M. K. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) ACCUSED Nos. 1 to 13 (except accused Nos. 4 6 and 13 who were child accused) pleaded guilty. Their plea was accepted and they were convicted and sentenced on their own plea. Thereafter after recording some evidence charge was framed against accused no. 14 i. e. the present respondent and at the conclusion of the trial the learned Magistrate placed reliance on the statements of some of the co-accused and recorded a finding of guilty for the said offence under sec. 135 of the Customs Act against accused no. 14 and he was sentenced to undergo R. I. for 9 mo- nths and a fine of Rs. 200. 00 i. e. R. I. for one month by the learned Magistrate First 51ass Khambhalia on 27-5-1976. ( 2 ) THE matter was carried in appeal by accused no. 14 before the Court of the Sessions Judge at Jamnagar. The learned Sessions Judge after hearing both the sides came to the conclusion that the order of conviction and sentence passed on the basis of the statements of the co-accused was not sustainable. He therefore allowed the appeal set aside the order of conviction and sentence and hence this appeal by the Union of India. ( 3 ) MR. Chhaya the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the Union submitted that the learned Sessions Judge erred in holding that the stat- ements of the co-accused could not be used against accused no. 14 because their plea of guilty having been accepted and they having been convicted it cannot be said that they were tried jointly in the same trial with acc- used no. 14. Mr. Chhayas contention is that all the accused were put up for trial in one case i. e. case No. 844 of 1974. Barring the juvenile ac- cused who were ordered to be tried by the Juvenile Court the rest of the accused pleaded guilty except accused no. 14. The fact that their plea was accepted and they were convicted and sentenced on their own plea and that thereafter the trial proceeded against accused no. 14 cannot mean that the trial ceased to be a joint trial of all the accused except the ac- cused who were ordered to be tried by the Juvenile Court. In Mr. 14. The fact that their plea was accepted and they were convicted and sentenced on their own plea and that thereafter the trial proceeded against accused no. 14 cannot mean that the trial ceased to be a joint trial of all the accused except the ac- cused who were ordered to be tried by the Juvenile Court. In Mr. Chhayas submission till the trial ended by the final order which was passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class on 27th May 1976 all the accused including accused no. 14 were co-accused in a case being case No. 844/ 74 before the learned J. M. F. C. Khambhalia and that therefore the pr- ovisions of sec. 30 of the Indian Evidence Act would come into play and the learned Magistrate was therefore justified in considering and relying on the confessions of the co-accused. ( 4 ) WE are unable to accept this contention of Mr. Chhaya for the reasons stated hereafter. In the first instance on 22nd January 1975 when the plea of the accused was recorded and when the accused who pleaded guilty were convicted on acceptance of their plea the trial with regard to such accused came to an end their case having been disposed of by a final order of conviction and sentence against them passed on 22nd Janu- ary 1975. It was thereafter that some evidence was recorded and the case was treated as a warrant case and a charge was framed only against accused no 14. In a warrant case the trial begins after the charge is framed. Charge at Ex. 26 was framed against accused no. 14 only on 17th September 1975. The trial therefore began against accused no. 14 on 17th September 1975. The remaining accused who bad earlier pleaded guilty were no longer before the Court their case having been disposed off by passing an order of conviction and sentence against them on acc- eptance of their plea of guilty recorded as early as 22nd January 1975. The learned Magistrate therefore was patently in error in pressing into service the provisions of sec. 30 of the Evidence Act for the purpose of relying on the statements of the co-accused. The learned Magistrate therefore was patently in error in pressing into service the provisions of sec. 30 of the Evidence Act for the purpose of relying on the statements of the co-accused. ( 5 ) AGAIN apart from this aspect on going through the record it is manifest that same and except the said statements of the accused convicted earlier as aforesaid there is no other evidence on record con- neeting the respondent-accused with the crime. It is an admitted position that when the ship left for its destination for Salaya it was empty. It ap- pears that Masur Dal was loaded into the ship at Parodia a few nautical miles away from Salaya and the ship was intercepted thereafter near Kalubhar. Accused no. 14 was not on the vessel at that time. There is no other material on record to show that he had any hand in the loading d the Masur Dal which was done after the ship left empty from Salaya. Merely on the confessional statements of a co-accused an accused person cannot be convicted because that statement cannot be used as substantive evidence. It can be used only for the purpose of seeking an assurance to a finding arrived at on the strength of other reliable evidence. This is settled legal position. ( 6 ) THE appeal therefore deserves to fail and is consequently dismi- ssed. Appeal dismissed. .