Judgment :- 1. The second appeal is directed, against the judgment and decree dated 19-12-1970 in O.S. No. 68 of 1969 on the file of the Munsiff's Court, Parur, as modified by the judgment and decree dated 15-1-1976 in A. S. No. 49 of 1974 on the file of the Sub Court, Parur The suit was one for redemption. Repelling the contentions of the appellant-defendant, the suit was decreed by the trial court, and, subject to certain modifications with respect to mesne profits payable to the decree-holder, the preliminary decree passed by the trial court has been confirmed by the first appellate court, which has also directed that the decree passed by it may be treated as the final decree for redemption. The cross objection by the respondents plaintiffs is directed against the reservation of kudikidappu right in favour of the appellant-defendant allowed by the courts below. 2. Though several other contentions also are seen to have been raised in the Memorandum of Second Appeal, the sole point high-lighted by Shri. P.N. Sankaranarayana Pillai, the counsel for the appellant, is that gross miscarriage of justice has been caused by the courts below in not allowing the -appellant to take out a Commission to value the improvements effected by the appellant for payment of compensation to her. It is seen observed in the judgment of the first appellate court that after the issues were framed by the trial court, though the suit had undergone several adjournments, till the date on which the suit came up in the special list for actual trial, the appellant did not take any steps for the issue of commission, and therefore, there was no ground made out for remanding the matter to enable the appellant to take out a commission for valuing the improvements, if any, effected by her. Counsel for the respondents relied on this observation and also referred to the clause in Ext. Dl mortgage deed dated 16-4-1123 M. E. prohibiting the mortgagee from effecting any improvements in the land comprised in the mortgage and categorically disclaiming the mortgagor's liability to pay compensation, for improvements, if any, effected in violation of the terms of the mortgage. 3. I cannot help saying that the appellant was guilty of laches in not having been vigilant about her rights and for not having taken steps for the issue of commission at the appropriate stage. 3. I cannot help saying that the appellant was guilty of laches in not having been vigilant about her rights and for not having taken steps for the issue of commission at the appropriate stage. The tendency to apply for the issue of commission on the date on which the suit comes up for trial in the special list, after it having undergone several adjournments, has to be deprecated in strong words. After the passing of the preliminary decree by the trial court a period of nearly one decade has elapsed. The counsel for the appellant while admitting that there was apparent delay in applying for the issue of commission, hastened to add that it was not due to indifference or wilful negligence on the part of the appellant, but was due to her honest belief that the suit might not be taken up for trial within such a short time of about one year from the date of framing the issues; and, she may be given an opportunity of taking out a commission, even on payment of costs. It is with great reluctance that I accede to the request of the counsel for the appellant for giving the appellant an opportunity of taking out a commission for assessing the value of improvements alleged to have been effected by her; and it is also on condition that the appellant should pay by way of costs to the respondents, through their counsel in this court, a sum of Rs. 250/-. 4. Before parting with the question relating to the value of improvements, I should also like to refer to the contention raised by the counsel for the respondents, that in view of the clause in Ext. Dl mortgage deed, prohibiting the mortgagee from effecting improvements the appellant could not be entitled to claim compensation for improvements effected by her. In this connection, reference may be made to the relevant provisions in the Kerala Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, 29 of 1958. The term "tenant" as defined by S.2 (d) (i) includes a mortgagee also. S.17 provides that nothing in any contract entered into, whether before or after the commencement of the Act, shall take away or limit the right of a tenant to make improvements and to claim compensation for them in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The term "tenant" as defined by S.2 (d) (i) includes a mortgagee also. S.17 provides that nothing in any contract entered into, whether before or after the commencement of the Act, shall take away or limit the right of a tenant to make improvements and to claim compensation for them in accordance with the provisions of the Act. I, therefore, find little merit in the contention of the counsel for the respondents that in the absence of permission in that behalf, and in the face of the prohibitory clause contained in Ext. D1 mortgage deed, the appellant-defendant is not entitled to claim compensation for the improvements alleged to have been effected by her in the land comprised in the mortgage. 5. I will now take up for consideration the cross objection. The courts below, while passing the decrees impugned, had granted reservation of kudikidappu right with respect to the residential building, in Item No. 2 of the properties mortgaged, as they found that it fell squarely within the ambit of the definition 'hut'in S.2(25) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, and the appellant was entitled to the protection contained in Explanation IV to S.2 (25) of the Act she being a person who fulfilled the requirements of proviso clauses (a) and (b) thereof. Explanation TV reads as follows: "Where a mortgagee with possession erects for his residence a homestead, or resides in a but already in existence, on the land to which the mortgage relates, he shall, notwithstanding the redemption of the mortgage, be deemed to be a kudikidappukaran in respect of such homestead or hut, provided that at the time of the redemption (a) he has no other kudikidappu or residential building belonging to him, or any land exceeding three cents in any city or major municipality or five cents in any other municipality or ten cents in any panchayat area or township, in possession either as owner or as tenant, on which he could erect a homestead; and (b) his annual income does not exceed two thousand rupees." No argument that conditions laid down in the proviso clauses (a) and (b) to Explanation IV have not been fulfilled in this case was advanced before me. The submission of the counsel for the respondent-plaintiffs is that the Explanation will have application only to cases where the hut, in which the mortgagee resides, is not included in the subject matter of the mortgage. In other words, his contention is that the Explanation visualises a transaction in which the land alone, excluding the building (hut) therein, is the subject matter of the mortgage. Emphasis is laid on the words "on the land to which the mortgage relates." According to the counsel in this case it is not disputed that not only the land but also the building in which the appellant-defendant was residing as a mortgagee, was the subject matter of the mortgage, and, therefore, the Explanation has no application to this case. He would contend that on redemption, the property mortgaged should come back to the mortgagor intact without any portion thereof being subtracted for whatever reason it may be. The reasoning of the counsel, I am afraid, cannot stand close scrutiny. In the very same Explanation there is the provision that where a mortgagee with possession erects for his residence a homestead he shall be deemed to be a kudikidappukaran in respect of such homestead notwithstanding the redemption of the mortgage. In that case also it is not possible for the mortgagor to get back the property in its entirety in as much as the area occupied by the homestead erected by the mortgagee will have necessarily to be excluded from the area of actual recovery. That apart, the mortgage of immovable property should be deemed to include not only the land but also the buildings thereon in accordance with the definition given for the term "immovable property" in S.3 of the Transfer of Property Act, the exclusion with respect to that term being confined to standing timber, growing crops or grass. That apart, the mortgage of immovable property should be deemed to include not only the land but also the buildings thereon in accordance with the definition given for the term "immovable property" in S.3 of the Transfer of Property Act, the exclusion with respect to that term being confined to standing timber, growing crops or grass. There is yet another fallacy in this argument, viz , if the contention of the counsel that it is only in cases where the building is not included in the subject matter of the mortgage that the Explanation would apply is held to be correct, then, the explanation itself becomes superfluous, in as much as, in that case, the redemption might not take in the building, as it does not form part of the property mortgaged, and it would automatically fall outside the decree for redemption even without the aid of the Explanation under reference. From the scheme of the Act and the social and economic object sought to be achieved by it. it is clear that the intention of the Legislature was to give protection to the kudikidappukaran even when the kudikidappu is situated in the land comprised in a mortgage, making the position clear that the kudikidappukaran's interest will not be jeopardised when the property mortgaged in which the kudikidappu is situated is redeemed. 6. For the foregoing reasons the Second Appeal is allowed in part; and the final decree for redemption passed by the first appellate court shall remain subject to the following modifications: A. The trial court in execution proceedings shall issue a commission for valuing the improvements alleged to have been effected by the appellant and with respect to which she claims compensation, provided by way of costs for her laches she pays to the respondents-plaintiffs, through the counsel appearing for them in this Court, a sum of Rs. 250/ (Rupees Two hundred and fifty only) and produces proof thereof within a reasonable time as may be fixed by that court. B.The respondents-plaintiffs will be entitled to mesne profits from the date of deposit of the mortgage amount at the rate that might be ascertained by the commissioner who inspects the property for the purpose of valuing the improvements alleged to have been effected by the appellant-defendant, or as may be fixed on such other material as is made available to the court. C. From the mesne profits found payable to the respondents amount, if any, representing the income from the improvement, if any, effected by the appellant-defendant would be deducted. D. The execution petition stated to have been filed by the respondents-plaintiffs, if pending, will be taken up for further proceedings as expeditiously as possible; and if no petition is pending, the execution court shall proceed expeditiously to have the matter ended as early as possible if and when the execution petition is filed by the respondents decree holders. E. In this second appeal the parties will bear their respective costs; the sum of Rs. 250/-ordered to be paid by the appellant-defendant to the respondents-plaintiffs by way of costs is irrespective of the result of the proceedings. Party Allowed.