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1979 DIGILAW 189 (GUJ)

CHIEF CONTROLLER REVENUE AUTHORITY v. HOUSING COMMISSIONER GUJARAT HOUSING BOARD

1979-10-12

B.K.MEHTA, G.T.NANAVATI, P.D.DESAI

body1979
B. K. MEHTA, G. T. NANAVATI, P. D. DESAI, J. ( 1 ) THIS Reference under sec. 54 (1) of the Bombay Stamp Act 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is made by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority at the instance of the Gujarat Housing Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board) and the following two questions are referred herein for the opinion of this Court : (1) Whether the document would attract the benefit of remission granted under Government Notification Revenue Department No. STP/1462/80296-H dt. 17-1-1964. OR (2) Whether the document would be chargeable with stamp duty as per the rates prescribed for the instrument of conveyance in Article 25 (b) of Schedule I of Bombay Stamp Act 1958 ( 2 ) THE facts giving rise to the Reference are few. In exercise of the powers conferred by the Gujarat Housing Board Act 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Housing Board Act) the Board has framed a housing scheme and constructed residential buildings in the Vadaj area of the city of Ahmedabad. The housing scheme is a hire-purchase scheme. An instrument which is entitled Conveyance Deed and which was to be executed by and between the Board as the party of the first part and one Shri Kurva Umarshi Jethabhai who was described in the instrument as the purchaser and as party of the second part was presented for adjudication to the Assistant Superintendent of Stamps Gujarat State Ahmedabad by the Housing Commissioner under sec. 31 of the Act and the officer was requested to give his opinion on the question whether any stamp duty was chargeable in respect of the said instrument. Under the said instrument a flat in a building comprised in the aforesaid housing scheme was to be conveyed by the board to Shri Kurva for a consideration of Rs. 35 0 which was the entire hire-purchase price of the fiat in question. ( 3 ) THE contention of the Board before the adjudicating Authority was that in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a) of sec. 9 of the Act the State Government had issued an order dated January 17 1964 remitting the duty chargeable under the Act in respect of instruments executed by the Board and that since in the instant case the instrument in question was to be executed by the Board no stamp duty was chargeable on the said instrument. 9 of the Act the State Government had issued an order dated January 17 1964 remitting the duty chargeable under the Act in respect of instruments executed by the Board and that since in the instant case the instrument in question was to be executed by the Board no stamp duty was chargeable on the said instrument. ( 4 ) THE Adjudication Authority was of the view that: (a) under the first proviso to sec. 3 of the Act no duty was chargeable in respect of an instrument executed by or on behalf of or in favour of the Government in cases where but for the exemption the Government would be liable to pay the duty chargeable in respect of such instrument (b) accordingly exemption under the said proviso was attracted only when in respect of any instrument of the nature therein described the Government would be liable to pay the stamp duty chargeable (c) the principle underlying the said proviso governs the order of remission issued by the State Government under clause (a) of sec. 9 (d) unless therefore stamp duty in respect of the instrument was payable by the Board the benefit of remission under the notification issued under clause (a) of sec. 9 would not be available and (e) as the liability of paying stamp duty on the instrument in question was not of the Board hut of the purchaser the benefit of remission was not available. The Adjudicating Authority accordingly held by its order dated September 30 1994 that the instrument to be executed in favour of Shri Kurva was chargeable with stamp duty of Rs. 2100. 00 (Rs. two thousand one hundred only) as per Article 25 (b) of Schedule I of the Act. ( 5 ) THE Board feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Adjudicating Authority moved the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority under sec. 53 (1) by its application dated November 7 1974 The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority has thereupon stated a case in respect of the two questions set out above for the opinion of this Court. ( 6 ) IT might he stated that in the statement of case the Chief cont- rolling Revenue Authority has expressed the opinion that the order issued under clause (a) of sec. ( 6 ) IT might he stated that in the statement of case the Chief cont- rolling Revenue Authority has expressed the opinion that the order issued under clause (a) of sec. 9 granting remission seems to be intended to ensure that the Housing Board has not to pay to Government any stamp duty since it is a statutory Board and since its finances are mainly out of Government funds and that it does not appear the intention to remit the duty when such expenditure is the liability of another party. In the instant case since the purchaser is to bear the burden of stamp duty giving such remission would amount to further concession to such persons at cost of the Government funds. The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority accordingly appears to be concurring in the ultimate view of the Adjudicating Authority. ( 7 ) IT would be necessary to refer at the outset to the relevant provisions of law. Sec. 2 of the Act defines various words used in the Act. Clause (g) of the said section defines conveyance as including a conveyance on sale and every instrument by which property whether movable or immovable is transferred inter verves and which is not otherwise specifically provided for by Schedule I. Clause (1) defines executed and execution as meaning signed and signature respectively when used with reference to instruments. Clause (1) defines instrument as including every document by which any right or liability is or purports to be created transferred limited extended extinguished or recorded but does not include a bill of exchange cheque promissory note bill of lading letter of credit policy of insurance transfer of share debenture proxy and receipt. Sec. 3 is the charging section and broadly speaking it provides that subject to the provisions of the Act and the exemptions contained in Schedule 1 instruments of the nature described therein shall be chargeable with duty of the amount indicated in Schedule I as the proper duty therefore respectively. Sec. 3 is the charging section and broadly speaking it provides that subject to the provisions of the Act and the exemptions contained in Schedule 1 instruments of the nature described therein shall be chargeable with duty of the amount indicated in Schedule I as the proper duty therefore respectively. There are two proviso to the said section and for the purposes of the present case the first proviso is relevant and it reads as under: provided that no duty shall be chargeable in respect of (X) any instrument executed by or on behalf of or in favour of the Government in cases where but for this exemption the Government would be liable to pay the duty chargeable in respect of such instrument; the next material section is sec. 9 and with clause (a) thereof we are directly concerned. The material part of the said section reads as under :-"the state government may by rule or order published in the Official Gazette - (a) reduce or remit whether prospectively or retrospectively in the whole or ally part of the state the duties with which any instruments or any particular class of instruments or any of the instruments belonging to such class or any instruments when executed by or in favour of any particular class of persons or by or in favour of any members of such class are chargeable". Sec. 30 inter alia provides that in the absence of an agreement to the contrary the expense of providing the proper stamp shall be borne in the case of a conveyance by the grantee. Sec. 31 sub-sec. (1) inter alia provides that when any instrument whether executed or not and whether previously stamped or not is brought to the Collector and the person bringing it applies to have the opinion of that officer as to the duty if any with which it is chargeable and pays such requisite fee within the prescribed limits as the collector in each case directs the Collector shall determine the duty if any with which in his judgment the instrument is chargeable. Sec. 53 sub-sec. (1) provides that the powers exercisable by the Collector inter alia under sec. 31 shall in all cases be subject to the control of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority. Sec. 53 sub-sec. (1) provides that the powers exercisable by the Collector inter alia under sec. 31 shall in all cases be subject to the control of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority. Sec. 54 in so far as it is material for the purposes of this case authorises the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority to state any case and refer the same with its own opinion thereon to the High Court. Article 25 (b) of Schedule I dealt with conveyance so far as it related to immovable proparty situate within an urban area at the relevant time and provided the rate at which such an instrument is chargeable to stamp duty. ( 8 ) IT would be convenient to reproduce at this stage the order dated January 17 1964 issued by the State Government under clause (a) of sec. 9 of the Act. The material part of the order reads as under :" No. STP. 1462/802r6-H-In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a) of sec. 9 of the Bombay Stamp Act 1958 (Bom. LX of 1958) the Government of Gujarat hereby remits the duty chargeable under the said Act in respect of instruments executed by the Gujarat Housing Board established under the Gujarat Housing Board Act 1961 (Gujarat XXVIII of 1961) ( 9 ) REFERENCE may also be made to the relevant provisions of the Housing Board Act. The Board is a statutory Corporation established under sec. 3 of the Housing Board Act for the purposes of the Act which include the management and use of lands and buildings belonging to or vesting in the Board under or for the purposes of the Act and the exercise of its rights over and with respect to such lands and buildings for the purposes of the Act. Sec. 20 provides that the Board may enter into and perform all such contracts as it may consider necessary or expedient for carrying out any of the purposes of the Act. Secs 21 and 23 make provision for execution of such contracts. Sec. 20 provides that the Board may enter into and perform all such contracts as it may consider necessary or expedient for carrying out any of the purposes of the Act. Secs 21 and 23 make provision for execution of such contracts. Sec. 24 imposes upon the Board the duty to undertake housing scheme and it provides that subject to the provisions of the Housing Board Act and subject to the control of the State Government the Board may incur expenditure and undertake works in such urban area as the State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette specify for the framing and execution of such housing schemes as it may consider necessary from time to time or as may be entrusted to it by the State Government. Sec. 25 deals with matters to be provided for by a housing scheme and thereunder a housing scheme may provide inter alia for the construction of building and the sale of any property comprised in the scheme. Under sec. 74 the Board is authorised to make from time to time regulations consistent with the Housing Board Act and with any rules made under the said Act with the previous sanction of the State Government. The regulations to be made accordingly may provide inter alia for the management and use of buildings construsted under any housing scheme. In exercise of the powers conferred by the aforesaid provision the Board has framed Disposal of Property Regulations which apply to those schemes in which properties forming part of the schemes are to be disposed of by way of sale or hire-purchases and in particular to the Low Income Group Housing Scheme and Middle Income Group Housing Scheme. Such schemes are undertaken for persons of low income and middle income groups that is to say persons whose annual aggregate income does not exceed Rs. 6000. 00 and Rs. 1500q. 00 respectively. Regulation 7 provides that the disposal of properly shall be effected by either hire-purchase or sale as decided by the Board. The Regulations make detailed provision with regard to the allotment of houses and the payment of hire-purchase price or disposal price as the case may be. ( 10 ) HAVING noticed the relevant statutory provisions we must now turn to the terms of the instrument in question. The instrument is entitled Conveyance Deed. The Regulations make detailed provision with regard to the allotment of houses and the payment of hire-purchase price or disposal price as the case may be. ( 10 ) HAVING noticed the relevant statutory provisions we must now turn to the terms of the instrument in question. The instrument is entitled Conveyance Deed. In its preambulary portion the instrument describes the party of the second part as the purchaser. The consideration of Rs. 35000. 00 has been described as the entire hire-purchase price. There is also a recital to the effect that the purchaser requested the Board to execute the instrument 4for conveying the said flat to him which the Board has agreed to. The operative part of the instrument stipulates that the party of the second part accepts to hold the property. . . . as owner. The instrument further provides that the part of the second part shall hold leasehold rights in the plot of and on which the building comprising the flat was situate jointly with the co-holders through the Association of which he is the constituent member in pursuance of the lease-deed executed between the Board and the Association. There is also a stipulation that the party of the second part shall have the right of use of common portions and common services along with other occupants of the building subject to the constitution of the Association of which he is the constituent member. There is a provision that the property in question will be offered to the Board in the first instance if it is put up or brought to sale within a specified time limit at such reasonable price as may be fixed by the Board and that in all cases it would have to be offered for sale only to persons eligible under the Scheme. ( 11 ) THOUGHT the instrument does not mention as to who was to bear the expenses of providing the proper stamp duty payable on the instrument it is not in dispute that the intending purchaser had to bear the cost of stamp duty in case such duty is leviable. We must therefore proceed on the footing that the Board would not be required to bear the liability of payment of stamp duty on the aforesaid instrument. We must therefore proceed on the footing that the Board would not be required to bear the liability of payment of stamp duty on the aforesaid instrument. ( 12 ) AGAINST the aforesaid background we shall take up for consideration first question No. 1 referred by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority. The answer to the question turns upon the true interpretation of the order dated January 17 1964 issued by the State Government under clause (a) of sec. 9. Under the sail order the State Government has remitted the duty chargeable under the Act in respect of instruments executed by the Gujarat Housing Board established under the Housing Board Act on a plain reading of the order therefore it is clear that the stamp duty payable in respect of any instrument executed by the Board is remitted thereunder. The question therefore boils down to this: Is the instrument with which we are concerned herein an instrument executed by the Board within the meaning of the said order ? ( 13 ) THE words and expressions used in the order which is a statutory order issued under the Act must ordinarily bear the same meaning which is assigned to those words and expressions in the Act unless a different meaning has been expressly assigned to them in the order or unless there is anything Repugnant in the subject or context. In the instant case neither of those two exceptions is attracted and therefore the words instrument and executed must bear the same meaning which has been assigned to those words in clauses (i) and (1) of sec. 2 of the Act. The document in question undoubtedly creates and/or transfers rights in the Bat in question in favour of the intending purchaser. It is therefore an instrument within the meaning of the Act and also within the meaning of the statutory order in question. There is in fact no dispute on this point. It also cannot be disputed indeed it is not in dispute-that the instrument is a bilateral agreement between the Board acting through its Housing Commissioner and the intending purchaser. The terms and tenor of the document leave no room for doubt that it is executed by the Board as the party of the first part and it is to be signed by and on behalf of the Board by the Housing Commissioner. The terms and tenor of the document leave no room for doubt that it is executed by the Board as the party of the first part and it is to be signed by and on behalf of the Board by the Housing Commissioner. Under the circumstances there is no escape from the conclusion that the instrument is executed by the Board. ( 14 ) ONCE we reach the aforesaid conclusions it is manifest that the benefit of remission under the statutory order is attracted and that no stamp duty would be payable on the instrument in question. The contrary view taken by the Adjudicating Authority and the contrary opinion expressed by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority do not appear to be well-founded in law. The Adjudicating Authority completely misdirected itself in law in invoking the analogy of the first proviso to sec 3 and in holding that since the exemption thereunder granted in favour of the Government is attracted only when the Government would be liable to pay the duty chargeable in respect of an instrument executed by or on behalf of or in favour of the Government even for the purposes of granting remission under the statutory order issued under clause (a) of sec. 9 the liability to pay the duty chargeable on the instrument in respect of which remission is claimed must be of the Board. Secs. 3 and 9 are two distinct and different provisions. On its plain terms clause (a) of sec. 9 confers a wide power on the State Government to reduce remit or compound duty. The power is not hedged in by any condition similar to that which is to be found in the first provision to sec. 3. It Would not therefore be proper to read by implication into clause (a) of sec. 9 any such condition. The State Government in its wisdom has also not laid down any such condition in the statutory order issued by it. Under such circumstances it would be hazardous and indeed it is not permissible to read into the statutory order any condition similar to that which finds place in the first proviso to sec. 3 The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority is also clearly in error in expressing the opinion that remission of duty could not be claimed because the intention was not to remit duty when payment of stamp duty is the liability of the purchaser. 3 The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority is also clearly in error in expressing the opinion that remission of duty could not be claimed because the intention was not to remit duty when payment of stamp duty is the liability of the purchaser. In a fiscal instrument like the one with which we are concerned one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no presumption that the remission would be available only if certain conditions which do not find place in the instrument are satisfied. Nothing can be read into the instrument and nothing can be in -. plied. The instrument must be interpreted as it stands without making good deficiencies if any based on supposed intention. ( 15 ) IN Hansraj Gordhandas v. H. H. Dave A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 755 the question was whether the appellant was entitled to exemption from payment of excise duty on cotton fabrics having regard to the two notifications issued in pursuance of sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules 1944 The claim for exemption was based on the plain language of the notifications in question. The respondents resisted the claim inter alia on the ground that having regard to the underlying object and policy of granting the exemption the appellant was not entitled to exemption and was liable to pay excise duty. The argument of the respondents was repelled in the following words:"on a true construction of the language of the notifications dated 31 1959 and April 30 1960 it is clear that all that is required for claiming exemption is that the cotton fabrics must be produced on power-looms owned by the co-operative society. There is no further requirement under the two notification that the cotton fabrics must be produced by the Co-operative Society on the powerlooms for itself. It is well established that in a taxing statute there is no room for any intendment but regard must be had to the clear meaning of the words. The entire matter is governed wholly by the language of the notification. If the tax-payer is within the plain terms of the exemption it cannot be denied its benefit by calling in aid any supposed intention of the exempting authority. The entire matter is governed wholly by the language of the notification. If the tax-payer is within the plain terms of the exemption it cannot be denied its benefit by calling in aid any supposed intention of the exempting authority. If such intention can be gathered from the construction of the words of the notification or by necessary implication therefrom the matter is different but that is not the case here. . . . . . . . But the operation of the notifications has to be judged not by the object which the rule-making authority had in mind but by the words which it has employed to effectuate the legislative intent. "this principle has to be borne in mind in construing an instrument granting exemption of remission. ( 16 ) ON a plain construction of the words used in the statutory order under clause (a) of sec. 9 or by necessary implication therefrom it is not possible to hold that the remission of duty under the statutory order is confined only to those cases where the Board had to bear the expenses in relation to the payment of stamp duty It is therefore not possible to agree with the opinion of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority that since in the instant case the stamp duty in respect of the instrument in question was not payable by the Board remission cannot be granted although in terms the statutory order is attracted and remission thereunder granted is otherwise climbable. ( 17 ) WE are therefore of the opinion that the order dated January 17 1964 issued by the State Government under clause (a) of sec. 9 of the Act is clearly attracted so far as the instrument in question is concerned and that having regard to the fact that the duty chargeable under the Act on such instrument is fully remitted thereunder the instrument in question is not chargeable with any duty ( 18 ) HAVING regard to the aforesaid view which we are taking as regards the first question it is not necessary to answer the second question which is rendered entirely academic. We therefore decline to express any opinion as regards the second question. ( 19 ) IN the result we answer the questions which have been referred for our opinion as under: Question No. 1-In the affirmative. Question No. 2-Not necessary to be answered. We therefore decline to express any opinion as regards the second question. ( 19 ) IN the result we answer the questions which have been referred for our opinion as under: Question No. 1-In the affirmative. Question No. 2-Not necessary to be answered. The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority will pay the costs of this Reference to the Board. There will be no order as to the costs of the other persons who have been joined as party-respondents in the Reference at their request. .