JUDGMENT 1. - In a suit for permanent mandatory injunction, appellant Pukh Raj alleged that he was the tenant of the shop given in para No. 1 of the plaint. The shop was leased on 16.5.1960 by Dule Raj, father of Jagish Raj, defendant No. 1, Madho Raj and Gopal Raj defendants Nos.6 and 7 who happen to be the real brothers of Jagdish Raj defendant No.l. Towards the north of that shop, is the house occupied by Jagdish Raj. Defendants No. 1 and 2, on 25.6.1962 are alleged to have opened a door in the southern well of the house towards the shop of the plaintiff, and it is being used for the roof of the shop. When the plaintiff wanted to erect a well on the roof of the shop to close this door, defendants Nos. 1 to 4 obstructed, hence, the plaintiff sought relief in the court by filing a suit. Jagdish Raj was the main contesting defendant, who pleaded that the door in question was there in existence for a pretty long time, and he has the right for using the roof. That the plaintiff had no cause of action. On the basis of the pleadings, various issues were framed and the learned Additional Civil judge held that the way coming over to the roof from towards the house in occupation of Jagdish Raj, was in existence prior to the shop being leased out to the plaintiff. As such, the learned Additional Civil Judge held that the plaintiff having failed to prove that the disputed door was opened on 25-6-1962, he was not entitled to close the door on the court. 2. The suit of the plaintiff being dismissed, he preferred an appeal in the court of District judge, jodhpur. The learned District judge, by his judgment dated 26-8-68, dismissed the appeal. Being aggrieved by that judgment Pukhraj has filed this second appeal. During the pendency of this appeal, the main contesting defendant Jagdish Raj expired on 2-11-1969, and his legal representatives were brought on record. 3. The learned District judge, by his judgment dated 26-8-68, dismissed the appeal. Being aggrieved by that judgment Pukhraj has filed this second appeal. During the pendency of this appeal, the main contesting defendant Jagdish Raj expired on 2-11-1969, and his legal representatives were brought on record. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the judgment of the two courts below on the ground that it was the unpartitioned ancestral house of which the shop of the appellant was a part, and the house occupied by Jagdish Raj, was also a part of that house, and therefore, the peaceful enjoyment of the shop leased by Dule Raj, father of Jagdish Raj, in his capacity as 'Karta' of the family, cannot be interrupted by Jagdish Raj, or his family members According to the learned counsel, the whole 'Nohra' including the shop. was rented to the appellant, and therefore, he was entitled to make use of the roof excluding the interruption by anybody. It has also been argued by the learned counsel that the shop was leased in the year 1950, when the family was joint and therefore, it does not lie with Jagdish Raj to say that they can use the roof even after its being leased out. The appellant has come with a specific case that it was on 25.6.1962 that the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 opened a door in the southern wall towards the roof of the shop of the plaintiff. The trial court as well as the first appellate court has elaborately discussed the evidence led from both the sides on this paint, and have arrived at a conclusion that the door was there in existence since long. While hearing this second appeal, the reappraisal of evidence on a question of fact is not called for, specially when the concurrent finding of the two courts blow is based on detailed scrutiny of the evidence led by both the parties. The two courts below have given definite reasons for disbelieving the witnesses of the appellant. Thus, this concurrent finding of fact that the door was not opened on 25-6-1962, as alleged by the appellant, rather it was in existence since long, cannot be disturbed in this second appeal. 4. The two courts below have given definite reasons for disbelieving the witnesses of the appellant. Thus, this concurrent finding of fact that the door was not opened on 25-6-1962, as alleged by the appellant, rather it was in existence since long, cannot be disturbed in this second appeal. 4. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant that there was breach of contract by Jagdish Raj in not allowing the peaceful enjoyment of the roof of the shop leased to Pukhraj is not appealing. The reason is that Pukhraj was not the lessee, and in my opinion, the two courts have rightly held that Duleraj, Gopal Raj and Madho Raj not being on good terms with Jagdish Raj had colluded with the plaintiff to disturb the peaceful enjoyment of the roof by Jagdish Raj through this door in question. The two authorities cited on the point by the learned counsel are of no help to him, because in the case of Kanchanlul and others. defendant appellants v. Hari Prassad Dadu Khadakhsingh & others plaintiff respondents, AIR 1951 Nagpur 379 , as well as in the case of Brahmdeo Narainsingh Appellant v. Members of the Notified Area Committee, AIR 1965 Patna 179 . A point of quiet enjoyment by the lessee and the disturbance by the lessor or the persons claiming through him, was in question, while in the case in hand according to the learned counsel for the appellant himself, the house was ancestral and was unpartitioned at the time of the filing of suit. Naturally, therefore Jagdish Raj was occupying the house and using the roof in his own right. If the father and the two brothers executed the rent note in favour of the plaintiff it was not binding on Jagdish Raj so as to interfere. In his right of use of the roof through the door already in existence. The learned counsel for the appellant inter alia argued that assuming the existence of the door prior to the shop being leased, the exclusive use of the roof by the appellant could not have been disturbed by Jagdish Raj and his family. It is pertinent to note that when a party comes out with a specific case and fails to prove it, then the relief sought is not available to him. It is pertinent to note that when a party comes out with a specific case and fails to prove it, then the relief sought is not available to him. The prepetual mandatory injunction sought on the ground that the door was opened on 25-6-1962 and since then the interruption of the peaceful enjoyment of the plaintiff commenced. Hence, the prayer is for getting that door closed by way of mandatory injunction. It having been found that there was no interruption like that and the door was in existence since long and Jagdish Raj and his family members were enjoying the right to use the roof since beginning there was no question of any disturbance of right of the plaintiff. Thus, the two courts below were justified in dismissing the suit of the plaintiff. 5. Consequently, the appeal being devoid of force, is dismissed with costs.Appeal dismissed with costs. *******