Ram Nath Singh v. Brij Kishore Singh — 1979 DIGILAW 186 (PAT)

Judgment 1. This application in revision by the defendants is directed against the order dated 14-12-1977 of the Additional Munsif III, Patna, passed in Title Suit No. 3/35 of 1968/77 refusing to take into evidence some registered documents tendered into evidence by the defendants. These documents were filed in court and were tendered into evidence of the 14-12-1977 by which date the evidence of the plaintiffs, witnesses had concluded and as many as eleven witnesses on behalf of the defendants had been examined and that the examination of the twelfth witness on their behalf was proceeding. 2. The suit in which these documents were tendered into evidence has been brought by the plaintiffs for recovery of possession of certain lands in village Harshankarpur Korra in the district of Patna on the allegation that the plaintiffs and their ancestors before them were the tenants of the lands, but taking advantage of an adverse order in mutation proceedings after the vesting of the estate within which these lands were comprised, the defendants had dispossessed them. The defendants resisted the suit on the ground that they, and not the plaintiffs were the tenants, that the entry in the record of right in favour of the plaintiffs ancestors was not correct and that rent receipts, if any, filed by the plaintiffs were forged and fabricated and, therefore, had not been filed along with the plaint though the plaint stated that they were being filed along with it. According to the averments in the petition which have not been controverted and, therefore, must be accepted to be correct, rent receipts in respect of the lands purported to have been granted by the former landlords and some of them purported to be signed by Baghubansh Narain Singh, Radhey Kishun Singh and Ramlakhan Singh, were filed by the plaintiffs-opposite party only when the hearing of the case was to start and they were actually exhibited only on 7-12-1977 having been proved by P.W. 4, the last witness examined on behalf of the plaintiffs. The case of the defendants, which was clearly suggested to the plaintiff who was examined as P.W. 1, was that rent receipts filed on his behalf were alt forged. The case of the defendants, which was clearly suggested to the plaintiff who was examined as P.W. 1, was that rent receipts filed on his behalf were alt forged. On 14-2-1977 as I have already stated, the defendants filed some registered documents purported to have been executed by Radhey Kishun Singh and Raghubansh Narain Singh and they prayed that they may be taken into evidence. The subject in tendering those documents into evidence obviously was to show that the rent receipts purporting to bear the signature of Raghubansh Narain Singh or Radhey Kishun Singh did not in fact bear their signature, rather the purported signatures of those persons were forged and fabricated. The prayer was opposed on behalf of the plaintiffs orally on the ground that it would not be proper to take those documents into evidence at that stage as the plaintiffs had already adduced their oral evidence. After setting out the aforesaid contention on behalf of the parties, the learned Munsif observed as follows : "Heard both parties on this point. The submission on behalf of the plaintiffs appears to be proper. Therefore, the aforesaid prayer on behalf of the defendants is rejected. (This is English transaction of the extract from the order which is in Hindi)." 3. It is thus manifest that the only reason given by the learned Munsif for refusing to take into evidence the registered documents produced by the defendants on 14-12-1997 was that the oral evidence on behalf of the plaintiffs was already over. Though the circumstance that all the plaintiffs witnesses had already been examined may not be entirely irrelevant in deciding whether or not the defendants should be permitted to adduce documentary evidence at that stage, in my opinion, the prayer for taking into evidence documentary evidence may not be rejected solely and wholly on that ground. Under O.XVIII, Rule 2, Civil P.C., the court may, for reasons to be recorded, direct or permit any party to examine any witness at any stage. It was, therefore, quite within the jurisdiction of the court below to have permitted the plaintiffs to adduce further evidence, oral or documentary, to rebut the documentary evidence produced by the defendants on 14-12-1977, it in the opinion of the court, for reasons to be recorded by it, such a course was expedient in the interest of justice. It was, therefore, quite within the jurisdiction of the court below to have permitted the plaintiffs to adduce further evidence, oral or documentary, to rebut the documentary evidence produced by the defendants on 14-12-1977, it in the opinion of the court, for reasons to be recorded by it, such a course was expedient in the interest of justice. Under O.XVIII, Rule 17, Civil P.C., the court could also recall any witness who had been examined. In these circumstances, it is obvious that a court may not shut out relevant evidence whose authenticity is ordinarily beyond question merely on the ground that the party against whom the evidence is tendered has closed his oral evidence. The court was bound to take into consideration other relevant materials, namely, whether the evidence tendered was relevant, whether the documents were authentic, whether there was sufficient reason for non-production of these documents at an earlier stage etc. 4. The learned Advocate for the opposite party referred to the provisions of O.XIII, Rule 2, Civil P.C., according to which documentary evidence in possession or power of any party which, according to the provision of O.XIII; R.1 should have been produced on or before the settlement of issues but has not been produced, may not be received into evidence at any subsequent stage of the proceedings. But the bar is not absolute even in cases so covered. The court has discretion to admit those documents into evidence if good cause is shown to the satisfaction of the court for non-production of those documents early. There is nothing on the record to suggest that the documents produced on 14-12-1977 were documents either in the possession of or under the power of the defendants. The learned counsel for the opposite party, however, contends that as they themselves produced them without recourse to the powers of the court to compel production of documents etc, the presumption would be that they were in their power or possession. Even assuming that they were in their power or possession, as I have said, the court had a discretion in the matter. As was observed in S.M. James V/s. Dr. Abdul Khair, AIR 1961 Pat 242 - "R.2 makes the satisfactory explanation for non-production at the first hearing a condition precedent for the reception of documents produced out of time. Even assuming that they were in their power or possession, as I have said, the court had a discretion in the matter. As was observed in S.M. James V/s. Dr. Abdul Khair, AIR 1961 Pat 242 - "R.2 makes the satisfactory explanation for non-production at the first hearing a condition precedent for the reception of documents produced out of time. But this R.2 must be liberally construed so as to advance the cause of justice. As observed by Sir Lionel Leach, of the Privy Council, in Kanda V/s. Waghu, AIR 1950 PC 68 : The Court has a discretion and while generally speaking it will be a wise exercise of the discretion to admit such evidence, the question must be decided in each case in the light of the particular circumstances." 5. The court below has not at all applied its mind to the question whether in view of the provisions of O.XIII, R.2, Civil P.C., the documents could be received in evidence at that stage. Therefore, the court did not take into consideration ail the relevant matters which ought to have been considered before deciding the question whether or not documents produced at a late stage should be taken into evidence. It exercised its discretion in that matter, therefore, illegally and/or with material irregularity and its order is subject to revision by this Court. 6. Further, I have no doubt that if the order is permitted to stand, the defendants-petitioners would suffer irreparable loss because they would be deprived of an opportunity of showing that the rent receipts produced on behalf of the plaintiffs which were valuable and even vital evidence in the case, were all forged and fabricated. It is therefore, a fit case for interference on exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. 7. The learned Advocate for the opposite party referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Hari Shankar V/s. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, AIR 1963 SC 698 and contended that this Court should not interfere in revision with the discretionary order passed by the court below. That decision merely makes reference to the well known rule that power of High Court to interfere under S.115, Civil P.C. is defined to jurisdictional errors. That decision merely makes reference to the well known rule that power of High Court to interfere under S.115, Civil P.C. is defined to jurisdictional errors. I have held already that exercise of discretion without taking into account all relevant consideration, is exercise of that discretion in at illegal manner and, therefore, in question of jurisdiction is involved. I was first inclined to set aside the order and remand the matter to the court below for fresh decision on the question of admission of documents filed in the court by the defendants on 14-12-1977. It is, however, not disputed that the documents filed are all registered documents. It is also not disputed that those documents are relevant evidence on the point of genuineness of the rent receipts filed by the plaintiffs. In these circumstances, in my opinion, it is not expedient in the interest of justice to remand the matter to the court below because there can be no doubt that it is a fit case in which the discretion of the Court should be exercised in favour of reception of those documents into evidence when validly proved. Being registered documents, there is a presumption that those documents are genuine and bear the signatures of Radhey Kishun Singh and Raghubansh Narain Singh. I may, however, add that though a presumption of genuineness attaches to registered documents that presumption can be rebutted by cogent and unimpeachable evidence. 8. There is also good cause for non-production of those documents at the stage of framing of the issues or at the first hearing of the suit. The necessity for filing these documents arose only after the rent receipts bearing the signatures of Raghubansh Narain Singh and Radhey Kishun Singh were exhibited on behalf of the plaintiffs. Those rent receipts were exhibited only on 7-12-1979 when the last witness on behalf of the plaintiffs was being examined. There can, therefore, be no doubt that even if the rule of exclusion enacted in O.XIII, R.2 supplied, there was good cause for the non-production of those documents at the time of the first hearing of the case. 9. Those rent receipts were exhibited only on 7-12-1979 when the last witness on behalf of the plaintiffs was being examined. There can, therefore, be no doubt that even if the rule of exclusion enacted in O.XIII, R.2 supplied, there was good cause for the non-production of those documents at the time of the first hearing of the case. 9. I would, accordingly, allow the applications, set aside the order under revision, of the learned Munsif refusing to receive into evidence the documents filed to court on 14-12-1979 on behalf of the defendants and direct that those documents be received into evidence if they are properly proved in accordance with law of court the plaintiffs would be at liberty to adduce evidence after the close of the oral evidence on behalf of the defendants to show that those documents were either not executed by the same Raghubansh Narain Singh or Radhey Kishun Singh who had granted or signed the rent receipts or that the signatures are not genuine. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order for costs.