JUDGMENT : Sarwar Ali, A.C.J. : This is one of those cages which high lights the fact that inexpert drafting and failure to give proper thought and attention to the language of an enactment, by the draftsman, leads to complication and litigation. These could have been avoided if an important legislation like the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act 1956 had been given that care and consideration which a law of far reaching consequence demands. It is my experience with such inept drafting and failure to fully appreciate the consequences there of, that has led me to advocate outside the Court, the establishment of a law commission in the State, having a statutory status. Recently in the Full Bench Decision of this Court in Ramkrit Singh Vs. State of Bihar we have emphasised the desirability of establishment of such a commission. The present case not only strengthens me in this view but induces me to highlight again this aspect in the judgment, realising fully that the Courts should be slow to put forth suggestions, unless in Interest of justice and proper administration of law requires them to do so. In my view, the presence of both these elements in the instant case provide justification for reiterating what have been stated by me in paragraph 20 of the judgment of the Full Bench a view which was concurred to by my learned collegues. 2. With these introductory remarks, I must now, compactly, state the facts, leading to the filing of this Civil Revision application. A Title suit being Title suit No. 103/1962 was tiled by the plaintiffs opposite party first set for declaration of title and recovery of possession over about 3.8 acres of land. The said suit was dismissed by the trial court. The plaintiffs filed a First Appeal in this Court being First Appeal No. 276 of 1965. The appeal was allowed and the suit decreed on 29.1.1977. Thereafter the plaintiffs filed an execution case being Execution Case No.4 of 1977. In the said execution case an objection under sections 47 and l51 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed. The plaintiffs filed a First Appeal in this Court being First Appeal No. 276 of 1965. The appeal was allowed and the suit decreed on 29.1.1977. Thereafter the plaintiffs filed an execution case being Execution Case No.4 of 1977. In the said execution case an objection under sections 47 and l51 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed. In the objection it was, inter alia, stated that since the consolidation operations were going on in the village in which the suit land was situate both at the time of pendency of the suit and appeal, as also the tiling of the execution petition, the execution case could not be entertained. This objection has been overruled. Hence this Civil Revision application. 3. So far as the suit and the appeal are concerned, it is clear that it is not open to the executing court to determine whether the suit or appeal had abated or not. Section 4(1)(c) is quite clear that the abatement takes place only after an order is passed in this behalf by the court or authority before whom such suit or proceeding is pending. Thus so far as the suit or appeal is concerned, an order of abatement could only be passed by the trial .court or the High Court in the first appeal. The executing court has no power to hold that the suit or appeal had abated. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners, therefore, took a slightly different stand in this court and contended that the execution proceeding could not be entertained in view of section 4(1)(b) of the Act. Before considering the arguments it would be appropriate to read section 4(1)(b) and (c) so tar as they are relevant. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners, therefore, took a slightly different stand in this court and contended that the execution proceeding could not be entertained in view of section 4(1)(b) of the Act. Before considering the arguments it would be appropriate to read section 4(1)(b) and (c) so tar as they are relevant. "Effect of notification under section 3(1) of the Act: Upon the publication of the notification under sub section (1) of section 3 in the official gazette the consequences, as hereinafter set forth shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, from the date specified in the notification till the close of the consolidation operation, ensue in the area to which the notification relates, namely; xx xx xx (b) No suit or other legal proceeding, in respect of any land in such areas shall be entertained in any court, and in calculating period of limitation applicable to such suits and proceedings such period shall not be counted : xx xx xx (c) every proceeding for the correction of records and every proceedings for suit and proceedings in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land lying in the area or for declaration or adjudication of any other right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to be taken under this Act, pending before any court or authority whether of the first instance or of appeal, reference or revision, shall, on an order being passed in that behalf by the court or authority before whom such suit or proceeding is pending stand abated." Thus, section 4 (1) (b) deals with a situation where a suit or legal proceeding is instituted after the publication of notification under section 3(1) of the Act. Section 4 (1) (c) on the other hand, deals with the situation where the notification aforesaid has been issued during the pendency of the suit or proceeding. 5. The expression "in regard to which proceeding can or ought to be taken under this Act" in section 4 (1) (c) can be read to refer only to the expression "for declaration or adjudication of any other right." Alternatively it may also be read to refer to the earlier expression "every suit and proceeding in respect of declaration of right or interest in land lying in the area". In order to determine which of the two interpretations is acceptable it would be appropriate to refer to the scheme of the Act. The Scheme of the Act bas been set forth in paragraph 3 of the full bench decision of this Court in Ramkrit Singh's case (supra). It has also been referred to in Subhog Sah & other Vrs. Doma Sah & others and it may not be repeated here. What is clear, however, is that objections of the nature that are to be determined in an execution proceeding can not be adjudicated upon by the consolidation authorities. It is also manifest that the consolidation authorities have no right to execute a decree which is binding on the parties. It is further apparent that the execution of a decree can not and does not in any way put impediments in the consolidation proceedings or in giving effect to the scheme of consolidation. Indeed the scheme of consolidation has to be in consonance with the decree which is binding on the parties. A decree of the court, which is not subjudice, will have to be given effect to in the consolidation proceeding itself and the rights entered in the register of lands according to such a decree. It is difficult to see as to what could be the purpose of postponing the execution of a decree if the same does not stand in the implementation of the scheme of consolidation as envisaged under the Act. It is, therefore, in consonance with reason and justice that the execution proceedings should not be covered under the provisions of section 4(1)(c) of the Act. Where two interpretations are possible, it is a well settled rule of constructions that an interpretation w bleb avoids inconvenience and advances the cause of justice should be preferred. Indeed, in my view, strong and compelling words are required to oust the jurisdiction of courts or prevent the execution of decrees passed by courts of competent jurisdiction. Such compelling words are absent in the instant case. 6. It is also a well settled rule of construction that the consequence of one interpretation or the other should be borne in mind while deciding the meaning given to a statutory provision. What is the position here? Such compelling words are absent in the instant case. 6. It is also a well settled rule of construction that the consequence of one interpretation or the other should be borne in mind while deciding the meaning given to a statutory provision. What is the position here? The position as I understand, is that if the execution proceeding is held to abate then although there is a concluded judgment between the parties, and although the consolidation authorities have no right to implement, these judgments the decree holder has to be deprived of the fruits of the decree till such time as a notification under section 264 is issued; and issue of such notifications, as is the common experience, takes years If not decades. As against that there is neither inconvenience nor hard ship to the party against whom the decree has been passed if it is held that the re is no abatement. I am, thus of the view that section 4(1)(c) should be so read and interpreted as to result in abatement of such suits or legal proceedings in relation where to determination, adjudication or relief is obtainable under the Act itself. Learned counsel pointed out that even In cases relating to lands where suit has been decreed and mesne profit, have been allowed the full bench has held that there is abatement of the suit and the appeal. A party is thus deprived of the fruits of the decree for a pretty long time. But it is to be observed, as pointed out in Ramkirit Singh's Case (supra) that these are cases where the relief of mesne profit is an ancillary relief and not an independent relief. It was held by the Full Bench that where the main relief is such as to be covered under the provisions of section 4(1)(c) the mere fact that the ancillary relief is not so covered would not stand in the way of abatement of the suit. The two positions cannot, therefore. be compared. 7. I now consider the position in relation to section 4(1)(b) The relevant provision has already been quoted. It states that no suit or other legal proceeding in respect of any land in which consolidation operation is going on shall be entertained in any Court. The two positions cannot, therefore. be compared. 7. I now consider the position in relation to section 4(1)(b) The relevant provision has already been quoted. It states that no suit or other legal proceeding in respect of any land in which consolidation operation is going on shall be entertained in any Court. Giving widest amplitude to the words used there can be no doubt that the execution proceedings in relation to "lands" could be covered by the broad language used in the provision. But, in my view a restricted meaning has to be given to the words used. If it is not so done it would not only result in hardship or injustice, not intended by the legislature, but would also render the provision unconstitutional. Before amplifying, however, this aspect to the matter it would be appropriate to consider as to whether modification of the words used in a legislation is permissible. 8. It is well settled that the intention of the legislature has to be ascertained from the language used. Necessarily, therefore, and as a general rule, the Courts have no power to add or change alter or eliminate the words which the legislature has incorporated in a statute. But this general rule is subject to exceptions. Indeed, in the latest edition of Maxwell (12th Edition) a separate chapter has been incorporated under the heading "exceptional construction." It may now be considered under what circumstances the ordinary and accepted rule of interpretation can be departed from. 9. As stated by the Supreme Court in Shyam Kishori Devi Vrs. The Patna Municipal Corporation & another “the words of statute never should in interpretation be added to or substracted from without almost a necessity.” It has to be considered as to when this necessity arises. 10. In Tirath Singh Vrs. Bachittar Singh, Maxwell's enunciation of law, which is to the following effect, was approved. "Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentences" (under lining is mine). The same view has been expressed in State of Madhya Pradesh Vrs, Azad Bharat Finance Company. 11. The same view has been expressed in State of Madhya Pradesh Vrs, Azad Bharat Finance Company. 11. There are a number of cases of the Supreme Court where the modification of the language has been judicially approved. In R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla & another & analogous Vs. Union of India, the expression prize competition was read as limited to competition in which success does not depend on skill. In so deciding the Supreme Court took assistance of principles stated in Heydon's case and in Bengal Immunity Company Vs. State of Bihar, In Income Tax Officer Vs. Damodar modification of the language was held permissible as without such modification the provision of the law under consideration would have been nullified, In R.L. Arora Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, the judicial control of the wide language used was recognised by taking into account, what is implicit in it (statutory provision) in view of the setting in which the provision appears and the circumstances in which it might have been enacted." In Vrajlal & Company V. State of Madhya Pradesh it was emphasised that in interpreting a statutory provision courts lean towards constitutionality and interpret the law taking into consideration the object and purpose of the enactment. Holding that the limited construction was permissible, it was observed : "A construction so limited In its sweep is commendable as it is consistent with the object of the Act and is also in harmony with clause (5) & (6) of Article 19 and clause (b) of Article 304." 12. Exceptional construction, as noted above, is not, in the words of Rowlatt, J. "adding anything to the section for it is quite clear that the intention was and the omission of certain words that you would expect to find there is nothing more than a faultiness of expression." (1920-1 K. B. 650-657). Lord Reid has said that he prefers to see a mistake on the part of the draftsman in doing revision rather than a deliberate attempt to introduce irrational rule. "The canons of construction," he said "are not so rigid as to prevent a realistic solution." (Cramas Properties Ltd. Vs. Connought Fur Trimmings Ltd. (1956-1 W.L.R. 892 at 899). 13. It would now be proper to examine whether there are, in the instant case, compelling circumstance's to require departure from the general rule of construction and resort to the exceptional rule. Connought Fur Trimmings Ltd. (1956-1 W.L.R. 892 at 899). 13. It would now be proper to examine whether there are, in the instant case, compelling circumstance's to require departure from the general rule of construction and resort to the exceptional rule. I first take up the question of hardship or injustice. If section 4(1)(b) is interpreted in its full v. width, the result would be that matters unconnected with the consolidation operation would be put in cold storage for years Parties having obtained decrees from courts, in many cases, after considerable expenses and delay, would find the doors of the courts barred. And with what purpose and aim in view? None, at all, as far as I can envisage, and none was advanced during the course of argument. To illustrate if a person has obtained a money decree he would not be able to execute it if be proceeds against a landed property which is situate in a village where consolidation operation is going on, for such an execution proceeding would be in respect of land in the widest sense of the term. raking another illustration, if an execution proceeding in respect of land which is subject matter of consolidation proceeding is attached and a person wants to prefer a claim under order 21 rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure in order to show that the land is not liable to be attached or proceeded against in the execution case, his application would not be entertained. Taking into consideration the frame work of the Act there does not appear to be the slightest reason for thinking that the legislature Intended non-entertainment of such a proceeding. Thus an expansive interpretation of the provision would lead to extraordinary results, for which it is difficult to discover any reason or justification. It would lead to consequences which could not, in my view, be in the contemplation of the legislature. In such a situation the mistake of the draftsman or faultiness of expression should not prevent a realistic solution. It should not be permitted to impute intention which the legislature never had. It should not be allowed to lead to unjust consequences. 14. The wide interpretation would result in making section 4(1)(b) unconstitutional as well. I have already dealt with scope of section 4(1)(c). I have held that pending execution cases do not abate. It should not be permitted to impute intention which the legislature never had. It should not be allowed to lead to unjust consequences. 14. The wide interpretation would result in making section 4(1)(b) unconstitutional as well. I have already dealt with scope of section 4(1)(c). I have held that pending execution cases do not abate. If it is held that execution cases that have been filed after issue of notification under section 3 (1) of the Act are not entertainable, the situation will be clearly discriminatoty. There must be some rational basis for making a distinction between execution cases that are pending and the execution cases which are filed after the issue of the notification. I am unable to discover any reasonable basis for classification of these two class of cases. To avoid unconstitutionality modification of language is clearly permissible, as illustrated by Vrajlal's case (supra). 15. Thus, in order to make section 4(1)(b) of the Act consistent with object of the legislation, avoid hardship and injustice, and make it constitutionally sustainable I would prefer to depart from the general rule and treat this case is a case of exceptional statutory construction. 16. The interpretation I would put on section 4 (1)(b) is that the provisions of section 4(1)(c) should be read into section 4(1)(b). This is permissible as is illustrated by R.V. Kingsby (1851) 15 J. P. 65). There the court read the provision of section 7 into section 6 of the Bread Act (6 and 7 William IV C. 37). Although I have held that section 4(1)(b) has to be given a restricted meaning as already discussed, it appears to me that In cases of this nature, which affect a sizeable section of the litigating public, it is always advisable to amend statutory provisions which do not conform to the intention of the legislature, and exceptional rule of construction has to be resorted to give effect to, what the court thinks, is the real intent of the legislature, and sustain its constitutional validity. I hope in the instant case also necessary amendment of section 4(1)(b) would be brought about. 17. I hope in the instant case also necessary amendment of section 4(1)(b) would be brought about. 17. In the result, I would hold that execution proceedings in respect of land, filed either before or after the issue of notification under section 3(1) of the Act, are not barred, where the right or interest in land could not be adjudicated upon or dealt with under any of the provisions of the Act. I would accordingly dismiss the civil revision application, but in the circumstances without costs. Application dismissed.