordered the removal of the petitioner from the office of muthwalli with immediate effect and the Dargah to be administered by a Committee and till such constitution to be managed by the I. C. A. On the basis of the aforesaid order, the Secretary of respondent No. 1 issued a memo bearing NO. KTW. LCC. 2,7175 dated, 19th november, 1976 (Ext. L) authorising the I. C. A. to take charge and manage the affairs of the Dargah. In this petition under Art. 226 of the constitution presented on 28. 12. 1976, the petitioner, while challenging the order dated 18. 11. 1976 (Ext. K) of the Administrator, sought for stay of operation of the, said order. On 29. 12. 1976 Jagannatha Shetty, J. refused the prayer for stay but directed the petitioner and his family members should not be dispossessed from the residential quarters. By orders made in independent writ petitions or on interlocutory applications, the petitioner has been permitted to perform the Urus at the Dargah from time to time. On 29. 12. 1976 Jagannatha Shetty, J. refused the prayer for stay but directed the petitioner and his family members should not be dispossessed from the residential quarters. By orders made in independent writ petitions or on interlocutory applications, the petitioner has been permitted to perform the Urus at the Dargah from time to time. ( 4 ) THE petitioner has asserted that the Adminstrator has not held an inquiry as required by S. 45 of the Act and Rule 13 of the Rules framed thereunder. He, has also asserted that he and his counsel had no notice of the; inquiry subsequent to 24. 4. 1976, ( 5 ) IN their return, respondents 1 and 2 have urged that the petitioner has not availed of the alternative remedy of an appeal available to him under S. 43 (4a) of the Act, and the petition is therefore, not maintainable. They have asserted that the petitioner and his counsel were, absent on 3. 11. 1976 in spite of notice and the inquiry held by the Administrator and the order made by him are legal. Lastry, they have urged that non-examination of witnesses and recording of their evidence does not vitiate the impugned order. ( 6 ) BEFORE examining the merits of the contentions, it is useful to examine a preliminary objection urged by the respondents to the maintainability of the writ petition. ( 7 ) SRI N. Y. Hanumanthappa, learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 and Sri C. Shiaappa, learned Government Pleader, appearing for respondents 3 and 4 contended that against the impugned order the petitioner ha,d an alternative remedy of an appeal under S. 43 (4a) of the act to the Government which had not been availed by him and that in view of the bar created by sub-article (3) of Art. 226 of the Constitution substituted by the 42nd amendment of the Constitution, this writ petition is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed in limine. In answer to this contention Sri Mir Noor Hussair, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that there is an infraction of the fundamental rights of the Petr. and therefore, the bar created under sub-art. (3) of Art, 226 of the Constitution would not operate. In answer to this contention Sri Mir Noor Hussair, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that there is an infraction of the fundamental rights of the Petr. and therefore, the bar created under sub-art. (3) of Art, 226 of the Constitution would not operate. He also urged that the action taken by Respt No. 1 is at the very instance of the Minister far Wakfs, who has to hear the appeal and therefore, the remedy of an appeal was illusory. ( 8 ) IN the earlier Writ Appeal, the Division Bench (vide pajras 7 and, 8 of its judgment) had, observed tha,t muthwalli is not a trustee) of the Wakf property, but is only a Superintendent or Manager of the property. On the lights of muthwalli to manage the properties, the Division, Bench observed thus. "although the Wakf property is not vested in the muthwalli he has the stame rights of management as an individual owner. " by the removal of the petitioner from the office of muthwaili, both the religious and secular aspects are affected. This being the position, it cannot be said that the fundamental rights of the petitioner are not infringed and therefore the bar created by sub-article (3) of Art. 226 of the Constitution as substituted by the 42nd amendment will not also apply. ( 9 ) BEFORE 1. 2. 1977, on which day Art. 220 was substituted by the 42nd amendment of the Constitution, the existence of an alternative remedy did not create a complete bar on the exercise of jurisdiction in appropriate cases, which position is now restored by the 44th amendment of the constitution that has come into force from 1. 8. 1979 (vide Notification. No. F. 1 (18) 78-ADV. (A) dated 19th June, 1979) An examination of the papers produced by respondents 1 and 2 reveals, that at all stages, the present minister for Wakfs who had to hear the appeal had interested in removing the Petitioner from the office of muthwalli. 8. 1979 (vide Notification. No. F. 1 (18) 78-ADV. (A) dated 19th June, 1979) An examination of the papers produced by respondents 1 and 2 reveals, that at all stages, the present minister for Wakfs who had to hear the appeal had interested in removing the Petitioner from the office of muthwalli. In these circumstances the grievance of he petitioner that the remedy ol an appeal available under the Act was not efficacious and is nugatory, cannot be characterised as imaginary and unfounded ( 10 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondents contended that muthwalli is a hereditary trusitee which is not property within the meaning of Art. 19 (1) (f) and 31 of the Constitution and there is no infraction of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed ro the petitioner. In support of their contention, they strongly relied on the ruling of the Supreme Court in kakinadat Annadana Samajam Etc. , v. Commissioner of HRCE, AIR 1971 SC 891 ( 11 ) EARLIER, I have noticed that the Division Bench ha,s already held that a muthwalli is not a, trustee of the Wakf property. In k. A. Samajam's case, the Supreme Court whlie considering the validity of the Andhara Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1876, in particular the term 'hereditary trustee' which included a muthwalli held that the office of hereditary trustee was not properly, which is not the case, here, In this view, the latic in K. A. Samajam's case does not bear on the point. For these reasons, there is no merit in the preliminary objections of the respondents and 1 reject the same. I therefore proceed to examine the marits of the case. ( 12 ) SRI Mir Noor Hussian at the forefront contended that, no enquiry had been held by the Adminstrator and the enquiry if any, held was not in conformity with the requirements of S. 45 of the Act and Rule 13 of the rules. ( 13 ) SRI Hanumanthappa urged that the petitioner who had failed to avail the opportunity afforded to him has not let in any evidence in support of his case and the Administrator wa,s justified in placing reliance on the report of the I. C. A. and the proceedings of the previous committee and the same satisfied the requirements of an enquiry under the Act. ( 14 ) S. 3 (f) of the Act defines a muthwalli as a person appointed either verbally or under any deed or instrument by which a wakf has been created or by a competent authority to be the muthwalli of a wakf and includes any naib muthwalli, khadim, mujawar, Sajjadanishin, amin or other person Appointed by a muthwali to perform the duties of a muthwalli and, save as otherwise provided in this Act, any pernon or Committee for the time being managing or administering any wakf proprvty as such. " In the survey of wakfs (Ex. A), the petitioner has been recognised as the muthwalli of the wakf by heredity. S. 43 of the Act empowers the Wakf board to remove a muthwalli notwithstanding anything contained in any other law or the deed from his office, if he has committed one or the; other acts referred in clauses (a) to (e) of sub -section (1) of S. 43 of the Act. In the affairs of a wakf, muthwallis hold a pivotal place. Secondly, the members of the Muslim community hold the, muthwallis in great esteem and regard. Sub-section (4) of S. 43 in emphatic and dear terms directs the Board not to remove a muthwalli without holding an inquiry into any of the matters enumerated in clauses (a) to (e) of sub section (1) of S. 43 of the act except in the manner prescribed by the Rules framed, under the Act and the to remove such a muthwalli is agreed to by not less than three-fourths of the members of the wakf Board. Sub-section (4) commences with negative words. Whenever negative words are employed in a provision, the intcndment of such a provision unless the context otherwise requires. is mandatory. The two imperative requirements of sub-section (4) of S. 43 are that before a muthawalli can be removed, there should be an inquiry in the manner prescribed, by the Rules and that the same should be agreed to by not less than three fourths of the members of the Board. ( 15 ) THE manner of holding an inquiry into any of the matters enumerated in subsection (1) of S. 43 of the Act, is indicated in. Rule 13 of the rules. ( 15 ) THE manner of holding an inquiry into any of the matters enumerated in subsection (1) of S. 43 of the Act, is indicated in. Rule 13 of the rules. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 13 requires the Board to give a notice of inquiry to the muthwali which should be not less than fqur days before the date fixed for the enquiry. The notice of inquiry is required to be sent by registered post acknowledgement due. Sub-rule, (2) requires a copy of the notice to be affixed on the notice board of the wakf board and other conspicuous places of the locality where the wakf property is situated. Sub rule (3) prqvides for filing of statements by the muthwalli and other persons that may desire to participate in, the enquiry. Sub rule (4) authorises the parties to the proceedings to adduce oral and documentary evidence and for summoning of witnesses and documents. Sub-rule (5) directs the inquiring officer to recprd the qra,l evidence of witnesses in his qwn hand writing. Sub-rule (6) makes applicable the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code as far as applicable for the appearance of pleader, filing of affidavits, production of documents, examination of witnesses, recording of oral evidence, proof of affidavits filing of exhibits, issue of commissions, return of documents and other matters connected with an inquiry. Sub-rule (7) requires the enquiry officer to pronounce his decision within 15 days from the date of the conclusion of the inquiry after due notice to the parties. All these provisions providing for the; conduct of the inquiries for the, removal of a muthwalli fairly resemble the trial of suits in a civil Court or a trial of criminal case before a criminal Court. The object and intendment of making very derailed provisions for holding an inquiry is that the power to remove a muthwalli who holds an impctant place in the affairs of the wakf and the members of the muslim community, should be exercised after holding a regular inquiry into the misconducts, if any alleged against him. Sub-Section (5) of S. 43 clothes an order removing a muthwalli from hisi office and, the directions to deliver the property to the Board with that of a decree of a civil Court and authorises a civil Court to execute such an order as if it is a decree made by it. Sub-Section (5) of S. 43 clothes an order removing a muthwalli from hisi office and, the directions to deliver the property to the Board with that of a decree of a civil Court and authorises a civil Court to execute such an order as if it is a decree made by it. A person removed from the office of the muthwalli is disqualified to be appointed as a muthwalli of any wakf for a period of five years from the date of his removal (vide sub section (6) of S. 43) on e combined reading of sub-sectien (5) of S. 43 and Rule 13, it is manifest that the legislative intent is a regular inquiry almost analogous to that of deciding a civil suit by a civil Court or a criminal case by a criminal Court, should be held by the inquiring authority or officer before removing a person from the office of the muthwalli An order made for the lemoval of a muthwalli has serious civil consequences on a muthwaili of a wakf. The detailed provisions made in Rule 13 are in conformity with one of the basic principles of natural justice, of audi alteram partem. The word inquiry which is not a term of art has not also been defined in the Act or the Rules and therefore its meaning has to be ascertained in the context, the scheme and object of the Act and the consesquences that ensue. In the context, inquiry cannot mean a mere perusal of a statement or a report made by an I. C. A. who occupies the role of a complainant, the truth of which is also disputed by the opponent. An inquiry in the context canntot mean what an inquiring officer sees with his own eyes of rely on a report made by a complainant. A fair inquiry into any matter signifies due notice to the person against whom an accusation is made and examining the evidence that establishes the truth or otherwise of the accusation, levelled against such a person. ( 16 ) IN Labouchere v. Earl of Wharncliffe, L. R. 13 Chd 346jessel, Master of the rolls, had to consider the action of a Club called the Beefsteak Club in removing the plaintiff from the membership of the Club without any inquiry. Rule 20 of the Club Rules provided for removal of a Club member after inquiry. ( 16 ) IN Labouchere v. Earl of Wharncliffe, L. R. 13 Chd 346jessel, Master of the rolls, had to consider the action of a Club called the Beefsteak Club in removing the plaintiff from the membership of the Club without any inquiry. Rule 20 of the Club Rules provided for removal of a Club member after inquiry. In examining the action of the Club in the context of the words 'after inquiry' the, learned Judge observed: thus: -"the words do not mean that they are simply to take up a newspaper see in it that Mr A. B. has written, a letter or has been brought up at a police-court for drunkenness, and then, expel him. "proceeding further, the learned Judge observed thus: "what the rule which I have quoted means is that there shall be a fair inquiry into the truth of the alleged facts. " in Baroness Wenlock v. The River Dce Company LR (1887) Vol, 19 QBD 355 the English court of Appeal had to consider the meaning of the words inquiry and report occurring in Section 56 of the Judicature Act of 1873. Lord Esher, master of the Rolls, in construing the term inquiry occurring therein observed thus:"the reference under Sec. 56 is to be for inquiry and report. It does not appear to me that the word 'inquiry' only includes an, inquiry which the referee is to make with his own eyes. The word "inquiry" in my opinion signifies an inquiry in which he is to take evidence and hold a judicial inquiry in the. usual way in which such inquiriep are held. The word "inquiry" is used because it is not meant to have the same result as a trial I have consulted judges who haye had great experience in the matter, and from what they have told me, and what i know myself, I am convinced that, from the time when the Act came into operation, the section has been treated as having the meaning I have indicated. "fry and Lopes, JJ. in separate but concurring judgments agreed with the above enunciation of Lord Esher. In my opiniqn, the meaning attached to the word 'inquiry' in Labouchar's case and Baroness Wenlock's case, should be applied in construing the term 'inquiry' occurring in S. 43 of the act and Rule 13 of the Rules. "fry and Lopes, JJ. in separate but concurring judgments agreed with the above enunciation of Lord Esher. In my opiniqn, the meaning attached to the word 'inquiry' in Labouchar's case and Baroness Wenlock's case, should be applied in construing the term 'inquiry' occurring in S. 43 of the act and Rule 13 of the Rules. ( 17 ) LET me now examine whether the inquiry held in the instant case conforms with the above construetion and requirements. ( 18 ) AS already noticed, the Administrator did not examine any witnesses and blindly accepted the report of the I. C. A. who was in the position of a complainant, without even formally examining him and getting his report marked as an exhibit. The T. C. A. has not entered the witness box and has not spoken to the truth of the allegations made by him in his report. When the petitioner had seriously disputed the correctness of the statements made by the I. C. A in his report, it was all the more necessary for the Administrator to have directed him to enter the witness box and swear to the contents of his report which has not been done by him. The only other material relied on is the statements alleged to haye been made by certain persons before the Committee which also suffer from the same infirmity as the report of the I. C. A. The fact that the petitioner was absent does not and cannot dispense with the requirement of holding an inquiry as interpreted by me In this view I haye no hesitation in holding that the Administrator had not held, an inquiry as required by S. 43 and Rule 13 of the Rules, and the impugned order is therefore, liable to be quashed without examining the other contentions. But as Sri Mir Noor Hussain argued several other grounds at some length, i propose to notice them and briefly state my views. ( 19 ) SRI Mir Noor Hussain contended that the petitioner and his counsel had no notice of the inquiry held on 3. 11. 1976 and the proceedings held on that day are vitiated. ( 20 ) IN their return, respondents 1 and 2 have denied the above assertion of the petitioner. ( 19 ) SRI Mir Noor Hussain contended that the petitioner and his counsel had no notice of the inquiry held on 3. 11. 1976 and the proceedings held on that day are vitiated. ( 20 ) IN their return, respondents 1 and 2 have denied the above assertion of the petitioner. At the hearing of the case, Sri Hanumanthappa produced the original delivery book to show that the notice of hearing of the case fixed on 3. 11. 76, had been served on Sri Mir Noor Hussain, who was representing the petitioner. After perusing the said delivery book and the signature found therein Sri Mir Noor Hussain, submitted that the signature against his name was not his signature, I have no reason to disbelieve the submission of Sri Mir Noor Hussajn, In the view I have taken on the other contentions, I do not consider it necessary to examine this aspect in full and decide the same. ( 21 ) SRI Mir Noor Hussain contended thar the nature of the office and the right of the petitioner thereto was not the subject of inquiry, but still the Administrator has examined the same, and has found against the petitioner which was not permissible. ( 22 ) EARLIER I have set out the charges framed by the Secretary of the board in his notice dated 27/29th September, 1975, against the peititioner. In notice, the rights of the petitioner over the Dargah and its properties, was not one of the items that was prqposed to be inquired into by the Board. In its notification dated 1st April, 1965 (Ex. A) the board has recognised, the petitioner as the muthwali of the Dargah by heredity. The petitioner has not applied for the amendment or correction of the entry made in the register of wakfs. Sub-section (2) of s. 27 of the Act declares an entry made jn the register of wakfs to be final and conclusive subject to a, decision of a civil Court. S. 28 empowers the board to amend the entry made in the register of wakfs. The Board had not initiated any proceedings for amendment of the eptries made in the register. In this view, the nature and the right of the petitioner over the dargah and the correctness of the entry made in. S. 28 empowers the board to amend the entry made in the register of wakfs. The Board had not initiated any proceedings for amendment of the eptries made in the register. In this view, the nature and the right of the petitioner over the dargah and the correctness of the entry made in. the Register of wakfs could not haye been decided by the Administrator without notice and an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. ( 23 ) SRI Mir Noor Hussain, next contended that the Administrator, was in error in considering the failure of the petitioner, if any, to file the statement of accounts which were not the subject matter of inquiry. In particular, he drew my attention to the observations made by the administrator that the Board had delivered possession of the properties to the petitioner on 25. 3. 1975 and the failure to file the accounts of the Urus held, in the year 1975-76 which did not form part of the show cause notice issued to him much less an inquiry into those matters. ( 24 ) AS noticed earlier, in the show cause notice these were not specified as the subject matters for inquiry. Seconday, the petitioner has asserted that the Board had not redelivered the properties to him in obedience, 'to the directions of this Court Lastly he has also asserted that he has filed the statement of accounts for that year. As to whether these are true or not alre all matters that could not be properly considered and decided in the absence of a proper show cause notice and a charge. ( 25 ) SRI Mir Noor Hussain, lastly urged that the Board had not complied with the directions issued by this Court in W. P. No. 3455 of 1973 and in W. A, NO. 393 of 1975 and the Board should be compelled to obey those directions. ( 26 ) WHETHER the Board has not complied with the directions of this court in the earner proceedings is a matter that cannot be properly decided in this case. In case the Board has failed to comply with the directions issued by this Court it is open to the petitioner to intiate such legal proceedings as are available to him for its compliance. In this view, i do not propose to examine this contention and record my finding therepn. In case the Board has failed to comply with the directions issued by this Court it is open to the petitioner to intiate such legal proceedings as are available to him for its compliance. In this view, i do not propose to examine this contention and record my finding therepn. ( 27 ) IN the light of my above discussion, I hold that the order dated 18. 11. 1976 of the Administrator, Karnataka Board of Wakfs, Bangalore, in case No. L. C. C. 27|75 (Exhibit K) and the Memo No. KTW LCC 27|75 dated 19. 11. 1976 issued by the Secretary, Karnataka Board of Wakfs, (Exhibit L) are liable to be quashed and therefore they are quashed. But, this does nod prevent the Wakf Board from holding an inquiry on the basis of the show cause notice, NO. LCC 27/75/1587 dated 27/ 29. 9. 1975 (Exhibit E) and complete the proceedings on the basis of that notice or in supersession of that notice issue a fresh show cause notice, as may be decided by it and complete the proceedings in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in this order. ( 28 ) RULE issued is made absolute. ( 29 ) IN the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .