JUDGMENT - Gadgil B.C., J.: - The plaintiff in Regular Civil Suit No. 732 of 19M of the file of 4th Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Nagpur has preferred this appeal against the dismissal of that suit The trial Court decreed the plaintiffs suit for possession. That decision, however was set aside by the Assistant Judge, Nagpur in Civil Appeal No. 479 of 1962 and consequently, the plaintiffs suit has been ordered to be dismissed. 2. Plaintiff Chbotelal filed the suit in question as the Managing Trustee of Hanuman Deosthan, New Shukrawari, Nagpur. The Trust is a public Trust which was previously registered under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act and is now registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act. Plaintiffs case in brief is that the house No. 230(old 185) situate at Nagpur was originally owned by Gajjulal Dhanoalal Pardeshi. In January 1916, he orally dedicated the suit house in favour of the public Trust. Gajjulal died in April 1916. Thereafter, Matadin managed the house as the Trustee till 1921. After the death of Matadin, his son Kanhaiyalal managed the suit property as the Trustee from 1921 to 1950. From 1950, plaintiff Chhote1al started managing the suit property as a Managing Trustee of the Public Trusts. The defendant entered the suit property as a tenant of the Trust in 1951. However, he stopped paying rent from July 1960 and began asserting his title to the suit property. There was exchange of notices between the parties. Plaintiff, thereafter, filed the suit under appeal to recover possession and 1 certain mesne profits. 3. This suit was resisted by the defendant. He admitted that Gajjulal was the owner of the house. He, however, contended that after Gajjulals death, the house was inherited by Matadin as the heir of Gajjulal and in due course, Kanhaiyalal inherited the property as the heir of Matadin. The defendant contended that on 3-4-1950 Kanhaiyalal gifted the suit house to one Anandrao Narayanrao Bujade by the gift deed, Exb. 54. The defendant was in possession as a tenant of Anandrao Bujade. After some years, i. e. on 12-1-1961, Anandrao Bujade sold the suit house to the defendant vide Exh.47. Thus, in substance, the defendant contended that the plaintiff Trust has no concern with the suit house and that the property is owned by the defendant as mentioned above. 4. 54. The defendant was in possession as a tenant of Anandrao Bujade. After some years, i. e. on 12-1-1961, Anandrao Bujade sold the suit house to the defendant vide Exh.47. Thus, in substance, the defendant contended that the plaintiff Trust has no concern with the suit house and that the property is owned by the defendant as mentioned above. 4. On these pleadings, the learned Civil Judge Junior Division, Nagpur framed the issues and heard the suit. He held that the suit property is ill Deostban property of the plaintiff and that the plaintiff was in possession within 12 years next before Suit. A finding was recorded that Kanhaiyalal has been managing the Deosthan as a Trustee. As the defendant has raised a plea of his title, an issue in that respect was framed and the Court recorded a finding that the defendant did not prove his title to the suit property. With these findings, the suit was decreed. The defendant went in appeal to the District Court. It was registered as Civil Appeal No. 479 of 1962. The Second Extra Assistant Judge at Nagpur allowed the appeal mainly on the ground that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide the question as to whether the property is owned by the Public Trust or not. Plaintiff filed Second Appeal No. 195 of 1964. By judgment dated 27-9-1966, the decree dismissing the suit was set aside. The judgment shows that the dismissal of the plaintiffs suit on the above ground was not correct. The matter was therefore, remanded to the District Court for fresh decision on merits. 5. After this remand, the appeal was heard by the Second Extra Assistant Judge, Nagpur and by his judgment dated 29-4-1967, he allowed the appeal as he came to the conclusion that there was no dedication of the house by Gajjulal to the Public Trust. 6. Mr. Deshpande for the appellant contended that though this is a second appeal, still the appellant has a right to successfully challenge the decision of the District Court as there has been an error of law which has vitiated the judgment. In the trial Court, the plaintiff has led evidence of Ramaji(P. W. I) and Shionarayan(P. W. 2) for the purpose of proving the oral dedication by Gajjulal. In the trial Court, the plaintiff has led evidence of Ramaji(P. W. I) and Shionarayan(P. W. 2) for the purpose of proving the oral dedication by Gajjulal. Gopalrao(P. W. 3) and Sitaram(P. W. 4) were occupying a part of the suit house as tenants from the Trust and they have deposed that they were such tenants of the Trust. Tulshiram(P. W 5) and Chhotelal(P. W. 6) have deposed about the management of the suit property by them on behalf of the Trust. In addition, the plaintiff produced at Ex. 46, a statement made by the defendant to the Municipal authorities. Plaintiffs contention is that this statement dated 2-7-1959 constitutes an admission of the defendants status as a tenant in the suit house belonging to the Public Trust. The trial Judge has held that this document Exh. 46 is an admission. The Second Extra Assistant Judge, however, discarded that evidence and then proceeded to discuss the rest of the evidence that has been by the parties. 7. Before considering the contention of Mr. Deshpande that Exh. 46 is an admission by the defendant, I would like to state briefly the nature of that document The Nagpur Corporation sent the notice dated 2-7-1959 EXB. 46) ,to the defendant stating therein that the defendant has been occupying the suit house No. 230 as a tenant. By that notice, the defendant was called tip on to furnish the information in prescribed form that was appended on the reverse of the notice. Column No. 1 requires to mention the extent of the premises while column No.2 deals with the monthly rent that is payable by the tenant. Against column No.4, it is necessary to state as to whether the premises were taken for residence or for any other purpose. Column No.8 deals with the name of the owner. The rest of the columns are not material. The defendant has filled in these columns to show that he was the monthly tenant on the rent of Rs. 20; that he has taken the property for shop purposes and that the owner of the house is Bajrang Panch Committee, Sarpanch Chhotelal. Thus, the document Exh. 46 on the face of it shows that the defendant admitted that he was the tenant of the plaintiff Trust in the shop premises in the suit property on a monthly rent of Rs. 20. Thus, the document Exh. 46 on the face of it shows that the defendant admitted that he was the tenant of the plaintiff Trust in the shop premises in the suit property on a monthly rent of Rs. 20. The learned Second Extra Assistant Judge in paragraph 21 of the judgment has observed that the above statements in Exh. 46 would not constitute any estoppel as the plaintiff has not changed its position vis-a-vis the suit property on the basis of the representation appearing in Exh. 46. Mr. Deshpande for the appellant frankly stated that the appellant is not relying upon Exh. 46 for the purposes of claiming that there was any estoppel against the defendant. The learned advocate, however, argued that Exh. 46 is an admission and that it would be binding upon the defendant unless the defendant proves that it is either false or erroneous. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of(Narayan v. Gopal)l A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 101, wherein the value of the evidence in the shape of an admission has been considered. The relevant bead note reads as follows: “An admission is the best evidence that an opposing party can rely upon, and though not conclusive, is decisive of the matter, unless successfully withdrawn or proved erroneous.” In another decision in the case of(Union of India v. Moksh Builders Financiars)2 A.I.R. 1977S.C. 409, the Supreme Court has further clarified the position by holding as follows: . “An admission by a party is substantive evidence of the fact admitted, and admissions duly proved are admissible evidence irrespective of whether the party making them appeared in the witness box or not and whether that party when appearing as witness was confronted with those statements in case it made a statement contrary to those admissions.” It was contended by Mr. Kherdekar that the defendant in his evidence has -explained his admission. The defendant has stated that Exh. 46 was in respect of a room in the temple of the plaintiff Deosthan and that at that time he was a tenant in that room on a monthly rent of Rs 20 white in 1959 he was staying in the suit house as a tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 45 and was in possession through Anandrao Bujade. 46 was in respect of a room in the temple of the plaintiff Deosthan and that at that time he was a tenant in that room on a monthly rent of Rs 20 white in 1959 he was staying in the suit house as a tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 45 and was in possession through Anandrao Bujade. This explanation, however, has got to be scrutinised with the help of the statements elicited in the cross-examination of the defendant. Nos. 9 and) 0 of his deposition. “I first took one room of the suit house on rent from Anandrao. This was in 1951. There was no rent note. I had supplied the information contained in Exit 45. In that declaration I had given the name of owner as Bajrang Panch Committee, Sirpanch Chhotelal. I have no receipt to show that I paid Rs 20 to Anandrao for rent for one room. I had taken the room in the temple on rent in 1958. That room was with me for six months. I had taken that room on rent from Bajrang Pancho Committee. Before I purchased the suit house I did not receive any assessment notice. 10. The notice of assessment Ex. 46 was in respect of house No. 230. I received the notice in my shop in H. No. 230. I made the declaration in respect of rent I paid for a godown and not for the shop in H. No. 230. There was no shop in the room of the temple. I know the difference between a shop and a godown. I win not ,”all a godown a shop. The declaration is for the shop.” The learned Second Extra Assistant Judge ignored the above statements in the cross-examination by observing at the fag end of paragraph 21 of the judgment as follows: “In the declaration form home number is not written by defendant to be No. 230 of Circle No 2 this Ex. 46 cannot be used as- piece of evidence to establish title of the plaintiff, relating to suit house. It may be that in paragraph 10 of hi” cross-examination defendant has admitted that he know,> the difference between a godown and cycle shop- and that he would not call the one by the name of the other bat that inadvertent statement cannot establish title of the plaintiff.” , The grievance of Mr. It may be that in paragraph 10 of hi” cross-examination defendant has admitted that he know,> the difference between a godown and cycle shop- and that he would not call the one by the name of the other bat that inadvertent statement cannot establish title of the plaintiff.” , The grievance of Mr. Deshpande is that the admissions in paragraphs 9 and 10 read as a whole should not have been thrown out by saying that they are inadvertent statements. According to him the plain reading of those statement in the cross-examination would mean that the defendant admitted that the notice of assessment, Exh. 46 was in respect of suit house No 230; that there was no shop of the defendant in the room that was taken by him from the temple premises, that be knew the difference between shop and the godown; that he will not call a godown a shop and that the declaration was for the shop. Thus, here is a case where the defendant has admitted that he was holding the suit property as a tenant from the Trust. That admission has not been taken into account by the Second Extra Assistant Judge on the ,hypothesis that certain statements made in the cross-examination were in advertent statements. As I said above, the admissions in Ex. 46 as also in the witness box are not liable to be brushed aside for the reasons stated by the Second Extra Assistant Judge in his judgment. There is much substance in the contention of Mr. Deshpande that the statements made by the defendant in paragraphs 9 and 10 of his deposition have been totally misread and that such misreading of evidence would obviously be an error of law. After giving my anxious consideration to the statements in Ex. 46 as well as statements in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the evidence, I am satisfied that it would be very difficult for anybody to hold that all this put together does not constitute an admission or that they were only inadvertent statements which ought to be left out. 8. Mr. Deshpande contended that in addition to the above mentioned error of law, learned Second Extra Assistant Judge has also committed another error in holding that the plaintiff has also made a statement that he is not the owner of the suit house. 8. Mr. Deshpande contended that in addition to the above mentioned error of law, learned Second Extra Assistant Judge has also committed another error in holding that the plaintiff has also made a statement that he is not the owner of the suit house. For registering the public trust, plaintiff made an application, Ex 37 in which he has mentioned the trust property as house Nos. 379, 369 and 55. Exh. 37 does not include house No 230 i e. old No 185, The learned Second Extra Assistant Judge has held that this omission would constitute an admission. However, the omission has been explained by plaintiff Chhotelal in paragraph 5 of his evidence. He has stated that he has shown the suit house as the Trust property and that he mentioned the number as 369. He has added that there were two numbers of the Corporation of the same house and the other number was 185. He has further stated that there were two number plates on the door. Dattatraya Godse(P. W. 7) was the Assessing Inspector of the Nagpur Corporation. He has stated that there was a Census in 1951 and 1961 and that the houses were given Census numbers. He has stated that in 1951 the plates bearing Census numbers were fixed on the houses. It was contended by Mr. Kherdekar that the above mentioned explanation does not appear to be plausible if one reads the contents of the other form Exh, 38 that was subsequently filed by the plaintiff for registration of the Trust. In that form, the plaintiff has mentioned house No. 230 as also house No. 369. My attention was drawn to this position for the purpose of submitting that if the numbers 230 and 369 constitute one and the same house, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to mention both there numbers. It may be noted that the plaintiff has not been cross-examined with the help of Exh. 38. He has been put on question as to how in that document he has mentioned house Nos. 230 and 369. In the absence of such cross-examination, I do not think that the explanation given by the plaintiff as regards the mistake in mentioning the house numbers in Exh. 37 can be left aside. 9. There is another important factor. 38. He has been put on question as to how in that document he has mentioned house Nos. 230 and 369. In the absence of such cross-examination, I do not think that the explanation given by the plaintiff as regards the mistake in mentioning the house numbers in Exh. 37 can be left aside. 9. There is another important factor. Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act says that an admission as a statement is contemplated by that section. The term “statement” is not defined but the dictionary meaning shows that the statement would mean something that is stated. It is doubtful as to whether an omission can be termed as a statement as contemplated by section 17. That apart, as discussed above, the plaintiff has explained the omission and it will not be possible for the defendant to rely upon the said omission for the purpose of contending that the plaintiff did not claim ownership over the suit property. 10. Mr. Deshpande also contended that the approach of the learned Second Extra Assistant Judge would not be correct even if it is assumed that Exh. 37 constitutes an admission by the plctintiff. In paragraph 24- A, the learned Second Extra Assistant Judge has observed that the admissions of the plaintiff, and that of the defendant are contradictory admissions of the parties and they could be treated as cancelling each other. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of(Kedar Nath v. Pralhad Rai)3 A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 213. However, during the course of arguments, I requested the advocates to show me the relevant portion of the judgment, but that has not been shown. It is true that in the case of(Bhawarila/ v. Mathura Prasad)4 A.I.R. 1962 M.P. 141, certain observations does appear, but in my opinion, the proper approach would be to weigh the admissions and not to cancel both the admissions. After assessing the evidentiary value of the admissions, made by each of the parties, the Court may accept one admission in preference to the other. However, it will not be possible to cancel both the admissions. This is another error of law in the judgment of the appellate Court. 11. It was next urged by Mr. Deshpande that the appellate Court has wrongly admitted in evidence the judgment(Ex. 58) in Civil Suit No. 4-A I 1955. However, it will not be possible to cancel both the admissions. This is another error of law in the judgment of the appellate Court. 11. It was next urged by Mr. Deshpande that the appellate Court has wrongly admitted in evidence the judgment(Ex. 58) in Civil Suit No. 4-A I 1955. It was a litigation between Kalasiabai daughter of Kanhaiyalal and Fulsiabai, daughter-in-law of Kanhaiyalal. The correctness and legality of the gift deed in favour of Anandrao Bujade was in question and finding has been recorded that it is not binding on the heirs of Kanhaiyalal as it was obtained by undue influence. In the District Court, the defendant produced at Exh. 34, another document namely, a compromise decree in some other litigation. The original Civil Suit was numbered as 11 of 1962. The matter was taken up in Appeal No. 114 of 1963 and in that appeal, by a compromise, arrangement has been made as to whom the property covered by gift would go. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the present plaintiff was not a party to both these proceedings and as such they would not be admissible. Mr. Kherdekar for the respondent, however, relied upon the provisions of section 13 of the Indian Evidence Act. He also drew my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of(Srinivas v. Narayan)5 A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 379, and also in the case of(Sital Das v. Sant Ram)6 A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 60S. In that case it has been held that a judgment though not inter parties may be admissible as an assertion of claim over a particular property. In view of this decision, I do not think that Mr. Deshpande can successfully urge that the two documents Exhs. 58 and 37 has been wrongly admitted in evidence. Of course, the evidentiary value of these two documents would be very little as the plaintiff was not a party to the. 12. It is thus clear that the learned appellate Judge has ignored the evidence afforded by the defendants admission on Exh. 46. This would be an error of law and the effect of not taking into account such piece of evidence would enable the plaintiff to urge for re-assessment of evidence in the second appeal. 12. It is thus clear that the learned appellate Judge has ignored the evidence afforded by the defendants admission on Exh. 46. This would be an error of law and the effect of not taking into account such piece of evidence would enable the plaintiff to urge for re-assessment of evidence in the second appeal. This is obvious inasmuch as the finding that plaintiff has no title, has been recorded without taking into account the above mentioned admission at Exh. 46. The Supreme Court has held that the admissions are the best evidence and though they are not conclusive still they would be decisive. The finding of fact recorded after omitting such type of decisive evidence, can be successfully in a second appeal of course, this Court would confirm that finding, if on a fresh reassessment of the entire evidence this Court would come to the conclusion that the finding is correct. 13. The plaintiffs evidence will have, therefore, to be appreciated and considered after bearing in mind the admission given by the defendant. That ad mission would be a very strong circumstance in favour of the plaintiff. Plaintiffs witnesses Ramaji(P. W. 1) and Shivnarayan(P. W. 2) have deposed that there has been oral dedication of the suit property by Gajjulal in favour of the Trust. The learned Second Extra Assistant Judge in paragraph 15 of the judgment has observed that the evidence is cryptic and that the witnesses have not stated what were the exact words used by Gajjulal while dedicating the property In that paragraph, some observation is made that the dedication of the property may be either complete or partial. However, that aspect is material inasmuch as it is nobodys case that the dedication was complete and partial. Another observation is that Ramaji does not state as to which house Gajjulal has dedicated to Hanuman Deosthan. At the fag end of the paragraph, it is further observed that the witnesses should have given more details instead of making a bald statement about the dedication. It may be noted that the evidence of Ramaji and Shivnarayan is specific when they say that Gajjulal dedicated the house in favour of the public Trust. The cross-exclamations of these witnesses do not indicate that there is any inherent lacuna in the version given by them. Sitaram(P. W.4) and Gopalrao(P. W. 3) are two more witnesses examined by the plaintiff. The cross-exclamations of these witnesses do not indicate that there is any inherent lacuna in the version given by them. Sitaram(P. W.4) and Gopalrao(P. W. 3) are two more witnesses examined by the plaintiff. They occupy the suit property a tenants of the Trust for some time. Their evidence is discussed by the appellate Court in paragraph 18 of the judgment. In my opinion there is nothing which would prevent the Court from accepting their version that they occupied the property as the tenants of the Trust. As far as Municipal records are concerned, the defendant has produced before the District Court at Exh. 35 a Jamabandi showing that in 1914-15 and 1915.16 Gajjulal was shown as occupant and that in 1916-17 Matadin was shown as occupant. The name of Kanhaiyalal was entered in 1921 and in 1951-53 the name of plaintiff Trust was shown as Kabjedar and in addition, Anandrao Bujades name was entered. In paragraph 20. the learned Second Extra Assistant Judge has observed that the word Kabjedar is usually used with reference to agricultural lands and may be relevant to be entered in the Record of Right. He has also stated that the Assessment Register of the Municipal Corporation does not mention to Record of Right relating to the house. With these observations, he has stated that such quibbling in the Municipal Record would not confer any title. The efficacy of the entries in the Municipal Record has again to be considered in the background that the defendant has admitted that he was tenant of the plaintiff Trust in the suit property. Another important factor is that Matadin was not related to Gajjulal. Plaintiffs witnesses Shivnarayan(P. W. 2) and Tulshiram(P. W. 5)” have deposed that Gajjulal and Matadin were not related and that Matadin could not be the heir. The entry of the name of Matadin in the Municipal record after the death of Gajjulal is more consistent with the plaintiffs case that after the death of Gajjulal. Matadin managed the suit house in behalf of the Trust. Matadins name could not have been entered as heir of Gajjulal because they were not related to each other. It is, therefore rightly urged by Mr. Deshpande that such an entry is more consistent with the dedication of the house by Gajjulal to the plaintiff Trust. Matadin managed the suit house in behalf of the Trust. Matadins name could not have been entered as heir of Gajjulal because they were not related to each other. It is, therefore rightly urged by Mr. Deshpande that such an entry is more consistent with the dedication of the house by Gajjulal to the plaintiff Trust. The defendant donor Anandrao Bujade has admitted that a part of the suit house was in possession of Chhotelal. In the examination-in-chief itself, he has stated that Chhotelal(Original plaintiff) has stayed in the suit house in rear portion as a tenant. In cross-examination, be states that the said portion was taken on rent for holding meeting of the Hanuman Deosthan. It does not appear probable that when the plaintiff Deostban was itself owning other property, the plaintiff should occupy anybody elses property as a tenant for holding meetings of the Deosthan. The story of plaintiff taking suit property from Anandrao appears to be highly improbable and it seems that such an attempt is made by Anandrao with a view to explain plaintiffs possession of the suit house. 14. Result, therefore, is that the evidence on record sufficiently proves that the suit house is owned by the plaintiff and that he was in possession within 12 years before the suit. 15. The burden of proving title and possession within 12 years is on the plaintiff. While coming to the above conclusion, I have mainly dealt with the evidence led by the plaintiff. Of course that evidence also includes an admission given by the defendant. Mr. Deshpande drew my attention to certain other factors which are more in favour of plaintiffs title. Anandrao has admitted that after the name of plaintiff was entered to the Suit house, he objected to that entry He further states that the Corporation did not take any notice of that objection. In paragraph 8, Anandrao(D. W. 2) stated that be has not paid corporation taxes after he became the owner. According to him, the plaintiff who is said to be the tenant of a part of the house paid the tax from the arrears of rent. He then states that the plaintiff left the room in 1954. However, he admits that be did not pay any tax from 1954 to 1961. This conduct is more consistent with the plaintiffs case that the property was in the management of the plaintiff. He then states that the plaintiff left the room in 1954. However, he admits that be did not pay any tax from 1954 to 1961. This conduct is more consistent with the plaintiffs case that the property was in the management of the plaintiff. It is true that the plaintiff has not produced evidence in the shape of rent receipts when the rent was paid by plaintiffs witnesses Sitaram and Gopalrao. No documentary evidence is on record to show that the defendant had paid any rent to Anandrao. Of course I am casually making reference to these circumstances as they were placed before me by Mr, Deshpande. As stated earlier, my findings in favour of the plaintiffs recorded on the -basis of the evidence that has been led by the plaintiff. 16. Mr. Kherdekar submitted that during the pendency of the suit the authorities under the Bombay Public Trusts Act have recorded a finding that the suit property is not owned by the plaintiff Trust and that this finding has been confirmed by the District Judge in an application under section 72 of the Bombay Public Trust Act. He has produced a certified copy of that judgment alongwith Civil Application No. 3482 of 1978. The copy of the 0 judgment does show that position. Mr. Kherdekar, therefore, urged that the competent authority has recorded a finding about the ownership of the suit house by the defendant and that this finding would be binding upon the plaintiff. I do not think that the judgment in an application under section 72 of the Bombay Public Trust Act can be made use of in such a manner. Ordinarily the question of title will have to be decided by the civil Court and finding recorded by any other authority in that respect would not be conclusive so as to constitute res judicata. There is one more hurdle in the way of the defendant. I have already stated that in Second appeal No. 195 of 1964 a remand order was passed after holding that the suit was not barred by any of the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. Not only that the defendant has specifically conceded at the time of hearing of that appeal before this Court that the civil Court will have jurisdiction to try the question of title to the property in dispute. Not only that the defendant has specifically conceded at the time of hearing of that appeal before this Court that the civil Court will have jurisdiction to try the question of title to the property in dispute. I would like to reproduce the following portions from that judgment: “As regards the jurisdiction of the civil Court to try the question of title to the property in dispute it is conceded that no such question having been raised could not have been raised and the defendant conceded that the civil Court should have jurisdiction to try the issue also. In other words, any such plea which was taken for the first time in the Court of appeal it now withdrawn. The effect of the withdrawal of this contention in this case is that the respondent-defendant will not be allowed to raise this question again at any stage of this litigation.” It will not, therefore, be possible to successfully urge that the decision given by the District Court in an application under section 72 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act would come in the way of the plaintiff to establish its title to the suit property. 17. It was next urged that the after the death of Chhotelal, some other person has been appointed as Managing Trustee of the plaintiff Trust and that, therefore, Tulshiram, whose name is brought on record of this appeal would not have a right to prosecute the appeal. It must, however, be remembered that Tulshiram filed Civil Application No. 2682 of 1968 for bringing his name on record. In that application, he has stated that the Trustees of the Public Trust in their meeting held on 16-7-1968 have unanimously elected Tulshiram as Sarpanch and that in that capacity he was entitled to prosecute the appeal. That application has been granted though it was opposed. I will now be too late for the respondent to urge that Tulshiram has no right to prosecute the appeal. 18. Result, therefore, is that the appeal succeeds, the decree passed by the Second Extra Assistant Judge in Civil Appeal No. 479 of 1962 is set aside and in its place the decree passed by the trial Court in Civil Suit No. 732 of 1961 is restored. Respondent No.1 to pay the plaintiffs costs throughout. Appeal allowed. -----