JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE petitioner was a Bus Conductor employed by the M. P. State Road Transport Corporation. On 11-12-1974, he was going in a Bus as Conductor, The Bus was checked by the flying squad of the corporation. The petitioner was produced before the Mobile Court. He was fined Rs. 35 under section 7 of the M. P. Rajya Sadak Parivahan Seva (Bina Tikat Yatra Ki Rok) Adhiniyam, 1974. On 15-4-1975, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner by the Corporation. The notice stated as to why the petitioner having been convicted by a criminal Court for an offence involving moral turpitude be not dismissed from service. The petitioner in his reply to the notice stated that 3 Police Constables boarded the bus near the Court and the petitioner, after issuing tickets to other passengers, was in the process of making tickets for these Constables, when the bus was checked. The petitioner was dismissed from service under Regulation 109 of the M. P. State Road Transport Corporation Employees Service Regulations, by order of the Depot Manager, Raipur, dated 22-4-1975. The petitioner approached the Labour Court against his dismissal. The Labour Court, by order dated 22-7-1977, allowed the petitioners application and granted reinstatement without back wages. In the revision filed by the Corporation, the Industrial Court, by order dated 7-7-1978, set aside the order of the labour Court. There was another revision filed by the petitioner for grant of back wages. That was dismissed. The petitioner then filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging the order of the Industrial court. ( 2. ) THE view taken by the Industrial Court in this case is that under regulation 109, there was no necessity of holding any enquiry and the petitioner could be dismissed from service even without any notice. Regulation 109 is one of the Regulations made by the Corporation under section 45 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950. Regulation 109 provides that notwithstanding the provisions of Regulation 69, the services of an employee, if he has been convicted in a Criminal Court or has been declared insolvent by a competent Court, shall be liable to be terminated without notice. Regulation 69 enables termination of employment on notice or payment of salary in lieu of notice. ( 3. Regulation 109 provides that notwithstanding the provisions of Regulation 69, the services of an employee, if he has been convicted in a Criminal Court or has been declared insolvent by a competent Court, shall be liable to be terminated without notice. Regulation 69 enables termination of employment on notice or payment of salary in lieu of notice. ( 3. ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner submitted before us that Regulation 109, in so far as it provides for termination of employment on conviction by a criminal Court, should not be given effect to, because it is inconsistent with Standing Order 12 of the Standard Standing Orders applicable to the Corporation under the M. P. Industrial Employment (Standing Orders)Act, 1961. In our opinion, the contention raised by the learned counsel must be accepted. Standing Order 12 (1) specifies the acts or omissions which constitute major misconduct. Clause (a) of this Standing Order specifies conviction by a Court of law for an offence involving mora! turpitude as a major misconduct. Standing Order 12 (4) requires that no punishment shall be imposed on any employee, unless proved guilty of misconduct on an enquiry conducted in the manner provided therein. There is no exception in Standing Order 12 (4) that no enquiry is necessary in case an employee is charged under Standing Order 12 (1) (a. ). In other words, an enquiry is also contemplated under Standing Order 12 (4), when the misconduct consists of conviction by a Court of law for an offence involving moral turpitude. Here there are two matters which should be taken notice of: (1) Regulation 109 refers to any conviction by a Criminal Court, whereas Standing order 12 (1) (a) refers to a conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude; and (2) Regulation 109 contemplates no inquiry whereas Standing order 12 (4) requires an enquiry even in a case where the charge is of conviction by a criminal Court for an offence involving moral turpitude. There is thus an apparent conflict between Regulation 109 and Standing order 12. It has been held by a Full Bench of this Court in M. P. S. R. T. C. v. Ramchandra, (1977 MPLJ341.), that in case of conflict Standing Orders prevail over the regulations. Standing Order 12 must, in our opinion, therefore, be given effect to in preference to Regulation 109. ( 4. It has been held by a Full Bench of this Court in M. P. S. R. T. C. v. Ramchandra, (1977 MPLJ341.), that in case of conflict Standing Orders prevail over the regulations. Standing Order 12 must, in our opinion, therefore, be given effect to in preference to Regulation 109. ( 4. ) THE learned counsel for the Corporation submitted that on a proper construction, it should be held that no enquiry is required under Standing order 12 (4), otherwise, the result would be that a matter which is concluded by the findings of a criminal Court would again be enquired into in a domestic enquiry giving rise to duplication of proceedings and contradictory findings. In our opinion, there is no merit in this submission. We have already stated that Standing Order 12 (4) makes no exception for a case where the charge is under Standing Order 12 (1) (a ). Apart from that, there is good reason to hold why an enquiry is necessary under Standing order 12 (4), even in a case where the charge is of conviction by a Court of law for an offence involving moral turpitude. Now, it would be seen that simply because an employee is convicted by a criminal Court, he cannot be held guilty of major misconduct under Standing Order 12 (1) (a ). It has further to be shown that the conviction is for an offence involving moral turpitude. In the enquiry under Standing Order 12 (4), it would be for the employer to prove not only that the employee has been convicted of an offence but that the offence for which he has been convicted involved moral turpitude. Like any other case of misconduct, the burden to prove the charge of misconduct under Standing Order 12 (1) (a) would be on the corporation. It is true that in many cases, the production of the judgment of the Criminal Court would be enough evidence of the charge, but it cannot be laid down as a universal rule that in every case, the production of judgment of the Criminal Court would be sufficient to prove the charge of misconduct under Standing Order 12 (1) (a ). If the conviction is for an offence which may or may not involve moral turpitude and the judgment of the criminal Court does not state the facts fully, as often happens in a summary trial, it may be necessary for the Corporation to place relevant material, apart from the Criminal Courts judgment, to show that the offence for which the employee was convicted involved moral turpitude. Moreover, the enquiry will always enable the employee to bring out extenuating circumstances bearing upon the question of penalty. We may, however, make it clear that the findings of the Criminal Court would not be open to review in the domestic enquiry and it would not be open to the employee to contend that he was wrongly convicted by the Criminal Court. There is, thus, no scope for duplication of proceedings or contradictory findings. The learned counsel, for the Corporation relied upon the case of Mohd. Khan v. M. P. S. R. T. C. , (1978 M P L J 672, p. 677. ). In that case, the effect of omission to hold an enquiry under Standing order 12 (4) was not considered as the petitioner had directly come under article 226 of the Constitution, without approaching the Labour Court. That case is, therefore, not an authority for construction of Standing order 12. ( 5. ) IN the instant case, the petitioner was convicted under section 7 of the M. P. Rajya Sadak Parivahan Seva (Bina Tikat Yatra Ki Rok)Adhiniyam, 1974. This section reads as follows : "7. Breach of duty imposed on servant etc. of State Transport undertaking under section 3. If a servant of the State Transport Undertaking or an agent referred in section 3, whose duty is to supply a ticket to a person who travels or intends to travel in a motor vehicle comprised in road transport service carried by the State Transport Undertaking on payment of fare by him, negligently or wilfully omits to supply a ticket or supplies an invalid ticket, he shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to one month or with fine which may extend to two hundred and fifty rupees or with both. " It would be seen from section 7 that a person can be guilty of offence under that section, even if he negligently omits to supply ticket or supplies invalid ticket. " It would be seen from section 7 that a person can be guilty of offence under that section, even if he negligently omits to supply ticket or supplies invalid ticket. Moral turpitude signifies baseness, depravity or wickedness of character or disposition. Mere negligent omission to supply ticket does not involve moral turpitude. It would, therefore, be possible for an employee convicted of an offence under section 7, to urge that his conviction did not involve any moral turpitude and that he was not guilty of any major misconduct under Standing Order 12 (1) (a ). Admission of conviction in such cases is not enough to prove the charge, As earlier stated, it is for the corporation to prove the charge by producing the judgment of conviction and other relevant material, if necessary. In the instant case, there was no departmental enquiry. In the proceedings before the Labour Court, although the parties led evidence, the Corporation did not choose to file a copy of the judgment showing the nature of the charge and the facts found against the petitioner by the Criminal Court. There was also no other material from which it could be inferred that the omission to supply tickets was wilful or that it involved any moral turpitude. There was, therefore, absolutely no material to hold that the petitioner was guilty of any major misconduct under Standing Order 12 (1) (a ). The Labour Court was, therefore, right in setting aside the petitioners dismissal. The Industrial Court was wrong in interfering with the order of the Labour Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not pressed his claim before us for back wages due till today. ( 6. ) THE petition is allowed. The order of the Industrial Court, allowing the revision of the Corporation, is set aside and the order of the Labour court is restored. The petitioner would, however, not be entitled to back wages due till today. The petitioner shall get his costs of this petition from the Corporation. Counsels fee Rs. 150. The security amount shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition allowed.