Judgment Manoranjan Prasad, J. 1. This criminal revision application by the petitioners, who were the second party in the court below, is directed against an order dated the 22nd September, 1978, passed by Shree D. K. Prasad, Executive magistrate, Hajipur, in a proceeding under section 107 of the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Code), in Case No. II/1973 of 1976. 2. It appears that the Opposite Party No.2, who was the first party in the court below, had filed a petition on the 24th June, 1976, in the court of the sub-divisional Magistrate, Hajipur, against the petitioners, by imoleading them as the second party, for starting a proceeding under section 107 of the Code against them. Thereupon, the learned Magistrate, had sent the said petition to the local police for inquiry and report. The police submitted its report dated the 6th July, 1976, recommending for starting of a proceeding against the second party under section 107 of the Code. On receipt of the said Police report, the magistrate, by his order dated the 8th December, 1976, directed to issue notices to the second party to show cause as to why they should not be ordered to execute a bond of Rs.1,000 each to keep the peace for a period of one year. In response to the said notice, the second party appeared and filed a show cause petition dated tha 28th December, 1976, in which they contended that no proceeding under section 107 of the Code could be drawn up against them alone and prayed that the order dated the 8th December, 1976, should be recalled. 3. The learned Magistrate heard the Counsel for the parties on the 29th december, 1976, on the said show cause petition dated the 28th December, 1976 of the second party, and, thereafter he fixed the 19th January, 1977, for orders. But, after a few adjournments he passed orders on the 9th March, 1977, rejecting the contention of the second party, that no proceeding under section 107 of the code could be drawn up against them, mainly on the ground that a decision to start a proceeding under section 107 of the Code against the second party had already been taken on the 8th December, 1976, and, there was no justification for recalling it. 4. 4. Thereafter the second party filed their show cause in the proceeding on the 14th July, 1977, in which they, on the grounds mentioned in the show cause, prayed for dropping the proceedings against them. The case remained pending in the court of the Subdivisional Magistrate, Hajipur, till the 7th feburary, 1978, without any further progress, and on the 7th February, 1978, he transferred the case for disposal to Shree Ramadhar Sharma, Executive magistrate. It, however appears that Shree Ramadhar Sharma had, in the mean time, been transferred and the case ultimately came to the file of Shree D. K. Prasad, Executive Magistiate. 5. Shree D. K. Prasad, on the 10th March, 1978, fixed the 21st March, 1978, as the date for examination of witness. No witness was, however, examined either on the 21st March, 1978, or on two subsequent adjourned dates, namely, the 5th April, 1978, and the 18th April, 1978, for one reason or the other, and the case was again adjourned to the 27th April, 978, when one witness on behalf of the first party was examined and cross-examined Between the 27th april, 1978, and the 2nd September, 1978, some more witnesses on behalf of the first party were examined and cross-examined, and the evidence of the first party was closed. 6. On the 2nd September, 1978, a petition was filed on behalf of the first party for extending the period of inquiry by six months, as there was still apprehension of breach of the peace between the parties. The Magistrate fixed 8th September, 1978, for passing orders on the said petition dated the 2nd september, 1978, of the first party. No order was, however, passed on the 8th september, 1978, as the Magistrate was busy in law and order problem, and the case was adjourned to the 15th September, 1978, when the Magistrate passed an order extending the period of inquiry till the 30th October, 1978. Thereafter the second party filed a petition on the 22nd September, 1978, for recalling the said order dated the 15th September, 1978, but this was rejected by the learned magistrate by his impugned order dated the 22nd September, 1978, against which the second party (petitioners) have filed the present criminal revision application. 7. In support of the application, Mr. Thereafter the second party filed a petition on the 22nd September, 1978, for recalling the said order dated the 15th September, 1978, but this was rejected by the learned magistrate by his impugned order dated the 22nd September, 1978, against which the second party (petitioners) have filed the present criminal revision application. 7. In support of the application, Mr. B. P. Samaiyar, learned counsel appearing for the second party, petitioners, has placed reliance on sub-section (6) of section 116 of the Code, which lays down that an inquiry under section 107 of the Code shall be completed within a period of six months from the date of its commencement, and if such an inquiry is not so completed, the proceeding shall, on the expiry of the said period, stand terminated unless, for special reasons to be recorded in writing, the Magistrate otherwise directs His contention is that the inquiry under section 107 of the Code commenced on the 29th December, 1978, when the learned Magistrate had heard the counsel for the parties on the show-cause petition dated the 28th December, 1976, filed by the second party, in which they had contended that no proceeding under section 107 of the Code could be drawn up against them, and had prayed that the order dated the 8th december, 1976, starting the proceeding under section 107 of the Code of, against them be recalled ; and, computing from the said date, the period of six months, as contemplated in sub-section (6) of section 116 of the Code, had long elapsed, and the proceeding stood automatically terminated. Alternatively, learned counsel has argued that the inquiry commenced latest on the 7th February, 1978 when the Sub-divisional Magistrate had transferred the case from his file to the file of Shree Ramadhar Sharma, Executive Magistrate, for disposal, and computing from that date also, the said period of six months elapsed on the 7th august, 1978, much before the first party had filed his petition dated the 2nd september, 1978, for extension of the period of the inquiry by another six months, or the order dated the 15th September, 1978, passed by the learned magistrate, extending the period of the inquiry till the 30th October, 1978 ; and the proceeding stood terminated on the 7th August, 1978. In this connection, learned Counsel has placed relience on a Division Bench decision of this court in the case of Nathan Yadav and others V/s. The State of Bihar and others, ( 1977 bbcj 357 ). 8. In the said Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Nathan yadav and others (supra), a proceeding under section 107 of the Code was drawn up as against the petitioners on the 10th May, 1974. After service of notice in them, on the 5th September, 1974, the petitioners filed their show cause. On the 17th October, 1974, both parties requested the Magistrate to fix a date for producing their witnesses and he fixed the 2nd November, 1974, for the purpose. On the 2nd November, 1974, the parties appeared, but they did not produce their witnesses. No witness, therefore, could be examined on that date. For some reason or the other, witnesses could not be examined even on several dates fixed in the case thereafter on the 1st March, 1975, an application was filed on behalf of the petitioners contending that since the proceeding had been pending for more than six months, it stood automatically terminated. On that question, arguments of the lawyers of both parties were heard on the 3rd March, 1975, and the 10th March, 1975, was fixed for orders. The Magistrate could not, however, pass the order on the 10th March, 1975, and several other dates fixed thereafter for the purpose. He passed the order on the 15th May, 1975, rejecting the petition of the petitioners. He held that he was satisfied that even on the 15th May, 1975, there was serious apprehension of a breach of the peace at the hands of the petitioners, and, therefore, termination of the proceeding might cause danger on the life of the first party-respondents, and, under the circumstances, it was not safe to terminate the proceeding but to continue the same in order to avoid serious breach of the peace. 9. Against the said order dated the 15th May, 1975, the petitioners had filed an application in revision before the Sessions Judge, who dismissed their application by his order dated the 17th June, 1975. 9. Against the said order dated the 15th May, 1975, the petitioners had filed an application in revision before the Sessions Judge, who dismissed their application by his order dated the 17th June, 1975. As against the aforesaid order of the Sessions Judge, the petitioners filed a criminal miscellaneous application before the High Court, which was dismissed at the time of admission on the ground that really it was a second application for revision before the high Court and was not maintainable, as the petitioners had already moved the sessions Judge in revision. Then the petitioners filed an application before the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. One of the questions which arose for decision in that case was, when an inquiry as envisaged by section 116 (1) (6) of the Code commenced. The other point which arose for decision was whether the order dated the 15th May, 1975, should relate back to the 3rd March, 1975, when arguments of the parties in the case were heard and should be deemed to have been passed on that date for the purpose of continuing the inquiry. 10. As regards the first point, it was held that the inquiry commences only after a show-cause is filed and the Magistrate applies his mind to that show-cause, and, in that case, it was held that the inquiry commenced on the 17th october, 1974, when the Magistrate fixed a date for the production of the witnesses by the parties, though the petitioners had filed their show cause on the 5th of September, 1974. As regards the second question, it was held that the order dated the 15th May, 1975, should relate back to the 3rd March,, 1975, and should be deemed to have been passed on that date. It was observed that it is a well-established principle of law that no party to a litigation should be made to suffer on account of some fault on the part of the court. It is well settled that where a case is heard and merely stands over for consideration, the judgment, which is pronounced, subsequently, refers back and is conceived in the same terms as if pronounced when the case was beard. It is well settled that where a case is heard and merely stands over for consideration, the judgment, which is pronounced, subsequently, refers back and is conceived in the same terms as if pronounced when the case was beard. Therefore, it was held that though the order extending the period of six months was passed on the 15th May, 1975 after the expiry of six months, computed from the commencement of the inquiry on the 17th October, 1974, the order extending the said period of six months shall be deemed to have been passed on the 3rd of March, 1975, before the expiry of the said period of six months, which expired on the 7th april, 1975. 11. Applying the aforesaid principles of the said Division Bench case of this Court, to the facts of the present case, I am of the opinion that the inquiry in the present case commenced on the 10th of March, 1978, when, after the filing of the show cause by the second party in the proceeding under section 107 of the Code on the 14th July, 1977, the Magistrate, for the first time, fixed a date for production of witnesses by the parties, and when he must be deemed to have applied his mind to that show cause. Computed from that date, the period of six months elapsed on the 10th September, 1978, but, in the meantime, the first party had filed a petition on the 2nd September, 1978, for extending the period of inquiry by another six months, as there was still apprehension of breach of the peace between the parties, whereupon the learned Magistrate, after perusing the same, fixed the 8th September, 1978, for passing orders thereon. But no order was passed on the 8th September, 1978, as the Magistrate was busy with law and order problem and the order was ultimately passed on the 15th september, 1978, extending the period of inquiry till the 30th October, 1978. Therefore, though the order of the learned Magistrate, on the said petition dated the 2nd September, 1978, was passed on the 15th September, 1978, it shall be deemed to have been passed on the 2nd September, 1978, itself, when, after perusing the said petition, the learned Magistrate had fixed a date for passing orders thereon. Therefore, though the order of the learned Magistrate, on the said petition dated the 2nd September, 1978, was passed on the 15th September, 1978, it shall be deemed to have been passed on the 2nd September, 1978, itself, when, after perusing the said petition, the learned Magistrate had fixed a date for passing orders thereon. The said 2nd September, 1978, was within six months from the commencement of the inquiry, which, as already held above, had commenced on the 10th March, 1978, when the learned Magistrate had, for the first time, fixed a date for production of witnesses by the parties. Therefore, the order of the learned Magistrate dated the 15th September, 1978, extending the period of the inquiry till the 30th October, 1978, shall be deemed to have been passed within the period of six months from the commencement of the inquiry and, as such, it must be held to be a valid order. The Magistrate was, therefore, fully justified in rejecting the petition dated the 22nd September, 1978, filed by the second party for recalling the said order dated the 15th September, 1978. I, therefore, see no merit in the present application, which is directed against the impugned order dated the 22nd September, 1978, rejecting the aforesaid petition dated the 22nd September, 1978, filed by the second party for recalling the aforesaid order dated the 15th September, 1978. 12. I, therefore, see no merit in the present application, which is directed against the impugned order dated the 22nd September, 1978, rejecting the aforesaid petition dated the 22nd September, 1978, filed by the second party for recalling the aforesaid order dated the 15th September, 1978. 12. In view of the aforesaid Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Nathan Yadav and others (supra), which I have already discussed above.1 do not find any merit in the contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the second party petitioners that the inquiry under section 107 of the Code, in the present case, commenced on the 29th December, 1976, when the learned magistrate had heard the counsel for the parties on the petition dated the 28th december, 1976, filed by the second party, in which they had contended that no proceeding under section 107 of the Code could be drawn up against them alone and had prayed that the order dated the 8th December, 1976 starting the proceeding under section 107 of the Code against them alone be recalled, which was rejected by the learned Magistrate, by his order dated the 9th March, 1977, on the ground that the decision to start a proceeding under section 107 of the code against the second party had already been taken on the 8th December, 1976, and, there was no justification for recalling it, as the said show cause was not a regular show cause filed in the proceeding under section 107 of the Code, but it was a petition which was filed by the second party objecting to the starting of the proceeding itself against them alone. The regular show cause petition was filed by the second party in the proceeding under section 107 of the Code on the 14th July, 1977, whereafter the Magistrate, for the first time, on the 10th march, 1978, fixed a date for the production of the witnesses by the parties, and, as already held above, it was the said date, the 10th March, 1978, which must be held to be the date of the commencement of the inquiry. 13. 13. I also do not agree with the contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the second party-petitioners that the inquiry commenced on the 7th February, 1978, when the learned Magistrate had transferred the case to another Magistrate, Shree Ramadhar Sharma, for disposal, as no inquiry or trial commences simply by transfer of a case from one court to another. 14. Another point, though not raised in the application, has been taken up Mr. Samaiyar, learned Counsel appearing for the second party-petitioners, at the time of arguments, after seeing the lower court records. As already mentioned above, the case was transferred on the 7th February, 1978, from the court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to the Court of shree Ramadhar Sharma, Executive Magistrate, but, since, in the meantime, shree Ramadhar Sharma had been transferred the case ultimately, on transfer, came to the file of Shree D. K. Prasad, who has passed the impugned order. In the order-sheet of the lower court, there is a rubber stamp, showing that the case was recalled to the general file of the Sub-divisional Magistrate and it was re-transferred to another Magistrate for disposal, and, thereafter, there is an order dated the 28th February, 1978, passed by Shree D. K. Prasad, to the effect that he had received this record on transfer from the court of the Sub divisional magistrate under his Memo no.141, dated the 17th February, 1978. The said rubber stamp, which is there just above the aforesaid order dated the 28th february, 1978, passed by Shree D. K. Prasad, however, does not bear the signature or the initials of the Sub-divisional Magistrate, or the name of Shree d. K. Prasad, in whose court the case was transferred. . On this it has been argued by Mr. Samaiyar that there was no proper transfer of the case to the court of Shree D. K. Prasad by the Sub-divisional Magistrate and, hence, the impugned order dated the 22nd September, 1978, passed by Shree D. K. Prasad was without jurisdiction. 15. Section 411 of the Code deals with making over or withdrawal of cases by Executive Magistrates. Samaiyar that there was no proper transfer of the case to the court of Shree D. K. Prasad by the Sub-divisional Magistrate and, hence, the impugned order dated the 22nd September, 1978, passed by Shree D. K. Prasad was without jurisdiction. 15. Section 411 of the Code deals with making over or withdrawal of cases by Executive Magistrates. It lays down that any District Magistrate or sub-divisional Magistrate, may (a) make over, for disposal, any proceeding which has been started before him, to any Magistrate subordinate to him ; and (b)withdraw any case from or recall any case, which he has made over to, any magistrate subordinate to him, and dispose of such proceeding himself, or refer it for disposal to any other Magistrate. The said section 411 of the Code does not prescribe any particular procedure or mode for making over or withdrawal of cases by the District Magistrate or the Sub-divisional Magistrates. Therefore, passing an order of transfer in the order sheet is not the only mode of transfer, and it can be done in other ways also, as in the present case, in whtch the case was transferred by the Sub divisional Magistrate to Shree D. K. Prasad by his memo No.141, dated the 17th February, 1978, referred to in the order dated the 28th February, 1978, passed by Shree D. K. Prasad. Therefore, I am of the opinion that there was no want of jurisdiction on the part of Shree D. K. Prasad in passing either the order dated the 15th September, 1978, extending the inquiry till the 30th October, 1978, or the impugned order dated the 22nd September, 1978 rejecting the petition dated the 22nd September, 1978, of the second party-petitioner, for recalling the said order dated the 15th September, 1978, 16. In the result, there is no merit in the present application, which is accordingly dismissed.