Sadan Singh v. Ram Sagar Singh — 1979 DIGILAW 209 (PAT)

JUDGMENT : Manoranjan Prasad, J. 1. This criminal revision application has been filed by the petitioners, Sadan Singh and Shivanandan Singh, for quashing the criminal proceeding pending against them in Complaint Case No. 415/C of 1978, in the court of Shree Ramsagar Prasad Singh, Judicial Magistrate, Barh, in which cognizance against the petitioners and others was taken by the Magistrate on the 12th February, 1979, under Sections 323, 324, 147 and 148 of the Indian Penal Code, on a complaint petition dated the 8th December, 1978, filed by the complainant, Ramsagar Singh, who is the opposite party in the present application. It appears that on the 8th December, 1978, the complainant, Ramsagar Singh, had filed a complaint petition against the petitioners and four others, namely Remnandan Singh, Bhushan Singh, Ramratan Singh and Jageshwar Singh in the court of the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Barh. The case of the complainant in his said complaint petition dated the 8th December, 1978, was that on the 8th November, 1978, at about 4.30 P.M. the accused persons came near his Dalan, variously armed, and started uprooting and damaging his bamboo enclosures, situate towards west of his Dalan, and, on his protest, accused Sadan Singh ORDER :ed to assault him, whereupon accused Ramnandan Singh gave a Farsa blow, causing injuries on his left hand and on palm and the rest of the accused assaulted him with Lathi, fists and slaps, and they also assaulted the witnesses, Harbansh Singh, Karu Singh, Rambalak Singh and Banke Singh, with Farsa and Lathi. On halla, the other witnesses and the villagers assembled at the place of the occurrence and they tried to prevent the accused persons from indulging in such high-handedness, but the accused persons became ready to assault them also. Thereupon the people, who had assembled there, started pelting stones on the accused persons and it was then that the accused persons fled away. The act of the accused persons in breaking the aforesaid enclosure caused a loss of Rs. 75/- to the complainant. After the occurrence, the injured complainant and the above named injured witnesses went to Jalalpur Hospital, where their injuries were examined. The cause of the occurrence, as mentioned in the complaint petition, was that previously the Mukhiya and the Sarpanch, i.e. Sadan Singh (petitioner no. 1), and Shivanandan Singh (petitioner no. 75/- to the complainant. After the occurrence, the injured complainant and the above named injured witnesses went to Jalalpur Hospital, where their injuries were examined. The cause of the occurrence, as mentioned in the complaint petition, was that previously the Mukhiya and the Sarpanch, i.e. Sadan Singh (petitioner no. 1), and Shivanandan Singh (petitioner no. 2), respectively, in collusion with the other accused persons, had given a notice to the complainant to remove the enclosure which the complainant did not remove, and this had annoyed them. It was further mentioned in the complaint petition that after the occurrence the complainant had gone to the Hathidah Police Station to report about the occurrence, finding the Mukhiya and the Sarpanch sitting there, he had returned back and thereafter, because of the injuries received by him, he had become ill, but, in the meantime, the accused persons had instituted a false case against him, by bringing in collusion the Sun Inspector of Police of Panchmahala Police Out post, in which he surrendered and thereafter he was released on bail. This was mentioned in the complaint petition on the 8th December, 1978, after a delay of about one month, in respect of an occurrence, which was alleged to have taken place on the 8th November, 1978. 2. On receipt of the aforesaid complaint petition dated the 8th December, 1978, the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Barh, perused the complaint petition and thereafter, by his ORDER :dated the 8th December, 1978, he made over the case under Section 192(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Code,) to Shree Ramsagar Prasad Singh, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Barh, for disposal according to law. 3. Thereafter, Shree Ramsagar Prasad Singh, Judicial Magistrate, examined the complainant on solemn affirmation and fixed 3rd February, 1979, for examination of the other witnesses of the complainant in an inquiry under Section 202 of the Code. On the 3rd February, 1979, complainant's two witnesses, namely P.W. 2, Harbansh Singh and P.W. 3 Jagdish Singh, were examined in the inquiry under Section 202 of the Code, and, thereafter the inquiry was adjourned to the 12th February, 1979. On 12th February, 1979, the complainant's two more witnesses, namely, P.W. 4 Ramjee Singh and P.W. 5. On the 3rd February, 1979, complainant's two witnesses, namely P.W. 2, Harbansh Singh and P.W. 3 Jagdish Singh, were examined in the inquiry under Section 202 of the Code, and, thereafter the inquiry was adjourned to the 12th February, 1979. On 12th February, 1979, the complainant's two more witnesses, namely, P.W. 4 Ramjee Singh and P.W. 5. Deoki Singh, were examined in the inquiry under Section 202 of the Code, and, thereafter, after examining the complaint petition, examination of the complainant on solemn affirmation and the evidence of the complainant's witnesses in the inquiry under Section 202 of the Code, the learned Magistrate, by his ORDER :dated the 12th February, 1979, took cognizance against the petitioners and others named in the complaint petition as accused under Sections 323, 324, 147 and 148 of the Indian Penal Code and ORDER :ed for issuance of summonses against them. 4. Thereafter, Only two of the accused persons, namely, Sadan Singh and Shivanandan Singh, who, respectively, happened to bet he Mukhiya and the Sarpanch of the local Gram Panchayat, filed the present criminal revision application on the 8th March, 1979, for quashing the criminal proceeding pending against them, in which cognizance against them also had been taken by the learned Magistrate by his aforesaid ORDER :dated the 12th February, 1979, under the aforesaid Sections 323, 324, 147 and 148 of the Indian Penal Code. 5. The case of the petitioners in the present revision application is that there is a Gairmazarua plot of land, being Plot No. 2006, appertaining to Khata No. 274, which is the only public path for access to the village from the public road, known as the Patna Mokameh Road. The complainant and his family members, whose houses are by the aide of the said public path, encroached upon a substantial portion of it, including a well, which is also a public well. It caused tremendous inconvenience and hardship to the public of the village. In these circumstances, the Sarpanch of the local Gram Panchayat, noticed the complainant and others, namely Harbansh' Singh, and Karu Singh, on the 11th July, 1978, to remove the encroachment from the public path but, without any effect. It caused tremendous inconvenience and hardship to the public of the village. In these circumstances, the Sarpanch of the local Gram Panchayat, noticed the complainant and others, namely Harbansh' Singh, and Karu Singh, on the 11th July, 1978, to remove the encroachment from the public path but, without any effect. Thereafter on the 19th July, 1978, the Mukhiya of the Gram Panchayat made a complaint to the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Barh, about the alleged encroachment and for taking necessary action for getting the encroachment removed and to take measures to prevent breach of the peace. A copy of the said complaint made by the Mukhiya to the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Barh, is Annexure 2' to the application. Thereupon, the Sub-divisional Magistrate, referred the matter to the Officer-in-Charge of Hathidah-police station for report, and the Officer-in-Charge on inquiry, found that as a matter of fact there was an encroachment on the public path of the village. It was further stated by the Officer-in-Charge in his report that due to the intervention of the petitioners, namely, the Mukhiya and the Sarpanch, there was an amicable settlement and the complainant and his family members had undertaken to remove the encroachment, but, still they had failed to do so, and, on that account, there was always an apprehension of the breach of the peace and therefore, proceedings under Sections 133 and 144 of the Code should be started against the complainant and his family members. Thereafter, the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Barh, started a proceeding under Section 133 of the Code against the complainant and his family members. It is the further case of the petitioners in the present revision application that on the 8th November, 1978, i.e., the date of the occurrence, Ramanandan Singh of the village, who is one of the accused named in the complaint petition, had gone to take water from the well in that Plot No. 2006, but the complainant and his family members brutally assaulted him and his family members, including Bhushan Singh, who is another accused named in the complaint petition, who at that time, sustained grievous injuries on his head. The complainant and his family members had practically killed Bhushan Singh, but due to the timely medical aid, he could be saved. The complainant and his family members had practically killed Bhushan Singh, but due to the timely medical aid, he could be saved. On that very day a Fardbeyan was given by the aforesaid Ramanandan Singh to the Officer-in-Charge at the Hospital, and on that basis a formal first information report was drawn up and after investigation chargesheet was submitted against the complainant and others under Sections 307, 147, 148 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code, and cognizance was also taken under those very Sections and they are to be tried for the aforesaid offences. 6. It was only a month after that incident that that complainant, who is an accused in the aforesaid case under Section 307 and other sections of the Indian Penal Code, filed the present petition of complaint in the court of the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Barh on the 8th December, 1979, in respect of the same occurrence, stating that the petitioners, who are the Mukhiya and the Sarpanch of Dumka Gram Panchayat, came in a mob and tried to remove the enclosure at the plot in question, and they also assaulted him and his other family members, and the said complaint petition, which was filed after an inordinate delay of one month, was a mala fide one. 7. On the aforesaid grounds, the contention of the petitioners is that they, as Mukhiya and Sarpanch of the local Gram Panchayat, were perfectly within their rights to maintain law and ORDER :and to make an attempt for removal of the encroachments from the Gairmazarua land, which was causing great hardship to the general public. 8. It is also the case of the petitioners that they being the Mukhiya and the Sarpanch, no cognizance could have been taken against them for any offence alleged to have been committed by them while acting, or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duties, without the previous sanction of the Government or the prescribed authority, as required under Section 84A of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) which has not been obtained. 9. On the aforesaid grounds the petitioners have prayed that the criminal proceeding pending against them, on the basis of the aforesaid complaint petition, should be quashed. 10 The complainant has filed a counter-affidavit in this case. 9. On the aforesaid grounds the petitioners have prayed that the criminal proceeding pending against them, on the basis of the aforesaid complaint petition, should be quashed. 10 The complainant has filed a counter-affidavit in this case. The case of the complainant in the counter affidavit is that it is no doubt true that Plot No. 2006 is a Gairmazarua land, but he has got nothing to do with the said land, nor it is a fact that he has encroached upon the public path or the well. According to him, his house stands on Plot No. 2008 and the well in question is in Plot No. 2007, and, hence, the question of encroachment of the gairmazarua land does not arise at all. 11. In support of the present application, Mr. Indrabhanu Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, has at first referred to certain provisions of the Act, and he has also cited a number of decisions, and I would like to refer to them first. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioners has referred to Section 14(g), Section 19(c), and Section 28(d) of the Act. Section 14(g) of the Act lays down that one of the compulsory duties of the Gram Panchayat is "the reporting and removal of encroachments on public streets, public places and' property vested in it;" Section 19(c) of the Act lays down that the Executive Committee of the Gram Panchayat shall have control over all public streets, and it may do all things necessary for the maintenance and repair thereof and it may "widen, open, enlarge or otherwise improve any public street, culvert or bridge and with minimum damage to the neighbouring fields, plant and preserve trees on the sides of such street". Section 38(d) of the Act lays down that on the occasion of an emergency, the Mukhiya the Chief Officer or any Other officer in the immediate charge of the village volunteer force may, "generally, take such measures as may be necessary for the protection of life and property." 13. Mr. Indrabhanu Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, has also referred to the decisions in the cases of (1) Vadilal Panchal vs Dattatraya Dulaji Ghadigaonkar and another A.I.R. 1960 Supreme Court 1113), (2) Dr. Mr. Indrabhanu Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, has also referred to the decisions in the cases of (1) Vadilal Panchal vs Dattatraya Dulaji Ghadigaonkar and another A.I.R. 1960 Supreme Court 1113), (2) Dr. Hori Ram Singh vs. Emperor (A.I.R. 1939 FC 43), (3) Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli and another vs. The State of Bombay (A.I.R. 1955 SC 287), (4) Amrik Singh vs. The State of Pepsu (A.I.R. 1955 SC 309), (5) Matajog Dobey vs. H.C. Bhari (A.I.R. 1956 SC 44), and (6) Somchand Sanghvi vs. Bibhuti Bhusan Chakravarty (A.I.R. 1965 SC 588). 14. In the case of Vadilal Panchal (supra) the short question before the Supreme Court was as to whether the High Court of Bombay was right in its view that when a Magistrate directs an inquiry under Section 202 of the Code, for ascertaining the truth or falsehood of a complaint and receives a report from the inquiring officer, supporting a plea of self-defence made by the person complained against, it is not open to him to hold that the plea is correct on the basis of the report and the statements of the witnesses recorded by the inquiring officer. It was held by the Supreme Court when a Magistrate directs an inquiry under Section 202 of the Code for ascertaining truth or falsehood of a complaint and receives a report from the inquiring officer supporting a plea of self-defence made by the person complained against, it is open to him to hold that the plea is correct on the basis of the report and the statements of the witnesses recorded by the inquiring officer, and, it is not obligatory on the Magistrate, as a matter of law, to issue processes in such a case and leave the person complained against to establish his plea of self-defence at the trial. 15. In the case of Dr. 15. In the case of Dr. Hori Ram Singh (supra), it has been held by the Federal Court, while interpreting Section 270 of the Government of India Act, 1935, that as the consent of the Governor, provided for in Section 270(1) is a condition precedent to the institution of proceedings against a public servant, the necessity for such consent cannot be made to depend upon the case which the accused or the defendant may put forward after the proceedings had been instituted, but must be determined with reference to the nature of the allegations made against the public servant in the suit or criminal proceedings. If these alleviations cannot be held to relate to "any act done or purporting to be done in the execution of his duty" by the defendant or the accused, "as a servant of the crown" the consent of the authorities would, prima facie, not be necessary for the institution of the proceedings. If, in the course of the trial all that could be proved should be found to relate only to what he did or purported to do "in the execution of his duty", the proceedings would fail on the merits, unless the court was satisfied that the acts complained of were not done in good faith. Even otherwise, the proceedings would fail for want of the consent of the Governor, if the evidence established only official acts. It has been further held therein that having regard to the ordinary and natural meaning of the words "purporting to be done", it is difficult to say that it necessarily implies "purporting to be done in good faith", for a person who ostensibly acts in execution of his duty still purports so to act, although he may have a dishonest intention. The test is not that the offence is capable of being committed only by a public servant and not by any one else, but that it is committed by a public servant in an act done or purporting to be done in the execution of his duty. The Section cannot be confined to only such acts as are done by a public servant directly in pursuance of his public office, though in excess of the duty or under a mistaken belief as to the existence of such duty. The Section cannot be confined to only such acts as are done by a public servant directly in pursuance of his public office, though in excess of the duty or under a mistaken belief as to the existence of such duty. Nor is it necessary to go to the length of saying that the act constituting the offence should be so inseparably connected with the official duty as to form part and parcel of the same transaction. The section is not intended to apply to acts done purely in a private capacity by a public servant. It must have been ostensibly done by him in his official capacity in execution of his duty, which would not necessarily be the case merely because it was done at a time when he held such office, nor even necessary because he was engaged in his official business at the time. 16. The cases of Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli and another (supra). Amrik Singh (supra), Matajog Dobey (supra) and Somchand Sanghvi (supra) were all cases in which the question of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, arose and the principles which were laid down by the Supreme Court in those cases were that in ORDER :to attract the provisions of Section 197 of the said Code relating to sanction, the offence alleged to have been committed by the public servant must have something to do or must be related in some manner with the discharge of his official duty. No question of sanction can arise under Section 197 of the Code, unless the act complained of is an offence; the only point to determine in such a case is whether it was committed in the discharge of his official duty. There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the official duty. It is not always necessary that the need for sanction under Section 197 of the Code is to be considered as soon as the complaint is lodged and on the allegations therein contained. The question may arise at any stage of the proceeding. The complaint may not disclose that the act constituting the offence was done or purported to be done in the discharge of official duty, but the facts subsequently coming to light, on a police or judicial inquiry, or even in course of the prosecution evidence at the trial, may establish the necessity for sanction. The complaint may not disclose that the act constituting the offence was done or purported to be done in the discharge of official duty, but the facts subsequently coming to light, on a police or judicial inquiry, or even in course of the prosecution evidence at the trial, may establish the necessity for sanction. Whether sanction is necessary or not, may have to be determined from stage to stage. The necessity may reveal itself in course of the progress of the case. 17. The aforesaid provisions of the Act and the aforesaid decisions have been referred to by Mr. Indrabhanu Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, in support of his contention that the petitioners, as the Mukhiya and the Sarpanch of the local Gram Panchayat, were entitled to remove the obstruction caused on the public path by the complainant and his men, and to use reasonable force to achieve that and hence the offences alleged against them by the complainant must be deemed to have been committed by them while acting or purporting to act in discharge of their official duty, for which sanction of the Government or the prescribed authority is required under Section 81A of the Act, before any court could take cognizance of the alleged offences against them, and the said previous sanction having not been obtained in this case, the cognizance taken against them is bad in law and is fit to be quashed. 18. On the other hand, Mr. Madan Mohan Prasad Singh, learned counsel appearing for the complainant opposite party, has referred to a decision of this court in the case of (7) Ram Pratap Lal and others vs. Mahesh Ram (A.I.R. 1955 Pat (NUC) 1958, and also to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (8) Smt. Nagawwa vs. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi and others (A.I.R. 1976 SC 1947). 19. In the case of Rampratap Lal and others (supra) it has been held that the Sarpanch, the Mukhiya and the Gram Sevak under the Act are 'public servants', but that does not mean that in no circumstance they can be prosecuted. The law provides that if a public servant commits an offence in the exercise of his public duty or purporting to exercise his public duty, then he is protected, otherwise he is not. The law provides that if a public servant commits an offence in the exercise of his public duty or purporting to exercise his public duty, then he is protected, otherwise he is not. The words "take such measures as may be necessary for the protection of life and property" in clause (d) of Section 28 of the Act, do not necessarily mean that those servants have the power to arrest. Even if the term means that they have it then they have power only in the case of an emergency and not for day to day administration. Where, therefore, the Mukhiya, the Sarpanch and the Grain Sevak went to the house of the opposite party, tied him in ropes and then publicly exhibited him with the idea of humiliating him and for this act those officers were summoned by the Magistrate under Section 342 of the Indian Penal Code, without previous sanction, it was held that there was absolutely no emergency of any kind whatsoever and the officers did not act in the discharge of their duty, as provided by the Act, and, therefore, the sanction was not necessary and the prosecution was valid. 20. In the case of Smt. Nagawwa (supra) it has been held by the Supreme Court that at the stage of issuing processes, the Magistrate is mainly concerned with the allegations made in the complaint or the evidence led in support of the same and he is only to be prima facie satisfied whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. At that stage it is not the province of the Magistrate to enter into a detailed discussion of the merits or demerits of the case, nor can the High Court go into this master in its revisional jurisdiction, which is a very limited one. The scope of the inquiry under Section 202 of the Code is extremely limited only to the ascertainment of the truth or falsehood of the allegations made in the complaint-- (i) on the materials placed by the complainant before the court, (ii) for the limited purpose of finding out whether a prima facie case for issue of processes has been made out; and, (iii) for deciding the question purely from the point of view of the complainant, without at all adverting to any defence that the accused may have. In fact, in proceedings under Section 202 of the Code, the accused has got absolutely no locus standi and he is not entitled to be heard on the question whether the process should be issued against him or not. It is true that in coming to a decision as to whether a process should be issued, the Magistrate can take into consideration inherent improbabilities appearing on the face of the complaint or in the evidence led by the complainant in support of the allegations, but, there appears to be a very thin line of demarcation between a probability or conviction of the accused and establishment of a prima facie case against him. The Magistrate has been given an undoubted discretion in the matter and the discretion has to be judicially exercised by him. Once the Magistrate has exercised his discretion it is not for the High Court, or even the Supreme Court to substitute its own discretion for that of the Magistrate or to examine the case on merits with a view to find out whether or not the allegations in the complaint, if proved would ultimately end in conviction of the accused. These considerations are to tally foreign to the scope and ambit of an inquiry under Section 202 which culminates into an ORDER :under Section 204. Thus, in the following cases an ORDER :of the Magistrate issuing process against the accused can be quashed or set aside-- (1) Where the allegation made in the complaint or the statement of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused; (2) Where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (3) Where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and, (4) Where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like. 21. (3) Where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and, (4) Where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like. 21. From the aforesaid decisions, it will appear, as has been held by the Federal Court in the case of Dr. Hori Ram Singh (supra), that the question of sanction, which is a condition precedent to the institution of a proceeding, against a public servant, cannot be made to depend upon the case which the accused may put forward after the proceeding had been instituted, but must be determined with reference to the nature of the allegations made against the public servant in the criminal proceeding and if the allegations can not be held to relate to "any act done or purporting to be done in the execution of his duties", as a public servant, the sanction of the authority would prima facie not be necessary for the institution of the proceeding. 22. Therefore, the question, whether the previous sanction of the Government or the prescribed authority is required under Section 84A of the Act before any court could take cognizance of the offences alleged against the petitioners in the complaint petition, has got to be determined with reference to the nature of the allegations made against them in the complaint petition; and the necessity of such sanction cannot be made to depend upon the case which the petitioners may put forward after the proceeding had been instituted. Looking at the complaint petition, it is abundantly clear that the case against the petitioners and others is of forming an unlawful assembly and causing hurt to the complainant and his witnesses by Lathi, Farsa, fists and slaps, by the accused persons, including the petitioners, which, prima facie, cannot be said to have been committed by the petitioners while acting or purporting to act in discharge of their official duty as the Mukhiya of the Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat under the Act. Section 14(g), 19(c) and 28(d) of the Act, referred to by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, also do not authorise the formation of an unlawful assembly or causing of hurt by Lathi, Farsa, fists and slaps by the Mukhiya or the Sarpanch. The decision in the case of Vadilal Panchal (supra), referred to by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, in which it was held by the Supreme Court that when a Magistrate directs an inquiry under Section 302 of the Code, for ascertaining the truth or falsity of a complaint, and receives a report from the inquiring officer-supporting a plea of self-defence made by the person complained against, it is open to the Magistrate to hold that the plea is correct on the basis of the report and the statements of the witnesses recorded the inquiring officer, is also of no help to the petitioners, as, in the present case, neither the statements of the complainant's witnesses recorded by the Magistrate in the inquiry under Section 202 of the Code, nor the conclusion of the Magistrate on the basis of the said statements make out or support the plea raised by the petitioners subsequent to the taking of cognizance against them and others under Sections 323, 324, 147 and 148 of the Indian Penal Code. As has been held in the case of Smt. Nagawwa (supra), at the stage of issuing processes, the Magistrate is mainly concerned with the allegations made in the complaint petition or the evidence led in support of the same, and he is only to be prima facie satisfied whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused, and, at that stage, it is not the province of the Magistrate to enter into a detailed discussion of the merits or demerits of the case, nor can the High Court go into this matter in its revisional jurisdiction, which is a very limited one. The scope of the inquiry under Section 202 of the Code is extremely limited only to the ascertainment of the truth or falsehood of the allegations made in the complaint on the materials placed by the complainant before the Court for deciding the question purely from the point of view of the complainant, without at all adverting to any defence that the accused may have, as in a proceeding under Section 202 of the Code, the accused has got absolutely no locus standi and he is not entitled to be heard on the question, whether the processes should be issued against him or not. The present case also does not come under any of the categories mentioned by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case of Smt. Nagawwa (supra), under which an ORDER :of the Magistrate issuing processes against the accused persons can be quashed or set aside. At this stage, therefore, I see no reason for quashing the criminal proceedings pending against the petitioners. 23. I would, however, like to observe that, as has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Matajog Dobey (supra), it is not always necessary to decide the question of sanction as soon as the complaint is lodged and on the allegations therein contained. The question may arise at any stage of the proceeding. The complaint may not disclose that the act constituting the offence was done or purported to be done in the discharge of the official duty, but facts subsequently coming to light, even in course of the prosecution evidence at the trial, may establish the necessity for sanction. Whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage. The necessity may reveal itself in course of the progress of the case. It would, therefore, be open to the accused petitioners to raise the question of sanction even at the subsequent stage of the trial, if the evidence reveals the necessity thereof and then it would be for the Magistrate to decide the question on previous sanction. In the result, I find no merit in the present application, which is accordingly dismissed, with the aforesaid observation. Application dismissed.