N. H. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a petition by one citizen challenging the order of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in the revision application before that Tribunal registered as TEN. B. A. no. 300 of 1974 filed by him which came to be rejected and the common order of the Tribunal in the respondents revision application no. TEN. B. A. No. 415 of 1974 which was allowed by the Revenue Tribunal. The Tribunals order is Annexure E to the petition. ( 2 ) A few facts need to be clearly stated. There are situated in the sim of village Kanbha Taluka Daskroi of Ahmedabad District six pieces of agricultural lands. They are S. Nos. 339/1 342 343 34316 351 and 351/1 respectively admeasuring 2 acres one guntha 11 gunthas 19 guntbas 14 gunthas 20 gunthas and 2 acres and 16 gunthas all told admeasuring 6 acres and 1 guntha. These lands belonged to one Ichhaben the respondent no. 2 to this petition. The respondent no. 3/4 Magaji Kalaji who was in the record of rights as the tenant of the land had surrendered his tenancy rights of these lands in favour of the landlady by recourse to sec. 15 of the Bombay Tenancy Act hereinafter referred to as the Act. The said proceedings had come to be registered by the Mamlatdar and intimation no. 336 of 1960 dated 30-8-60 was given to the Village Officer. It is however a common ground that these surrender proceedings had been effected in the year 1956 but the mutation entry Annexure A came to be made on 12-9-60 pursuant to the intimation of the Mamlatdar dated 30-8-60. Said Magaji was the heir of one Kaluji Dhulaji. Said Kaluji had his widow Bai Jivi who was initially the party to the proceedings before the Mamlatdar in her capacity as the widow of Kalaji and she also claimed to be the guardian of her two minor sons Babaji and Hathaji. In the year 1962 above mentioned Bai Jivi had filed an application acting for herself and for her two minor sons before the Mamlatdar against Bai Ichha claiming possession of the lands from Bai Ichha under sec. In the year 1962 above mentioned Bai Jivi had filed an application acting for herself and for her two minor sons before the Mamlatdar against Bai Ichha claiming possession of the lands from Bai Ichha under sec. 29 (1) of the Act alleging that her husband and father of the two minors Babaji and Hathaji was the tenant and said Kalaji having died leaving behind hum Mangaji Babaji Hathaji and Bai Jivi as his heirs the tenancy rights had devolved on all of them jointly. That application filed by said Jivi had come to be rejected by the Mamlatdar on 20-3-63 as per his order Annexure B. The Mamlatdar rejected the application on the ground that Mangaji Kalaji alone was the tenant and that the application was even time-barred. Thus the judgment Annexure B was on merits also. The said order which was to the prejudice of Bai Jivi and her two minor sons was taken lying down by her. The landlady Ichhaben then sold these lands on 28-8-63 to the present petitioner Rabari Babaji Mahiji. After about five years of the said sale taken by this petitioner the Mamlatdar started suo motu proceedings under sec. 84 C of the Act because it appeared to him prima facie that the sale-deed executed by Bai Ichha in favour of the petitioner was invalid. The mamlatdar had declared the sale valid and so Bai Jivi had preferred the appeal no. 240 of 1969 before the appellant authority who was pleased to remand the matter to the Mamlatdar by his order dated 16-5-69. Against the order of remand this landlady Bai Ichha filed revision application no TEN A. 1574 of 1969 before the Revenue Tribunal which had also confirmed the order of remand with certain elaborations. The Revenue Tribunal had directed the Agricultural Lands Tribunal to give its finding on the following three issues :- (1) Whether deceased Bai Ichha had the right and authority to transfer or sell the lands in question to Babaji Mahiji Rabari as alleged ? (2) Whether the sale or transfer effected in favour of Mahiji Rabari in respect of the land in question is invalid as alleged (3) Whether the opponents-tenants have the right and interest to challenge the said transaction. (2) Whether the sale or transfer effected in favour of Mahiji Rabari in respect of the land in question is invalid as alleged (3) Whether the opponents-tenants have the right and interest to challenge the said transaction. ( 3 ) AFTER the remand the Mamlatdar by his order Annexure C dated 25-5-73 declared the sale invalid on the ground that Bai Ichha got surrender of the land from Mangaji only for the purpose of personal cultivation and she could not therefore sell the land. ( 4 ) BEING aggrieved by the said decision of the Mamlatdar Annexure C the petitioner preferred Tenancy Appeal no. 122 of 1973. The appellate authority. namely the Prant Officer by his order dated 22-4-74 held that the respondents that is Jiviben and her two sons had no right to challenge The said sale-deed. He however upheld the Mamlatdars decision that the sale was invalid because Bai Ichha got possession of the lands on surrender for bona fide cultivating the land personally. The Prant Officers order Annexure D dissatisfied Bai Jivi and her sons because they were declared not entitled to the lands on the Prant Officers finding that they had no right to challenge the sale transaction. The present petitioner also was aggrieved because his sale was declared invalid. The petitioner therefore filed the revision application TEN. B. A. 300/74 before the Revenue Tribunal and Bai Jivi and her sons filed revision application No. TEN B. A. 415 of 1974 before the Revenue Tribunal. The present petitioners revision application came to be rejected by the Tribunal with the result that the sale stood declared invalid. The application filed by Bai Jivi and her sons was allowed by the Tribunal which declared that they were joint tenants and they were entitled to restoration of the suits lands from the present petitioner. The Tribunals common order in this revision applications is at Annexure E and it is dated 31-1-75. It is against this common order. Annexure E that the present petition has been filed by the petitioner contending that the sale was valid and that Bai Jivi (who died during the pendency of the proceedings) and her sons had no right to take back possession. It is evident that if the sale is held to be valid the claim of Bai Jivi and her sons would not be required to be considered. ( 5 ) MR. It is evident that if the sale is held to be valid the claim of Bai Jivi and her sons would not be required to be considered. ( 5 ) MR. Shaikh the learned advocate for the contending respondents had raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the petition on the ground that Bai Ichha against whom the order had come to be passed by the Mamlatdar the Prant Officer and the Revenue Tribunal had not challenged the said order and therefore it was not open to this petitioner to do so. There is little merit in this preliminary objection raised by Mr. Shaikh because the aggrieved party is this petitioner though incidentally Bai Ichha also can be said to be aggrieved. The right of this petitioner is not dependent on the taking of any action on the part of Bai Ichha. The petitioner has a cause of action of his own. Any person aggrieved by the decision can have recourse to the remedy of appeal and/or revision application and by no stretch of imagination could it be said that the present petitioner had no grievance to make against the impugned orders. ( 6 ) COMING to the merits of the case I find that all the three authorities below have proceeding on a totally erroneous interpretation of law. Curiously enough neither of the parties has produced the original order of surrender but on the basis of the entry in the record of rights Annexure A it was assumed that the delivery of possession was made in favour of Bai Ichha only for the purpose of bona fide personal cultivation. Without the order being on the record it is hazardous to raise such an inference on the strength of an entry in the record of rights. Under sec. 15 (2) of the Bombay Tenancy Act as it then stood the landlord was entitled to retain the land so surrendered for the like purposes and to the like extent and in so far as the conditions are applicable subject to the like conditions as are provided in sec. 31 and 31 A for the termination of tenancies. The authorities below thought that sec. 37 of the Act required the landlord in whose favour surrender was effected to continue to cultivate the land personally. 31 and 31 A for the termination of tenancies. The authorities below thought that sec. 37 of the Act required the landlord in whose favour surrender was effected to continue to cultivate the land personally. Sec. 37 of the Act is quoted below :- ( 7 ) IF any support for the above conclusion is needed to be cited the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Vithal Rangnath Gaikwad v. Murlidhar Waman Dhavale 77 B. L. R. 387 could be had. It was a case in which the landlord had procured possession under sec. 15 (2) of the Act as it then was on the statute book at the relevant time sec. 37 was sought to be attracted and it was pleaded that the landlord who got possession having not tilled the land for 12 years as provided in sec. 37 of the Act was liable to forfeit the possession. The learned Judges of the Bombay High Court negatived this contention by observing follows :"to proceedings taken and orders passed under sec. 15 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 read with sec. 29 of the Act the provisions of sec. 37 are not attracted unless of course in a given case on facts it is found that the surrender itself was conditional and the order passed by the Mamlatdar under sec. 15 directed delivery of possession upon condition that the landlord shall cultivate the land personally or make use of it for non-agricultural purposes". The reasoning of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court is a clear answer to the contention raised by Mr. Shaikh for the contending respondents. Incidentally it is to be noted that this authority was pressed into service by Mr. Shaikh himself because he wanted to rely on the latter part of the above-quoted decision. This latter part of the above-quoted observation of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court is a clear obiter in that case. The petition was dismissed on the ground that sec. 37 was not attracted in that case of surrender under sec. 15. Shaikh himself because he wanted to rely on the latter part of the above-quoted decision. This latter part of the above-quoted observation of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court is a clear obiter in that case. The petition was dismissed on the ground that sec. 37 was not attracted in that case of surrender under sec. 15. Even if the said observation which I have called obiter is treated as a part and parcel of the principle enunciated by the Bombay High Court I have no hesitation in holding that it is an observation confined to a specific condition imposed by the Mamlatdar while passing the order of delivery of possession the condition being that the landlord shall continue to cultivate the land personally for indefinite period. I have my own doubts whether a Mamlatdar as a public functionary has got any such right to impose such conditions de hors the provisions of sec. 15 (2) and 31 and 31 A of the Act. In the case on hand even if what Mr. Shaikh contended is accepted there is nothing on record to show that such a condition was imposed by the Mamlatdar while he passed the order under sec. 15 (2) of the Act accepting the surrender and allowing the landlord to retain possession of the land. Reference to personal cultivation in the record of rights is a poor substitute for the contents of the order of surrender. ( 8 ) EVEN if I hold that the delivery of possession was for the purpose of cultivating personally it would not mean that the landlady for all time to come and from generation to generation should put the land to the use only of personal cultivation. The fact that she cultivated the land from 1956 to August 1963 would show that she had retained the possession for personal cultivation. Belated idea to dispose of the land in the year 1963 would not in any way reflect on her claim of bona fide personal cultivation which was put forward by her in the year 1956 or 1960 even if we hold that the order of the Mamlatdar was passed in the year 1960 For want of any legal inhibition in the landlords way of transferring the land after some lapse of time her action in selling the property after 3 or 7 years cannot be assailed as invalid. ( 9 ) IN above view of the matter the order passed by the Mamlatdar Prant Officer and the Revenue Tribunal declaring the sale invalid is set aside and it is declared that the sale executed by Bai Ichha in favour of the petitioner was valid. .