K. S. PUTTASWAMY, J. ( 1 ) A Society called the C. B. C. I. Society for Medical Education (hereinafter referred to as'the Society') registered under the provisions of the karnataka Societies Registration Act of 1969, which is the 2nd petitioner has established and is running a private medical College called the St. John's medical College, Bangalore, (hereinafter referred to as 'the College') which is the let petitioner in this writ petition. One Dr. C. M. Francis, who is the Dean of the College is the 3rd petitioner. These petitioners, who have a joint and common interest have joined in filing this writ petition to avoid any possible technical objection by the respondents. ( 2 ) FOR the academic year 1978-79, which is stated to commence on 2nd august, 1978and end with the end of april 1978, the College invited applications from qualified candidates to fill up the sanctioned strength of 60 candidates of the 1st M. B. B. S. Course. In response to the said invitation; respondent No. 3 and a large number of eligible candidates applied and in the selection made with due regard to reservations and merit, respondent No. 3 did not find a place in the list of 60 candidates, but found a place as SI. No. 2 in the waiting list of candidates Ml the selected 60 candidates joined the College on or before the due date and thersefore the question of offering seats to the candidates placed in the waiting list did not then arise. Some time after the commencement of the classes, one of the lady candidates discontinued her studies and therefore a vacancy arose the filling of which has given rise to this writ petition. In the first instance, the College. decided to fill up that vacancy by offering the same to the 1st candidate in the waiting list, who did not accept the same. In that view, the College decided to admit respondent No. 3 by obtaining permission of the Bangalore university (hereinafter referred to as 'the University') constituted and functioning under the provisions of the Karnataka State Universities Act, 1976 (Karnataka Act No. 28 of 1976) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') for her late admission and accordingly addressed the University in the matter, which was granted by it on 25-9-1978. On the strength of the permission granted by the University, respondent No. 3 approached the college to admit her to the course, which v as not acceded to by it in spite of another direction issued by the University. In these circumstances, respondent No. 3 moved this court in W. P. No. 11513 of 1978 seeking for a writ in the nature of mandamus to the College to admit her, impleading the University also as a party respondent. On 31. 10. 1978, rama Jois, J. holding that a writ petition seeking for a writ of mandamus against the College which was a private Medical College was not maintainable, dismissed the said writ petition. In dealing with a submission made by respondent No. 3 that the university can compel the College to admit her to the College which issue did not directly arise for determination, the learned Judge observed thus: -"8. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that having regard to the wide powers conferred on the University under the Act, if the respondent-College fails to admit any student to the College arbitrarily, they have ample powers to take such actions as may compel the private College to act reasonably and admit the petitioner. Whether the University has any power to take and can take any action aginst a private College i:' it acts arbitrarily in making or denying admission to students into the college is not a matte;r which is germane to this writ petition. If the University is of the opinion that the action of the respondent-College is arbitrary, it is open for the University to take such action or impose such sanctions, against the respondent-College as are open to them under the law and thereby compel them to admit the petitioner, and I do not express any opinion on this question. " ( 3 ) WITHOUT challenging the above order in an appeal or any other legal proceeding, respondent No. 3 presented a petition on 4. 11. 1978 to the governor of Karnataka who is also the chancellor of the University to intervene in the matter and prevail on the College authorities to admit her to the College, as if that was the view or direction of this Court. On that petition, the Chancellor on the same day, minuted as under: -"in the light of the earlier direction of the University to St. On that petition, the Chancellor on the same day, minuted as under: -"in the light of the earlier direction of the University to St. John's medical College (vide Registrar's letter of 7th Oct. 78) and in view of the observations of the learned judge of the High! Court dated 31. 10. 78 (even though the writ had to be dismissed because of it being a private college), St. John's medical College will be well advised to admit this candidate immediately failing which the presumption would be that they are not fair and just and are exerting discrimination arbitrarily and further severe remedies may have to be thought of to bring them under some proper discipline. "agreeably, with the minute of the chancellor on 6. 11. 1978, the Secretary to the Governor addressed a letter to the Vice-Chancellor requesting him to take necessary action to compel the college to admit respondent No. 3. ( 4 ) ON receipt of the said letter, the university explored the possibilities ot complying with the aforesaid directions of the Chancellor. As a follow up action, the administration prepared a note and a draft Ordinance to empower the Vice-Chancellor to intervene and placed it for the consideration of the Syndicate scheduled to meet on 25. 11-1978 and the Draft ordinance placed before the Syndicate reads thus: -"ordinance: (ADMISSION of students vide Sec. 37 of the Karnataka State Universities act, 1976) - every Principal of an affiliated college of the Bangalore University and every Head of a University or a department of the University shall ensure that admissions are made to all courses upto the limit of the sanctioned intake. Such admissions shall be made taking into account the qualifications prescribed in the regulations. If in any case it has come to the notice of the Vice- chancellor that the sanctioned intake is not filled up and the Vice- chancellor has reasonable cause to believe that an eligible applicant to the college has been denied admission though seats are available, he may after conducting such enquiry as he may consider necessary in the circumstances of the case, order admission of an applicant to the college or Department and the applicant shall be deemed to have been admitted to the College or Department from the date of the order. "in its meeting held on 25. 11. "in its meeting held on 25. 11. 1978, the syndicate considered the said draft and passed a resolution in these terms: -"item No. 21: Draft Ordinances regarding admission of students to the various courses in the university, the Ordinance proposed by the vice-Chancellor was discussed. Dr. H. L Thimme Gowda gave a draft of ordinances which was drafted by him. After discussion, the Ordinance as proposed by the Vice-Chancellor was accepted with several changes. The Vice-Chancellor was requested to see whether a sentence can be added stipulating that the College will be disaffiliated if the. order is not complied with. The Vice- chancellor said he would- consult the Legal Advisor and issue the ordinance. This was agreed to. "a copy of the same was forwarded in due course to the administration for further action. As to what happened thereafter can be best gathered by referring to the notes and orders made thereon. The same reads thus: -"extract of item No. 21 of the minutes of the meeting of the syndicate held on 25-11-1978 is placed below. Minutes of the Syndicate held on 25. 11. 1978 on item No. 21 may be seen. The Ordinances as proposed by the Vice-Chancellor are stated to have been accepted with 'several changes' The 'changes' incorporated to the Ordinances proposed in the reference note is not forthcoming. Before issue of the Ordinance, the legal Advisor must also be consulted in the matter of adding a sentence, stating that the College will be disaffiliated if the order of the University is not complied with. It is therefore submitted to indicate that the several changes made in the Ordinances for reference of the office and for taking needful action. For perusal. Id |- sd|- Registrar) 5. 12. 5-12-78 i was told that an amendment ordinance as approved by the Legal authorities has been received, please send it to the Registrar, id- 5. 12. P. S. to V. C. Id/- 5. 12. Syn) reference to minutes of the Registrar, at page 10 on pre-page: ordinances drafted in consultation with the Legal Advisor (Vijay Shan- kar) is obtained and placed at 'flag A' in the file. A draft notification incorporating these Ordinances is put up for approval. Kind reference is invited to S. 38 (4) of the Act, according to which all ordinances made by the Syndicate shall have effect from such date as it may direct. A draft notification incorporating these Ordinances is put up for approval. Kind reference is invited to S. 38 (4) of the Act, according to which all ordinances made by the Syndicate shall have effect from such date as it may direct. But every ordinance shall be submitted through the State Government to the Chancellor within two weeks from the making thereof. The chancellor may within four weeks of the receipt of the ordinance, by order, direct, that the operation of Ordinances be suspended and shall as soon as possible inform the Syndicate of his opinion etc. After issue of thtts notification, this will be forwarded to the Chancellor through the State Government under the said provisiton. For perusal and approval. Id/-Sd (-5. 12. 5-12-78 Regr) preamble to the Ordinance to be prepared. Draft submitted to V. C. for approval. Id/- 5. 12. Syn) accordingly revised draft notification is put up for approval. Id/- as amended id/- Id/- 5. 12. 6. 12. Syn) issued on 6-12-78. "in the light of the above notings and orders, a new Ordinance, though broadly conforming to the Ordinance placed before the syndicate, was then prepared and approved by the Vice-Chancellor on 5-12-4978 which has been published by the Registrar on 5-12-1978 in Notification No. SYN 1 ORD 78 (Ext. J ). The Ordinance approved by the Vice- chancellor and published by the Registrar reads thus: -"bangalore University sub:- Ordinances governing the admission or students to the various courses in the Bangalore University. Ref:- Resolution on admission of students to Affiliated Colleges passed) by the Syndicate at its 12th meeting held on 25th November, 1978. Notification No. Syn. 1 Ord- 78 Bangalore, 5th December, 1978. In exercise of the powers conferred on it under S. 38 of the Karnataka state Universities. Act, 1976 the Syndicate of the Bangalore University at its meeting held on 25-11-1978 has been pleased to make the following Ordinances governing the admission of students to the various courses in the bangalore University, as required under S. 37 (a) of the Act, 76: - ordinance: 1) Every Principal of an Affiliated college of the Bangalore University and every Head of a University College or a Department of the University shall ensure that admissions are made to all courses upto the limit of the sanctioned intake. Such admissions shall be mataking into account the qualifications prescribed in the regulations. Such admissions shall be mataking into account the qualifications prescribed in the regulations. 2) If in any case it has come to the notice of the Vice-Chancellor that the sanctioned intake is not filled up and the Vice-Chancellor has reasonable cause to believe that an eligible applicant to the College has been denier admission though seats are available, he may after conducting such enquiry as he may consider necessary in the circumstances of the case, order admission of such applicant, entitled to such admission to the College-Department. 3) The Principal or Head of the Department shall comply with such order from the date of the order. By Order, Sd/- K. M. Kadam, Registrar I/c. "on 6 -. 2-1978, the Registrar addressed a letter to the Government to submit the ordinance notified on 5-12-1978 to the chancellor in terms of sub-sec. (4) of s. 38 of the Act. But without waiting for the expiry of the term or the orders of the Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor on 5-1-1979 purporting to exercise the power conferred by the Ordinance published on 5-12-1978 made an order directing the College to admit respondent No. 3 which was received by it on 9-1-1979. The material portion of the order reads thus: -"from the perusal of the records mentioned above, I hold that there is reasonable cause to believe that an eligible applicant to the St. John's medical College, Bangalore, has been denied admission to the First M. B. B. S. course during the academic year 1978-79, though a seat was available. As all the facts are available, no further enquiry is required. By virtue of the power conferred on me by the Ordinance referred to at serial No. 8 above, I hereby order that Miss Lakshmi Srinivas, an applicant to the M. B. B. S. course of Bangalore University shall be admitted to the St. John's Medical College, bangalore, with immediate effect. Sd/- * * * Vice-Chancellor. " ( 5 ) THE letter dated 6-12-1978 of the registrar evoked an interim reply by government on 20/21-2-1979 in which it indicated that the word 'all' occurring in the Ordinance was inappropriate and sought the clarification of the University and the same was placed before the Syndicate at its meeting held on 24-3-1979 which passed a resolution directing the Ordinance made by it on 25-11-1978 be given effect to from 5-12-1978. In Notification No. Syn 1 Ord 78 dated 24-3-1979 (Annex- ure R. 1), the Registrar has published the same in these terms: -"bangalore University sub: -. Ordinance governing the admission of students to the various courses in the Bangalore University. Read: - 1. Resolution on admission of students to Affiliated Colleges passed by the Syndicate at its 12th meeting held on 25th November, 1978. 2. University Notification No. SYN 1 ORD 78 dated 5th December, 1978. 3. Resolution of the Syndicate passed at its meeting held on 24-3-1979. Notification No. Syn 1 Ord 78 Banga- galore 24th March, 1979. In exercise of the powers conferred on it under S. 38 (4) of the Karnataka state Universities Act, 1976, the syndicate of the Bangalore University at its meeting held on 24-3-1979 resolved to direct that the University notification issued on 5th December, 1973 regarding Ordinance governing the admission of students to the various courses in the bangalore University shall have effect from the date of its Notification i. e. , 5th December, 1978. By Order, sd/- K. M. Kadam, Registrar I/c. " ( 6 ) IN answer to the letter dated 21-2-1979 of the Government, the Registrar on 30-4-1979 addressed a letter to government clarifying that the word 'all' was appropriate and the same has been give a effect to from 5-12-1978. But, strangely the Registrar in the last para of that letter stated that the approval of the Chancellor for the ordinance be obtained and communicated to him early. In this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, the petitioners while asserting that the College is a minority institution, have challenged the Notification dated 5-12-197e of the registrar (Ext. J), the order dated 5-1-1979 of the Vice-Chancellor and the notification dated 24-3-1979 of the registrar (Annexure R. 1) on diverse grounds. ( 7 ) IN a common return, respondent nos. 1 and 2 have denied that the College is a minority institution and have justified their actions which is supported by respondent No. 3 in a separate return filed by her. ( 8 ) THE factual position is that the academic year for which the direction was issued by the Vice-Chancellor has expired and that respondent No. 3 has not so far been admitted to the College. ( 8 ) THE factual position is that the academic year for which the direction was issued by the Vice-Chancellor has expired and that respondent No. 3 has not so far been admitted to the College. For these reasons prima facie the order has become incapable of compliance bui both sides did not take that stand and argued their respective cases on merits on the assumption that the order of the Vice-Chancellor is capable of compliance. ( 9 ) SHRI J. A, Sequeira, learned counsel for the petitioners, contended that the Ordinance made by the Syndicate of the University without conaulting the Academic Council was invalid. ( 10 ) SRIYUTHS S. Vjiayashankar and B. K. Venkata Krishna, learned counsel for the respondents, contended that the ordinance made by the Syndicate does not affect the courses of study and therefore consultation with the academic Council was unnecessary. ( 11 ) IN the first place, it is useful to examine whether the Syndicate has really made an Ordinance and, if not, as to who has made the Ordinance and its validity, ( 12 ) ON 25-11-1978 the Syndicate did not approve the draft Ordinance as placed before it but authorised the [vice-Chancellor to virtually re-examine the matter afresh and issue an ordinance. With the authority conferred on him by the Syndicate, the Vice- chancellor made an Ordinance on 5-12-1978 which has been notified by the registrar on the same day. The Ordinance made by the Vice-Chancellor and published by the Registrar is not a carbon copy of the draft Ordinance placed before the Syndicate. One of the sentences in the Resolution dated 25-11-1978 of the Syndicate viz, After discussion, the Ordinance as proposed by the Vice-Chancellor was accepted with several changes", besides being inconsistent with the sentences that follow, the said sentence, is factually incorrect, as there is no Ordinance incorporating the changes and approved by the Syndicate at that meeting. The events referred to also disclose that a modified ordinance was prepared and published only after the meeting of the syndicate. What is published by the registrar in truth is the Ordinance made by the Vice-Chancellor and not the Syndicate of the University. What then is the legal position is the next question that requires to be examined by me. The events referred to also disclose that a modified ordinance was prepared and published only after the meeting of the syndicate. What is published by the registrar in truth is the Ordinance made by the Vice-Chancellor and not the Syndicate of the University. What then is the legal position is the next question that requires to be examined by me. ( 13 ) UNDER Chapter IV of the Act, the syndicate is one of the authorities that is constituted for the proper functioning of the University. S. 24 provides as to who shall constitute the Syndicate. S. 25 of the Act enumerates the powers of the Syndicate. The Vice-Chancellor and the Registrar are not the authorities of the University but are only its officers (vide S. 9 of the Act ). ( 14 ) INDISPUTABLY, the Legislature which is otherwise competent to legislate has delegated its power of making 'ordinance' on the Syndicate. S. 38 confers the power of making ordinances on the Syndicate. The power conferred on the Syndicate by S. 38 of the act is exclusive and cannot be exercised by any other authority or an officer of the University. S. 38 of the Act or any other provision of the Act expressly or by necessary implication does not authorise the Syndicate to delegate its power on any other authority or officer, however, high he may be. It was not open to the Syndicate to abdicate its powers and confer that power on any other authority or officer of the University. The legal principle that a delegated authority cannot be re-delegated - delegata potestas non potest delegari - clearly prohibited the Syndicate from delegating its power to any other authority or officer. ( 15 ) A somewhat similar situation arose for consideration in Rex v. Holmes, (1943) 1 DLR 241. before Parker, J. of the county Court, Ontario. ( 16 ) ON 6-2-1942, one Earl Holmes sold a new tube to one A. W. Mitchell without a permit contrary to a regulation made by the Deputy Controller of Supplies. For the said contravention, Earl holmes was prosecuted before a Magistrate, who convicted and sentenced him to pay a fine of 100 Canadian dollars and costs of 16. 25 Canadian dollars or in the alternative to undergo two months imprisonment, which was challenged by him in an appeal before the county Court, Ontario, Canada. For the said contravention, Earl holmes was prosecuted before a Magistrate, who convicted and sentenced him to pay a fine of 100 Canadian dollars and costs of 16. 25 Canadian dollars or in the alternative to undergo two months imprisonment, which was challenged by him in an appeal before the county Court, Ontario, Canada. In that appeal, Earl Holmes, inter-alia contended that under the Act of the canadian Parliament called the Department of Munitions and Supply Act and other cognate Acts, the authority to frame the regulations was the governor in Council, but that authority in authorising the Deputy Controller of Supplies to make regulations and the regulations so made by him on such authority were ultra vires of the Act. In accepting the said plea of the appellant and invalidating the regulations, the conviction and sentence, Parker, j. enunciated the principle in these words: --"broom's maxim delegatus non potest clelegare has been accepted as a true statement of the law. It may be, and it is my opinion, that a person or authority to whom powers have been delegated may employ machinery to effectuate his or its order and regulations, but such person or authrity cannot in turn delegate its powers to legislate. Order C. S. 4f of the controller of Supplies is an attempt to legislate and no such authority was, or could be, under the legislation referred to, delegated to him. A very full and convincing discussion of 'tendencies in Canadian Administration" is found in the Constitution of Canada by W. P. M. Kennedy, professor of Law in the University of Toronto. In this chapter he gives many examples of delegation of legislative powers to Ministers and others, and the reasons for such, and he points out that it is well in this connection to remember Sir Henry maine's statement that substantive law is often concealed in the interstices of procedure. Order C. S. 4f is a perfect example of this. I think it is beyond dispute that parliament in enacting the Department of Munitions and Supply Act intended to delegate, and in fact only transferred or delegated to the governor in Council as an authority by merely declaring the policy or principle which it regards as desirable under the circumstances, without working out in detail the methods or courses to be adopted in accomplishing its purpose. In the present instance that power or authority was delegated to the governor in Council and the latter's function is thereby limited. Looking at the problem in Canada today one must realise that the Go gevernment in Canada cannot go on without the delegation of wide legislative authority to the executive, but one must also realise that that delegation cannot develop to the extent thai, our democratic Government blossoms into a bureaucracy and dictatorship. The delegation of powers is never dangerous in itself; the danger lies in the manner in which these powers are administered, to wit, in this instance by the attempt of the Governor in Council ,to pass on, without authority, to a third person, the powers delegated to it alone. In my opinion, Ss. 6, 8 and 11 of the order of C. S. 4f are ultra vires of the Controller of Supplies and are a nullity. For these reasons, also, I would allow the appeal. "in my opinion, the above enunciation of Parker, J. concurred by D. J. Hewitt in his treatise The Control of Delegated Legislation 1953 Edn. (vide pages 162 to 164 under the heading 'sub Delegation') correctly represents the legal position and I am in respectful agreement with the same. For these reasons, I hold that the Syndicate, in abdicating its powers and authorising the Vice-Chancellor to make the ordinance on the authority of which he has issued the impugned ordinance, published by the Registrar on 5-12-1978 are ultra vires of S, 38 of the Act and all actions taken thereon are liable to be struck down. ( 17 ) ON the above conclusion reached by me, an examination of other questions that arise in the case is wholly unnecessary. But as my order is subject to appeal, I deem it proper to notice and state my views oh the other related questions fully argued before me. For this purpose, I will assume that the ordinance had been validly made by the Syndicate. ( 18 ) SHRI Sequeira next contended that the resolution dated 24-3-1979 of the Syndicate and the Notification No. SYN 1 ORD 78 dated 24-3-1979 (An- nexure R. 1) bringing the ordinance into force from 5-12-1978 retrospectively are invalid. For this purpose, I will assume that the ordinance had been validly made by the Syndicate. ( 18 ) SHRI Sequeira next contended that the resolution dated 24-3-1979 of the Syndicate and the Notification No. SYN 1 ORD 78 dated 24-3-1979 (An- nexure R. 1) bringing the ordinance into force from 5-12-1978 retrospectively are invalid. Elaborating his contention, Shri Sequeira maintained that a subordinate legislative authority like the Syndicate had no power to fix a date from a retrospective date and validate the invalid action of the Vice- chancellor. In support of his contention, Shri Sequeira relied on the ruling of the Supreme Court in Cannanore spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Customs and Central Excise, AIR 1970 SC, 1950. and the rulings of this Court in india Sugars and Refineries Ltd. v. State of Mysore, AIR I960 Mys. 326. = 1960 Mys. L. J. 635. and g. Govindaraju v. State of Mysore, AIR 1963 Mys. 265. = 1963 Mys. L. J. Supp. 525. ( 19 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondents contended (1) that the ordinance takes effect from the date of its publication, (2) that the ordinance had not been given retrospective effect but operates prosp'ectively and (3) that the syndicate wag competent to appoint a date retrospectively. As the consideration of the contention urged by Shri sequeira, depends on the acceptance or rejection of the first two contentions urged by the learned counsel for the respondents, it is necessary to examine them first. ( 20 ) SHRI Vijayashankar's contention that the ordinance takes effect from the date of publication, is plainly opposed to S. 38 (4) of the Act. The ordinance made by the Syndicate comes into force from a date to be appointed by it. The power to make an ordinance and appoint a date from which date the same should take effect has been conferred exclusively on the Syndicate. So long as the Syndicate does not appoint a date, an ordinance made by it does not come into force at all. By mere publication, an ordinance made by the Syndicate will not come into force as in the case of certain other legislation. I therefore reject this contention of Shri Vijayashankar. So long as the Syndicate does not appoint a date, an ordinance made by it does not come into force at all. By mere publication, an ordinance made by the Syndicate will not come into force as in the case of certain other legislation. I therefore reject this contention of Shri Vijayashankar. ( 21 ) THE Notification published by the registrar on 5-12-78, does not state that the ordinance has been given effect to from the date of its publication or from any other date. In their petition, the petitioners had specifically urged that no date had been appointed in the said Notification and therefore the Vice-Chancellor had no power to issue any direction. Notices of the writ petition were served on the University on 22-1-1979. The Syndicate in its resolution dated 24-3-1979 on item No. 33, expressly states that the ordinance shall be deemed to have come into force from 5-12-1978. Even the Notification dated 24-3-1979 expressly states that the ordinance shall be effective from 5-12-1978. In the face of all these, I fail to see as to how Shri Vijayashankar can maintain that the ordinance has not been given retrospective effect and I therefore reject the same. ( 22 ) AS I have found that there is no merit in the two contentions urged by shri Vijayashankar, I now proceed to examine the contention of Shri sequeira. ( 23 ) AN ordinance made by the Syndicate is lequired to be submitted to the chancellor through the State Government within two weeks from the making of an ordinance. On such submission, the Chancellor has the power to examine the validity of such an ordinance suspend its operation and after receiving the comments of the syndicate if any, order the withdrawal of the order of suspension or disallow the same. Once an ordinance is suspended or disallowed by the Chancellor, it does not legally take effect and operate. The power of suspension and disallowance can be exercised by the Chancellor within four weeks of the receipt of the ordinance and if not exercised within that period, it is open to the Syndicate to give effect to such an ordinance. The Act, expressly or by necessary implication does not authorise the Syndicate to make an ordinance or appoint a date with retrospective effect. The Act, expressly or by necessary implication does not authorise the Syndicate to make an ordinance or appoint a date with retrospective effect. But the above requirements of S. 38 (4) of the Act, indicates that the Syndicate can make an ordinance and appoint a date prospectively and, not retrospectively. ( 24 ) IN Govindaraju's case, the meaning of the term retrospective legislation has been succinctly stated by a Division Bench of this court in these words: -"42. Before proceeding further, it is quite essential to ascertain what exactly is meant by 'retrospective legislation. ' The mere fact that a law or a rule looks back and takes into account certain events that have already taken place does not necessarily mean that the said law or rule operates or acts from a date anterior to its promulgation. A law or rule may take into account the previous events or facts but may, nevertheless, operate only prospectively as from the date of its promulgation. Perhaps a more accurate expression to be used to describe a law which acts or operates as from a date anterior to its promulgation would be "retroactive legislation" or ex post facto legislation" Such ex post facto legislation may either take away the rights created by previous transaction or validate what was in its inception invalid. Even when the rights acquired under previous transactions are taken away by a law, such law may leave in tact all the consequences of the rights previously acquired upto the date of its promulgation and render those rights ineffective only from the date of its promulgation. In sueh a case, it will be noticed that the law is not in the real sense of the term retroactive. Commonest form of ex post facto legislation that we come across is legislation which validates what was in its inception invalid. "it is true the decision of this Court in Govindaraju's case has been reversed by the Supreme Court, in b. N. Nagarajan v. State of Mysore, air 1966 SC 1942 . disagreeing with the view taken by this Court that the power of legislation conferred by the proviso to art. 309 of the Constitution on the governor was not subordinate legislation. But the meaning attached to the term retrospective legislation in govindaraju's case correctly states its meaning and is unexceptionable. disagreeing with the view taken by this Court that the power of legislation conferred by the proviso to art. 309 of the Constitution on the governor was not subordinate legislation. But the meaning attached to the term retrospective legislation in govindaraju's case correctly states its meaning and is unexceptionable. ( 25 ) IT is settled law that a subordinate legislative authority cannot make legislation retrospectively unless authorised by the Act. A subordinate legislative authority like the Syndicate cannot appoint a date retrospectively is also concluded by the ruling of the supreme Court in Income tax Officer, mleppy v. M. C. Ponnoose, AIR 1979 SC. 385. ( 26 ) IN Ponnoose's Case the facts in brief were these: Under the Indian income Tax Act, 1961, the Government of Kerala issued a Notification on 14-8-1963, authorising the Tahsildars to exercise the powers of tax recovery officers from 1-4-1962. Ponnoose and others, whose properties had been attached by the Tahsildars before the notification dated 14-8-1963 was issued by the Government of Kerala, challenged the validity of the Notification before the Kerala High Court, which was accepted by that court. On an appeal filed by the Revenue, the supreme Court affirming the decision of the Kerala ' High Court, stated the principle in these words: -"5. Now it is open to a sovereign legislature to enact laws which have retrospective operation. Even when the Parliament enacts retrospective laws such laws are - in the words of willes, J. in Phillips v. Eyre, (1870) 40 LJ QB 28 at page 37 - "no doubt prima facie of questionable policy, and contrary to the general principle that legislation by which the conduct of mankind is to be regulated ought, when introduced for the first time, to deal with future acts, and ought not to change the character of past transactions carried on upon the faith of the then existing law. " The courts will not, therefore, ascribe retrospectivity to new laws affecting rights unless by express words or necessary implication it appears that such was the intention of the legislature. The Parliament can delegate its legislative power within the recognised limits. Where any rule or regulation is made by any person or authority to whom such powers have been delegated by the legislature it may or may not be possible to make the same so as to give retrospective operation. The Parliament can delegate its legislative power within the recognised limits. Where any rule or regulation is made by any person or authority to whom such powers have been delegated by the legislature it may or may not be possible to make the same so as to give retrospective operation. It will depend on the language employed in the statutory provision which may in express terms or by necessary implication empower the authority concerned to make a rule or regulation with retrospective effect. But where no such language is to be found it has been held by the courts that the person or authority exercising subordinate legislative functions cannot make a rule, regulation or bye-law which can operate with retrospective effect. (See Subba Rao, J. , in Dr. Indramoni pyarelal Gupta v. W. R. Nathu (1963) 1 SCR 721 = (A. I. R. 1963 SC 274) - the majority not having expressed any different opinion on the point; Modi Food Products Ltd. , v. Commr. of Sales Tax, U. P. , AIR 1956 All 35 ; India Sugar Refineries ltd, v. State of Mysore AIR 1960 mys. 326 and Shivdev Singh v. State of Punjab, 61 PLR 514 = AIR 1959 pun 453 FB. "in my view, the above principle enunciated in ponnoose's case and reiterated in other cases like the Cannanore spinning and Weaving Mills Limited's case and Hukam Chand v. Union of india, (1973) 2 SCWR 129. is applicable to the apiointment of a date to be made by the syndicate under S. 38 (4) of the Act. In this view, it was not competent for the Syndicate to appoint a date retrospectively and therefore the resolution and the Notification dated 24. 3. 1979 being ultra vires of the Act are liable to be struck down. ( 27 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondents lastly contended that the power to issue a Notification prospectively includes the power to appoint a date retrospectively. In support of their contention, learned counsel for the respondents relied on various provisions of the Karnataka General clauses Act. 3. 1979 being ultra vires of the Act are liable to be struck down. ( 27 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondents lastly contended that the power to issue a Notification prospectively includes the power to appoint a date retrospectively. In support of their contention, learned counsel for the respondents relied on various provisions of the Karnataka General clauses Act. ( 28 ) AN examination of the provisions of the Karnataka General Clauses Act or the corresponding Central General clauses Act, does not authorise an authority to exercise the power of appointing a date retrospectively and validate an invalid action which can only be exercised by a competent legislature and not by a subordinate legislative authority like the Syndicate. In india Sugars and Refineries Ltd. 's case, approved by the Supreme Court in ponnoose's case, a similar argument was repelled by a Division Bench of this Court in these words:-"i am unable to hold that a power conferred by the Legislature on a subsidiary body e. g. Government, to issue notifications if couched in general language can be exercised retrospectively. On the other hand, i am of the opinion that such power. unless it is expressly stated that the same can be exercised retrospectively, can only be exercised prospectively. In other words, it is only those powers which are expressly conferred that can be exercised by the delegated authority. "for these reasons, I reject the contention urged for the respondents. ( 29 ) AS I have found that the ordinance and the Notification bringing the ordinance into effect are ultra vires of the Act and are liable to be struck down, the order made by the vice-Chancellor on 5-1-1979 on the authority of such an ordinance is also liable to be struck down. ( 30 ) BEFORE parting with the case, it is necessary to record that I have not heard the learned counsel for the parties on the other questions that have been raised in the writ petition. ( 31 ) IN the light of my above discussion, I quash the resolution dated 25-11-1978 of the Syndicate on item No. 21, the Notification No. SYN 1 ORD 78 dated 5-12-1978 issued by the Registrar (Ext. J) and the resolution of the syndicate dated 24-3-1979 on item No. 33 and the Notification No. SYN 1 ORD 78 dated 24-3-1979 (Annexure R 1) and the order No. ACA 1 R2 Med. J) and the resolution of the syndicate dated 24-3-1979 on item No. 33 and the Notification No. SYN 1 ORD 78 dated 24-3-1979 (Annexure R 1) and the order No. ACA 1 R2 Med. Adm. 99|78-79 dated 5-1-1979 (Ext. K) made by the Vice-Chancellor. ( 32 ) RULE issued is made absolute. ( 33 ) PETITIONERS are entitled to their , costs from respondent Nos. 1 and 2. Advocate's fee Rs. 100. --- *** --- .