JUDGMENT P.N. Goel, J. - In this appeal against the judgment and decree dated 13-4-1967 passed by the District Judge, Ballia, reversing the judgment and decree dated 2-6-1966 passed by the Civil Judge Ballia in original suit No. 31 of 1963, the learned counsel for the appellant has urged two legal points; 1. The suit was barred by the provisions of O. 2, R. 2, C. P. C. and 2. the suit having been filed on 26-8-1963 was barred by the provisions of the Limitation Act. 2. It is undisputed that the Town Area Committee, Chitbaragaon, got prepared plans and estimates for the constructions of the building of the Town Area. According to the estimate the building was to be constructed with bricks in lime. The respondent works as a Contractor. He entered into agreement with the Town. Area Committee to construct the building. He executed an agreement dated 13-8-1953. This agreement was accepted by the Officer in charge Town Area/Sub-Divisional Officer on behalf of the District Magistrate, Ballia. One of the terms of the agreement was that payment to the respondent would be made after measurements by the overseer of the Town Area. Another term of the agreement was that the respondent would do the work to the satisfaction of the Officer in charge and the Chairman of the Town Area Committee. The Chairman had deputed Sri Badri Narain, a member of the Committee to supervise the work of the respondent. The respondent collected material on the site and filled up the foundation up to the plinth. This work was done by the third week of Dec., 1953. There was some dispute between the parties regarding the quality of lime used. Therefore, at the end of the 3rd week of Dec., 1953, the respondent was asked not to construct further. The respondent then prepared a bill for the work done up to the 3rd week of Dec., 1953. His work was measured by the overseer of the Town Area, but the Town Area committee did not make payment of the bill of the respondent. Therefore, on 12-4-1956 the respondent filed a suit No. 18 of 1956 for the recovery of the amount of the said work. That suit was dismissed by the trial Court. But it was decreed by the lower appellate court. Therefore, on 12-4-1956 the respondent filed a suit No. 18 of 1956 for the recovery of the amount of the said work. That suit was dismissed by the trial Court. But it was decreed by the lower appellate court. Second Appeal No. 3741 of 1966 has already been disposed of by this Court upholding the decree passed by the lower appellate court. Some bags of cement were lying with the Town Area Committee. The overseer reported that further construction be permitted to be made, instead of lime, in cement. Consequently by order dated 25-1-1954, the Officer-in-Charge directed the respondent to use cement instead of lime. The respondent then resumed the work from 27-1-1954. The respondent continued the work up to 7-2-1954. On 10-2-1954, the Chairman verbally directed the respondent not to proceed with the work till the earner dispute was settled. According to the terms of the agreement the building was to be constructed and completed by 28-2-1954. Up to 28-2-1954 the respondent was not permitted to make further constructions. The respondent filed suit No. 31 of 1963 on 26-8-1963 for the recovery of (1) Rs. 2,250/- deposited by him as security for the contract, (2) Rs. 2,877/- as the costs of the construction made during the period 27-1-1954 to 7-2-54 and (3) Rs. 1,239/- as interest by way of damages, totalling Rs. 6.366. Out of this sum the respondent claimed a decree for a total sum of Rs. 5,400/-. 3. The trial Court found that the suit was not barred by the provisions of O. 2, R 2, C. P. C. and that it was mainly barred by the provisions of the Limitation Act. Therefore, the suit of the respondent was dismissed. The District Judge did not agree with the trial court on the question of limitation and as such he set aside the decree of the trial court and decreed the suit of the respondent in full. 4. The first point that has been urged by the appellants counsel and upon which the respondents counsel has also been heard is whether the present suit was barred by the provisions of O. 2, R. 2, C. P. C. The bare question is whether the items which have been claimed in the present suit could be claimed in the earlier suit No. 18 of 1956. Two things are glaringly clear (1) the respondent worked first up to the 3rd week of December 1953. Then he was permitted t.o use cement instead of lime in the brick work. The respondent then worked for about 10 days from 27-1-1954 to 7-2-54. The contract which was entered into on 13-8-1953 continued. Both the parties counsel agree that there was only one continuing contract. The respondent was not allowed to work after 10-2-1954. The respondent could not complete the building by 28-2-1954, the date fixed in the agreement. Even after 28-2-1954, the respondent was not called upon to construct, and (2) the earlier suit was filed in the year 1954 i. e. 2 years after the date fixed for the completion of the building. 5. O. 2, R. 2, sub-r. (1) lays down that every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action. Then sub-rule (2) lays down that where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of or intentionally relinquishes any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. Sub-rule (3) further provides that a person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs; but if he omits, except with the leave of the court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted. 6. The above provisions clearly show that all the reliefs arising out of the cause of action should be claimed in one suit and if all the reliefs are not claimed in one suit, subsequent suit is not permissible. 7. In the instant case there was only one continuing contract. Under this contract some portion of the work was done up to the 3rd week of December, 1953, and some work was done between the period 27-1-1954 to 7-2-1954. Thereafter no work was done up to the date by which the building was to be completed. All these facts happened well before the filing of the first suit No. 18 of 1956. Thereafter no work was done up to the date by which the building was to be completed. All these facts happened well before the filing of the first suit No. 18 of 1956. Therefore, on the date of the filing of the first suit, the respondent was not only entitled to get payment for the work done up to the 3rd week of Dec., 1953 but also for the work done during the period 27-1-1954 to 7-2-1954. As the Town Area Committee did not permit the respondent to construct after 10-2-1954 the breach of contract was committed by the Town Area Committee. This is the finding of fact by both the ; courts below. Therefore, the consequence of the breach of the contract on the part of the Town Area Committee was that the respondent became entitled to claim back his security amount immediately. It means that even Ion the date of the filing of the first suit, the respondent could claim back his security amount. 8. Expression "cause of action" is to be understood in its broadest sense. This expression means that the person seeking relief should prove all those facts which entitled him to a decree. As the respondent became entitled to get payment of the works done by him and to Take back his security amount, there was just one cause of action and that cause of action had accrued to the appellant (sic) well before the filing of first suit. 9. Along with the security amount and the costs of the constructions made, the appellant could easily sue for damages or interest by way of damages. 10. In view of what has been stated above all the three items claimed in the second suit could easily be claimed in the first suit. The respondent was aware of this position. At the end of the plaint of the first suit the respondent wrote a note that he was reserving his right to sue for further constructions etc. But the respondent did not obtain any leave of the court as required by the rule. In other words the respondent himself omitted/refrained from claiming the amounts claimed in the present suit. The said note will not give any protection or immunity, nor it entitles the respondent to bring a fresh suit for the other items. 11. But the respondent did not obtain any leave of the court as required by the rule. In other words the respondent himself omitted/refrained from claiming the amounts claimed in the present suit. The said note will not give any protection or immunity, nor it entitles the respondent to bring a fresh suit for the other items. 11. In this connection reference may be made to the following cases cited by the learned counsel for the appellant: (1) Mohammad Khalil Khan v. Mahbub Ali Mian, AIR 1949 PC 78 : (1948 All LJ 574). In this case it was observed that the correct test in cases falling under Order 2, R. 2 is whether the claim in the new suit is in fact founded upon a cause of action distinct from that which was the foundation for the former suit. Then it was observed that the cause of action meant every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove if traversed in order to support his right to the judgment. In the present case the respondent was entitled to get the amount for the work done by him under one and the same contract. Therefore, in the present case the cause of action for the first suit as well as for the second suit was one and; the same. The cause of action in the two suits was not distinct. (2) Nageshwar Tewari v. Dwarka Prasad, AIR 1953 All 541 . In this case it was held that the cause of action for the suit for partition of joint family property was one and every item of property must be included. It means that the suit for partition must include all properties. If any property is left out in the first suit, second suit for partition in respect of that property would not be maintainable. (3) Jaldu Paidayya v. Jaldu Manikyala Rao, AIR 1959 Andh Pra 404. In this case it was observed (at p, 406): "The object of the above rule is to avoid splitting up of claims and to prevent multiplicity of suits. (3) Jaldu Paidayya v. Jaldu Manikyala Rao, AIR 1959 Andh Pra 404. In this case it was observed (at p, 406): "The object of the above rule is to avoid splitting up of claims and to prevent multiplicity of suits. Rule 2 enacts that if the plaintiff fails to sue for the whole of the claim which he is entitled to make in respect of a cause of action in the first suit, then he is precluded from suing in a second suit in respect of the portion so omitted." (4) State of Rajasthan v. Rao Dhir Singh, AIR 1972 Raj 241 . In .this case the estate of Rao Dhir Singh, respondent who was a minor was taken under the superintendence of Court of Wards on 16-10-1942. On 10-8-1953, Rao Dhir Singh attained the age of 18 years and therefore his estate was released from the superintendence of the Court of Wards on 16-1-1954. On 6-11-1954, the Government of Rajasthan passed an order directing that a sum of Rs. 5,649/-4/3 deposited in the State Treasury be paid to one Badri Prasad. Accordingly the said sum was paid to Badri Prasad on 30-12-1954 out of the funds of Rao Dhir Singh. On 5-3-1954 (sic) a suit was filed on behalf of Rao Dhir Singh that it was apprehended that further sums of money would be paid by the Court of Wards and as such permanent injunction be issued from making any payment out of- the funds of Rao Dhir Singh. Thereafter another suit was instituted on17-8-1957, inter alia, for the recovery of Rs. 5649/- plus interest. It, was held that the subsequent suit was barred under O. 2, R. 2, C. P. C. because this amount had been paid prior to the filing of the first suit. 12. It is evident from the above case hat the applicability of bar of Order 2, Rule 2 depends on there being one cause of action. In the instant case it has been pointed out above that there was only one continuing contract between the parties, that on the date of the filing of the first suit, the respondent was entitled to get the amount of all the works done by him as. well as his security amount. In the instant case it has been pointed out above that there was only one continuing contract between the parties, that on the date of the filing of the first suit, the respondent was entitled to get the amount of all the works done by him as. well as his security amount. Therefore there was only one cause of action and as such the respondent could claim the three items claimed in the present suit in the earlier suit. 13. The trial court held that the suit was not barred by O. 2, R. 2, C. P. C. on the ground that according to the contract the overseer was to measure the work done by him between 27-1-1954 and 7-2-4954 and that the overseer bad never measured the work. The lower Appellate Court also referred to para 3 of the agreement which provided that payment would be made to the respondent after the measurements were done by the overseer of the Committee. There fore, the lower Appellate Court also held that the suit was not barred by O. 2, R. 2, C. P. C. The respondent could not claim advantage of the said term of the agreement. The agreement was executed by the respondent only. It is not a bilateral agreement. This agreement was simply accepted by the Officer-in-Charge on behalf of the District Magistrate. Therefore, if the plaintiff agreed to lake payment after measurements have been done by the overseer, then he could not use this term of the agreement against the Town Area Committee for not preferring claim along with the earlier claim. As soon as the respondent did the work, he became entitled to receive its payment. The learned counsel for the respondent was questioned by this Court as to how the appellant had claimed Rs. 2,877/- as costs of. the construction. The respondents counsel replied that this amount was based on the measurements made by the respondent himself. It is obvious that the respondent had made the constructions. He himself could measure the constructions and claim the amount according to the estimate. Therefore, for claiming the amount there was hardly any need for the overseer to make the measurements. The making of the measurement by the overseer was for the satisfaction of the Town Area Committee to make payment. He himself could measure the constructions and claim the amount according to the estimate. Therefore, for claiming the amount there was hardly any need for the overseer to make the measurements. The making of the measurement by the overseer was for the satisfaction of the Town Area Committee to make payment. Therefore on this ground that toe overseer had not made measurement, so the plaintiff could not have claimed the amount in question in the earlier suit is simply fallacious and does not hold good. 14. The position that easily follows is that both the courts below have taken wholly erroneous view on the question of applicability of O. 2, R. 2, C. P. C. The learned counsel for the respondent could not show that the claim made in the present suit could not be made in the earlier suit. The cause of action was one and, therefore, all the items claimed in the present suit should have been claimed in the first suit. The present suit is clearly barred by the provisions of O. 2, Rule 2, C. P. C. 15. The next question is about the limitation. The learned counsel for the appellant urged that Arts. 56 and 115 of old Limitation Act applied. The trial court applied Art. 115 to the two items (1) Rs. 2,877/-, the cost of construction and Rs. 1,239/- interest by way of damages. The trial court applied Art. 145 to the sum of Rs. 2,250/-, the security amount. Therefore the suit for the refund of security amount was held within time and the suit for recovery of two other amounts was held barred by time. The lower appellate court found that the contract was cancelled by a resolution dated 29-6-1969 which was conveyed to the respondent a day later and, therefore, the entire claim of the respondent was within time. 16. The view taken by the lower appellate court may be immediately disposed of. The last date for the completion of the building was 28-2-1954. The Chairman of the Town Area Committee ;did not permit the respondent to make constructions after 10-2-1954. Therefore &the breach of contract took place either on 12-2-1954 or latest on 28-2-1954. The breach of contract in the instant case did not require any resolution to be passed by the Town Area Committee cancelling the contract. The contract automatically came to an end on 28-2-1954. Therefore &the breach of contract took place either on 12-2-1954 or latest on 28-2-1954. The breach of contract in the instant case did not require any resolution to be passed by the Town Area Committee cancelling the contract. The contract automatically came to an end on 28-2-1954. There is absolutely nothing on the record to show that the Town Area Committee directed the respondent, to resume the work after 8-2-1954. Therefore, the view taken by the lower appellate court is wholly bad in law. 17. Article 56 of the old Limitation Act prescribes a period of three years for filing a suit for the price of work done by the plaintiff for the defendant at his request. Whore no time had been fixed for payment, the period of three years begins to run when the work is done. In the present case the respondent did the work on the request of the appellant. In the agreement no particular time for making payment was fixed. Therefore Art. 56 clearly applied in respect of the sum of Rs. 2 877/- which was claimed as cost of constructions made during the period 27-1-1954 to 7-2-1954. Thus period of three years began to run when the work was dene. It means that in the instant case he period of three years is to be reckon :d from 7-2-1954. 18. Article 115 prescribes 3 years for compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied, not in writing, registered and not herein specifically provided for. The period of three years is to be reckoned when the contract is broken. In the present case the. breach of contract took place on 10-2-1954 on which date the Chairman asked the respondent not to construct further, In any case the date of breach of contract cannot go beyond 28-2-1954, the last date for completing the work. Therefore, the claim for interest by way of damages should have been made within 3 years of 28-2-1954. 19. Article 145 prescribes a period of 30 years for a suit against a depository or pawned to recover moveable property deposited or pawned. This period of 30 years is to be reckoned from the date of deposit or pawn. 20. In the instant case a sum of Rupees 2,250/ was given as security for the fulfilment of the contract. 19. Article 145 prescribes a period of 30 years for a suit against a depository or pawned to recover moveable property deposited or pawned. This period of 30 years is to be reckoned from the date of deposit or pawn. 20. In the instant case a sum of Rupees 2,250/ was given as security for the fulfilment of the contract. Therefore, it is not' a case of deposit or pawn and as such Art. 145 is not at all applicable. The trial court as well as the lower appellate court has referred to the case of Ahilyamba Chatram v. R. Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1954 Mad 101 . In this case respondent was appointed as a clerk of the appellant in 1927. For the proper fulfilment of his duties as a clerk he deposited a sum of Rs. 200/- in 1930. He left the service in Jan., 1947. He gave a notice for the refund of his security money. It was held that Art. 145 of the Limitation Act was applicable. Facts of this case are quite distinct. In the present case the respondent had given security for the fulfilment of the agreement. According to the agreement, contract the work was to be completed by 28-2-1954. The breach of the contract on behalf of the Town Area Committee took place about a fortnight before the date of the completion of the work. It will be noticed that the respondent himself had not left the work. The cause of action to the respondent for claiming the amounts due to him arose on the breach of contract or at the most on the last date fixed for the completion of the work. Therefore the case referred to by the two courts below does not help the respondent. 21. For the refund of the security amount the Article which is applicable is the residuary Art. 120. This Article prescribes a period of 6 years from the date the right to sue accrues. In the present case the breach of contract at the most took place on 28-2-1954. Hence; the period of 6 years is to be reckoned; from 28-2-1954 and as such the suit for: the refund of the security money having been filed 9 years later was beyond time. In the present case the breach of contract at the most took place on 28-2-1954. Hence; the period of 6 years is to be reckoned; from 28-2-1954 and as such the suit for: the refund of the security money having been filed 9 years later was beyond time. Art. 60 is also not applicable to the refund of the security money because this Article relates to the money deposited under an agreement that it would be payable on demand. There is no such agreement in the instant case. 22. The present suit was filed in the year 1963. It is obviously barred by limitation in respect of all the three items. 23. The learned counsel for the respondent could not show that the suit brought by the respondent was within limitation under any Article of the Limitation Act. 24. The learned counsel for the respondent pointed out that on 25-7-1965, the Town Area Committee had passed a resolution that the decretal amount of the previous suit should be paid and the respondent should be called upon to complete the constructions. This resolution has no bearing on the case because the present suit had already been filed on 26-8-1963. In the present suit the cause of action has not been taken from the resolution of 25-7-1965. Therefore, on the basis of this resolution, the respondents suit for the work done cannot be decreed. 25. For the findings arrived at above, the learned District Judge was not justified in decreeing the respondents suit. Appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment and decree dated 13-4-1967 passed by the District Judge, Ballia in Civil Appeal No. 4 of 1966 are set aside and the plaintiff respondents suit is ordered to be dismissed. The appellant will its costs of all the three courts from the plaintiff respondent.