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1979 DIGILAW 185 (KAR)

BHIMANAGOUDA MALLANGOUDA v. MALLESHAPPA BASAPPA

1979-08-03

D.R.VITHAL RAO, M.S.NESARGI

body1979
NESARGI, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is preferred on special leave granted under Sec. 378 (4) cr. PC. , 1973, against the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the sessions Judge, Bijapur, in Crl. A. No. 87 of 1977 allowing the appeal and setting aside the conviction and sentence passed by the Judicial Magistrate first Class (II Court), Bijapur, in c. C. No. 134 of 1976 convicting the respondents for the offence punishable under Sec. 500 I. P. C. and sentencing each one of them to undergo simple imprisonment till the rising of the court and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- or in default to undergo simple imprisonment for three months. ( 2 ) THE appellant-complainant (hereinafter referred to as the complainant) filed a complaint under Sec. 200 of the cr. P. C. against the respondents (hereinafter referred to as the accused) in the court of the J. M. F. C. (II Court), bijapur, alleging that A-l had defamed him by using the expressions to the effect that he was a rowdy type man and was an ex-convict at Ex. P. 1 (A) in Ex. P. 1, which is an affidavit filed by A-1 in support of I. A. I. in O. S. No. 71 of 1975 on the file of the Civil judge. Bijapur; that both the accused had defamed him by using the very expressions at Ex. P. 2 (A) in Ex. P. 2, the plaint in O. S. No. 71 of 1975 and lastly, that A-l had defamed him by using the expressions to the effect that he was a rowdy type of man and an ex-convict in respect of an encroachment, at Ex. P. 3 (A) in Ex. P. 3, an application sent by him to the Assistant commissioner, Indi Subdivision. The accused have admitted having filed Ex. P. 2. A-l has admitted that he had sworn to the affidavit Ex. P1 and sent the application Ex. P. 3. They have explained that the expressions were used in good faith in their own interest and that they had mis-understood the decree for damages passed by the Munsiff, Bijapur, in O. S. No. 29 of 1970 as per Ex. D. 1, to be a conviction and therefore, had got the complainant described as an ex-convict. P. 3. They have explained that the expressions were used in good faith in their own interest and that they had mis-understood the decree for damages passed by the Munsiff, Bijapur, in O. S. No. 29 of 1970 as per Ex. D. 1, to be a conviction and therefore, had got the complainant described as an ex-convict. The Magistrate held that the ingredients of the Ninth Exception to S. 499 of the I. P. C. were not established by the accused and therefore, they were guilty of the offence of defamation. The Sessions Judge held to the contrary. ( 3 ) WE will now proceed to consider whether the expression 'rowdy type man' is per se defamation. What is commonly understood by the use of the expression rowdy type of man in the parts where the complainant and the accused are residing, is not established by adducing evidence. Therefore, we have to look into the dictionary meaning of the word 'rowdy'. The concise Oxford Dictionary gives the meaning of the word 'rowdy' as 'rough and disorderly person'. This shows that by using the word 'rowdy' the character of the complainant is not at all touched. In other words, his character is not brought down in the estimation of others. Sri Riazuddin, learned counsel for the complainant argued vehemently that even by understanding the word 'rowdy' to mean 'rough and disorderly person' and describing the complainant in such a manner, would amount to defamation, because, there is no material to show that in fact, the complainant was either rough on disorderly or both. We cannot accept this reasoning, because by saying that a person is rough and disorderly, the estimation of the person in the eyes of others cannot be said to be lowered. Coming to the expression 'ex-convict' we find that it is for the first time used in the plaint filed on 9-12-1975, and used for the second time at Ex. P. 1 (A) in Ex. P. 1 filed in support of i. A. I, which in turn was filed along with the plaint on 9-12. 1975 and lastly, used at Ex. P-3 (A) in Ex. P. 3 on 24-12-1975. In fact a sort of explanation as to why the word 'ex-convict' is used is found at Ex. P- 3 (A), because the words used are 'ex-convict in respect of an encroachment'. Ex. 1975 and lastly, used at Ex. P-3 (A) in Ex. P. 3 on 24-12-1975. In fact a sort of explanation as to why the word 'ex-convict' is used is found at Ex. P- 3 (A), because the words used are 'ex-convict in respect of an encroachment'. Ex. D. 1 is certified copy of the judgment in O. S. No. 29 of 1970. A decree for damages for having caused damage to a bund belonging to the accused is seen to have been passed thereunder. Therefore, it is no wonder that the accused might have understood the decree to mean that it is in relation to an encroichment. ( 4 ) SRI. Piazuddin contended that the accused are well aware of the distinction between a decree passed by a civil court and a conviction recorded by a criminal court; because A-1 and five others were accused in C. C. No. 24 of 1941 and A-l and others had been convicted in it. This argument is on sound basis. But it is to be seen whether the Ninth exception to Sec. 499 of the I. P. C. is applicable. The accused were interested in securing an ex-parte injunction by filing I. A. I, while, they were being harassed in their possession and interference was being made in their possession. They have used the expressions rowdy type of man and ex-convict against the complainant who was a defendant in that suit. Hence, we have no hesitation in holding that using of these expressions was in the interests of the accused. One of the requirements of ninth exception to Sec. 499 of the i. P. C. is satisfied. But this must be done in good faith. That is the other ingredient of the Ninth exception. In the decision Harbhajan Singh v. State of Punjab (1) this very exception has been considered by the supreme Court and it has been held as follows:"whether or not good faith has been proved by an accused person who pleads in his defence the Ninth exception under Sec. 499 to a charge of defamation under Sec. 500, I. P. C. is a question of fact. "sri Riazuddin argued that the burden of proving the exception lay heavily on the accused, and the accused have not discharged that burden. "sri Riazuddin argued that the burden of proving the exception lay heavily on the accused, and the accused have not discharged that burden. It is well settled, that whenever an exception is pleaded, may be one of the exceptions to Sec. 300 of the I. P. C. or one of the exceptions to Sec. 499 of I. P. C. in a case of an offence under Sec. 500 of the i. P. C. or any of the provisions relating to self-defence, the burden is to be discharged by the accused who has pleaded accordingly. But what material is sufficient to hold that that burden is discharged is also well settled. If the material on record establishes preponderance of reasonable probability of a paricular exception being applicable, then the burden is to be held satisfactorily discharged by the accused. It is not necessary in law for the accused to produce positive evidence and prove the facts required for discharging such burden. What is good faith is defined, in section 52 of the I. P. C. as follows:"nothing is said to be done or believed in 'good faith' which is done or believed without due care and attention. "ex. P-2 the plaint, it is patent, has been prepared by the concerned lawyer, who is none other than the lawyer who represented the accused in the criminal case and in appeal before the Sessions Judge. It is in english, which is not the mother tongue of the accused. Sri Riazuddin urged that the material in Ex. P. 2 must have been provided by the accused by way of instructions. There is every force in this submission. But even then the material supplied by the accused in their mother tongue, it is clear, has been translated into English by the lawyer. Even if it is for the sake of arguments assumed that the expressions alleged to be defamatory are the transliterations of the words in which the accused instructed the lawyer, one fact that is patent is that before making use of the expressions or publishing the expressions, the accused took legal advice of the lawyer. In regard to such matters, one cannot expect anything more to be done by persons while acting with, due care and attention. Consulting an experienced lawyer before using such expressions is sufficient compliance of the ingredients of Sec. 52 of the Indian penal Code. In regard to such matters, one cannot expect anything more to be done by persons while acting with, due care and attention. Consulting an experienced lawyer before using such expressions is sufficient compliance of the ingredients of Sec. 52 of the Indian penal Code. The very expressions have been used in Exs. P. 1 and P-3. The source of these expressions is Ex. P. 2, the plaint. It is noteworthy that the lawyer is not made an accused in this case. He has not been even examined as a prosecution witness. There is no material to make us presume or infer that the lawyer had not seen Ex. D. 1 or had not got it clarified that the accused were characterising the complainant as an ex-convict. Whether he had done so or not is anybody's guess. ( 5 ) BUT the hard fact is that the expressions complained of have been published in consultation with a lawyer. ( 6 ) THIS, in our opinion, clearly amounts to exercising due care and bestowing' necessary attention by the accused as required by Sec. 52 I. P. C. We, therefore, hold that the material on record is sufficient to provide preponderance of reasonable probability in favour of the accused, in discharging the burden cast by law on them in taking shelter under the Ninth Exception to Sec. 499 of the Indian Penal Code. ( 7 ) IN the result, we hold that this appeal has no substance and dismiss it. --- *** --- .