ORDER J.S. Verma, J.—The petitioner was employed as a Conductor in February 1972 by respondent No 1. During the pendency of a reference before the Labour Court, in which the petitioner was one of the workmen involved, the service of the petitioner was terminated on 29-5-1973. Accordingly an application u/s 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was filed by the petitioner in the Labour Court, Jabalpur, alleging contravention of the provisions of section 33 of the Act by the employer. It appears that conciliation proceedings were also held as a result of the dispute arising out of the petitioner's termination of service and the same having failed, a reference was made to the Labour Court, Budhar, u/s 10(1) of the Act by order dated 16-12-1975 (Annexure A). The reference was to adjudicate about the legality and validity of the termination of the petitioner's service. Thereafter, in the proceedings of that reference before the Labour Court, Budhar, an application was made by the employer without filing his written statement, contending that the petitioner be directed to withdraw one of those two proceedings since the scope of both of them was the same. The Labour Court, by its order dated 13-12-1976 directed the employer to file his written statement by the next date, if before that date the petitioner withdrew the other proceedings, namely, application u/s 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act filed in the Labour Court, Jabalpur. Thereupon, the petitioner withdrew his application made to the Labour Court, Jabalpur, u/s 33-A of the Act and that application was dismissed as withdrawn by order dated 27-12-1976 passed by the Labour Court, Jabalpur. 2. After withdrawal of the petitioner's application made u/s 33-A of the Act to the Labour Court, Jabalpur in the above manner, the employer proceeded to contend that the reference made u/s 10(1) of the Act was incompetent and the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to proceed with the same, since that reference had been made during the pendency of the petitioner's application u/s 33-A of the Act and both the proceedings related to the same matter, i.e., termination of the petitioner's service. This objection of the employer has been upheld by the Labour Court, Budhar, by its order dated 6-4-1978 (Annexure E) and it has been held that the reference is illegal and, therefore, it cannot proceed. This objection of the employer has been upheld by the Labour Court, Budhar, by its order dated 6-4-1978 (Annexure E) and it has been held that the reference is illegal and, therefore, it cannot proceed. Aggrieved by this order made by the Labour Court, Budhar, holding the reference to be incompetent, the petitioner has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the same. 3. The contention of Shri P.P. Naolekar, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the pendency of an application u/s 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act is no bar to the making of a reference u/s 10(1) of the Act. He argues that the petitioner had both these remedies available to him which can co-exist and are not mutually exclusive, so that it was open to the petitioner to resort to both of them as a matter of abundant caution, there being no prohibition against pursuing both the available remedies. It is also contended, in the alternative, that the application u/s 33-A of the Act having been dismissed as withdrawn on the employer's objection, it was extremely unjust to hold thereafter that the reference u/s 10(1) was incompetent so as to deprive the employee of both the remedies. In reply, Shri L.S. Singh, learned counsel for the employer (respondent No. 1), contends that the existence of a dispute is a condition precedent to the validity of a reference u/s 10(1) of the Act and on an application being made u/s 33A of the Act, that dispute had come to an end and, therefore, in the absence of any dispute, there was no jurisdiction to make the reference. This is the only argument to support the impugned order passed by the Labour Court. 4. The Labour Court has placed reliance on a decision of the Patna High Court in R. I. M. Sangh v. State of Bihar 1974 Lab. I C 1266, to hold that the reference in the present case is illegal and without jurisdiction. That was a case in which a dispute having already been referred u/s 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, it was held that another reference made subsequently of the same dispute under the same provision was illegal. I C 1266, to hold that the reference in the present case is illegal and without jurisdiction. That was a case in which a dispute having already been referred u/s 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, it was held that another reference made subsequently of the same dispute under the same provision was illegal. In short, it was held that in view of the earlier reference of the same dispute, it could not be said that the dispute was not already referred to for adjudication, when the second reference was made. That is not the position in the present case in this case, there is only one reference made u/s 10 of the Act and the question is whether it is invalid on account of the fact that the proceedings u/s 33-A of the Act commenced by the petitioner in respect of the same subject-matter had been initiated earlier. 5. It is not disputed before us that the petitioner had both the remedies open, i.e., by way of an application u/s 33-A to the Labour Court and by moving the appropriate Government to make a reference u/s 10 of the Act. No statutory provision has been shown to us to indicate that there is any prohibition against resorting to both the remedies simultaneously or that these two remedies are mutually exclusive. It is a different matter that it would be more appropriate not to allow both the proceedings to continue simultaneously so as to avoid the possibility of conflicting decisions and in case one of them is not withdrawn, it may be more appropriate to stay either of them till the conclusion of the other. But then that is not the same thing as saying that either of them would be incompetent. Instances are not wanting where a litigant has more than one remedy available to him for redress of the same grievance and as a matter of abundant caution quite often all the available remedies are resorted to, even though apart from one of them, the other may be kept pending so as to await the result of the proceeding which it is decided to prosecute in the first instance. The question before us is only of the legality of making a reference u/s 10 of the Act during the pendency of an application u/s 33-A for redress of the same grievance. The question before us is only of the legality of making a reference u/s 10 of the Act during the pendency of an application u/s 33-A for redress of the same grievance. We have not been shown any principle, authority or statutory provision to support the conclusion reached by the Labour Court that the reference was invalid. We have also shown that the decision of the Patna High Court, relied on has no application to the facts of the present case. Learned counsel for the employer is not right in contending that the dispute between the employer and the employee had come to an end with mere institution of the application u/s 33-A of the Act. That was merely the commencement of a proceeding to adjudicate the dispute between them and it did not have the result of thereby adjudicating the dispute so as to amount to non-existence of the dispute to restrain making of a valid reference. It is not disputed that there was no adjudication made on the application u/s 33-A and, in fact, the same was actually withdrawn with the result that there was no occasion for an adjudication to be made in that proceeding to result in termination of the dispute. In such a situation, it is difficult for us to appreciate why the reference made u/s 10 cart be treated as invalid. 6. It is common ground before us that there is no direct authority to cover the point raised before us Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, referred to us a decision in Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd., Chandigarh Vs. Suresh Chand and Another, , to contend that certain observations made therein indicate that these two remedies under sections 10 and 33-A of the Act can co-exist as they are not mutually exclusive. The question before their Lordships was about the maintainability of an application by a workman u/s 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Considering the scheme of the relevant provisions in this connection, their Lordships observed that the aggrieved workman who alleged that he had been robbed of the protection afforded to him u/s 33 of the Act, would not only have the remedy of moving the appropriate Government for making a reference u/s 10, but he would also be entitled to make a complaint to the Tribunal u/s 33A. These observations clearly indicate that the aggrieved workman has both these remedies available and he is entitled to resort to both of them, since there appears to be no prohibition against such a course and ex facie they do not appear to be mutually exclusive. We are, therefore satisfied that the Labour Court was wrong in holding that the reference u/s 10(1) of the Act is invalid. 7. For the aforesaid reasons, this petition is allowed and the order (Annexure E), dated 6-4-1978, passed by the Labour Court, Budhar (Shahdol in Case No. 1 /76 Industrial Disputes Act), is quashed. The petitioner shall get his costs from respondent No. 1. Counsel's fee Rs. 100, if certified. The security amount shall be refunded to the petitioner.