S. RANGANATHAN ( 1 ) SECTION 5 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to simply as s. 5 ), confers original jurisdiction on the High Court of Delhi in the following terms: Jurisdiction of High Court of Delhi: (1) The High Court of Delhi shall have, in respect of the territories for the time being included in the Union Territory of Delhi, all such original, appellate and other jurisdiction as, under the law in force immediately before the appointed day, is exercisable in respect of the said territories by the High Court of Punjab. (2) Notwithstanding anything. contained in any law for the time being in force, the High Court of Delhi shall also have in respect of the said territories ordinary original civil jurisdiction in every suit the value of which exceeds fifty thousand rupees. "this Civil Revision petition raises the interesting question as to whether, in view, of the above provision, after the coming into existence of the Delhi High Court, an application under Section 31 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 (hereinafter briefly referred to as the Act ), where the amount remaining due to the Financial Corporation concerned exceeds Rs. 50,000. 00, should be filed only in the High Court and not in the Court of the District Judge or Additional District Judge as before. ( 2 ) A brief factual background may also be necessary as some reference to the factual position was also made in the course of the arguments. The Parkash Playing Cards Manufacturing Company, ( the Petitioner ) had been advanced considerable amounts of money by the Delhi Financial Corporation ( the Corporation ). A sum of Rs. 67,196. 92 and further interest is claimed by the Corporation as payable by the petitioner. The Corporation therefore, made an application under Section 31 of the Act before the District Judge which was registered as Civil Suit No. 79 of 1976 and assigned for disposal to the Additional District Judge. On 12-10-1976 the Additional District Judge passed an order in favour of the Corporation for the amount claimed and directed that the same should be paid in monthly instalments of Rs. 2,000. 00 each commencing from 31-12-1976. The Court also drew up a decree in terms of the order. On 12-10-1976 the Additional District Judge passed an order in favour of the Corporation for the amount claimed and directed that the same should be paid in monthly instalments of Rs. 2,000. 00 each commencing from 31-12-1976. The Court also drew up a decree in terms of the order. Dissatisfied with the order, the Corporation preferred an appeal to the Delhi High Court which was registered as F. A. O. No. 15/77. There was a compromise in the High Court, the order of the lower court was confirmed but the terms of payment were altered in respects which are not now material. The petitioner not having paid its dues, the Corporation filed an application in Suit No. 79/76 for execution of the "decree" passed in the suit, as modified by the High Court, which has been treated as an execution matter in the suit. It is at this stage that the petitioner put forward an objection for the first time that the "decree" sought to be executed had not been passed by a competent court on the ground that only the High Court could have entertained and dealt with the application under Section 31 as the monetary claim of the Corporation was in excess of Rs. 50,000. This contention has been rejected by the Additional District Judge and hence the present revision. ( 3 ) IN order to succeed in his contention, the petitioner must first show that the proceedings initiated by an application under Section 31 of the Act constitute a "suit" the value of which exceeds Rs. 50,000, within the meaning of Section 5. For a proper understanding of the nature and scope of the proceedings outlined in Sections 31 and 32, it is first better to have broad perspective of the object and purposes of the Act itself. The Act was enacted by Parliament with a view to enabling State Governments to establish Finance Corporations tor enhancing the pace of industrialisation by providing credit on easy terms tor setttng up industrial concerns and/or for expanding the activities of the existing industrial concerns. As a considerable part of the funds of the Corporation are Government or public funds, the Act provides certain speedy procedures to avoid prolonged litigation and also confers wide powers on the Corporation which will enable it to realise the amounts due to it quickly. As a considerable part of the funds of the Corporation are Government or public funds, the Act provides certain speedy procedures to avoid prolonged litigation and also confers wide powers on the Corporation which will enable it to realise the amounts due to it quickly. Section 25 enables the Financial Corporation to carry on and transact any of the businesses set out therein, which include guaranteeing on such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon: (I) loans raised by industrial concerns which are repayable within a period not exceeding 20 years and are floated in the public market; or (ii) loans raised by industrial concerns from Scheduled Banks or State Co-operative Banks. It can also underwrite the issue of stocks, shares, bonds or debentures by an industrial concern. The Corporation can either guarantee the loans raised by the industrial concern or may even itself grant a loan on such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon between the Corporation and the industrial concern. Section 29 confers upon the Corporation in case of default by the industrial concern, the right to take over the management or. possession or both of the industrial concern as well as the right to transfer by way of lease or sale and realise the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned to the Corporation and any transfer of property made by the Corporation in exercise of the power conferred by Section 29 will vest in it all rights in the property transferred as if the transfer had been made by the owner of the property. Section 30 empowers the Corporation to call for the immediate repayment of the entire loan or advance from the industrial concern superseding the earlier instalment basis agreed upon. Section 31 prescribes a special procedure for enforcement of claims by the Corporation which is without prejudice to its right of direct action under Section 29 of the Act or Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 31 prescribes a special procedure for enforcement of claims by the Corporation which is without prejudice to its right of direct action under Section 29 of the Act or Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act. It comes into operation where an industrial concern: (I) In breach of any agreement, makes any default in repayment of any loan or advance or any instalment thereof or in meeting its obligations in relation to any guarantee given by the Corporation; or (ii) Otherwise fails to comply with the terms of its agreement with the Corporation; or (iii) Where the Corporation requires an industrial concern to make immediate repayment of any loan or advance under Sec. 30 and the industrial concern fails to make such repayment. It enables the Corporation to apply to the District Judge within the limit of whose jurisdiction, the industrial concern carries on the whole or a substantial part of its business praying for one or more of the following three reliefs: (A) for an order tor the sale of the property pledged etc. as security for the loan or advance; or (b) for an ad interim injunction restraining the industrial concern from transferring or removing its machinery, plant or equipment from the premises of the industrial concern without the permission of the Board, where such removal is apprehended. Sub-clause (2) provides that the application shall state: (A) the nature and extent of the liability of the industrial concern to the Corporation; (b) the ground on which the application is made; and (c) such other particulars as may be prescribed. No other particulars have, however, been prescribed as denned in the Act. Section 32 is important for the purposes of the present case and needs to be extracted in full: Section 32. No other particulars have, however, been prescribed as denned in the Act. Section 32 is important for the purposes of the present case and needs to be extracted in full: Section 32. Procedure of District Judge in respect of applications under S. 31 (1) When the application is for the reliefs mentioned in Clauses (a) and (c) of subsection (1) of Section 31, the District judge shall pass an ad interim order attaching the security, or so much of the property of the industrial concern as would on being sold realise in his estimate an amount equivalent in value to the outstanding liability of the industrial concern to the Financial Corporation, together with the costs of the proceedings taken under Section 31, with or without an ad interim injunction restraining the industrial concern from transferring or removing its machinery, plant or equipment. (2) When the application is for the relief mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 31, the District Judge shall grant an ad interim injunction restraining the industrial concern from transferring or removing its machinery, plant or equipment and issue a notice callingupon the industrial concern to show cause, on a date to be specified in the notice, why the management of the industrial concern should not be transferred to the Financial Corporation. (3) Before passing any order under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the District Judge may, if he thinks fit, examine the officer making the application. (4) At the same time as he passes an order under sub-section (1), the District Judge shall issue to the industrial concern a notice accompanied by copies of the order, the application and the evidence, if any, recorded by him calling upon it to show cause on a date to be specified in the notice why the ad interim order of attachment should not be made absolute or the injunction confirmed. (5) If no cause is shown on or before the date specified in the notice under subsections (2) and (4), the District Judge shall forthwith make the ad interim order absolute and direct the sale of the attached property or transfer the management of the industrial concern to the Financial Corporation or confirm the injunction. (5) If no cause is shown on or before the date specified in the notice under subsections (2) and (4), the District Judge shall forthwith make the ad interim order absolute and direct the sale of the attached property or transfer the management of the industrial concern to the Financial Corporation or confirm the injunction. (6) If cause is shown, the District Judge shall proceed to investigate the claim of the Financial Corporation in accordance with the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in so far as such provisions may be applied thereto. (7) After making an investigation under sub-section (6), the District Judge may (a) confirm the order of attachment and direct the sale of the attached property; (b) vary the order of attachment so as to release a portion of the property from attachment and direct the sale of the remainder of the attached property; (c) release the property from attachment; (d) confirm or dissolve the injunction or (e) transfer the management of the industrial concern to the Financial Corporation or reject the claim made in this behalf: Provided that when making an order under Clause (c), the District Judge may make such further orders as he thinks necessary to protect the interests of the Financial Corporation and may apportion the costs of the proceedings in such manner as he thinks fit: Provided further that unless the Financial Corporation intimates to the District Judge that it will not appeal against any order releasing any property from attachment, such order shall not be given effect to, until the expiry of the period fixed under sub-section (9) within which an appeal may be preferred or, if any appeal is preferred, unless the High Court otherwise directs until the appeal is disposed of. (8) An order of attachment or sale of property under this section shall be carried into effect as far as practicable in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the attachment or sale of property in execution of a decree as if the Financial Corporation were the decree-holder. (8) An order of attachment or sale of property under this section shall be carried into effect as far as practicable in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the attachment or sale of property in execution of a decree as if the Financial Corporation were the decree-holder. (8a) An order under this section transferring the management of an industrial concern to the Financial Corporation shall be carried into effect, as far as may be practicable, in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the possession of immovable property or the delivery of movable property in execution of a decree, as if the Financial Corporation were the decree-holder. (9) Any party aggrieved by an order under sub-section (5) or sub-section (7) may, within thirty days from the date of the order, appeal to the High Court and upon such appeal the High Court, may, after hearing the parties, pass such orders thereon as it thinks proper. (10) Where proceedings for liquidation in respect of an industrial concern have commenced before an application is made under sub-section (1) of Section 31, nothing in this section shall be construed as giving to the Financial Corporation any preference over the other creditors of the industrial concern not conferred on it by any other law. (11) The functions of a District Judge under this section shall be exercisable (a) in a presidency town, where there is a city civil court having jurisdiction, by a Judge of that Court and in the absence of such Court, by the High Court and (b) elsewhere also by an Additional District Judge or by any Judge of the principal court of Civil jurisdiction. " ( 4 ) IT is in pursuance of the above provisions that the respondents filed the application before the Additional District Judge which, it is now said, should have been filed in this High Court. The first contention of Shri Andley is that the word suit has not been defined anywhere and that in the context of a legislation conferring jurisdiction on a High Court it should be given a very wide and liberal interpretation and that there is no reason to restrict the scope of its ambit by excluding an application of the present type. He points out that though a suit is normally instituted by filing a plaint, the word plaint is not defined anywhere, further Section 26 of the Code of Civil Procedure also permits the institution of a suit in any other prescribed manner. In a proceeding under Section 32, the Court has to go into all questions of fact and law that may be raised by the mortgagor. in defence to the application made by the Corporation. He may take up any plea such as that the deed has not been executed by it, that the deed (loan), has not been advanced as stated in the document; that the document is liable to be set aside on grounds of fraud, mistake or misrepresentation; that the entire or a substantial part of the money had been paid back and so on. He can raise all the pleas which are open to a mortgagor in a mortgage suit brought against him by the mortgagor. When any such claim is put forward by the mortgagor, the court has to decide the same in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to the extent possible. In other words, the court has to adjudicate upon issues on the same lines as in a regular suit instituted by the Corporation to enforce the mortgage. Though the section purports to restrict the nature of the reliefs claimable by the Corporation, before the Court can pass any order granting or revising or rejecting any part of the claim of the Corporation, it has necessarily to adjudicate upon all the issues raised by the mortgagor including issues relating to the genuineness, validity and extent of the claim. He, therefore, contends that though this is framed as a petition seeking summary relief, it is in fact nothing short of a suit filed by the Corporation for recovering the amounts due to it under the mortgage. ( 5 ) THE argument of learned counsel appears plausible and attractive but I do not think it can be accepted. The word suit has no doubt not been denned anywhere and is a word of very wide import. The dictionary meanings of the word are so comprehensive as to take in any request to any person, in particular, to a Court of Law or tribunal for redress. In law, it means, vide Mukherjee, Law Lexicon, p. 529. "suit. The word suit has no doubt not been denned anywhere and is a word of very wide import. The dictionary meanings of the word are so comprehensive as to take in any request to any person, in particular, to a Court of Law or tribunal for redress. In law, it means, vide Mukherjee, Law Lexicon, p. 529. "suit. suit in its common parlance is a term of wide amplitude. Broadly, a "suit" is a proceeding in a court of justice for the enforcement of a right denoting a legal proceeding of a civil kind. It is a proceeding in a Court according to the forms of law to enforce the remedy to which a party deems itself entitled. Lord Coke defines a suit to be "actio nihil aliud est quam jus prosequendi in judicio quod alicui debetur" meaning "an action is nothing else than the right of pursuing in a court of justice, that which is due to one". Blackstone simply says that a "suit" is a legal demand of one s rights. In its generic sense, a "suit" is the pursuit or prosecution of some claim. The term "suit" in its comprehensive sense may be treated as applying to any original proceedings in a court of justice by which a party pursues the remedy which the law grants him. The modes of proceedings may be various depending upon the different stages in the litigation, that is, proceedings in the original court, court of appeal, proceedings in the nature of review or revision and execution proceedings. The legal signification of the word "suit" is very broad, and the term has also a much narrower meaning when it is examined in the procedural sense. "however, it is seen that the expression derives colour from its setting and has been interpreted in different ways in different legislative contexts. In Kirpa Singh (AIR 1928 Lah 627), a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court pointed out that the words "suit, proceeding" and words of a similar connotation "have different meanings in different statutes and it is not possible to lay down a general rule of interpretation which would be applicable to all cases. In each particular case the question has to be examined in reference to the context and that meaning is to be preferred which will best fit in with it". In each particular case the question has to be examined in reference to the context and that meaning is to be preferred which will best fit in with it". The word has received a liberal interpretation in the context of Section 9 of the Letters Patent of the Chartered High Courts vide Harikishan Lal v. People s Bank, AIR 1936 Lah 608 and People s Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sardul Singh, AIR 1961 Pandh 87 where the High Court exercisedits extraordinary jurisdiction to transfer proceedings in miscellaneous and company matters to itself. Again in construing beneficial provisions of a legislation like the U. P. Agriculturists Relief Act, 1934 (See Balram Singh v. Dudh Nath, AIR 1949 All 100) or the Usurious Loans Act (See Public Prosecutor v. Basheer AIR 1966 Mad 325 ) where the object is to relieve certain classes of people in all proceedings of civil character, the word is given a very wide interpretation. On the other hand, it has been pointed out that every judicial proceeding cannot be termed a suit (see Premnath s case AIR 1963 Punj 62) and that the word "ordinarily" meant and apart from some context must be taken to mean, a civil proceeding instituted by the presentation of a plaint (Hansraj Gupta s case AIR 1933 PC 63 ). ( 6 ) I do not think the context of Section 5 warrants the wide interpretation. This section makes provision for the exercise of ordinary original civil jurisdiction by the High Court. In this context, what it provides for is clearly in regard to ordinary civil suits in the normal connotation of the term, the provision being that, if the value of their subject-matter exceeds Rs. 50,000 they should be filed in the High Court instead of the District Court. Such suits are initiated by the filing of a plaint (Order IV, Rule 1 ). It should contain several details and particulars one of which is value of the subject-matter (vide Order VII, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code ). An application under Section 31 carries the little information provided for in Section 31 (2) and does not contain the several details prescribed for a plaint under the Code of Civil Procedure. It should contain several details and particulars one of which is value of the subject-matter (vide Order VII, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code ). An application under Section 31 carries the little information provided for in Section 31 (2) and does not contain the several details prescribed for a plaint under the Code of Civil Procedure. No doubt, Section 26 of the Civil Procedure Code permits the initiation of a suit in a manner other than by the filing of a plaint but it should be in a manner prescribed in the rules framed under the Code of Civil Procedure, (see Ss. 2 (16) and 2 (18) ). For example, one may refer to the filing of an application under Order 33 which will itself amount to the institution of a suit when permission is accorded to the applicant to sue as an indigent person, (Order XXXIII, Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code ). But an application under Section 31 of the Act cannot be treated as a suit by virtue of the language of Section 26, Code of Civil Procedure. Again an application under Section 31 available to the Corporation is in addition to its right of regular suit, if it wishes to file one, on the basis of the mortgage. In an application under Section 31, the Corporation cannot ask for a personal decree against the mortgagors, seek relief against the guarantors, or implead all parties that may be necessary to effectively dispose of all the claims of the Corporation against the mortgagors. It is a provision for a quick and expeditious but limited relief and it would not be correct to describe the value of the property mortgaged or the amount due and outstanding to the Corporation on a mortgage as the "value of its subject matter. " ( 7 ) THAT an application under Section 31 cannot be properly described as a suit is clear from the decision of the Supreme Court in the Gujarat State Financial Corporation case ( AIR 1978 SC 1765 ) relied on by Shri Baweja, though that case was decided in the context of the Court-fees Act. " ( 7 ) THAT an application under Section 31 cannot be properly described as a suit is clear from the decision of the Supreme Court in the Gujarat State Financial Corporation case ( AIR 1978 SC 1765 ) relied on by Shri Baweja, though that case was decided in the context of the Court-fees Act. In that case, the Corporation had filed several applications under Section 31 (1) against several industrial concerns, and paid a fixed courtfee of 65 paise on each of them on the basis of Article 1 (c) of Schedule II of the Bombay Court-fees Act. This was upheld by one District Judge on the ground that it was in the nature of an execution application. But other District Judges and, on revision, the High Court accepted the contention of the State that the application would be governed either by Article 1 of Schedule I as it was in the nature of a plaint or at any rate by Article 7 of Schedule I which provided for an ad valorem court-fee on an application made for obtaining substantive relief which is capable of being valued in terms of monetary gain or prevention of monetary loss because to all intents and purposes the application was one for recovery of the outstanding claim of the Corporation. The Supreme Court reversed this decision. After surveying the scheme and relevant provisions of the Act, the Court dealt with the claim for ad valorem court-fee under Article 1 of Schedule I on the basis that the application is a plaint and observed: "section 31 (1) prescribes a special procedure for enforcement of claims by the Financial Corporation. The Corporation is to make an application for the reliefs set out in Section 31 (1 ). The reliefs that a Court can grant under Section 31 (1) are the sale of the property mortgaged, etc, to a Financial Corporation as security for the loan or advance; transfer of the management of the industrial concern to the Financial Corporation, restraining the industrial concern from transferring or removing its machinery or plant or equipment from the premises of the industrial concern without the permission of the Board of the Financial Corporation. An application for such a relief is certainly not a plaint in a suit for recovery of mortgage money by sale of mortgaged property. An application for such a relief is certainly not a plaint in a suit for recovery of mortgage money by sale of mortgaged property. On a breach of an agreement by an industrial concern the Corporation can seek one or more of the three reliefs set out in S. 31 (1 ). If the Corporation seeks the relief of transferring the management of the industrial concern to the Financial Corporation it could hardly be said that the application purports to be a plaint for recovering the mortgage money by sale of mortgaged property. It would be inappropriate to say that on analogy an application under Section 31 (1) is something akin to a suit by a mortgagee to recover mortgage money by sale of mortgaged property. At any rate, in an application under Section 31 (1) the Corporation does not and cannot pray for a decree for its outstanding dues. It can make an application for one of the three reliefs, none of which, if granted, results in a money decree, or decree for recovery of outstanding loan or advance. Section 31 (1) of the Act, in the circumstances, therein set out, permits the Corporation to seek one or more of the three reliefs therein stated. It is difficult to comprehend that merely the form of relief would attract one or the other Article of Court-fees Act. If relief of sale of mortgaged property is sought which permits an argument that the application is nothing but a suit for realising mortgage money by sale of mortgaged property and, therefore, ad valorem court-fees is payable, then what would be the nature of the application when instead of sale of mortgaged property the relief asked for is transfer of the management of the industrial concern or an interim injunction restraining the industrial concern from transferring or removing its machinery, plant or equipment from the premises of the industrial concern without the permission of the Board? In the last men tioned two cases the relief is incapable of any monetary evaluation. The High Court got over this difficult question by merely observing that this need not be answered in the petitions before the High Court. In the last men tioned two cases the relief is incapable of any monetary evaluation. The High Court got over this difficult question by merely observing that this need not be answered in the petitions before the High Court. Frankly speaking, they shed some light on the nature of the proceedings contemplated by Section 31, and Section 32 of the Act clearly points to the conclusion that the proceedings are not in the nature of a money recovery proceedings. Article 1 of Schedule I would, therefore, not be attracted and we must say in fairness to Mr. D. V. Patel, learned counsel for the respondent State of Gujarat who specifically stated that the application would not fall under Article 1 of Schedule I but it would be governed by Article 7 of Schedule I. "it was then urged that, in an application under Section 31, whatever the nature of the relief claimed, thesubstance of the matter was that the Corporation was seeking to recover the loan by the sale of the mortgaged property and thus sought to make a monetary gain or prevent a monetary loss. Dealing with this, the Court observed : "what then is the nature of proceedings contemplated by Section 31 (1) if it is not a suit by the mortgagee for recovery of mortgage money by sale of mortgaged property? Section 31 would to some extent provide a clue to this question. On an application under S. 31 (1) being made it is obligatory upon the Court to make an interim order attaching the security with or without interim injunction restraining the industrial concern from transferring or removing its plant, machinery or equipment without the permission of the Board of the Corporation. If the relief claimed in the application is transfer of the management of the industrial concern to the Corporation it is obligatory upon the District Judge to grant an ad interim injunction restraining the industrial concern from transferring or removing its machinery, plant or equipment. In either event a notice notifying the industrial concern to show cause why the order should not be made absolute is required to be served upon the industrial concern. In either event a notice notifying the industrial concern to show cause why the order should not be made absolute is required to be served upon the industrial concern. It was said that if cause is shown by the industrial concern it is obligatory upon the District Judge to investigate the claim of the Financial Corporation in accordance with the provision contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in so far as such provisions may be applied thereto. The contention is that once an industrial concern shows cause and contests the application of the Corporation there arises a lis between the parties which would include the investigation of the monetary claim of the Corporation and per se it would be a suit between the mortgagee and the mortgagor in which the ultimate relief is sale of mortgaged property for repayment of the mortgage money. Sub-sec. (6) of Sec. 32 of the Act has to be read in the context in which it is placed. The claim of the Corporation is not the monetary claim to be investigated though it may become necessary to specify the figure for the purpose of determining how much of the security should be sold. But the investigation of the claim does not involve all the contentions that can be raised in a suit. The claim of the Corporation is that there is a breach of agreement or default in making repayment of loan or advance or instalment thereof and, therefore, the mortgaged property should be sold. It is not a money claim. The contest can be that the jurisdictional fact which enables the Corporation to seek the relief of sale of property is not available to it or no case is made out for transfer of management of the industrial concern. Sub-section (7) of Section 32 prescribes what reliefs can be given after investigation under sub-section (6) is made, and it clearly gives a clue to the nature of contest under sub-section (6), sub-section (8) of Section 32 only prescribes the mode and method for executing the order of attachment or sale of property as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. Sub-sections (6), (7) and (8) of Section 32 read together would give an opportunity to the industrial concern to appear and satisfy the District Judge that the situation envisaged by Section 31 (1) has not arisen and the relief should not be granted. In the absence of a provision giving such an opportunity to the industrial concern to whose detriment the order is required to be made a serious question may arise about the constitutional validity of the procedure prescribed under Section 31 (1) inasmuch as it would be violative of principles of natural justice and that too in a proceeding in a Court of Law. The provision contained in sub-section (6) does not expand the contest in the application made under Section 31 (1) as to render the application to be a suit between a mortgagee and the mortgagor for sale of mortgaged property. If that were so, the Corporation would not be limited to specified reliefs only and if the contract permits it may seek to enforce personal liability of mortgage which it cannot enforce in an application under S. 31 (1 ). It may be, as contended by Mr. Patel, that in the ultimate analysis the result would be that the property will be sold for repayment of the loan or advance taken by the industrial concern from the Corporation but it could not be said that it is a substantive relief claimed by the Corporation which can be valued in terms of the monetary gain or prevention of monetary loss as envisaged by Article 1 of Schedule I of Court-fees Act. The substantive relief in an application under Section 31 (1) is something akin to an application for attachment of property in execution of a decree at a stage posterior to the passing of the decree. We are unable to appreciate the view taken by the High Court that the proceeding is not in the nature of execution of a decree because the question of enforcement of the order of attachment or sale would only arise after the same is made absolute under sub-section (7 ). We are unable to appreciate the view taken by the High Court that the proceeding is not in the nature of execution of a decree because the question of enforcement of the order of attachment or sale would only arise after the same is made absolute under sub-section (7 ). One has to look at the whole conspectus of provisions in Section 32 coupled with the nature of relief sought under Section 31 (1) and it becomes clear that special provision is made for certain types of reliefs that can be obtained by a Corporation by an application under Section 31 (1) which could not be styled as substantive relief tor repayment of mortgage money by sale of mortgaged property. Nor can it be said to be a proceeding to obtain substantive relief capable of being valued in terms of monetary gain or prevention of monetary loss. The form of the application, the nature of the relief, the compulsion to make interim order, the limited enquiry contemplated by sub-section (6) of Section 32 and the nature of relief that can be granted and the manner of execution clearly show that the application under Section 31 (1) is neither a plaint as contemplated by Article 1 of Schedule I nor an application in the nature of a plaint as contemplated by Art. 7 of Schedule I of Court-fees Act. "it is no doubt true that the Court was considering a taxation matter but that consideration, in my view, will not affect the Court s analysis of the nature of the application and the observations that it is not in the nature of a plaint and that its subject matter is not capable of valuation in terms of money. Shri Baweja also pointed out that the language of Section 32 (6) itself indicates the limited scope of an application under S. 32. According to him, it is open to a respondent Corporation in such an application to take only such pleas as are relevant to the reliefs asked for by the Corporation and that the scope of the enquiry in such an application cannot be enlarged to that of a regular suit for recoveries of money due under the mortgage. According to him, it is open to a respondent Corporation in such an application to take only such pleas as are relevant to the reliefs asked for by the Corporation and that the scope of the enquiry in such an application cannot be enlarged to that of a regular suit for recoveries of money due under the mortgage. Section 32 (6) advisedly used the word investigate which should be interpreted in the same manner as the same expression used in the context of Order XXI, Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as itstood before the recent amendments ). That provision has been interpreted (vide Nalinkant Bhanushanker Dave v. Hiralal Amratlal Parekh AIR 1959 Bom 87 ) to contemplate only a summary investigation and parties will be referred to a separate suit if an adjudication on the basis of title etc. becomes necessary. Shri Baweja referred me to the recent amendments to those provisions and the Statement of the Objects and Reasons therefor (vide Chitaley, Code of Civil Procedure, 9th Edition, Vol. 3, page 980) and pointed out that the amendment was intended to avoid the multiplicity of suits that became necessary under the unamended provision. There is a great force in this argument, particularly in the light of the observations of the Supreme Court. I am, therefore, of opinion that the first contention of Shri Andley cannot be accepted. ( 8 ) SHRI Andley pointed out that an application for leave to institue a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an application for permission to file a suit in forma pauperis under Order 33 of the Civil Procedure Code and an application to file an award under the Arbitration Act are filed before the High Court where they relate to matters in dispute of the value of more than 50,000 rupees. He submitted that, on the same analogy, even applications of the nature under consideration would and should be filed only in the High Court. These analogies do not help the petitioner. The language of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure makes it clear that the application for leave is to be obtained of the court in which the suit is to be instituted. These analogies do not help the petitioner. The language of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure makes it clear that the application for leave is to be obtained of the court in which the suit is to be instituted. The application under Order XXXIII for permission to sue as an indigent person contains all the particulars to be set out in a plaint (Rule 2) and where it is granted is deemed to have been instituted on the date when the application was presented (Rule 8 and Rule l5a ). Section 20 of the Arbitration Act specifically provides for the registration of an application thereunder as a suit and read with Section 2 (c) makes it clear that the application has to be filed in the Court where a suit would be filed with reference to the subject matter of the arbitration. In this context, Shri Baweja pointed out that if these arguments were correct, application for a succession certificate under Section 37 of the Indian Succession Act, applications under the Guardians and Wards Act or Hindu Guardianship Act for appointment of a property guardian and many other similar applications which are now being filed in District Courts would be liable to be filed only in the High Court if the value of the property in question exceeds Rs. 50,000. It is not necessary to say anything about these matters tor, as already pointed out, such analogies, which have to be considered on the terms of the specific enactment, are of no help in deciding the issue here. ( 9 ) THERE was also considerable discussion on the interpretation of S. 32 (11) of the Act. Section 31 directs that an application under the section should be filed in the Court of the District Judge within the limits of whose jurisdiction the industrial concern carries on the whole or a substantial part of its activities. Shri Andley points out that the word "district Judge" does not exclude the High Court if one has regard to the definition of "district Judge" as contained in the Civil Procedure Code. Shri Andley points out that the word "district Judge" does not exclude the High Court if one has regard to the definition of "district Judge" as contained in the Civil Procedure Code. On the other hand, as rightly pointed out by Shri Baweja, the expression should be understood as defined in the General Clauses Act, 1897, Section 3 (17) of which reads: "district Judge: (17) "district Judge" shall mean the Judge of a principal Civil Court of Original jurisdiction, but shall not include a High Court in the exercise of its ordinary or extraordinary original Civil jurisdiction. "and so understood, it does not contemplate an application being filed in the High Court. Now we turn to S. 32 (11 ). This sub-section, as it stands at present, has been extracted earlier but it has undergone some amendments. In 1951, when the Act as enacted, Section 32 (11) was in the following terms: "the functions of a District Judge under this section shall, in a presidency town, be exercised by the principal Judge of the City Civil Court, if any, having jurisdiction or by the High Court. "in 1962, the sub-section was amended to read as follows: " (II) The functions of a District Judge under this section shall be exercisable (a) in a presidency town, where there is a City Civil Court having jurisdiction by a Judge of that court and in the absence of such court, by the High Court and (b) elsewhere, also by an Additional District Judge. "then, again it was amended in 1972 to read as at present. This sub-section proceeds on the basis that normally the application has to be filed in the District Court as generally understood (not the High Court) and then seeks to clear up the difficulties in certain cases by carrying out certain exceptionsoriginally, there was only clause (a) to the effect that in a presidency town, the application should be filed in the city civil court but that it could be filed in the High Court if there was no city civil court. So far as other places are concerned, there was originally no- special provision and the application could be filed only before the District Judge. Then, an exception was introduced to allow an application being placed before the Additional District Judge. Some difficulties appear to have been felt necessitating a further amendment. So far as other places are concerned, there was originally no- special provision and the application could be filed only before the District Judge. Then, an exception was introduced to allow an application being placed before the Additional District Judge. Some difficulties appear to have been felt necessitating a further amendment. It is not clear what these difficulties were. Perhaps there were some cases where, in the place where the industrial concern had itsbusiness, the principal court of civil jurisdiction was only a court inferior to the District Court and the sub-section thus required the application to be filed before the District or Additional District Judge in a distant place. The amendment thereupon seems to have been made to enable the application being filed before the District Judge, the Additional District Judge or any other Judge of a principal Civil Court having jurisdiction over the place of business. The trend of these amendments indicates that the petition is to be filed in a High Court only in the circumstances mentioned in the amended clause (a ). Section 32 (9) also shows that the Act contemplates an application before the District Court with an appeal to the High Court. The reference to "principal court of Civil judisdiction" in clause (b) cannot, in the context, be construed as a reference to the High Court. Perhaps, even if one reads the clause that way, the language that the powers shall "also" be exerdsable by such a court only means that a party can file the petitions in the High Court also; this will not, however, deprive the District Judge of the jurisdiction he has under the main Section 31. If that be so, having regard to the principle of Section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the fact that Section 5 also does not apply for reasons already discussed, the plea of the appellant that the disposal of the petition by the Additional District Judge was without jurisdiction cannot be upheld. In my view, therefore, the terms of Section 32 (11) cannot help the present petitioner for having the order under Section 32 declared a nullity and so not capable of execution. In my view, therefore, the terms of Section 32 (11) cannot help the present petitioner for having the order under Section 32 declared a nullity and so not capable of execution. ( 10 ) SHRI Andley laid some emphasis on the fact that the application under Section 31 had been registered as a suit and that the appeal to the High Court had also been registered as a first appeal and disposed of on that basis. The registrations in the above manner were purely administrative acts, not based on any statutory provision and cannot estop the respondents from putting forward their legal contention, just as the appellant cannot be estopped from raising the present plea on the ground of its not having raised the same earlier in the "suit" or in the "appeal". ( 11 ) FOR the above reasons, I uphold the order of the learned Additional District Judge and dismiss this revision petition. I make no order as to costs.