JUDGMENT - Mohta V., J.: - There is only one common question of law which needs decision in these two writ petitions and hence their disposal by this common judgment. 2. Special Civil Application No. 248 of 1974 is at the instance of original owner of the disputed field property-petitioner No.1 Yeshwant and petitioner No. 2 Damodar the purchaser of a portion thereof. Special Civil Application No. 249 of 1974 is at the instance of petitioner No. 1 Yeshwant, the owner and petitioner No.2 Mahadeo the purchaser of we balance of the portion. The respondent Laxman is common in both the petitions, being an erstwhile tenant claiming rights in whole of the subject matter, namely, field Survey No. 134/1 measuring 9 acres and 29 gunthas of mouz Pimplod, Taluq Daryapur. District Amravali. 3. Though, in the Courts below there were some disputed facts, before me only undisputed facts are stated with a submission that the point arising should be determined on that basis only. Those facts are that right from the year 1951-52 the field property was in cultivating possession of the respondent. On 9-11-1956 a notice under section 9 of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951(hereinafter referred to as “the Berar Act”) was given by the- first petitioner to the respondent. This was a notice purporting to terminate the tenancy with effect from 1-4-1957. On that day, the respondent delivered possession of the property to the first petitioner voluntarly. On 30.4-1962, the first petitioner transferred area admeasuring 2 acres and 29 gunthas of the eastern side, north-south division to Damodar and on 3-9-1967 remaining portion was sold to petitioner Mahadeo. The respondent filed two applications under section 52 of the Bombay Tenancy and, agricultural Lands(Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958(hereinafter called as “the Bombay Act”) against the original land holder as well as the two purchasers making grievance that the landholder has ceased to cultivate the land personally as mentioned in the notice under section 9 of the Berar Act, and that he was entitled to the restoration of the possession as the sale had taken place without making his refusal in writing as required under section 52 of the Bombay Act. 4. 4. The tenancy Naib-Tahsildar, Daryapur, who tried both these cases together disposed of the application by a common order holding that the tenancy was not legally terminated under the provisions of section 9 of the Berar Act and therefore, section 52 of the Bombay Act could not be pressed into service. The respondent moved the Sub-Divisional Officer, Daryapur, in, the revisional jurisdiction and the two revisions came to be allowed by a common order dated 8-5-1973. On the basis of the view of this Court prevailing before 1971 as regards requirement of termination of tenancy under the Berar Act, the Sub-Divisional Officer held that the notice given under section 9 of the Berar Act had validly terminated the tenancy even without taking recourse to section 8(1), (g). It appears that the attention of the S. D. O. was invited to the case of(Smt. Joharabi v. Member M. R. T.)l 1971 Mh.L.J. 818(F. B.) wherein it was held that without the order of the Revenue Officer under section 8(1), (g) of the Berar Act, the tenancy could not be terminated. That no such order came to be passed was an admitted position: but the learned Such-Divisional Officer, Daryapur, held that inasmuch as this interpretation on combined effect of sections 8 and 9 of the Berar Act was not available on the dates on which Proceedings under section 52 of the Bombay Act were initiated, the interpretation subsequently made Could not come to the rescue of the landlord. 5. The three petitioners moved the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal under section 111 of the Bombay Act raising various grounds including that the Sub-Divisional Officer bad committed an error in not relying upon recent interpretation of law only because it was made ,subsequent to the filing of the application. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur has dealt with various aspects of the question but the point of law does not seem to have been touched. Mainly on the question that the landlord failed to collative the land personally application under section 52 of the Bombay Act came to be granted and the orders passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Daryapur, were maintained. Being aggrieved by these two orders, the landholder and the two, successors- in-title of the landholder have filed the present two writ petitions. 6. Mainly on the question that the landlord failed to collative the land personally application under section 52 of the Bombay Act came to be granted and the orders passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Daryapur, were maintained. Being aggrieved by these two orders, the landholder and the two, successors- in-title of the landholder have filed the present two writ petitions. 6. Shri Manohar, the learned counsel for the petitioners, has raised only one point and it is to the effect that the landlord had not taken possession of the property after terminating the tenancy of land under section 9 of the Berar Act as contemplated under section 52 of the Bombay Act as-a result that provision cannot be pressed into service by the landholder. Section. 52 of the Bombay Act reads as under :.- I “52.(1) Where after terminating the tenancy of any land under section 9 of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951, or under sections 38, 39 or 39-A of this Act, the landlord has taken possession of such land and he fails to use the land for the purpose specified in ,the notice given under the said section 9 or as the case may be, sections 38, 39 or 39-A within one year from the date on which he took possession or leased to use it at any time for any of the aforesaid purpoges within twelve years from the date on which he took such possession the landlord shall forthwith restore possession of the land to the tenant whose tenancy was terminated by him unless he has obtained from the tenant his refusal in writing to accept the tenancy on the same terms and conditions or has offered in writing to give possession of the land to the tenant on the same terms and conditions and the tenant has failed to accept the offer within three months of the receipt thereof: Provided that no refusal of the tenant shall be valid unless it has been verified before the Tahsildar in the prescribed manner. 2. After the tenant has recovered possession under sub-section(1) he shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, hold such land on the same terms and conditions on which he held it at the time his tenancy was terminated. 3. 2. After the tenant has recovered possession under sub-section(1) he shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, hold such land on the same terms and conditions on which he held it at the time his tenancy was terminated. 3. If the landlord has failed to restore possession of the land to the tenant as provided in sub-section(1), he shall be liable to pay such compensation to the tenant as may be determined by the Tahsildar for the loss suffered by the tenant on account of eviction. 4. If at any time the tenant makes an application to the Tahsildar and satisfied him that the landlord has failed to comply within a reasonable time with the provisions of sub-section(1), the tenant shall be entitled o~ a direction by the Tahsildar to obtain immediate possession of the land and to such compensation as may be awarded by the Tahsildar for any loss caused to the tenant by eviction and by failure on the part of the landlord to restore or give possession of the land to him as required by sub-section(1). 5. The provisions of this section shall not apply to a landlord who becomes a serving member of the armed forces; and on that account fails to use the land or ceases to use it, for the purpose specified in the notice referred to in sub-section(1) and within the period specified in that subsection.” The argument is that for the maintainability of the application under section 52 of the Bombay Act, it is necessary that there should be termination of tenancy in accordance with any of the provisions of the Tenancy Acts and the possession of the property must have been taken after that termination. Inasmuch as the possession had been handed over on 1-4-1957 the provisions of the Bombay Act will not be attracted and it will be necessary only to look into various provisions of the Berar Act to know how under that Act tenancy is terminated. Sections 8 and 9 in Chapter II of the Berar Act deal with the procedure and restrictions about termination of tenancy. Section 9(1) makes a mention that notwithstanding an) thing contained in section 8, the tenancy may be terminated by giving a three months notice in Waiting before the - commencement of the next agricultural year stating the reasons for such termination. Section 9(1) makes a mention that notwithstanding an) thing contained in section 8, the tenancy may be terminated by giving a three months notice in Waiting before the - commencement of the next agricultural year stating the reasons for such termination. If the tenancy is proposed to be terminated on the ground of personal cultivation, certain further requirements such as giving the description and area of the property etc. are to be followed. Provisions of this section operate “notwithstanding anything contained in section 8”. 7. Section 8(1), (g) of the Berar Act, however, provides that no tenancy can be terminated except under order of a revenue officer made on any of the grounds including the one contemplated under section 9. A debate was raised that because of the non-obstante clause in section 9, the tenancy terminated by giving a notice under section 9 only. Repealing this argument, Deshmukh J., as he then was, in the case of(Baburao Laxman Muley v. Shionath Mahadeo)2 1967 Mh.L.J. 670 has made the following abbreviations:- “Sub-section(1) of section 8 opens with non-obstante clause “notwithstanding any agreement, usage, decree or order of a Court of law”. In view of this provision it appears to me that the total bar on the right of a landlord to terminate the tenancy has been indicated, and the right to terminate the tenancy has been delegated to the Revenue Officer and that too for the specific causes mentioned in clauses(a) to (g). I would read section 8 as a complete bar to the landlords to terminate the tenancy merely as a matter of their volition. They are given a restricted right to apply to the Revenue Officer for termination of the tenancy, if anyone of the cause mentioned in clauses(a) to (g) are available to them for inducing the Revenue Officer to terminate the tenancy.” In the concluding part of the said judgment, it was held that unless and until order under section 8(1), (g) of the Berar Act is obtained, the tenancy cannot be terminated by giving only a notice under section <}(1). As there was some debate on the question, the matter was referred to the Full Bench of this Court and in the case of(Smt. Joharabai v. Member, M. R. T.)3 1971 Mh.L.J. 818, the aforesaid view was confirmed. 8. As there was some debate on the question, the matter was referred to the Full Bench of this Court and in the case of(Smt. Joharabai v. Member, M. R. T.)3 1971 Mh.L.J. 818, the aforesaid view was confirmed. 8. Section 9(3) of the Berar Act permits a tenant to challenge the notice on various grounds including the lack: of bona fides by applying before a Revenue Officer within 30 days from the date of the receipt of the notice either for a declaration that the notice was invalid or for permission to give some other land and sub-section(4) contemplates an enquiry into this matter. Thus, it was permissible to challenge the notice given by the landlord either in proceedings under section 8(1), (g) or in proceedings under section 9(3). If such a challenge was made in proceedings under section 9(3) of the Berar Act, it was not necessary for the landlord to start proceedings under section 8(1), (g) and if order was passed holding that the notice did not lack bona fides then also the tenancy was terminated in accordance with the Berar Act on the date of the passing of such an order. The Division Bench of this Court had occasion to deal with this question in the case of(Gopal Shioram Bhankhede v. Smt. Sagirabegum Kazi Mohinuddin)4 1975 Mh.L.J. 444. It was restated in this case that tenancy was not terminated only by giving notice under section 9(1) but after passing of the order in favour of the landholder either in proceedings under section 8(1), (g) or in proceedings under section 9(3). 9. Even if the various relevant provisions of the Bombay Act, namely, sections 36 and 38 are examined, it would be seen that the tenancy does not terminate only on giving a notice but the termination takes place only after the order. This aspect of the matter is also concluded by the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of(Harikisan Kanhaiyalal Pampa/ia v. Krishnaji Dhanaji Shalki)5 1976 Mh.L.J. 537. The Court observed as under :- “.....In the first place, even in terms of section 38, the termination of tenancy takes place on giving notice and making application and not on giving notice alone. Secondly, this only puts an end to contractual tenancy. The tenant still gets protection of the statute and such termination does not become effective till the date of order for possession. Secondly, this only puts an end to contractual tenancy. The tenant still gets protection of the statute and such termination does not become effective till the date of order for possession. Termination even cannot be said to have become operative strictly. Ordinary rule of rights getting crystallized on the date of application is inapplicable to proceedings under section 38 in view of the scheme under which rights do not get crystallized till the date of the order” Thus, the scheme of both the Acts and the underlying principles behind the relevant provisions of termination the tenancy appear to be that about the bona fides of a claim merely giving of the notice is not sufficient but satisfaction of a Revenue Officer about the bona fide is necessary. Even if no dispute is raised by the tenant, it is not permissible to the landlord to immediately act upon the notice but has to further apply to the Revenue Officer for obtaining order for terminating the tenancy. The purpose of the non-obstante clause in sub-section(1) of section 9 of the Berar Act appears to be only to confine its operation to the substantive provisions of section 8 which deal with the grounds on which permission to terminate the tenancy can be granted. Thus, the consistent accepted view is that under either of these Acts there is nothing like termination of tenancy simply by giving a notice, without obtaining the necessary order from the concerned Revenue Officers. This view of the matter being now unassailable, no doubt remains over the fact that in this particular case the tenancy was not terminated under section 9 of the Berar Act or under the provisions of section 38, 39 or 39-A of the Bombay Act. 10. Shri Manohar invited my attention to the Supreme Court decision in the case of(Shankar Madhoji v. Ghisuji)6 1972 Mh.L.J. 197. There is no doubt that this Supreme Court decision does not directly decide the controversy that is raised in this petition. However, there are certain observations made by the Supreme Court which are necessary to be extracted to throw light on the present controversy ;- “A fair reading of section 52 also, in our opinion, leads to the same conclusion. There is no doubt that this Supreme Court decision does not directly decide the controversy that is raised in this petition. However, there are certain observations made by the Supreme Court which are necessary to be extracted to throw light on the present controversy ;- “A fair reading of section 52 also, in our opinion, leads to the same conclusion. Section 52 provides for: (i) the tenancy being terminated under section 9 of the Berar Act; (ii) the landlord taking possession of such land on the basis of such termination of the tenancy; (iii) the landlord failing to use the land for the purpose specified in the notice under section 9 of the Berar Act; (iv) failure to use the land for the purpose mentioned in the notice within one year from the date on which he took possession; (v) the landlord ceasing to use the land for the purpose for which he obtains possession within 12 years of his taking possession...... .... The normal and reasonable construction to be placed upon section 52 is that it will apply only to cases of lands, the possession of which was obtained by the landlord under section 9 of the Berar Act ...........” In this connection, one can also look for guidance to the case of(Saraswatibai v. Bhikamchand)7 1966 Mh.L.J. 843(F B). and more particularly, the following observations:- “Now, section 52(1) comes into play under the following circumstances: (1) There has to be termination of the tenancy of any land under section 9 of the Berar Leases Act, or under section 38, 39 or 39A of the new Tenancy Act, and (2) taking of possession by the landholder in pursuance of the aforesaid order of determination of tenancy. It is the happening of the second circumstance that gives rise to the obligations cast on the landholder under sub-section(1) of section 52, and these obligations are two fold.” All these observations referred to above leave no room for doubt and clarify the position in law that for exercise of rights under section 52 of the Bombay Act the possession must have taken in pursuance of the termination as required under the law. 11. 11. The learned counsel for the respondent has argued that real intention behind section 52 was to give back the property to the tenant in case it is not utilised for the purpose for which it was taken back from him by the landlord, and thus this interpretation will ultimately lead to evasion of law. While it is true that on this interpretation it will be possible for the petitioner and others of his kind to retain the land in spite of their not using it for personal use, it cannot be said that any infringement of any provisions of the law has taken place. There is a well recognised distinction between “evading” and “infringement” of the law. Whether or not, law has been infringed will again depend upon what the law is and not upon a supposed intention behind it which is not expressed in the words of the statute. When the words are clear and unambiguous, natural meaning has to be given to them. No assumption of legislative intention can be made except from what is said in the enactment. No single argument has more weight in the Principles of Interpretation of Statute than its plain and literal meaning. The question of consequences, supposed intention underlying policy, equality etc. would be relevant only in case of two possible constructions of the statute. It is not permissible to assume particular intention first and then to search it in the words and then to interpret them on that hypothesis. Courts have no means to know the intention excepting through statute. Even if the intention of the statute is indicated but the words used do not admit of such interpretation, all that it can be said is that the intention has failed. Courts have no means to know the intention excepting through statute. Even if the intention of the statute is indicated but the words used do not admit of such interpretation, all that it can be said is that the intention has failed. I can do not better than extract the following passage from Halsburys Laws of England Second Volume fit page 499 :- “If the result of the interpretation of the statute by this rule is not what the Legislature intended, it is for the Legislature to amend the statute construed rather than, for the Courts to attempt necessary amendment by investing the plain language with some other than its natural meaning to produce a result which it is thought, the Legislature must have intended.” Thus, it wilt be seen that it is one thing to say that the law has been evaded and quite another to say that it is infringed. In this case, it also cannot be said that the petitioner has evaded any law by any conscience action though the net result of the whole thing can be that he gets advantage of the provision as it stands. Even if it is assumed that the evasion has been possible, it cannot be prevented as in my view the language of section 52 is quite plain and does not cover cases of restoration of land where possession is taken by the landlord otherwise than after termination of tenancy in terms of provisions of either of the two Tenancy Acts referred to in the provision. 12. My attention was also invited by Shri Chandurkar to a decision of this Court in the case of(Eknath Namdev v. Kondba Laxman)8 1975 Mh.L.J. 114, in support of the proposition that he canvassed that no indulgence could be shown under Article 227 to the person who proposes to take advantage of his own wrong. Reliance was placed more particularly on the following observations :- “The powers of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India are intended to be used only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate Courts and Tribunal within their authority and not merely correcting the errors. In the present case the landlords want to take illegal possession of the suit property from the respondent tenant. In the present case the landlords want to take illegal possession of the suit property from the respondent tenant. They themselves had instituted proceedings under section 36(2) read with section 33 or section 39 of the Act for resumption of the suit field. Thereafter instead of cultivating the suit field personally they sold away the suit property and now a contention is being raised before this Court that the proceedings instituted by the landlords and the order obtained therein by them itself were illegal and without jurisdiction. In substance this practically means that the purchasers who entered into the shoes of landlords want to take the advantage of their own wrong. In my opinion, such a course is not permissible and the subsequent purchasers should be held to be bound by the Acts or omissions of the original landlords. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, this is not a fit case wherein this Court should exercise its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in favour 01 such petitioners.” These considerations for denying a relief, in my view, will be somewhat extraneous to a case where relief is based on a constitution of a statute and not on any action of the: petitioners. Apart from this, the principle enunciated will have no application to the facts of the present case at all. 13. Full Bench decision of the Nagpur High Court reported in(Namdeo v. Gangubai)9 1952 N.L.J. 1, was also relied upon and on the basis of certain observations made therein it was canvassed that if a statute requires one way of enforcement of a right for getting a relief, it does not mean that privately by consent the self-same result cannot be achieved. This was a case of pre emption right as conferred by Chapter XIV of the Berar Land Revenue Code and Interpretation of the word “enforceable” in section 174 of the Code fell for consideration in that case. Section 18l of the Code provided that the right of preemption may be enforced by a suit. There was no prohibition against private recognition of the rights and in that back ground it was held that the right could be enforced either privately or through a civil suit. Such is not the case with either of the Tenancy Acts with which we are concerned. There was no prohibition against private recognition of the rights and in that back ground it was held that the right could be enforced either privately or through a civil suit. Such is not the case with either of the Tenancy Acts with which we are concerned. Indeed, ;a several private transactions are not recognised and are considered to be null and void. The whole object i,; to give protection to the tenants not only against the landlords but also against themselves. Such being the position, the ratio decidendi in that case is in applicable to the present petitioners. 14. Is it then that the landlord can obtain possession on the ground of (bonafide personal cultivation privately or other wise than via provision of .section 9 of the Berar Act and can still commit breach of the obligation to cultivate? Is the tenant remediless in such a situation? Answer to these questions will depend upon various factors. To me, it appears toot be is not helpless. However, the only question presently before us is whether his rights 10 get back the property can be worked out in terms of section 52 of the Bombay Act and to that my answer is No. 15. In the result, both the petitions are allowed by quashing the impugned orders passed by the Sub- Divisional Officer as well as the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. Consequently, the application by the respondent /Under section 52 of the Bombay Act stands dismissed. No order as to costs under the circumstances. Petitions allowed. -----