JUDGMENT - S.K. DESAI, J.:---This revision is preferred against the order of the learned District Judge, Parbhani, dated 22-6-1979, dismissing Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 14 of 1979 which was an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay in filing the appeal which was from the order of the Rent Controller, Sailu, District Parbhani. The Deputy Collector who is also the Rent controller, dismissed the said application on 4-1-1979. This he did so purportedly in view of the decision of the Bombay High Court directing the petitioner before me to give possession to the landlord. According to the petitioner no hearing was given to the petitioner on the said objection application. According to Mr. Agrawal, as no hearing was given to him and this order was made and remained in the file, he came to know of this order much later than the appearance date thereof which is his explanation for filing the appeal late. 2. The appeal was filed, as was required, before the District Judge, Parbhani. As there was ostensible delay, an application for condonation of delay was made. The learned District Judge, held that the application could not be granted. In his view the provisions contained in section 5 of the Limitation Act were not applicable. As stated in paragraph 12 of the impugned order, the provisions for appeals contained in the Hyderabad House (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954 to be found in section 25 were self contained provisions. On a number of footings to be found contained in paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 the learned District Judge held that the application was required to be dismissed. 3. There are two questions which are required to be considered. The first question is whether section 5 of the Limitation Act which permits extension of period in certain cases is available to the appellant (revision-petitioner before me). Mr. Kikla drew my attention to the phraseology of section 5, the definition of the expressions "period of limitation" and "prescribed period" to be found in section 2(j) of the Limitation Act, as also to section 29(2) of the said Act. He submitted that since the Limitation Act, did not prescribe any period of limitation for such appeal in the Schedule, section 5 could not be resorted to. On the other hand, Mr. He submitted that since the Limitation Act, did not prescribe any period of limitation for such appeal in the Schedule, section 5 could not be resorted to. On the other hand, Mr. Agarwal submitted that the point was concluded in his favour by a majority decision of the Supreme Court in (Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel)1, A.I.R. 1964 S.C.p. 1099. Chief Justice B.P. Sinha, Subba Rao, J. and Ayyangar, J. (Raghubar Dayal and Madholkar, JJ. dissenting) have in the said decision taken the view that section 5 would be applicable even in such cases. In their view, which is binding on me, under the Limitation Act as no period was prescribed in respect of such appeals, such appeals could be filed without any period of limitation, but for the restricted period of limitation under the Hyderabad Houses (Rents, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954. In their view, therefore, the Limitation Act, must be deemed to provide an unlimited period for filing such appeals. Under section 25 appeals are required to be filed within thirty days from the date of order and this being a restricted or a shorter period than the position as contemplated under the Limitation Act (in the opinion of the Supreme Court) section 5 could be resorted to if a proper case for extension of time is made out by the party applying for relief on that footing. 4. The next question which is required to be considered is whether the learned District Judge can be considered to be a Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act is available only in matters of appeals or applications (other than applications under Order 21 of the Civil Procedure Code which may be made to courts. The submission briefly stated was that since the appeals lay under the Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954 to the District Judge, who was a persona designata, he was not a Court. 5. Mr. Kikla drew my attention to the judgment of the Kerala High Court which has been adverted to by the learned District Judge, in the impugned order (see paragraph 9 of the impugned order). 5. Mr. Kikla drew my attention to the judgment of the Kerala High Court which has been adverted to by the learned District Judge, in the impugned order (see paragraph 9 of the impugned order). With respect to the learned Judges of the Kerala High Court it is difficult to uphold the plea that the Court of Law to which an appeal is provided from the decision, even assuming that the original deciding authority is an administrative authority, will cease to be a Court merely because the provision for appeal requires that the appeal will be heard by one of the designated Judge of that Court, either the seniormost Judge or the next seniormost Judge, as the case may be. For example, we have under the Municipal Act a right of appeal provided to certain designated courts from rating decisions or similar decisions withholding, granting or revoking the licenses granted. Can it be said merely because the appeal is provided and the right of hearing it is restricted to the seniormost Judge, that he does not function as a Court when hearing the appeal? When the Chief Judge or the Additional Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court hears appeals under the provisions of the Municipal Act or the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court hears appeals under the Public Premises (Eviction) Act or when the District Judge hears appeals from the decisions of the Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, they do not in my opinion cease to be Courts merely because the right of appeal is conferred and designated on one of the Judges of the Small Causes Court, City Civil Court or the District Court, as the case may be. On principle there is no rationale behind the view which found favour with the Kerala High Court and I am unable to agree with that view at least as far as the appeals under the Hyderabad House (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954. 6. Mr. Kikla has sought to support the impugned order only on these two pleas. I have not been able to accept either of them. In the result, the rule must be made absolute and the order of the learned District Judge, Parbhani, dated 22-6-1979, will be required to be quashed. 6. Mr. Kikla has sought to support the impugned order only on these two pleas. I have not been able to accept either of them. In the result, the rule must be made absolute and the order of the learned District Judge, Parbhani, dated 22-6-1979, will be required to be quashed. In my opinion, section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to the appeals filed before the District Judge and it will now be his duty to consider whether the appellant has made out sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of limitation prescribed in section 25 of the Hyderabad House (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954. If this finding is in favour of the appellant, it is hoped that the learned District Judge, will then dispose of the appeal expeditiously. 7. The parties will bear their own costs of the Civil Revision Application. The writ to go down forthwith. -----