JUDGMENT Birendra Prasad Sinha, J. This is an application under Article 22. of the Constitution of India by one Shri Mahendra Prasad Singh, who claims himself a follower and dedicated worker of Ananda Marga in charge of the Ananda Marga Office, Patliputra Colony, Patna, In the writ application, as originally filed on 3.10.1978, a prayer was made to direct the respondents the State of Bihar, the Union of India, the Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna and the Officer-in-charge, Patliputra colony Police Station, Patna, to produce one Mr. Franco Bressanin. It was further prayed that if any illegal, arbitrary and unconstitutional deportation order existed against the said Mr. Bressanin, the same may be quashed so that he may be at liberty to return to Patna from wherever he may be. 2. The short facts leading to this application may be stated hereunder ; Mr. Bressanin was staying at the Ananda Margi Office in the Patliputra Colony since August, 1, 1978, He is an Italian national and had come to India on the Italian passport. His visa was to expire on June 20, 1978 but had been extended until September 5. 1978. He applied for further extension of his visa on the 31st of August, 1978, on the ground that some criminal and civil cases were pending in the courts against the police, the Union of India and Shri Jaya Prakash Narayan, Mr. Bressaoin had come along with l3 others to India for the Darshan of their Guru Shri Anand Muniji. It, appears that they were subsequently arrested in some cases but were later exonerated from the charges. On 1st of October, 1978, Mr. Bressanin received a letter directing him to submit his passport in connection with his application dated 31.8.1978 for the extension of his visa. It is alleged that the passport was submitted in the Office of the Superintendent of Police, Patna where Mr. Bressanin was taken into custody. It is stated by the petitioner that he along with a lawyer tried to meet Mr. Bressanin in custody but he was not allowed to do so. The petitioner later on could not locate the whereabouts of Mr. Bressanin and there upon filed this writ petition with the prayers mentioned above. 3. Bressanin was taken into custody. It is stated by the petitioner that he along with a lawyer tried to meet Mr. Bressanin in custody but he was not allowed to do so. The petitioner later on could not locate the whereabouts of Mr. Bressanin and there upon filed this writ petition with the prayers mentioned above. 3. The writ petition carne up for admission on 4.10.1978 when at the instance of the learned Counsel for the State, it was adjourned for a day to seek necessary instructions. On 5.10.1978. learned Govt. Pleader no. 2 Informed this Court that Mr. Bressanin bad already left this country voluntarily. The correctness of this statement was challenged on behalf of the petitioner and it was stated that Mr. Bressanin was still in this country. Learned Counsel for the parties were directed to file affidavits in support of their respective stands by 24.10.1978. On 24.10.1978, a supplementary affidavit was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating, inter alia, that Mr. Bressanin was in Delhi on 5th of October, 1978 from where he had written a letter to Shri Ranjan Dwivedi, Advocate. That letter is annexed as Annexure ‘A' to the supplementary affidavit. A counter-affidavit was filed on behalf of the Respondent-State on 24.10.1978 in which it was stated that Mr. Bressanin left Patna on 1.10.1978 and left India for Rome In the early morning of 6.10.1978 by air. It appears that Mr. Bressanin had been served with a quit India order no. 426 dated 28.9.1978 for being deported to his native land. On 25.10.1978, when the matter came up for admission again before a bench of this Court, it was stated on behalf of the Respondent-State that the statement made on 5.10.1978 by the learned Govt. Pleader No.2 was on the instructions of Mr. G.C. Banerjee, Under Secretary, Home Department, Govt. of Bihar and the Office of the Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna. It appears that the Court had been persuaded not to pass any interim order on. 10, 1978 when Mr. Bressanin was still in this country. The application for writ of habeas corpus was thus really made infructuous. We are constrained to say that this attitute on the part of Mr. G. C. Banerjee, under Secretary, Home Department, Govt. It appears that the Court had been persuaded not to pass any interim order on. 10, 1978 when Mr. Bressanin was still in this country. The application for writ of habeas corpus was thus really made infructuous. We are constrained to say that this attitute on the part of Mr. G. C. Banerjee, under Secretary, Home Department, Govt. of Bihar or any other officer of the State must be seriously taken note of the State is not like a private litigant and it is not expected that the authorities of the State would try to defeat an application by misleading the Court. 4. Mr. Kanula Nidhan Keillav, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner fairly conceded that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be issued in this case since the petitioner is not in any illegal custody and he bas gone out of this country. On the other band, be submitted that, in the facts and circumstances of this case, a writ of habeas corpus and testificandum can be issued. In support of his argument, Mr. Keshav referred us co paragraph 1509.at page 800 of Halsbury's Laws of England Fourth Edition. It appears that the object of the writ of habeas corpus and testificandum is to enable a person who is in legal custody in prison to be brought up before a court for the purpose of giving evidence as a witness. There is absolutely no averment in the petition that Mr. Breslanin has to give evidence as a witness in any case. Learned Counsel referred us to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the writ application where in there is reference to certain criminal and civil cases pending in courts. These cases obviously are not against Mr. Bressanin. It is not stated that Mr. Bressanin has to appear as a witness in any of these cases. Secondly, Mr. Bressanin is not is any legal custody in any prison in this country. He has already left this country on 6. 10. 1978. That being the position, a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum also cannot be issued in the present case. 5. The main difficulty with which the petitioner is faced, in the present case, is about the maintainability of the writ application. The petitioner claims himself to be a worker of Ananda Marga. 10. 1978. That being the position, a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum also cannot be issued in the present case. 5. The main difficulty with which the petitioner is faced, in the present case, is about the maintainability of the writ application. The petitioner claims himself to be a worker of Ananda Marga. It is stated that in that capacity one of his duties is to be the custodian for and maintaining registry of foreigners at the Office of the Ananda Marga. Learned counsel emphatically stated that a writ of certiorari can be issued quashing the arbitrary unconstitutional deportation order of Mr. Bressanin. The First difficulty is that the deportation order is not before us. It is difficult to say whether the order is arbitrary or unconstitutional. A writ of certiorari is an extraordinary legal remedy and is corrective in nature. This remedy arises on principle from the superintending authority which the sovereign superior courts possess and exercise over inferior jurisdictions as the delegates of the sovereign. It is well establisbed by a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court that this right can be enforced ,by a person who complains of the infringement of his fundamental or statutory rights. The rights which is the foundation of the application under Article 226 for the issue of a writ of certiorari is a personal and individual right. A non-citizen cannot apply for the enforcement of fundamental right which is conferred by the Constitntion only upon citizens, as for example a right under. Article 19 of the Constitution. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that Mr. Bressanin has a right to be in this country and he cannot be prohibited from coming to this country. That right obviously fails under Article 19 of the Constitution. Needless to say that the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution is not available to Mr. Bressanin who is not a citizen of this country. In any case the petitioner has not been able to show that he has any existing legal right to maintain this application. That right obviously fails under Article 19 of the Constitution. Needless to say that the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution is not available to Mr. Bressanin who is not a citizen of this country. In any case the petitioner has not been able to show that he has any existing legal right to maintain this application. In the case of State of Orissa V. Ram Chandral, it was observed that though the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 was wide in that sense, the concluding words of the Article clearly indicate chat before a writ or an appropriate order can be issued in favour of a party it must be established that the party has a right and the said right is illegally invaded or threatened; It is obvious, therefore that the existence of a right is thus the foundation of a petition under Art. 226. In the case of Venkateswara Rao V. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, it was observed that a petitioner who seeks to file an application under Article 226 of the Constitution should "ordinarily'" be one who has a personal or individual right in the subject matter of the petition. Refering to this decision learned Counsel submitted that it is not necessary that in all cases the rights should be personal or individual in order to maintain an application under Article 226 for a writ of certiorari. He submitted that the petitioner is a trustee of some of the goods Mr. Bressanin and in that capacity he can maintain the present application. The expression "Ordinarily” indicates a person who has been prejudicially affected by an Act, or omission of an authority. Even though that person has no proprietary or even fiduciary interest in the subject-matter he can maintain an application but he must show that he has been prejudicially affected by the impugned order. There is nothing to indicate in this application that the writ petitioner has been prejudicially affected by the order deporting Mr. Bressanin from this country. There are numerous other decisions of the Supreme Court On this point which it is not necessary to mention here. Mr. Keshav referred to the case of R.V. Brighron Justices. Suffice it to say that the applicant in that case was a licensee and was a rival trader. His trade was affected by the grant of an occasional licence by the respondent. Mr. Keshav referred to the case of R.V. Brighron Justices. Suffice it to say that the applicant in that case was a licensee and was a rival trader. His trade was affected by the grant of an occasional licence by the respondent. Thus he was a person who had been prejudicially affected. This case does not apply to the facts of the present case, Mr. Keshav could not show us any authority indicating that a writ of certiorari can lie at the instance of a stranger. This being the position the present application by a stranger to issue a writ of certiorari is not maintainable. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner then contended that the writ of prohibition should issue restraining the respondents from obstructing the entry of Mr. Bressanin. To say the least this submission has been made only to be rejected. A Writ of prohibition is a judicial writ issued from a superior jurisdiction to an inferior Tribunal or Court or administrative authorities having a duty imposed on them to proceed judicially, to prevent these tribunal from continuing their proceedings in excess or abuse of their jurisdiction or in violation of the rules of natural justice. While the writ of prohibition prevented, the writ of certiorari cured. However, the effect of the writ of prohibition is not merely to prevent the making of an order should it arrive in time, but also to prevent the enforcement of it. There is absolutely no material on the record to indicate that Mr. Bressanin intends to come back to this country or that anybody was trying to prevent him from coming. Secondly, the prayer for the issue of writ of prohibition has to be made only by the person aggrieved and not by a stranger. The petitioner, In the present case, is not person aggrieved in this case. For the reasons for which the petitioner's prayer for the grant or writ of certiorari I has been rejected. his prayer for the grant of writ of prohibition also must be rejected. 7. Having considered the facts and circumstances of this case and the argument of the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, I am of the opinion that neither the writ of certiorari nor the writ of prohibition much less the writ of habeas corpus rind testificandum Can be issued in this case. The petition therefore, must fail and is dismissed. 7. Having considered the facts and circumstances of this case and the argument of the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, I am of the opinion that neither the writ of certiorari nor the writ of prohibition much less the writ of habeas corpus rind testificandum Can be issued in this case. The petition therefore, must fail and is dismissed. S. Shamsul Hasan, J. 8. While being in agreement with the judgment of my learned Brother, B. P. Sinha, J, I wish to add a few words of my own. 9. The application as framed sought two reliefs. First of them amounts to a prayer for issue of writ of habeas corpus to secure release of Mr. France Bressanin. The second seeks the quashing of any order that may have been passed regarding the deportation of Mr. Bressanin. The petitioner in the writ claims to be a person who could be said to be a friend of Mr. Bressanin and could thus maintain a writ of habeas corpus. The writ has, however, been rendered infructuous because Mr. Bressanin has already been deported from this country on 6.10.1978 and is neither in custody nor any longer in this country. When the application was being considered for admission, a statement was made at the instance of one Mr. Banerjee that Mr. Bressanin has voluntarily left this country on 6.10.1978. In fact, now it transpires, this instruction given by Mr. Banerjee was palpably a false statement and Mr. Bressanin was still in India on that date. If this false statement had not been given in this Court, perhaps, while admitting this application an interim order may have been passed staying deportation of Mr. Bressanin and the validity of the order deporting him could have been examined and adjudicated upon. The opposite party concerned have. Therefore by misleading the Court rendered both tile prayers in the writ petition infructuous. Learned Counsel appearing for the State brought to our notice the counter-affidavit in which an explanation bas been offered in regard to the conduct of Shri Banerjee. It has been stated that be made statement in the bona fide belief that having left Patna on 1.10.1978 he must have left this country within three days. We are not satisfied with that explanation which has been placed before us in Court. 10. It has been stated that be made statement in the bona fide belief that having left Patna on 1.10.1978 he must have left this country within three days. We are not satisfied with that explanation which has been placed before us in Court. 10. A copy the deportation order has also not been made available to us nor has it been produced in the counter affidavit by the State. In course of submissions learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the deportation order can still be set aside and the direction should be issued that Mr. Bressanin may be allowed to enter India in order to prosecute the several cases pending in this country. In my view, it is beyond the scope of this application to grant this relief. It is sovereign right to every State to regulate movement and entry of a foreigner into a country. I do not, therefore, find any merit in this prayer. 11. Another aspect of the matter is that the present petitioner, Mahendra Pratap Singh, has no locus standi to maintain an application for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. It is well settled by numerous decisions of the Supreme Court that writs can only be issued at the instance of the persons whose legal right is affected. A writ as above cannot be maintained to enforce the legal right, if any, of another person. In this case obviously, the writ petitioner is not affected in any manner. The application is, therefore, dismissed. Application dismissed.