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1979 DIGILAW 185 (BOM)

Mohd. Altafur Rehman Taj Mohammad v. House Allotment Officer, Nagpur and another

1979-08-22

V.V.JOSHI

body1979
JUDGMENT - Joshi V.V., J.: - By this writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution the petitioner, who is the owner of suit house, has challenged the order of the House Allotment Officer, Nagpur (respondent No.1) dated 11-7-1978 ordering the petitioner to let out the house to respondent No.2. Although this order purports to have been passed under clause 24-A of the Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 l hereinafter referred to as the Rent Control Order), it a appears that in reality it has been passed under the provisions of clause 24 of the Rent Control Order. The whole house in question situated at Nelson square on Chhindwara road at Nagpur town originally belonged to one L. N. Piter. As L. N. Piter was in arrears of Corporation taxes, the house was sold by auction for recovery of the same and was purchased in auction sale by one Jatiram Barve under the sale-deed 24-1-1969 executed in his favour. In 1970 the petitioner entered into an agreement with Jatiram Barve for purchase of the house in question later on under the sale-deed dated 10-10-1972, 1/3rd portion of the suit house was purchased by the present petitioner and the remaining 2/3rd portion was purchased by the petitioners mother. After the petitioner had entered into the agreement of purchase of this house with Jatiram Barve in 1970, the petitioner requested Jatiram Barve to allow one Mohammad Yusuf who was a friend of the father of the petitioner to occupy a part of the house as a licensee without any payment of rent. Mohammad Yusuf thus occupied the particular portion, which was eventually purchased by the petitioner as his 1/3rd portion under the sale-deed dated 10-10 1972 and this Mohammad Yusuf continued to occupy the house till about the year 1977, when he vacated it. It is the petitioners contention that thereafter he has himself shifted with his family in the portion so vacated by Mohammad Yusuf. 2. On 10-7-1978 the respondent No.2 applied to the House Allotment Officer for allotment of the suit house to him under the Rent Control Order contending that this house was lying vacant. On 11-7-1978 the House Allotment Officer passed the impugned order allotting, as it would now seem really under clause 24 of the Rent Control Order, the suit house to the respondent No.2. On 11-7-1978 the House Allotment Officer passed the impugned order allotting, as it would now seem really under clause 24 of the Rent Control Order, the suit house to the respondent No.2. It is this order of the House Allotment Officer, which is challenged by the petitioner in this writ petition. 3. Now it would seen that the order under clause 24 of the Rent Control Order was passed by the House Allotment Officer relying on the representation in writing by the respondent No.2 that the house was vacant. According to the petitioner, there was no vacancy as was necessary to be notified under clause 22 of the Rent Control Order, because the house had not been let out any time earlier and Mohammad Yusuf, who vacated it after occupying it for some time was merely a licensee allowed to occupy the house without any payment of rent. Therefore, according to the petitioner, it was not necessary for the petitioner to give any intimation to the Collector under clause 22 of the Rent Control Order, nor could the suit house be said to be available for allotment by the Collector under clauses 23, 24 or 24A of the Rent Control Order. Mr. Mehadia arguing for the petitioner argues that passing of the allotment order under clause 24 -of the Rent Control Order, without even issuing a notice to the petitioner-landlord, and without making any enquiry as to whether there was in reality a vacancy of the house within the meaning of clause 22(1) of the Rent Control Order, was in utter breach of principles of natural justice and therefore the order deserves to be quashed. He further urges that in any case the house not having been let out to anybody and not being intended to be let out, was not available for allotment by the Collector under the provisions of clause 24 of the Rent Control Order. 4. I find considerable force in these contentions of Mr. Mehadia. In(Kisanlal v. S. D.O., Arvi)l 1976 Mh.L.J. Note 13, it was observed that merely because some accommodation in the occupation of the landlord is vacant, that accommodation does not become available for allotment. In order that the accommodation must be available for allotment the accommodation must be vacant in the sense that the landlord is not either using the accommodation or it is not in his own occupation. In order that the accommodation must be available for allotment the accommodation must be vacant in the sense that the landlord is not either using the accommodation or it is not in his own occupation. The landlord, in that case, had let out some rooms of his house and was in possession of the rest. He temporarily allowed a close relative who was staying in another village, to use some portion of his front room, which had no other facilities, for his dispensary. When the relative secured other accommodation, he left the room. The landlord had stocked some seeds etc. in the rear portion. When the relative left, the House allotment Officer, on an application of his reader for allotment, issued notice to the landlord who denied having let out the room and stated that it was temporarily occupied by his relative. The House Allotment Officer inspected the premises and without any further inquiry held that the house was vacant; that it was not in domestic Use; that the landlord had not given intimation, that even if plea for personal use were to be raised that would be falsified by the fact that other rooms were let out. He thus held that the room was available for allotment and allotted the same. This Court in that case held that the order of allotment was liable to be quashed on the short ground that ,the room could not in the circumstances be said to have become available for allotment. It has to be noted from the reported facts of that case, that in that case at least a notice had been issued to the landlord before the allotment order was passed. 5. In(Mangilal v. State of M. P.)2 A.I.R. 1955 Nag. 153, it was observed by a Division Bench of the then Nagpur High Court that the provisions contained in clauses 23, 24 and 24-A of the Rent Control Order do not compel the landlord to let his house if he does not intend-to induct any tenants into the premises. It is only after the house has already been let out or the landlord intends to let it out that the Deputy Commissioner is empowered to determine who shall be the tenant in such a house. It is only after the house has already been let out or the landlord intends to let it out that the Deputy Commissioner is empowered to determine who shall be the tenant in such a house. The wishes of the landlord, according to the statute, count only so long as he had not decided to let out the premises or any portion of them. But once he has exercised his volition of letting out the premises he has deprived himself of his absolute right to say No, and the power of the Deputy Commissioner to intervene and regulate the letting would come into existence. Thereafter, it is for the Deputy Commissioner to consider and determine after the enquiry whether the premises are really required by the landlord himself or whether they are open to be let out to tenants, and if so to whom. 6. Then it would appear that it is not every “vacancy” of a house, in the normal” sense of the house being made vacant, either temporarily or permanently, that would attract even the provisions of clause 22 of the Rent Control Order requiring intimation to be given to the Collector. It would seem that it is only when the house is vacated after it has been let out to a tenant or vacated by the landlord with the intention of letting it out to some tenant, that the provisions of clause 22(1) of the Rent Control Order would be attracted. There could be several cases in which a house would be “vacated” in the sense of its being made vacant, and yet the provisions of clause 22(1) would not be attracted. A purchaser of a house from his vendor could occupy the same only after the vendor who was himself living in the house has vacated it, there would be in that case a temporary vacancy of the house inasmuch as the house would have been vacated by the previous owner before the purchaser takes possession of it. An owner of a house occupying it himself might vacate it if he is going out of station for some period, intending to keep the vacant house locked, and not intending to let it out. An owner of a house occupying it himself might vacate it if he is going out of station for some period, intending to keep the vacant house locked, and not intending to let it out. An owner of a house occupying it personally may also vacate it and go elsewhere intending that after some time some relation of his may step into the house and occupy the same, not as a tenant, but for and on behalf of the owner. In all these cases it is difficult to imagine that the provisions of clause 22(1) of the Rent Control Order could be attracted requiring the landlord to notify the vacancy to the Collector, or giving power to the Collector to allot the house to be let out to a tenant of the Collectors choice, when the owner himself never desired to let it out. In each one of these cases mentioned above, any person in search of a house and finding that the house has been made vacant, may apply to the Collector for allotment of the same under clause 24 of the Rent Control Order. The person praying for allotment might even be making a mistaken allegation that a particular house had been vacated, although it may not really have been vacated, and the owner might still be occupying it himself. In each of these cases, if the Collector or the House Allotment Officer exercising the powers of the Collector were to pass an order of allotment under clause 24, without even issuing a notice to the owner of the house before passing the order, he would be running into difficulties and making the order of allotment in respect of a class of cases where he had no power to do so. Therefore, in each of these cases, it would be necessary for the House Allotment Officer to issue a notice to the owner of the house and to make the necessary inquiry before passing the allotment order under clause 24 of the Rent Control Order. Therefore, in each of these cases, it would be necessary for the House Allotment Officer to issue a notice to the owner of the house and to make the necessary inquiry before passing the allotment order under clause 24 of the Rent Control Order. It is true, that clause 24 of the Rent Control Order does not in terms specify that a notice shall be issued by the Collector to the owner before passing the order under clause 24, but that would be necessary, if anything, under the principles of natural justice that a person against whom an order is sought to be made is noticed and heard before the allotment order is made. That is more necessary because the Collector would be interfering with the rights of the owner to use his property in the manner he likes. If no notice is issued to the owner of the house before the order is passed, the illustrations given earlier will show that the Collector would be putting himself in difficulties, by making the order of allotment in respect of a class of cases where he may not have power to pass an order under clause 24 of the Rent Control Order. 7. In the view so taken, it would seem to me that the impugned order is bad as it was passed without notice to the petitioner or without any enquiry. On this short ground, this order needs to be quashed and this writ petition will have to be allowed. 8. The allotment order in favour of respondent No.2 passed by respondent No.1 on 11 -7-1978 is hereby quashed. The petition is allowed.. In the circumstances there shall be no older as to costs. Petition allowed. -----