JUDGMENT - Mohta V., J. : - One Smt. Bhagirathibai was the owner of field survey No. 121, measuring 21 acres 36 gunthas of mouza Pardi, Taluka Pusad, District Yavatmal. She expired some time after the year 1960 and the respondents succeeded as her heirs. The petitioner Dhondba had put up a case that initially he bad taken the field property on lease, but in the year 1960, he entered into oral contract of sale in respect of that property with the deceased Bhagirathibai and had, in fact. paid a sum of Rs. 3100 as earnest money and continued to remain in possession in his right as a ospective purchaser. 2. Between the parties, there was some dispute which was finally decided by this Court in Special Civil Application No. 255 of 1970. In those Revenue proceedings, one Ukanda had also put up his case saying that be was a tenant. The case of Ukanda did not find favour with the authorities and Ukanda remained satisfied with the orders that were passed against. him. Petitioner Dhondba was also held to be neither a tenant nor a person in possession in pursuance of an agreement of tale, by the trial Court. The Sub-Divisional Officer as an appellate: authority set aide these findings recorded against the petitioner holding that the issue of status of Dhondba as a purchaser did not arise for decision. Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, however, reversed the order passed by the appellate authority maintaining that of the trial Court. Dhondba challenged this order in the High Court by filing Special Civil Application, reference to which has been made by me earlier. The High Court quashed the order passed by Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal to a limited extent regarding a finding that the revenue Courts had no jurisdiction to decide the question of the right of the petitioner as a prospective purchaser, on the basis of agreement of sale of the year 1960. This is what the High Court has observed: “The Naib Tahsildar had, however, no jurisdiction to give a finding that the petitioner had not purchased land from Bhagirathibai in the year 1960. He has held that the petitioner is not in possession in pursuance of the contract of sale. It is conceded on behalf of the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 that this part of the issue was beyond the jurisdiction of the revenue authorities. He has held that the petitioner is not in possession in pursuance of the contract of sale. It is conceded on behalf of the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 that this part of the issue was beyond the jurisdiction of the revenue authorities. The finding given by the Naib Tahsildar that the petitioner was not in possession in pursuance of the contract of sale must, therefore, be quashed as being without jurisdiction. The Tribunal did not consider this aspect of the question and since the order of the Tribunal bas the effect of restoring the findings given by the Naib Tahsildar as a who1e, the order passed by the Tribunal has to be modified and it must be held that the Tribunals order is effective only so far as the finding regarding the status of the petitioner as a tenant is concerned. The finding given by the Naib Tahsildar that the petitioner is not in possession in pursuance of the contract of sale is, thus, quashed.” 3. The respondents thereafter filed a Civil Suit for possession and mesne profits in the Civil Court of Yavatmal and also moved the Collector for summary eviction of the petitioner under the provisions of section 120(c) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act. 1958(hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). 4. The petitioner once again put up the defence before the Collector of his being in possession under a contract of sale and he further contended that under the circumstances proceeding under section 120 of the Act was not maintainable, specially when the dispute is of civil nature and Civil Suit for seeking the same relief of eviction was already pending. It appears that the petitioner wanted to adduce evidence in support of his contention about the contract of sale and the legality of his possession but the said attempt was thwarted by the respondents saying that he could not be permitted to lead evidence in view of the provisions of section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, which refers to only agreement of sale in writing. The Collector was pleased to grant the application, thereby ordering summary eviction of the petitioner. inter alia, holding as under :- “The Court has only to see whether the possession of the N. A. over the suit field is in contravention of the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. The Collector was pleased to grant the application, thereby ordering summary eviction of the petitioner. inter alia, holding as under :- “The Court has only to see whether the possession of the N. A. over the suit field is in contravention of the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. As it bas been held that the N. A. is not tenant of the suit field. One would not be wrong to hold that the possession is unlawful as the same is in contravention of the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act unless until be has brought order from the proper forum to see that his possession is not unlawful under other provisions of law.” 5. Revision was preferred before Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and it came to be dismissed, though for different reasons. The reason which weighed with the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal was to the effect that if really oral contract of sale had taken place in the year 1960, the petitioner would certainly have applied for specific performance and holding against the petitioner only on that circumstance, the case put up was rejected. Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal further held that even though Civil Suit for the same relief was pending, it was no bar for exercising of a power by revenue Court under section 120(c) of “the Act”. 6. Being aggrieved by these two orders, the present petition has been tiled at the instance of Dhondba. The main thrust of address on behalf of the petitioner by Shri V.N. Patil, the learned Advocate is to the effect that in this background, the revenue Courts erred in entertaining an application for summary eviction under the provisions of “the Act” and that a question about the correctness or otherwise of the plea raised by the petitioner. about the agreement of sale which was kept open by the High Court could not be decided by the revenue Courts, much less, in the way it bas been done without even allowing a party to adduce evidence in support of his claim. about the agreement of sale which was kept open by the High Court could not be decided by the revenue Courts, much less, in the way it bas been done without even allowing a party to adduce evidence in support of his claim. On the other hand, the contention of Shri Bapat, the learned counsel for the respondent is that pendency of a civil suit for eviction is no bar to the maintainability of an application under section 120 of “the Act” and that as section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act refers only to an agreement in writing, the petitioner could not defend his possession on the basis of an oral agreement even if it exists and therefore, attempt to lead oral evidence was rightly opposed ;and opposition of the respondent was rightly upheld. 7. Inasmuch as the whole controversy revolves around the interpretation of section 120 of the “the Act”, it would be necessary to examine the letter as well as the spirit behind this section which reads as under: “120. Any person unauthorisedly occupying or wrongfully in possession of any land- (a) the transfer of which either by the act of parties or by the operation of law is invalid under the provisions of this Act. (b) the management of which has been assumed under the said provisions, or (c) to the use and occupation of which he is not entitled under the said provisions and the said provisions do not provide for the eviction of such person, may be summarily evicted by the Collector after such inquiry as he deems fit.” 8. This provision essentially deals with those who occupy the field property unauthorisedly or wrongfully, without any semblance of fight. If the person sought to be evicted fails within that category, then only the provisions of sub-section 120(c) applies. This is essentially a provision in the nature of summary jurisdiction resort to which may be taken by a party or may not be taken and the relief regarding that may be granted by the Collector or may not be granted. This is not to suggest even remotely that the Collector can act in the exercise or non-exercise of jurisdiction under this Act in any manner he likes. The discretion vested in the Collector is not certainly in the nature of free lance or unbridled but has to be exercised on sound judicial principles. This is not to suggest even remotely that the Collector can act in the exercise or non-exercise of jurisdiction under this Act in any manner he likes. The discretion vested in the Collector is not certainly in the nature of free lance or unbridled but has to be exercised on sound judicial principles. The words “may” and “summarily” used in the section are important and will be presumed to have been used in their natural meaning and with a purpose. There cannot be any manner of doubt that this is only an alternate remedy, and not exclusive one. 9. If there ale any complicated questions either of law or of fact, the Collector would be perfectly justified in staying his bands in the matter. Extraordinary power has been conferred on the Collector acting under this jurisdiction. Summary eviction of any person from the property is a drastic power and any provisions incorporating such action bas to be strictly construed and if even a doubt arises, the discretion has not to be exercised and the party must be made to resort to his ordinary civil rights lor redressing the grievance. 10. With a view to spell out the scope of jurisdiction under section 120 of the “the Act”, a Full Bench of this Court came to be constituted as there was some difference of opinion on the subject. In that case of [Kashiram v. Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur]1 1970 Mh. L.J. 463, the following observations were recorded :- “The Collector will have to look to the substance of the matter and decide whether it is a dispute regarding unauthorised occupation or wrongful possession or it is in substance a dispute regarding tenancy. If the latter, he must refer the matter to the Tahsildar. If the former, he will have jurisdction to decide it. It will not be sufficient to oust the jurisdiction of the Collector for a person to say that he is a tenant if on the face of the material before the Collector it appears to him that the plea of tenancy is one which cannot reasonably be raised or is not bona fide or the Collector comes to the express conclusion that it is raised mala fide. This may be difficult to decide in given cases, but in the absence of specification by the law as to whose jurisdiction is to prevail, that appears to us to be the only test to indicate the dividing line between two overlapping jurisdictions. The Collector must of course also see that the following conditions (which we have already discussed above are fulfilled: (1) that a person is unauthorisedly is occupation or wrongfully in possession; (2) that the other provisions of the Act do not provide for the eviction of such a person and (3) that the conditions required by clauses (a), (b) and (c) are fulfilled; (4) in deciding the application the Collector must apply his mind to the material before him and because the remedy is summary it will not be enough for him to say “sic volo, sic Jubeo”. [I wish it therefore it shall be). He must consider such material as he has before him and write an order giving his reasons. (5) The Collector must also bear in mind that the power which he exercises is a very drastic power and we have no doubt that he will exercise it with care, construing the provisions strictly in case of doubt. (6) In cases where complicated questions of law and fact arise the Collector moreover has a discretion to refer the parties to the civil Court or leave them to take any other remedy they may be entitled to.” 11. However, the only question that was ultimately decided in this case was whether under section 120 of “the Act”, the question of tenancy could be decided, and whether there was a necessity to refer the question of tenancy in view of section 124 and section 125 of “the Act”, Though it hag been held that such a question could be decided, it is clearly laid down that giving of such a decision is permissible provided certain conditions referred to section 120 of “the Act” are strictly fulfilled. These conditions have been referred to in the passage extracted above. 12. My attention was drawn by Shri Patil also to the case of [State of Punjab v. Bhai Ardaman Singh]2 A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 13. That was a case under section 43 of Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1953 which is pari materia with the section with which we are concerned. 12. My attention was drawn by Shri Patil also to the case of [State of Punjab v. Bhai Ardaman Singh]2 A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 13. That was a case under section 43 of Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1953 which is pari materia with the section with which we are concerned. Maintaining the order of the High Court, quashing summary eviction and dealing with certain powers of the Collector, the Supreme Court has observed as under:- “We must point that the proceedings of the Collector are judicial in character. The trial is summary, but the Collector is bound to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him not on a subjective satisfaction, as the Commissioner assumed, but on a judicial determination of facts which invest him with jurisdiction to pass an order in ejectment.” 12.A On behalf of the respondents reliance came to be placed on the decision of this Court in [Keshao v. Waman]3 1970 Mh. L.J. 801, in which it has been held that provisions of section 120 of “the Act” was no bar to the maintainability of a Civil Suit. As per the argument as a necessary consequence, it must follow that the pendency of a civil suit is no bar to the maintainability of proceeding under section 120 of “the Act”. 13. It will be seen that there cannot be any dispute on the question that this is a summary remedy and order of eviction even if passed, is subject to the result of a civil suit and thus even if summary eviction is ordered, the right of a party to get his right established in a civil Court is not barred. Indeed, it has been held that one of the conditions attached for the exercise of powers under section 120 is that in case any doubt arises about the title of the party, the power is not to be exercised and in case any complicated ques. tion of fact and law arises, the matter has to be referred to the civil Court or the parties can be left to take recourse to any other remedy that may be available. Even in Kashirams case (cited supra), it bas been clearly laid down as observed earlier that the relief granted will always be subject to the result of the suit. 14. Even in Kashirams case (cited supra), it bas been clearly laid down as observed earlier that the relief granted will always be subject to the result of the suit. 14. If this is the correct position, that the order of eviction passed in the summary jurisdiction is subject to result of the suit, it is understandable and logical that pendency of proceedings under section 120 of “the Act” cannot be a bar to the maintainability of the Civil Suit. But, the converse is not correct. In normal course if machinary of Civil Courts is already set in motion, for the same relief subsequent proceedings under the provision will not be maintainable and would at least be discouraged. 15. One of the basic principles of jurisprudence is that possibility of conflict of decision in respect of the same matter bas to be avoided as far as possible. Resorting to a remedy of civil suit for possession in which several questions of la wand facts fall for decision, should in my view, be considered as a bar to the maintainability of proceedings under section 120 of “the Act” as a principle as well as a policy. In my view, therefore, normally, it will not be advisable for the Collector to exercise this power in respect of a matter about which a party bas already resorted to civil suit. 16. Apart from this question of broad principle, or policy the impugned orders cannot be sustained even for different reasons. In this particular case, the High Court bas recorded a finding that the revenue Courts had no jurisdiction to decide about the correctness or otherwise of the right of the petitioner regarding the alleged agreement ot sale. Indeed, negative finding on the question was held to be without jurisdiction, by the High Court. It was in the background of this decision that the machinery of civil Court as well a Collector was pressed into service. The petitioner was, even prohibited from adducing any evidence in support of his plea, the Collector holding that his possession was in contravention of “the Act” and that the Collector was not concerned with any of the rights on which the petitioner may be banking and which may be flowing from any other source or enactment. The petitioner was, even prohibited from adducing any evidence in support of his plea, the Collector holding that his possession was in contravention of “the Act” and that the Collector was not concerned with any of the rights on which the petitioner may be banking and which may be flowing from any other source or enactment. The Collector has gone to the extent of saying that the possession of the petitioner would be treated as unlawful until and unless he bring an order from appropriate forum. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal gave a different reason that if the story about the agreement of sale was correct, it would be expected that the petitioner should move the civil Court for specific performance of the contract of sale. 17. None of these authorities have even dealt the point that because the agreement is not in writing, provisions of section 53-A would not be available even though the so called oral agreement is proved. The question as to whether or not really the oral agreement of sale bad taken place and even if it had taken place, whether the possession of the petitioner needed to be interfered with in the summary jurisdiction under section 120 of “the Act” is Dot a point on which the matter has been decided or concluded. Imagine a case in which a particular person is in possession of a property in pursuance of an admitted or proved oral agreement of sale. Is it the scheme and purpose of the Act that in such a situation, the Collector in its summary jurisdiction would be within his rights to order eviction specially in the background of the fact that this very question was agitated before the competent civil Court. Undoubtedly, this will be pre judging the issue which is pending before the civil Court and in my opinion, it will be wholly wrong for the Collector to do so. 18. In the result, the petition is all owed and the orders passed by the Collector as well as by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal are quashed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed. -----