JUDGMENT R.R. Rastogi, J. - Anis Ahmad, the petitioner, was appointed Eakshi of the Town Area Committee Machli Shahr, district Jaunpur (hereinafter referred to as the Town Area Committee) on 6-3-1975 and he took charge of that office on 17-3-1975. On the enforcement of the U. P. Town Areas and Notified Areas Committee (Centralised) Service Rules, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) from 1-7-1976 the services of Bakshis in the Town Areas of Uttar Pradesh were centralised and the petitioner became a member of that centralised service. In Aug., 1977 the elected Town Area Committee was superseded and the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Machli Shahr was made in-charge of it. The petitioner was suspended by the District Magistrate, Jaunpur by an order dated 2-1-1978 and this order forms the subject-matter of challenge in this writ petition and the prayer is for the issue of a writ of certiorari calling for the record of the petitioners case and for the quashing of the aforesaid order. 2. The impugned order purports to have been passed by the District Magistrate, Jaunpur on the authority of a communication received by him from the Under-Secretary Swayatta Shasan Anubhag-1, Vidhan Bhawan, Lucknow Dated 23-12-1977. That letter was classified as 'Secret and Immediate and rendered in simple English it reads as under: - "Dear Sir, Your attention is invited to the petition of the erstwhile member of the Town Area committee Machli Shahr addressed to the Honble Swayatta Shasan Mantri, which is attached herewith. It is evident that there are serious complaints against the present Bakshi Sri Anis Ahmad, of embezzlement and irregularities. This Bakshi had been to jail also and there were several complaints against him found by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Machli Shahr and despite having been suspended he was again taken in -service. In case the attached complaints against Sri Anis Ahmad are found to be correct then he may be suspended with immediate effect and a report to that effect be submitted to the Government within one week so that the Honble Minister might be apprised of the whole situation. In case he has already been suspended, a copy of the suspension order may kindly be sent. Yours faithfully Girish Chandra Asthana, Anu Sachiv." A copy of this letter is Annexure T to the rejoinder-affidavit. 3. Rule 39 of the Rules makes provision for disciplinary proceedings. In case he has already been suspended, a copy of the suspension order may kindly be sent. Yours faithfully Girish Chandra Asthana, Anu Sachiv." A copy of this letter is Annexure T to the rejoinder-affidavit. 3. Rule 39 of the Rules makes provision for disciplinary proceedings. Sub-rule (3) thereof, which is material for our purposes is as under: - "(3) In cases requiring immediate suspension of an officer of the Centralised Services, the power of suspending such an officer shall be exercised by such authority as may be specified in this behalf by the Government; and in other cases requiring suspension of an officer, reference shall be made to the Government." 4. Now, the submission made before us on behalf of the petitioner by his counsel Sri S. P. Gupta was that the letter of the Under-Secretary dated 23-12-1977 did not amount to authorising the District Magistrate by the Government to suspend the petitioner with immediate effect. In fact there was no order by the Government for suspending the petitioner with immediate effect nor was any delegation of such power made to the District Magistrate, Jaunpur. In effect there was no application of mind by the Government in this behalf. As for the factual aspect of this question our attention was invited to the averment made in para. 9 of the writ petition. It has been stated in that paragraph that the petitioner made all relevant enquiries from the office of the District Magistrate, Jaunpur as well as from other sources and came to know that the District Magistrate, Jaunpur had not been authorised by the State Government under R. 37 (3) of the Rules to immediately suspend the officers of the Centralised Service either by his name or by his office and as such the District Magistrate, Jaunpur had no authority to suspend the petitioner. In reply to this averment in counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents by Gauri Shankar Misra, who is Local Bodies clerk in the Collectorate, Jaunpur merely it has been stated that the State Government had issued directions to the District Magistrate to suspend the petitioner in the event the allegations against him were found to be correct and that the District Magistrate after enquiry found those allegations to be correct and consequently in compliance with the directions of the State Government suspended him. In the counter-affidavit a reference, of course, was made to the communication dated 23-12-1977 but a copy of the same was not filed. That was filed by the petitioner with his rejoinder-affidavit. Further, the petitioner in rejoinder-affidavit denied that any such direction had been given by the State Government in the letter aforesaid or that the impugned order was founded upon any such direction (vide paras. 6 and 11). On the basis of the aforesaid facts it was submitted by Sri S. P. Gupta that the impugned order was not passed by a competent authority and as such was liable to be quashed. 5. After hearing learned counsel for the parties we find that there is considerable substance in this submission. The question whether or not the District Magistrate, Jaunpur, had been given an authority by the State Government to suspend the petitioner with immediate effect would have to be decided on the interpretation of the letter dated 23-12-1977 which has been reproduced above. It is to be seen as to whether it is expressed in proper legal form and is properly authenticated, as required by Article 166 of the Constitution of India. This Article reads as under: - "166 (1) All executive action of the Govt, shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor. (2) Orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the Governor shall be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be made by the Governor, and the validity of an order or instrument which is so authenticated shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not an order or instrument made or executed by the Governor. (3) The Governor shall make rules for the more convenient transaction of business of the Government of the State, and for the allocation among Ministers of the said business in so far as it is not business with respect to which the Governor is by or under this Constitution required to act in his discretion." 6. The provisions are directory and not mandatory and the law in this behalf is rather well settled. The executive power of the Union which is vested in the President and of the State which is vested in the Governor, can be exercised by them either directly or through officers subordinate to them in accordance with the Constitution. The provisions are directory and not mandatory and the law in this behalf is rather well settled. The executive power of the Union which is vested in the President and of the State which is vested in the Governor, can be exercised by them either directly or through officers subordinate to them in accordance with the Constitution. Since it would be impossible for the President or the Governor to carry on the complex task of executive Government by themselves, the Constitution makes two kinds of provisions, one relating to the form and the other to the -substance of the executive work of Government. 7. In Dattatraya Moreshwar v. State of Bombay, ( AIR 1952 SC 181 ) the principle was enunciated as under (at page 135): - "It is well settled that generally speaking the provisions of a statute creating public duties are directory and those conferring private rights are imperative. When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of thus duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty and at the same time would not promote the main object of the legislature, it has been the practice of the Courts to hold such provisions to be directory only, the neglect of them not affecting the validity of the acts done." 8. Similarly in State of Bombay v. Purushottam Jog ( AIR 1952 SC 317 ) when an order of detention under Section 3 (I) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 stated in the preamble 'whereas the Government of Bombay was satisfied ............ and its operative part read; 'Now therefore......... ..................... the Government of Bombay is pleased to direct that the said 'Shri be detained and by order of the Governor of Bombay it was signed by the Secretary to the Govt, of Bombay, Home Dept., it was held that the order was expressed to be made in the name of the Governor as required by Art. 166 (1) because it said "By order of the Governor". It was also held that the meaning of "expressed" is to make known the opinions or the feeling: of a particular person and when Secretary to Government apprehends a man and tells him in the order that it is being done under the order of the Governor, he is in substance saying that he is acting in the name of the Governor, and, on his behalf, is making known to the detenu the opinion and feelings and order of the Governor. The Constitution does not require a magic incantation which can only be expressed in a set formula of words. What the Court has to see is whether substance of the requirements of Art. 166 (1) is there. 9. Another view taken in that case was that in order to aver the necessary facts it is not necessary to call in every case the Minister in charge. An affidavit of the Secretary or any other person having the requisite means of knowledge will be enough to prove t at the order was validly made by the Government of the State. 10. In R. Chitralekha v. State of Mysore ( AIR 1964 SC 1823 ) a letter was sent by the Under-Secretary to the Selection Board to prescribe interviews for regulation of admission in colleges. The validity of the interview was challenged not on the ground that no such order by the Government existed but on the ground that the letter was not issued in the name of Governor. It was held that the objection was without merits. Subba Hao, J. as his Lordship then was, speaking for the majority observed (at p. 1829) "If the conditions laid down in Article 166 had been complied with the order could not have been called in question on the ground that it was not an order made by the Government. But it was settled law that, the provisions of the Article were only directory and not mandatory in character and if they were not complied with it could still be established as a question of fact that the impugned order was issued in fact by & the State Government or Governor. But it was settled law that, the provisions of the Article were only directory and not mandatory in character and if they were not complied with it could still be established as a question of fact that the impugned order was issued in fact by & the State Government or Governor. The letter in question no doubt did not conform to the provisions of the Article but it ex facie said that the order to the effect mentioned therein was issued by the Government and it was not denied that it was communicated to the selection committee." 11. In that case the petitioner in none of his affidavits had made any specific averments that no such order had been issued by the Government. On the other hand there was a clear averment in the counter-affidavit that the Government gave the direction in question and it was not denied by the petitioner. That affidavit was filed by the Deputy Secretary to the Government. It would be seen that that decision proceeded on different facts altogether. 12. In State of Rajasthan v. Sripal Jain ( AIR 1963 SC 1323 ) again it was emphasised that it is well settled that any defect of form in the order by Government would not necessarily make it Illegal and the only consequence of the order not being in proper form as required by Art. 166 is that the burden is thrown on the Government to show that the order was in fact passed by it. 13. In P. Joseph John v. State of Travancore-Cochin ( AIR 1955 SC 160 ) the notice was signed by the Chief Secretary of the State and expressed to be on behalf of the Government. An opportunity was given by that notice to the petitioner to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him. The notice being in substantial compliance with Art. 166 was held to be perfectly valid. 14. In State of U. P. v. Om Prakash Gupta ( AIR 1970 SC 679 ) where the impugned order read thus (at p. 681) :- "Government of the United Provinces Appointment (A) Department. Notification Dated Lucknow, Aug. 30, 1949 No. 4795/II-A-125-1948 With effect from Aug. 30, 1949, Shri Om Prakash Gupta, Deputy Collector, under suspension is dismissed from service. Sd/- Bhagwan Sahay, Chief Secretary." The view taken was (at pp. Notification Dated Lucknow, Aug. 30, 1949 No. 4795/II-A-125-1948 With effect from Aug. 30, 1949, Shri Om Prakash Gupta, Deputy Collector, under suspension is dismissed from service. Sd/- Bhagwan Sahay, Chief Secretary." The view taken was (at pp. 684, 685): - "The Court has repeatedly held that the provisions of Art. 166 (1) (2) (similar to sub-secs. (1) and (2) of Sec. 59 of the Government of India Act, 1935), are directory and substantial compliance with those provisions is sufficient. See P. Joseph John v. State of Tranvancore Cochin, 1955 SCR 1011 : ( AIR 1955 SC 160 ) and Chitralekha v. State of Mysore, 1964-6 SCR 368 : ( AIR 1964 SC 1823 ). In this case the impugned order was made in the name of the State Government. It was signed by the Chief Secretary. Therefore, prima facie, it is a valid order." 15. It is thus -well established that the requirements of Art. 166 are directory. Thus orders and instruments which do not comply with this Article are not invalid but are deprived of the immunity, conferred by Cl. (2) of this Article; Consequently, if any such orders or instruments are challenged on the ground that they were not made by or on behalf of the Governor, the burden would lie upon the Government to show that they were, in fact, made by or under the authority of the Governor. 16. In Krishna Gopal Mukherji v. State (AIR 1960 Orissa 37); One S issued a letter purporting to be a show cause notice under Art. 311 (2), as Secretary to Government in the Works Department but he had not stated anywhere that the letter was issued by him under the direction of the Government. Nor did it say that the Government were not satisfied with the petitioners explanation and that they had tentatively decided to dismiss the petitioner from service. In the last portion of that letter also he had not stated that it was issued 'By order of the Governor. It was held that the letter was not authenticated in the manner indicated by Rr. 11 and 12 of the Rules of Business of Government. Hence the bar on judicial scrutiny imposed by Cl. (2) of Art. 166 of the Constitution will not apply. 17. It was held that the letter was not authenticated in the manner indicated by Rr. 11 and 12 of the Rules of Business of Government. Hence the bar on judicial scrutiny imposed by Cl. (2) of Art. 166 of the Constitution will not apply. 17. Similarly in Bishan Singh v. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1953 Raj 46 ) it was observed (at p. 49): - "The Ministers, therefore, only aid and advise the Governor and the orders of the Governor have to be expressed as taken in the name of the Governor. There is a well-known form for this in Rajasthan viz. By order of his Highness the Raj Pramukh, and where that form is used and authenticated in the manner provided by the rules, there is a conclusive presumption that the order was made by the Raj Pramukh in view of Art. 166 (2). In the present case, however, we do not find any order in that form. It was, in our opinion, the duty of the Revenue Secretary after the note of the Hon. Minister dated 11th June, 1951, reached him to take action in the manner provided in Art. 166." 18. In the instant case the letter Dated 23-12-1977 was neither expressed to be made in the name of the Governor in form nor in substance. The Under-Secretary only communicated to the District Magistrate, Jaunpur the desire of the Minister. The burden hence lay on the respondents to show that the communication in fact was made by order under the authority of the Governor. They have, however, failed to do so. The affidavit which has been filed on behalf of the respondents was not filed by any person having the requisite means of knowledge of the affairs of the Department concerned but it was filed by a clerk of the Collectors office, Jaunpur, who could have had no access to any record of the Government. It is, therefore, difficult to hold that there was any order made by the Government for immediate suspension of the petitioner or that there was delegation of such power to the District Magistrate, Jaunpur. The impugned order was therefore without any authority and is liable to be quashed. 19. It was however, submitted by the learned Standing Counsel that there is a presumption that official acts are done in the manner required by law. The impugned order was therefore without any authority and is liable to be quashed. 19. It was however, submitted by the learned Standing Counsel that there is a presumption that official acts are done in the manner required by law. Therefore, it should be presumed that the impugned order was passed by the District Magistrate under valid delegation of power. We are not inclined to accept this submission because, as we have indicated above, the letter dated 23-12-1977 does not comply with Art. 166 of the Constitution. The State, however, could prove as a fact that there had been such valid delegation of power but that has not been done. There was already an assertion made in the petition in para. 9 which has been referred to above when rule nisi was issued by this Court. After that the respondents should have taken care to find out the correct facts and to place them before the Court so as to show that a valid order as required by Art. 166 (1) had been made and that there had been valid delegation of power to the District Magistrate. During the arguments as well the State Government was afforded an opportunity to find out as to whether there was any such order passed by the Government on .the record but that could not be shown to us. We, therefore, hold that there was no proper authorisation in this behalf by the Government to the District Magistrate Jaunpur, and hence the impugned order passed by the District Magistrate, Jaunpur; was without any proper and competent authority. 20. In the view which we have taken, we are not inclined to agree with the Standing Counsel that there is an alternative remedy available to the petitioner by making a reference of his claim: to the Public Services Tribunal under Section 4 of the U. P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act, 1978. The District Magistrate, Jaunpur, could not be treated as the employer of the petitioner in view of our finding that he had not been authorised by the State Government to pass the impugned order nor had there been any such general delegation of power made in his favour. 21. In view of the foregoing discussion the writ petition is allowed and the order suspending the petitioner dated 2-1-1978 is hereby quashed. We, however, make no order as to costs.