Judgment :- 1. This appeal raises a point of principle about condonation of delay in execution proceedings. A question of this sort immediately sets legal minds thinking about S. 5 of the Limitation Act, almost by automatic reflex. It did so in this case too. Only its application proved far too involved and ticklish. 2. The problem arose this way. The appellants property was sold in execution of a decree against him. The auction-purchaser obtained his sale certificate and moved the executing court for delivery. But this application was dismissed one day when it was called and nobody appeared. There was a counsel on record, but he was absent. The auction-purchaser thereupon moved the execution court for setting aside the dismissal for default. Even this application was belated, filed as it was beyond 30 days. Hence the auction-purchasers moved another application for condonation of the delay. On notice of this last application, the judgment debtor opposed it tooth and nail. The executing court, however, overruled his objection, allowed the application and condoned the delay. This appeal is against that order. 3. S. 5 of the Limitation Act very much figured in the Court below. It still dominated the discussion in this Court as well. Actually, I heard arguments on two distinct avatars of S. 5. And throughout the discussion, each side hangs on to its own favourite incarnation of the section. Mr. Chandran, for instance, for the appellant, put his faith on S. 5, as it appears in the Limitation Act, 1963, now in force. Mr. Padmanabhan for the respondent, on the other hand, held fast to the previous version of S. 5 in the old Indian Limitation Act, 1908. The question is which provision are we to apply in the present case, the old S. 5 or the new S. 5? 4. If we are to apply the new S. 5, it will, as everybody agreed, put a lid on further discussion. For, this section expressly excludes from its ambit all applications arising under the execution Chapter of the Civil Procedure Code. As Mr. Chandran pointed out, the new S. 5, far from helping the auction-purchaser, actially hinders him from getting the relief he requires. 5. Mr. For, this section expressly excludes from its ambit all applications arising under the execution Chapter of the Civil Procedure Code. As Mr. Chandran pointed out, the new S. 5, far from helping the auction-purchaser, actially hinders him from getting the relief he requires. 5. Mr. Padmanabhan, however, argued that notwithstanding the repeal and re-enactment of the old Limitation Act, 1908, into the new Limitation Act, 1963, it is the old Section in the old Act to which we must resort for a decision in this case. He pointed out that under the old Act, execution proceedings were not excluded from the purview of S. 5. He urged that the old S. 5 alone would apply to execution proceedings before courts in this State, because it was that section which eyen now expressly stands incorporated in the relevant procedural rule in force in this State, namely, Or, 21, R. 105 (4) of the Code. 6. This rule, among others, was framed by this High Court, in exercise of its mandatory power under S. 122 of the Code. It came into effect on 4th September, 1945. The Rule was couched in the following terms; it has not undergone any change even after the enactment of the new Limitation Act, 1963: “(4) The provisions of S. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 shall apply to applications under sub-rule (1)”. The submission of Mr. Padmanabhan was that on a combined reading of Or. 21, R. 105 (4) and of S. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, which the said rule expressly refers to, an application would lie for excusing the delay in seeking to set aside the dismissal of an application for delivery. 7. Mr. Chandran, however, countered with the argument that even though Or. 21, R. 105 (4), as prescribed in the local amendment in this State, refers to S. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, the reference to that provision must be read as a reference to the corresponding provision of S. 5 of the present Limitation Act, 1963. He said that this mode of construction was enjoined by S. 18 of the Madras General Clauses Act, 1891. 8. S. 18 of the Madras General Clauses Act lays down a rule of construction for legislation by reference. He said that this mode of construction was enjoined by S. 18 of the Madras General Clauses Act, 1891. 8. S. 18 of the Madras General Clauses Act lays down a rule of construction for legislation by reference. The rule is that where a statue refers to a provision in another enactment and adopts it, and that other enactment is subsequently repealed and re-enacted, the reference in question in the statute must thereafter be treated as a reference to the provision as so re-enacted. This general rule, however, is subject to a rider, namely, that the Legislation by reference may itself evince a contrary intention. This is made clear by S. 12 of the Madras General Clauses Act. 9. These principles, as embodied in the General Clauses Act, may call for application, in terms only to construction of legislative enactments. But there is no reason why the basic principles cannot be applied to the construction of similar provisions in Rules and other statutory instruments made by rulemaking bodies. 10. Turning to Or. 21, R. 105 (4), when this Court, as the Rule-making authority, made this Rule in 1945, the one and only intention for doing so must have been to enable those who file applications beyond the prescribed period to move the court for extension of time on showing sufficient cause for the delay. The specific reference to S. 5 of the old Limitation Act, 1908, is meaningful only on this interpretation. It would be wholly pointless on any other understanding of the reference to S. 5. In this context, can we mechanically apply the canon of construction under S. 18 of the General Clauses Act and hold that after the enactment of the new Limitation Act, 1963, our construction of the same Rule must yield a result which proves to be diametrically opposite to the one which was intended by this Court when they drafted the Rule in the first place?. I think there can only be one answer to this question. This Court could not possibly have intended in 1945, that the Rule they were framing should one day be rendered wholly nugatory, not by express repeal of the Rule itself, but by a side-wind of S. 5 of the Limitation Act undergoing an amendment distorting it beyond recognition. I think there can only be one answer to this question. This Court could not possibly have intended in 1945, that the Rule they were framing should one day be rendered wholly nugatory, not by express repeal of the Rule itself, but by a side-wind of S. 5 of the Limitation Act undergoing an amendment distorting it beyond recognition. To say that R. 105 (4) evinces such an intention would be to attribute to it a wholly self-defeating legislative urge. It is a cardinal principle of construction that we must prefer that construction which makes the provision work. We cannot, in the name of statutory construction, reduce the provision to a shambles. 11. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the reference in Or. 21, R. 105 (4) to S. 5 of the Limitation Act continues to refer, strictly and literally, to S. 5 of the old Limitation Act, 1908, notwithstanding its repeal and re-enactment in the present Limitation Act, 1963. The result is that the execution Court in this case was quite right in entertaining the auction-purchasers application for condonation of the delay in seeking to set aside the dismissal for default of the application which he filed under Or. 21, R. 103. 12. Mr. Chandran attempted another argument to nullify the effect of Or. 21, R. 105 (4). He said that this Rule was a ‘special law’ within the meaning of S. 29 (2) of the present Limitation Act, 1963. As such ‘special law’, he said, R. 105(4) cannot escape from the application of the present S. 5 of the Act. He said that the only way for R. 105 (4) to avoid S. 5 of the new Limitation Act, would be to find out if that Rule carried any provision expressly excluding S. 5 of the new Act from the ambit of the R ule, and not otherwise. He said that R. 105 (4) contains no such exclusory provision He accordingly maintained that R. 105 (4) cannot serve any purpose at all. 13. This argument of Mr. Chandran is only the other side of the coin. Learned counsels earlier argument was that S. 5 of the new Act excluded R. 105 (4). His present argument is that R. 105 (4) does not exclude S. 5 and hence it cannot work. In my opinion, this argument of frustration is also not tenable. 13. This argument of Mr. Chandran is only the other side of the coin. Learned counsels earlier argument was that S. 5 of the new Act excluded R. 105 (4). His present argument is that R. 105 (4) does not exclude S. 5 and hence it cannot work. In my opinion, this argument of frustration is also not tenable. It may be conceded that Or. 21, R. 105 (3), C.P.C. is a special law within the meaning of S. 29 (2) even as the Supreme Court regarded S. 417 (3), Criminal Procedure Code as a special law. Vide Manguram v. DelhiMunicipality A.I.R. 1976. S.C. 105. Or 21, R. 105 may be regarded also as a local law, since it is peculiar to this State. But, it does not follow from these premises that S. 5 of the new Limitation Act, 1963 would govern R. 105 (3) or (4). 14. Mr. Chandran however relied on the following words in S. 29 (2)— “provisions contained in Ss. 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.” The argument was that there is nothing in R. 105 (4) which ‘expressly excluded’ S. 5 of the new Limitatiotion Act from applying. In my view, this is not the way to construe the words in question. The phrase ‘not expressly excluded’ does not mean or imply that exclusion must be in express terms. In my view, the phrase not expressly excluded’ would take note of express exclusion as well as express non-inclusion. In Or, 21, R. 105, this Court framed the rule expressly refering to S. 5 of the Indian Limitio n Act, 1908. This express mention of S. 5 of the old Act amounted to an express non-inclusion of any subsequent amendment inconsistent with it originl meaning and effect. In this view, therefore, I am satisfied that S. 5 of the new Limitation Act, 1963, cannot be invoked in the present case. 15. Mr. Padmanabhan urged a broader line of argument for his client when he said that if Or. 21, R. 105 (4) were held inapplicable to this case, resort may be had to the residuary Art. 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, which would offer a larger period of three years for such an application. 15. Mr. Padmanabhan urged a broader line of argument for his client when he said that if Or. 21, R. 105 (4) were held inapplicable to this case, resort may be had to the residuary Art. 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, which would offer a larger period of three years for such an application. I however, think that the reference to Art. 137 is foreign to the scope of this appeal. The limited question both before the execution court and in this appeal is whether the application filed by the auction-purchaser under Or. 21, R. 105 (4) read with S. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 was maintainable We are not concerned with the determination of the appropriate period of limitation, whether it is 30 days or 3 years. Nor are we concerned with the particular provision for limitation whether it is Or. 21, R. 105 (1) of the Code, or Art. 137 of the Limitation Act 1963? 16. On the merits of the order passed by the court below condoning the delay, I am satisfied that the court did the right thing when it ordered the application. The record shows that learned counsel who had entered appearance for the auction-purchaser was absent in court when the case was called. It subsequently transpired that he had discontinued his profession and had put his decision into effect by making himself scarce from all law courts. Apparently, the client was not aware of these developments until long afterwards. 17. I like to imagine that lawyers practising in courts may have excellent reasons of their own for turning their back on their profession, renouncing their robes and shunning the Courts at any given moment. But where the clients are not informed of their decision beforehand so as to enable them to make alternative arrangements, the result might well be to leave them in the lurch, and where parties find themselves in a quandary on such occasions, it would be a proper exercise of the courts good conscience to redeem the litigants from the faults of the lawyers. I am glad to find that this has been the approach of the court below in this case. I must uphold the order, accordingly as a just order. 18. In the result the appeal is dismissed and the order of the executing court is confirmed. I am glad to find that this has been the approach of the court below in this case. I must uphold the order, accordingly as a just order. 18. In the result the appeal is dismissed and the order of the executing court is confirmed. There will be no order as to costs.