Judgment :- 1. By order, d. 29th February, 1976, the respondent rejected the petitioners application under S. 18 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894, hereinafter referred to as the Act, and refused to make a reference to the Civil Court for determination of the compensation amount payable to the petitioner in respect of her lands which had been acquitted. In these proceedings the petitioner seeks a writ of certiorarified mandamus to quash the impugned order and issue directions to the respondent to make a reference in terms of her application to Civil Court. 2. The short facts of the case are as stated below. An extent of 2.43 acres of wet lands in Kadappakkam village, Saidapet Taluk, belonging to the petitioner and comprised in S. Nos. 238/2-A, 2-B and 2-C were acquired along with certain other lands measuring 32.23 acres in the same village for providing house sites to the Employees of the Madras Refineries etc., and the relevant award No. 4/74 for acquisition of the lands was passed on 14th October, 1974. As per the award, a compensation of Rs. 2,535 per acre was awarded to the owners of the lands. Notice of the award under S. 12(2) of the Act was served on the petitioner on 3oth October, 1974. The petitioner made an application on 18th December, 1974 under S. 18 (1) of the Act saying that the compensation awarded for her lands was wholly inadequate and as such the Collector should make a reference to the court for determining the fair amount of compensation payable to her. This application was received by the Collector on 20th December, 1974. Thereupon, he made a reference under S. 18 (1) of the Act, to the Court competent to deal with the matter, viz., Subordinate Judges Court of Chenglepattu. The reference was made on 25th April, 1975, but the Principal Subordinate Judge, Chengalpattu returned the reference on 1st July, 1975, stating that the application for reference has been made belatedly and as such the referring officer may quote the provision of law under which the reference can be taken on file. The reference was made on 25th April, 1975, but the Principal Subordinate Judge, Chengalpattu returned the reference on 1st July, 1975, stating that the application for reference has been made belatedly and as such the referring officer may quote the provision of law under which the reference can be taken on file. It was only then, the respondent realised that the petitioners application had been made beyond the period of six weeks from the date of receipt of the notice under S. 12 (2) of the Act and as such the application did not satisfy proviso (b) of sub-S.(2) of S. 18 of the Act. As a result of this discovery, the respondent rejected the petitioners application as time barred and sent the impugned order on 29th February, 1976. Aggrieved by that order, the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. 3. In her affidavit, the petitioner has stated that her husband died on 14th March, 1974, that within a month thereafter, her only son also died after being bedridden in hospital for a considerable period of time and it was in those circumstances, she could not send her application under S. 18 (1) of the Act before 18th December, 1974. She has further stated that though the application was sent on 18th December, 1974, it cannot be considered a belated one, because, clause (B) of sub-S.(2) of S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, provides alternative periods of limitation, viz.,(i) a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of the notice from the Collector under S. 12 sub-S.(2), and (ii) a period of six months from the date the Collectors award, and therefore under the second alternative, her application is within time. 4. A detailed counter-affidavit has been filed by the respondent and the stand taken therein is hat the notice under S. 12 (2) of the Act was served on the petitioner on 30th October, 1914 and as such her application should have been filed within a period of six weeks, but as it was made beyond the period of six weeks, it was a belated application, and would not therefore, place the Collector under an obligation to make a reference. It is further stated that by a mistake a reference was made to the Subordinate Judges Court, Chengalpattu, but on the court pointing out the limitation provision contained in S. 18 (2) (b), the correct principle of law has been applied and the petitioners application rejected on the ground of limitation. 5. Mr. Raghuraman, the learned counsel for the petitioner, rightly did not press the convention raised in the affidavit that two periods of limitation having concurrent force are available to the petitioner, and therefore, the application should have been treated as within time in that it had been sent within six weeks from the date of award. The fallacy of this contention lies in the fact that it does not take notice of the words ‘whichever period shall first expire’ occurring in S. 18 (2) (b) of the Act. No doubt, two periods of limitation are given in S. 18 (2) (b) but they are qualified by the words ‘whichever period shall first expire’. Therefore, they cannot have concurrent operative force. Admittedly, notice under S 12 (2) of the Act had been served on the petitioner on 30th October, 1974, and the efore the period of limitation available to the petitioner was only six weeks from that date. Inasmuch as her application was sent only on 18th December, 1974, it is beyond the period of six weeks, and is therefore, out of time. 6. Though Mr. Raghuraman, the learned counsel for the petitioner, could not assail the impugned order on the ground of limitation, he raised another argument to justify the petitioners claim that her application for reference under S. 18 (1) ought to have been acted upon and a reference made to court, and not rejected on the ground of limitation. His argument was that once the respondent who is the Referring Officer had treated the petitioner’s application as filed within time and made a reference to the Subordinate Judges Court, Chenglepattu, under S. 18 (1) of the Act, the Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to return the reference on the ground of belatedness of the petitioner’s application under S. 18(1) of the Act. In support of his argument, the learned counsel relied upon two judgments of the Allahabad High Court— Secretary of the State v. Bhagwal Prasad 1 and State of U.P. v. Abdul Karin A.I.R. 1963 All 556 (F.B.), and a judgment by a single Judge of this court in Venkateswaragwami v. Sub Collector, Bezwada A.I.R. 1943 Wad. 327=56 L.W. 85. The view taken in those decisions is that it is for the Collector and the Collector alone to determine whether to make a reference under S. 18 (1) of the Act or not and if he decided to make a reference, it is not open to the court to go behind the decision of the Collector and hold the reference to be out of time. This argument, attractive as it is, is however not capable of acceptance, because, the Supreme Court has now set at rest, the controversy on the question whether the Civil Court, on a reference made to it under S. 18 of the Act, can go into the question of limitation. In Mohd Hasnuddin v. State of Maharashtra 4 after a review of the conflicting decisions on the matter, the Supreme Court has held thus— “We are inclined to the view that the fulfilment of the conditions, particularly the one regarding limitation, are the conditions subject to which the power of the Collector to make the reference exists. It must accordingly be held that the making of an application for reference within the time prescribed by provision to S. 18 sub-S (2) is sine qua non for a valid reference by the Collector. From these considerations, it follows that the court functioning under the Act being all tribunal of special jurisdiction, it is its duty to see that the reference made to it by the Collector under S. 18 complies with the conditions laid down therein as to give the court jurisdiction to hear the reference.” In another portion of the judgment, their Lordships have stated as follows:— “If an application is made which is not within time, the Collector will not have power to make a reference In order to determine the limits of his own power, it is clear that the Collector will have to decide whether the application presented by the claimant is or is not within time and satisfies the conditions laid down in S. 18. Even if a reference is wrongly made by the Collector the court will still have to determine the validity of the reference, because the very jurisdiction of the court to hear a reference depends on a proper reference being made under S. 18 and if the reference is not proper, there is no jurisdiction in the court to hear the reference. It follows that it is the duty of the court to see that the statutory conditions laid down in S. 18 have been complied with, and it is not debarred from satisfying itself that the reference which it is called upon so hear is a valid reference. It is only a valid reference which gives jurisdiction to the court and therefore, the court has to ask itself the question whether it has jurisdiction to entertain the reference. 7. In view of this pronouncement, the submission of the petitioners counsel that the subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to return the reference made to him on the ground of limitation cannot be countenanced. 8. Yet another submission made by the petitioners counsel was that even if a notice under S. 12 (2) of the Act had been served on the petitioner on 30th October, 1974, the limitation period will not start running from that date, unless the respondent proved that the notice served on the petitioner was an effective one. What, in effect, the petitioners counsel urged was that a notice under S. 12 (2) of the Act merely containing the particulars regarding the true area of the land, the compensation he was awarding for the land and the manner in which the compensation was to be apportioned between the claimants, if there were more than one, will not be an effective notice and in order that the notice should be an effective one, it should have been accompanied with the full text of the award containing therein the reasons given by the Collector for computing the value of the land, building, trees, etc., at a particular rate in order to enlighten, the owner of the land, the basis on which compensation had been fixed and to afford him material to decide whether he should ask for enhanced compensation by means of reference under S. 18 (1) of the Act or accept the award as such. Though this contention has not been raised in the counter, I have heard arguments on this plea, because it is one of law and it is intimately connected with the plea of bar of limitation raised by the respondent. As authority for this argument, the petitioners counsel relies upon the judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Mangilal Jawanmal v. SpecialLand Acquisition Officer, Thana A.I.R. 1978 Bom. 325 in which the view taken is that if it is not every notice under S. 12 (2) of the Act which shall attract the running of the limitation period, but only an effective notice which contains not only the particulars referred to under S. 11 of the Act but also other particulars indicating to the parties receiving notice, the factors which had influenced the mind of the Acquisition Officer in fixing the compensation for the acquired property at a certain rate. The dictum of the Division Beneh is contained in the following words— “In our view, therefore, apart from the three items mentioned in S. 11 of the Act which go to comprise the award of the Collector, the other particulars indicated above including the reasons or the basis on which the quantum lot compensation has been fixed and offered would also constitute the essential contents of the award and unless the petitioners or the claimants are posted with knowledge of these particulars including the reasons or the basis for fixing compensation, it would not be possible for them to file a proper application for reference stating the grounds of objection to the award;.. In fact, as we have pointed out earlier, under S 11, an enquiry into the measurement, the value of the claim is contemplated at the hands of the Collector or the Special Land Acquisition Officer, and during the course of the enquiry, the Collector or the Special Land Acquisition Officer, would either accept what the claimant has claimed or may reject it on certain grounds and may arrive at compensation on certain other basis, but such basis on which compensation is fixed and the other particulars and the different heads of property must form part of his award and these things in our view would constitute the essential contents of the award without knowledge of which it would be utterly impossible for any claimant to make his application for reference stating the grounds of his objection to the award. If that be the correct position, we are clearly of the view that the phrase ‘within six weeks of the receipt of the notice’ occurring in the first part of proviso (b) to S. 18(2) must be interpreted to mean ‘within six weeks from the receipt of effective notice’ meaning thereby from the receipt of the knowledge of the essential contents of the award by the claimants including the reasons or the basis on which the quantum of compensation has been fixed as also the other particulars mentioned above. Such construction to our mind would be the most fair and reasonable one and in our view the period of six weeks limitation prescribed under the first part of proviso (b) to S. 18 (2) would commence from the receipt of such effective notice.” 9. In justification of their conclusion that the notice contemplated in proviso (b) to S. 18 (2) must be an effective notice, the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court have placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Mst. Quaisar Jehan Begum A.I.R. 168 S.C. 1064= (1964) 1 S.C.R. 971 where the court had to find out the meaning to be given to the words ‘within six weeks from the date of the Collectors award’ occurring in proviso (b) to S. 18 (2). Quaisar Jehan Begum A.I.R. 168 S.C. 1064= (1964) 1 S.C.R. 971 where the court had to find out the meaning to be given to the words ‘within six weeks from the date of the Collectors award’ occurring in proviso (b) to S. 18 (2). The Supreme Court held that the words have to be construed in the following manner— “It seems elear to us that the ratio of the decision in Raja Harish Chandras case 2 is that the party affected by the award must know it, actually or constructively, and the period of six months will run from the date of that knowledge. Now, knowledge of the award dots not mean the mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. These contents may be known either actually or constructively. If the award is communicated to a party under S. 12 (2) of the Act, the party must be obviously fixed with knowledge of the contents of the award whether he reads it or not. Similarly when a party is present in court either personally or through representative, when the award is made by the Collector, it must be presumed that he knows the contents of the award. Having regard to the scheme of the Act we think that knowledge of the award must mean knowledge of the essential contents of the award.” 10. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court have followed this ratio and held that the words ‘receipt of notice’ occurring in the proviso must be so construed as to mean receipt of effective notice, i.e. , a notice which not only mentions essential details such as the area of the land, the amount of compensation, the manner of apportionment of the compensation but also the basis on which the Collector had arrived at his conclusions. In the judgment of the Division Bench they have also quoted with approval, a judgment in Special Lund Acquisition Officer, H. D. P. Ghata Prabha v. Aparai Krishna Gadakari A.I.R. 1973 Mysore 22 and Civil Revision Appln. No. 583 of 1973, on the file of the Bombay High Court. 11. In view of this interpretation given to the crucial words with which we are now concerned what has to be seen is whether that ratio will not be attracted to the instant case also. No. 583 of 1973, on the file of the Bombay High Court. 11. In view of this interpretation given to the crucial words with which we are now concerned what has to be seen is whether that ratio will not be attracted to the instant case also. Admittedly, the notice under S. 12(2) did not contain the reasons which prompted the Land Acquisition Officer to fix the compensation at the rates mentioned in the notice. The learned Government Pleader concedes that notices issued under S. 12 (2) will refer only to the particulars mentioned in S. 11 of the Act and the full text of the award or even a gist of the reasoning contained therein will not be furnished to the parties when notice under S. 12 (2) is served. Therefore, on facts the petitioner is entitled to claim that she had no effective knowledge of the award when the notice under S. 12 (2) was served on her. The learned Government Pleader however attempted to distinguish Mangilal Jawanmal v. Special L. A. Officer, Thana A.I.R. 1978 Bom. 325 by arguing that the decision was rendered under totally different circumstances and as such, the dictum cannot provide assistance to the petitioner in the present case. He pointed out that the affected party in the Bombay case had applied for a certified copy of the award as soon as notice under S. 12 (2) was served and the certified copy was not furnished within the six weeks time, and therefore, there was justification to extend the period of limitation. His further contention was that under the Bombay Court-Fees Act ad valorem court-fees had to be paid on the enhanced compensation asked for by the claimant and for the purpose of calculating the court-fees the claimant would have to know the reasons which impelled the Collector to fix the compensation at a particular rate. But, so far as Tamil Nadu is concerned, the Tamil Nadu Court-Fees Act does not prescribe the payment of court-fees on references under S. 18 (2) for payment of enhanced compensation and such being the case there was no need for the petitioner to know the contents of the award before making an application under S. 18 (1) for requesting the Land Acquisition officer to make a reference to court. Neither of the contentions of the Government Pleader can be accepted. Neither of the contentions of the Government Pleader can be accepted. When the statute prescribed the service of notice, which has been construed by courts to be effective notice there is no need for a claimant to apply for a certified copy of the award in order to get enlightenment about the factors which influenced the Land Acquisition Officer to: (1) determine the true extent of land where there is a dispute about the extent, (2) the compensation to be paid for the land where a higher amount was asked for by the claimant and (3) the parsons to whom the compensation was to be awarded if there was dispute about the persons to whom the compensation was to be given. Therefore, the question whether the claimant had applied for certified copy or not cannot have any significance and once that position is established, then the question of the commencement of the limitation period will have nothing to do with the claimants applying for a certified copy of the award or not. As regards the second contention, it is no doubt true the Tamil Nadu Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act does not stipulate payment of court-fees by a claimant who asks for enhanced payment of compensation, but, even so the claimant is entitled to have full knowledge of the award, because sub-S.(2) of S. 18 expressly states that “the application shall state grounds on which the objection to the award is taken.” In view of this clear stipulation a claimant has to specifically state the grounds of objection to the award passed by the Collector and this specific objection cannot be taken unless the full details of the award are known to him. Therefore, I am unable to accept the learned Government Pleaders contention that the ratio laid in Mangilal Jawanmal v. Special L.A Officer Thana A.I.R. 1978 Bom. 325, can be distinguished with reference to the facts in that case and as such held not attracted to the facts of the petitioners case. 12. In view of my conclusion stated above the petition deserves to be allowed and accordingly will stand allowed with costs. Counsels fee is fixed for Rs. 150. 325, can be distinguished with reference to the facts in that case and as such held not attracted to the facts of the petitioners case. 12. In view of my conclusion stated above the petition deserves to be allowed and accordingly will stand allowed with costs. Counsels fee is fixed for Rs. 150. As the petitioner had six weeks time to make the application under S. 18 (2) from the date of effective notice and as the notice served on her was not an effective one, her application cannot be considered to be out of time. Therefore, the second respondent will make a fresh reference to the Subordinate Judge, Chengalpattu, in the light of this judgment.