JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. ( 1 ) THE appeal and two cross-objections arise out of a suit O. S. No. 150 of 1967 on the file of the Civil Judge, Chick- magalur. The suit which has been substantially decreed, was instituted on behalt of a lunatic by next friend, for partition of the joint family properties and business and also for declaration that the family settlement in respect of those matters was illegal and not binding on the lunatic. ( 2 ) BRIEFLY stated, the facts which are now found are these: hanji Veerappa, the grand-father of the plaintiff was a self-made man. The early part of his life was bristled with difficulties. He had just 29 guntas of garden land to begin with. He had three suns: (1) Rudrappa- (2) Thotappa; and (3) Gurappa (defendant-1 ). in 1945 he had two casualties in his family. His second son Thotappa became of unsound mind and died leaving behind his wife and two children. A couple of months later, his first son Rudrappa also died, leaving behind his wife and four children. Thotappa's wife Sakamma was defendant- 7 since deceased; his only son chandrashekarappa is the plaintiff who is lunatic, Sharadamma (defendant-8) is the sister of the plaintiff. Eramma (defendant-4) is the widow of Rudrappa. Her two daughters lalithamma and Indrakshi are defendants 5 and 6, and two sons Basavaraju and Raju are defendants 2 and 3 respectively. ( 3 ) IN 1940-41 Veerappa and his sons had to work under a local merchant b. V. Halappa to earn their livelihood. Thereafter they started independent business and began to acquire properties bit by bit mostly in the name of the father and a few in the joint names of the father and third son gurappa. In 1939 they got a grant of 12 acres of darkhast land out of which they converted six acres into areca garden. In 1945 a saw mill called 'veerabhadreswara Saw Mill' was purchased in the joint names of veerappa and Gurappa. Later gurappa became a partner in a local cinema theatre called 'bharath talkies' by purchasing 1/4th share. They also acquired as many as eight sites, 16 acres 29 guntas of wet land and 8 acres 26 guntas of dry land. They were in possession in all of a little more thar 14 acres of garden land. Later gurappa became a partner in a local cinema theatre called 'bharath talkies' by purchasing 1/4th share. They also acquired as many as eight sites, 16 acres 29 guntas of wet land and 8 acres 26 guntas of dry land. They were in possession in all of a little more thar 14 acres of garden land. ( 4 ) DEFERDANT-2 was just 10 years old when his lather died. After becoming a graluate, he joined the family business. His brother Raju was given higher education and he became a doctor. The plaintiff during his early education, gradually became dull. In spite el the best medical treatment, he could not continue his studies. In 1956 he became almost a lunatic and was admitted to a Nursing Home at Bangalore He is still there as an in-patieint. His sister Sharadamma studied upto 8th standard and in 1955 she was married to a lawyer practising at bangalore. He is now the next friend of the plaintiiff. Gurappa, the 1st defendant has seven children - 4 daughters and 3 sons. ( 5 ) IT appears that the entire family was closely knit and well looked after by the grand old man Hanji Veerappa. On 20th October, 1960, Hanji Veerappa in his early 80, executed a settlement deed Exf. P-9 distributing the family properties and business into three branches of his three sons. The properties in A Schedule thereunder was given to Gurappa, B Schedule to the plaintiff, and C Schedule to defendants 2 and 3 Or 31st October, 1966, the old man died. Thereafter the mother of the plaintiff had to part company with the family. In April 1969, she unfo tunately met with an unnatural deat at the residence of her daughter. ( 6 ) THE suit for partition was filed on behalf of the plaintiff with the following allegations: That the family settlement was engineered and got up by defendant-1 aided by defendants 2 and 3 by taking undue advantage of the old age, infirmity and helplessness of hanji Veerappa, and exercising undue influence on him The allotment of properties to the plaintiff under the settlement deed was highly inequitable and unjust. It was relatively insignificant in extent and income. The settlement deed was fraudulent, illegal, unconsctonable and therefore void. The plaintiff's mother was ignorant illiterate and wholly depended on defendants 1 To 3. It was relatively insignificant in extent and income. The settlement deed was fraudulent, illegal, unconsctonable and therefore void. The plaintiff's mother was ignorant illiterate and wholly depended on defendants 1 To 3. She was not aware oi the contents or implications of the settlement and she had not consciously or knowingly attested the deed. Even her consent cannot validate the settlement since the share given to the plaintiff was unfair and unequal and the same was not beneficial to the plaintiff. Alter the death of Hanji veerappa, defendants 1 to 3 were not looking after the plaintiff properly and therefore it was quite necessary in the interest of the plaintiff and for protecting his rights that there should be an ejuitable partition of the family properties. ( 7 ) WE will now refer to the defence taken by different defendants. The suit was resisted by defendants 1 to 3 under a common written statement. Their case was that the next friend of the plaintiff filed the suit with cruel hand in older to knock off the properties belonging to the lunatic. He is not a rit person to act as next friend of the plaintiff. So long as the mother and sister of the plaintiff were alive, nobody else could be permitted to sue as a next friend of the plaintiff. The mother of the plaintiff was a willing party to the famiiy settlement and at no time she expressed her dissatisfaction about the share given to the plaintiff. The settlement was arrived at to safeguard the interests of all the family members and with a view to prevent any future dispute after the death of Hanji Veerappa. Hanji veerappa was entitled to 1/4th share in the family properties, but he did not take anything. He gifted his share in equal portions to defendant-1 on one hand, and defendants 2 and 3 on the other. The share given to the plaintiff was proper and the settlement was acted upon by all the members of the tamily. It was a bona fide arrangement, reasonable and proper from each and every aspect. The right to claim a partition is a personal right of the plaintiff and that right cannot be exercised on his behalf by any next friend. It was a bona fide arrangement, reasonable and proper from each and every aspect. The right to claim a partition is a personal right of the plaintiff and that right cannot be exercised on his behalf by any next friend. Alternatively it was contended that some of the suit properties are the separase properties of Hanji Veerappa and the first defendant, and are not liable for partition. It was also contended that in case the Court directs partition, it should take into conside ratron the improvements made by defendants 1 to 3 after the family settlement and they should be reimbursed in respect of those improvements. ( 8 ) DEFENDANTS 7 and 8 filed separate written statements. While supporting the case of the plaintiff, they claimed each 1/36th share in the suit properties. The mother of the plaintiff (defendant 7) has alleged that defendant-1 used to bring a few papers to her and she had aflixed her L. T. M. on those papers on the representation that it was nesessary for revising the taxes and other purposes. She further alleged that she was always under the influence and control of defendants 1 to 3, but did not give consent to the family settlen ent as the guardian of her son. ( 9 ) THE Court tried the suit on the following among other issues:1. Whether the suit is not maintainable for the reasons stated in the written statement? 2 Whether the properties covered by the deed of settlement are not the jorns family properties oi the plaintiff and the defendants? 3. Whether the properties not covered by the deed of settlement, namery, the properties subsequently acquired and the areca mandi subsequently commenced are the jonal. family properties of the plaintiff and defendants? 4. Whether there has been disruption of family status by the document dated 20. 10. 1960 executed by veerappa? 5. Whether the plaintiff and his mother, the 7th defendant have consented to the said document, and if so, does the document bind them? ( 10 ) ON behalf of the plaintiff, three witnesses have been examined inculding the next friend oi the plaintiff. The defendants have examined twenty witnesses besides producing a host of documents. One of the two Commissioners appointed in the suit has been examined as a court witness. ( 10 ) ON behalf of the plaintiff, three witnesses have been examined inculding the next friend oi the plaintiff. The defendants have examined twenty witnesses besides producing a host of documents. One of the two Commissioners appointed in the suit has been examined as a court witness. ( 11 ) THE trial Court after considering the entire evidence, held as follows: the suit as brought by the next friend oi the plaintiff is maintainable. The properties covered by the deed of settlement were the joint family properties of the plaintiff and defendants. The properties and the business which are not covered by the settlement deed do not belong to the joint family. The settlement deed has brought about a disruption of the family status. The distribution of shares under the settlement deed was unjust and unequal and therefore not binding on the plaintiff. He could repudiate that arrangement and claim a partition and separation of his share. With these findings, the plaintiff was held entitled for 21/72 share in the joint family properties. The properties under items 23, 24 and 37 in A Schedule and those in Schedules D, E and F were held to be the separate properties of defendant-1. The Court also directed the appointment of a Commissioner to determine the profit and loss in the veerabhadreswara Saw Mill as well as the Bharath Talkies till the date of the settlement deed. It also directed that the plaintiff should be given his share from the net income from those businesses ( 12 ) CHALLENGING the said decree, defendants 1 to 3 have appealed to this court. The plaintiff and his sister defendant-8. have filed two cross- objections in respect of the reliefs denied to them. The sister has claimed 3/72 share in the suit properties. ( 13 ) IN the light of the submissions made by learned counsel on both sides, the main points that arise for our consideration are: (1) Whether the frame of the suit was proper and whether the next friend was actuated by personal benefit rather than the interest of the lunatic? (2) Whether the lunatic has a right to claim partition and separate possession of his share in the family properties? (3) Whether on facts and circumstances of the case, the settlement deed Ext. P-9 was unjust, unfair and detrimental to the interests of the plaintiff and therefore not binding on him? (2) Whether the lunatic has a right to claim partition and separate possession of his share in the family properties? (3) Whether on facts and circumstances of the case, the settlement deed Ext. P-9 was unjust, unfair and detrimental to the interests of the plaintiff and therefore not binding on him? (4) Whether it was proved that veerabhadreshwara Saw Mill and bharath Talkies are not the joint family properties?in addition to these points, some incidental questions also arise for consideration to which we will make a detailed reference a little later. ( 14 ) RE. Point No. 1: It is common ground that on the date of the suit the plantiff was of unsound mind and his mother defendant-7 was living then. But in the plaint it was alleged that his mother was ignorant, illiterate and dependent on defendants 1 to 3. She was not aware of the contents or implication of the family settlement and has not consciously or knowingly attested the deed nor consented thereto. It was also alleged that the suit for partition was therefore found necessary in the interests of the plaintiff and for protecting his rights and interest. The next friend in his evidence also stated that the mother of the plaintiff asked him to file the suit when he himself asked her to file the same on behalf of the plaintiff. He further stated that she had not given her consent for the settlement deed nor she was aware of the contents thereof. In the cross-examination he has ssserted that the mother was not against the suit being filed and on the contrary she asked him to file the suit on behalf of the lunatic. The argument for the appellants that the suit was filed for the personal benefit of the next friend has, in our opinion, no basis both on law and facts. Order 32 Rule 4 read with Rule 15 has reference to adverseness of interest of lunatics regarding the subject-matter of the suit It is nobody's case that the next friend is interested in the dismissal of the suit He is undoubtedly interested in obtaining a decree on behalf of the lunatic. By that, it cannot be held that the interest of the next friend is in any way adverse to that of the lunatic plaintiff. By that, it cannot be held that the interest of the next friend is in any way adverse to that of the lunatic plaintiff. Smt. Pramila, learned counsel for the appellants however, urged that after the death of the lunatic the wife of the next friend being the only sister of the lunatic would get all the properties of the lunatic and that appears to be the dominant consideration for the suit. We do not think that that remote aspect is relevant to the matter. That would be an inevitable consequence under law, and not an impediment for the brother-in-law to act as a next friend of the lunatic. Any person who is of sound mind and has attained majority may act as guardian or next friend, provided that his interest is not adverse to that of the lunatic. We are unable to find any such adverse interest with the next friend. The mother of the lunatic was not kept in darkness. She was impleaded as defendant-7. She has filed a written statement denying the factum and validity of the settlement deed. She has also supported the case pleaded in the plaint. Unfortunately, she could not enter into the witness-box. She died out of burns before the suit was ready for evidence. We are not concerned with the controversy surrounding her death as to whether it was a suicide or an accident. We are only concerned with her stand which is evidenced by the fact that she was not an unwilling party to the suit. We therefore reject the first contention urged for the appellants. ( 15 ) RE Point No. 2: It was urged that the plaintiff lunatic has no right to claim a partition and separate possession of his share in the family properties so long as his supervening malady continues. The contention proceeds on the first assumption that the lunatic has no volition of his own so that he could express his desire to disrupt the joint status of the family. Secondly, it is based on the traditional law that the right of avoidance of a family settlement or a partition based on the inequality of share is a personal right of the minor or lunatic and it cannot be exercised by the next friend. The first assumption, in our view, is based upon a fallacy. Secondly, it is based on the traditional law that the right of avoidance of a family settlement or a partition based on the inequality of share is a personal right of the minor or lunatic and it cannot be exercised by the next friend. The first assumption, in our view, is based upon a fallacy. When a minor or a lunatic represented by a next friend files a suit to enforce his rights under law, there is no question of any exercise of volition. As Rajamannar, c. J. observed in Parameshwaram pillai Velayudham Pillai v. Parmeswaram Fillai Narayana Pillai, AIR 196. 1 Mad. 345 at 347,"a minor in law can have no volition but surely it cannot be contended that a guardian or next friend of a minor cannot bring a suit to enforce the minor's right to property including a suit for partition. There is no question here of a right to disrupt the joint family status by unequivocal declaration of the intention of a coparcener to separate himself from the coparcenary. "the assumption next made that the right of avoidance of the family settlement based on the inequality of shares is a personal right of the lunatic and cannot be exercised by others, has also no merit. No doubt, the observation of th,e Madras High court in M. S. M. M. Meyyappa Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, madras, AIR 1951 Mad. 506 at 508 and also the decision of the federal Court in Ratneshwari Nandan singh v. Ehagwati Saran Singh, AIE 1950 FC 142. support the said contention. In meyyappa Chettiar's (2) case it was observed at page 508, para 5:". . . If the partition is unequal and unfair it is open to the sons if they are majors, to repudiate the partition; but if they are minors, it is open to them to avoid that partition by appropriate proceedings after they attain majority. The partition, therefore, will be good until it is set aside. It is not void and is not without effect. This right of avoidance based on the inequality of the shares is a personal right of the minors and cannot be exercised by others. The partition, therefore, will be good until it is set aside. It is not void and is not without effect. This right of avoidance based on the inequality of the shares is a personal right of the minors and cannot be exercised by others. "the Federal Court in Ratneshwari nandan Singh's (3) case observed that a person afflicted by a maladay like unsoundness of mind although he continues to be a co-sharer, does not become a coenjoyer and his rights remain in abeyance so long as his affliction lasts and he could exercise his rights on the malady being cured. But these principles can no longer be said to be vaild. In the old Mysore State when it was a Part B State, the Mysore hindu Inheritance (Removal of disabilities) Act, 1938 was in force which was analogous to Hindu Inheritance (Removal of Disabilities) Act, 1928. But with effect from first February 1966, state Act was repealed by the enadt merit of the Miscellaneous Persoral laws (Extension) Act, 1959, and that central Act was extended throughout india except the State of Jammu and kasha ir. S. 2 of the Hindu Inheritance (Removal of Disabilities) Act, 1928, provides that all persons other than a person who is and has been from birth a lunatic or idjot have been conferred with a right to share in joint family properties and no such person shall be excluded by reason only of disease, deformity or physical or mental defect the scope of this section has been considered by this Court in Papuram vedavuasa Rao v. Bapuram Narayan rao, AIR 1962 Mys. page 18 at 21. = 1961 Mys. L. J. 393 Hegde, J. , as he then was, speaking for the Court observed:". . . Prohibition laid down by the hindu Law Texts debarring persons of unsound mind from claiming a share is removed by the Act. 'any right' means all rights which includes a right to claim partition. Again a right to get a share means a right to get a separate share. The act in question is a social legislation intended to remove certain social disabilities imposed by the customary hindu Law. It calls for a benevolent construction. In our judgment, 'the act' placed a coparcener of unsound mind in the same position as that of a sane Coparcener. The act in question is a social legislation intended to remove certain social disabilities imposed by the customary hindu Law. It calls for a benevolent construction. In our judgment, 'the act' placed a coparcener of unsound mind in the same position as that of a sane Coparcener. "the learned Judge also obsesved that the purpose of the Act was not merely to clear certain doubts but also to amend the Hindu Law as laid down by the texts and interpreted by decisions. The decision of this Court has been referred to with approval by the Madras High Court in K. P. Pakkiriswamy mudahar v. K. P. Krishnaswamy, AIR 1973 Mad. 36 . The ratio of these decisions, in our view, are still good notwithstanding the slight amendment made to the said s. 2 by deleting therefrom the words "from inheritance or" by Schedule I of the Miscellaneous Personal Laws (Extension) Act, 1959. That apart, now the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is a complete answer to the contention urge a by learned counsel for the appellants. S 28 of the said Act provides:"no person shall be disqualified from succeeding to any property on the ground of any disease, defect or deformity, or save as provided in this this Act, on any other ground whatsoever. "the section expressly confers a right to succeed to property on persons not excluding the lunatic, which means and includes a legitimate right to get a separate share in such property. It that removes all traditional disqualifications for inheritance. In Mulla's hindu Law (6) the said section h; been commented upon as follows: under the texts of the Dharmashaatras as interpreted by the courts, cettain defects, deformities and diseases (as 98, 162-363 ante) excluded an heir from inheritance. This was substantially remedied by the Hindu inheritance (Removal of Disabilities) Act, 1928, which ruled that"no person, other than a person who and has been from birth a lunatic or idiot, shall be excluded from inheritance or from any right or share in joint family property by reason only of any disease, deformity or physical or mental defect. "the present section discards almost all the grounds which imposed exclusion from inheritance. It rules out disqualification on any ground whatsoever excepting those expressly recognised by any provisions of the Act. These appear to be the legal and logical principles emanating from the statutory enactments. "the present section discards almost all the grounds which imposed exclusion from inheritance. It rules out disqualification on any ground whatsoever excepting those expressly recognised by any provisions of the Act. These appear to be the legal and logical principles emanating from the statutory enactments. The right of a lunatic to claim a separate share cannot therefore be kept suspended till his malady continues. There is no principle upon which we could now accept that contention. There is no basis to whittle down the sweep of S. 28 of the Hindu Succession Act. The second contention also fails and is rejected. ( 16 ) RE. Point No. 3: The question is whether the settlement of the family properties effected by Hanji Veerappa was detrmental to the interests of the lunatid. The contention urged by Sri radbakrishna, learned counsel for the respondent was that on the very face of the deod the allotment of shares was unjust unfair and detrimental to the interests of the lunatic. He iaso urged that the plaintiff's mother in the circumstances in which she was placed, could not have given her willing consent t ' the settlement which was also patently prejudicial to her. Before considering the merits of these contentions, it would be convenient to have a brief summary of the law relating to family arrangement. The principles governing the family arrangement by and large stemmed from the following passage from Halsbury's Laws of England, third Edition, Volume 17, pages 215- 216:"a family arrangement is an arrangement between members o the same family, intended to be generally and reasonably for the benefit of the family either by compromising doubtful or disputed rights or by preserving the family property or the pease and security of the family by avoiding litigation or by saving its honour. "justice Subba Rao, J. as he then was speaking for the Bench of the Supreme court in Maturi Pullaiah v. Maturi narasimhan, AIR 1966 SC 1836 summarised the law as accepted by Indian Courts as follows:"briefly stated, though conflict of legal claims in praesenti or in future is gcnerally a condition for the validity of a family arrangement, it is not necessarily so. Even bona fids dispiues, present or possible, which may not involve legal claims will suffice. Even bona fids dispiues, present or possible, which may not involve legal claims will suffice. Members of a joint Hindu family may, to maintain peace or to bring about harmony in the family, enter into such a family arrangement. If such an arrangement is entered into bona fide and the terms thereof are fair in the circumstances of a particular case, Courts will more readily give assent to such an arrangement than to avoid it. "these principles have been reiterated by the Supreme Court in M. N. Aryamurihi v. M. L. Subbaraya Setty, AIR 1972 SC 1279 , and S. Shanmugam Pillai v. K. Shanmugam Pillai, AIR 1972 SC. 2069 . The courts lean strongly in favour of the family arrangement that brings about harmoney in a family and does justice to its various members. Even bonafide disputes, present or possible, which may not involve legal claims would be sufficient to effect a family arrangement. To mairtain peace or to bring about harmony, the members of a joint Hindu family may enter into family arrangement. If such an arrangement is made bona fide and the terms thereto are fair in the circumstances of a particular case, the courts would readily accept such agreement. ( 17 ) WITH this background, let us turn to the settlement deed and look at the facts found in the present case. The deed has been described as family settlement or family arrangement. It begins with a recital about the family structure of the parties. It then states that after the demise of the first and second sons of Hanji Veerappa. his third son Gurappa alone supported the father and also assisted him for acquiring the properties on behalf of the family. It further states that gurappa became a partner in Bharath talkies and also was instrumental in acquiring the Veerabhadreswara Saw mill for which he had incurred certain loans. Then it follows in these terms:"since I am becoming old and I am not in a position to do any work it has become necessary to make arrangement of my family properties to avoid any kind of dispute by any member of the family and in the interests of all the members, the settlement deed has been executed. "then there follows the follownig directions:"the loan taken by Gurappa must be repaid by him alone and the other members of the family should not be held responsible. "then there follows the follownig directions:"the loan taken by Gurappa must be repaid by him alone and the other members of the family should not be held responsible. The responsibility of the plaintiff should be that of his mother Sakamma and the properties allotted to him under the settlement deed should be managed by her alone. Gurappa and Basavaraju and Raju should also take care of the plaintiff. Sakarima must maintain herself and the plaintiff out of the properties allotted to the plaintiff. Basavaraju and Raju must look - after their mother and also see that their sister indrakshi is married properly. Gurappa alone must take care of his wife and children. All these members should live in such a manner as not to bring any disfame to the family. "the properties were distributed in the iollowing manner: Hanji Veerappa has not takon any share. The family properties were divided and distributed into three branches of his three sons. The properties in A schedule were allotted to the share of Gurappa, B schedule to the plaintiff and C schedule to defendants 2 and 3. Then the deed significantly states that the properties in each schedule are of equal value. There is a particular mention of the nature of the garden allotted to the plaintiff. It states:"the garden property given to the plaintiff is in a very good condition and that garden requires no improvement and no investment whereas those allotted to defendant-1, and defendants 2 and 3 are not in a good condition and they require a lot of investment. "the deed ends with a restraint to sakamma not to alienate the properties in B Schedule. It also states that the signatures of Gurappa, Basavaraju, raju and Sakamma as guardian of chandrasekharappa were obtained. But in the deed, in addition to these signatures there is also a signature of the plaintiff lunatic. ( 18 ) WE will now examine the question whether there was a just and fair distribution of the family properties into three branches. Before we consider this aspect, we must make it clear that Hanji Veerappa did not take his share in the family properties, nor he gifted his share to any other. ( 18 ) WE will now examine the question whether there was a just and fair distribution of the family properties into three branches. Before we consider this aspect, we must make it clear that Hanji Veerappa did not take his share in the family properties, nor he gifted his share to any other. He purported to have divided all the properties into three shares which, according to him, were of equal value For convenient reference, we may give the particulars hereunder: schedule garden wet dry house sites house a-G a-G a-G plaintiff b 2-8 1-36 0-26 1 nil deiendant-1 a 7-21 7-21 4-0 4 1/2 share defendants 2 and 3 c 3-19 7-11 4-0 3 1/2 share. It is admitted that the plaintiff was allotted 2 acres 8 guntas of garden land although in B schedule, the extent shown is only 2 acres 4 guntas. It comprises Survey Nos. 140 to 143 which together measures 2 acres 8 guntas. Defendant-1 was given garden land measuring 7 acres 21 guntas and defendants 2 and 3 were given about 3 acres 19 guntas. This wide disparity in the allotment was Sought to be justified by the learned counsel for the appellants that the garden allotted to the plaintiff was by far the best in comparison to that allotted to defendants 1 to 3. We were also referred to a report of the Commissioner who was appointed at the instance of the plaintiff and who was examined as Court Witness (C. W. 1 ). The Commissioner had a local inspection of the garden lands given to the respective parties. From his report, the following particulars may be ascertained. The garden allotted to the planintiff consists of uniformly aged areca trees of about 20 to 25 years. Out of seven acres 21 guntas of garden land given to defendant-1, 3/4th of an acre is barren land and in an area of 2 acres 21 guntas there are areca trees of about 8 to 10 years only and out of the remaining 4 acres 10 guntas, S. No. 27 measuring 29 guntas is of poor yielding. Some such defects were also pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants in regard to the garden allotted to defendants 2 and 3. We have carefully considered all these factors. Some such defects were also pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants in regard to the garden allotted to defendants 2 and 3. We have carefully considered all these factors. But we are unable to come to the conclusion that the plaintiff alone was a beneficiary of the best portion of the areca garden as made out by the learned counsel for the appellants. Defendants 1 to 3 also shared that cake. The well maintained family garden measuring about 7 acres has been distributed almost equally to all the sharers. In addition to that, defendants 1 to 3 have also been favoured with other gardens, may be of poor yielding or yet to yield on the date of the settlement ( 19 ) LET us now turn to the wet lands divided as between the three sharers. Counsel on both sides submitted that the total extent of wet lands covered 1 y the settlement was 16 acres 29 guntas out of which defendant-1 was allotted 7 acres 21 guntas; defendant 2 and 3 were together allotted 7 acres 11-1/2 guntas whereas the plaintff was given just one acre 36 guntas. This disparity would be still worse when we refer to the dry lands. The total extent of dry lands as admitted by the parties then available for partition was 8 acres 26 guntas, out of which defendant-1 was given 4 acres; defendants 2 and 3 were also given 4 acres; but the plaintiff was given just 26 guntas. We do not find any basis for this invidious distinction. While referring to these predial matters, we are not however, insisting on a mathetmatical precision in their division. It need not be there in a family arrangement. There might be give and take between the sharers, but the unequal shares given must be capable of being justified on a rational basis when somebody like in the present case challenges its legality or the bona fides. ( 20 ) THAT is not all. The justice done to the plaintiff by the arbitrary division reaches its climax when we turn to the house sites and houses owned by the joint family. There were in all 8 sites available for partition. Four of them were allotted to defendant-1, three were giver to defendants 2 and 3 and only one site was given to the plaintiff. What about the houses? There were in all 8 sites available for partition. Four of them were allotted to defendant-1, three were giver to defendants 2 and 3 and only one site was given to the plaintiff. What about the houses? The next friend of the plaintiff has stated in his evidence that the family had, four houses at the time of the settlement but no house was given to the plaintiff and those houses were divided only between defendant-1 and defendants 2 and 3. But for the appellants it was urged that the family had only one house and the other houses referred to in the plaint items 28 and 31 were in fact mere house sites which were divided in the settlement deed. We gave our anxious consideration to these rival contentions. Plaint item 27 admittedly is the family house which has been divided equally between defendant-1 and defendants 2 and 3 and the plaintiff was not given any share and not even a right of residence to the plaintiff's mother Sakamma to which she was legally entitled. Plaint item 28 though described as Man galore tiled house, is stated to be a cow-shed attached to the family house. Plaint item 31 consists of four tenements bearing municipal No. 2055 (Old Nos. 1962, 1963, 1964 and 1965 ). They were no doubt referred to in the settlement deed as house sites. We may assume all that in favour of the appellants. But still we are unable to see any reason for the total exclusion of the plaintiff from the family house or denying him any other residential premises. Where should then the mother go with the lunatic son Should she wander on the streets with the lunatic? Nobody appears to have bestowed any thought over this serious problem of life. Basavaraju (defendant-2) D. W. 19 has stated that after the settlement Sakamma with her son was living in the outhouse while defendants 1 to 3 shared the main house. It might be true, but that was not by her own right as she had no right even in that outhouse. It must be a merciful concession. It was perhaps due to this humiliation or predicament sakamma after the death of Hanji veerappa had to part company with the family and go to the house of her son-in-law at Bangalore to meet her unnatural death. It must be a merciful concession. It was perhaps due to this humiliation or predicament sakamma after the death of Hanji veerappa had to part company with the family and go to the house of her son-in-law at Bangalore to meet her unnatural death. The appellants might be generous but Hanji Veerappa ought not to have thrown this mother and son to their tender mercy. The omission to make any provision by Hanji Veerappa particularly in matter of residence the plaintiff clearly indicates that the settlement deed was unjust and also not bona fide. ( 21 ) RE. Point No- 4: This takes us to the question whether the Veerabhad- reshwara Saw Mill and 1/4th share in bharat Talkies were not the joint family business. Hanji Veerappa included them in the settlement deed as joint family properties, but here again no share was given to the plaintiff. For the appellants, it was urged that they were separate properties of defendant-1 and mere mixing them in the family settlement by itself is not sufficient to regard them as joint family properties. We will first deal with the saw Mill. Therefore in any view of the matter, there is no escape from the conclusion that the Saw Mill belonged to the joint family. ( 22 ) BUT the same cannot be said in the case of Bharath Talkies. From these circumstances, it is clear that the 1/4th share in Bharath talkies belonged to defendant-1 exclusively. It must therefore be excluded from the joint family properties ( 23 ) THIS takes us to the question raised in the Cross-Objections filed by the plaintiff. ( 24 ) THE cross objections of the plaintiff must therefore fail and is rejected. ( 25 ) THE 8th defendant in her Cross- objections has complained that the trial Court has not declared the share which she is entitled to in the family properties in the event of a partition. She hap claimed 3/72 share in the family properties in the event of this court affirming the decree of the trial court. The counsel for the appellants has not disputed that. She is therefore held entitled to 3/72 share in the family properties. ( 26 ) THAT, however, is not the end of the matter. There still remains two incidental questions. The appellants have claimed improvements made in the properties allotted to them under the settlement deed. The counsel for the appellants has not disputed that. She is therefore held entitled to 3/72 share in the family properties. ( 26 ) THAT, however, is not the end of the matter. There still remains two incidental questions. The appellants have claimed improvements made in the properties allotted to them under the settlement deed. It was said that they have raised fresh areca garden at their own cost and therefore they are entitled to improvements in respect of those matters. Counsel for the respondents did not dispute that claim. He, however, said that it requires investigation. He is right in his submission. The trial court shall determine that issue in the final decree proceedings with opportunity to both the parties. ( 27 ) THE other complaint of the appellants relates to the direction issued by the trial Court for taking profit and loss account in the Saw Mill as well as in Bharat Talkies till the date of the settlement deed and to allot a share to the plaintiff out of the net income therefrom. We have no doubt that the trial Court was clearly in error in issuing that direction. If the family settlement is not valid, the plaintiff could ask for accounts of the family properties only from the date of the demand for partition and not from any anterior date since there was no allegation of misappropriation or improper conversion of the joint family properties, Tn the absence of proof of misappropriation or fraudulent conversion, a coparcener seeking partition is not entitled to call upon the manager to account for his past dealings with the family property. The plaintiff has had been looked after by defendants 1 to 3. They are even now paying his monthly bill of the Nursing Home where he is still undergoing treatment. It is said that it comes to more than Rs. 800 per month. In the circumstances, that part of the trial Court's decree cannot be sustained. ( 28 ) IN the result and for the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed in part only to the extent indicated above. The Cross-Objecitions filed by the plaintiff is dismissed; The Cross-Objections filed by defendent-8 is allowed. She is held entitled to 3/72 share in the joint family properties which shall be separated by metes and bounds. ( 28 ) IN the result and for the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed in part only to the extent indicated above. The Cross-Objecitions filed by the plaintiff is dismissed; The Cross-Objections filed by defendent-8 is allowed. She is held entitled to 3/72 share in the joint family properties which shall be separated by metes and bounds. The account in regard to the net profits of the business in the Saw Mill shall be taken from the date of the suit. There shall also be enquiry on the question of improvements said to have been effected by the appellants at their cost in the garden lands allotted to their shares under the settlement deed. The 1/4th share held by defendant-1 in bharath Talkies should be excluded from the joint family properties. The decree of the trial Court in all other respects is confirmed. ( 29 ) IN the circumstances, we make no order as to costs. --- *** --- .