JUDGMENT H. S. Thakur, J.-—In the Civil Revision Petition Nos. 3 of 1978 and 4 of 1978, the dispute is between the same parties and in respect of the same premises, in proceedings under the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act. As such both the petitions can be disposed of together. 2. Civil Revision Petition No. 3 of 1978 the petitioner has challenged the order of Rent Controller (3), Simla dated the 2nd January, 1978 whereby he stayed the execuiton of the ex parte order till the disposal of the application of the respondent (hereinafter to be referred to as the tenant) for setting aside the ex parte order of eviction from the premises. In Civil Revision Petition No. 4 of 1^78 the petitioner has challenged the order of the Rent Controller dated 31st December, 1977 whereby he held that an application for setting aside the ex parte order of eviction is maintainable, under the facts and circumstances of the case. 3. Briefly the facts of the case are that the petitioner (hereinafter to be referred to as the landlady) filed a petition on 13th August, 1976 under the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act for the eviction of the tenant on account of non-payment of rent. The Rent Controller by an order dated 16th October, 1976, ordered the eviction of the tenant. 4. The tenant being aggrieved by the ex parte order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller, filed an appeal before the appellate authority, Simla Division, Simla. The appellate authority, however, by an order dated 7th June, 197/ dismissed the appeal as barred by limitation. 5. The tenant felling aggrieved by the order of the appellate authority filed a revision petition in the High Court which was numbered as Civil Revision No. 100 of 1977. The then Honble Chief Justice R. S. Pathak, by an order dated November 8, 1977 allowed the revision petition and set aside the order of the appellate authority. The appellate authority was, however, directed to consider the appeal afresh in the face of the facts indicated in the order. The parties were also directed to appear before the appellate authority on December, 9, 197/ for further proceedings in the appeal. The appellate authority, however, on December 9, 1977, after hearing the parties dismissed the appeal as withdrawn by the tenant. 6. The parties were also directed to appear before the appellate authority on December, 9, 197/ for further proceedings in the appeal. The appellate authority, however, on December 9, 1977, after hearing the parties dismissed the appeal as withdrawn by the tenant. 6. An application had been filed by the tenant on June 8, 1977 for withholding the issuance of warrant of eviction till the disposal of the application for setting aside the ex parte order of eviction. The Rent Controller by an order dated 5th July, 1977, allowed the application and stayed the execution of the warrant of eviction against the tenant till the disposal of the application for setting aside the ex parte order of eviction. The Rent Controller later on by an order dated 2nd August, 1977 on the application dated the 4th December, 1976 set aside the ex pane order of eviction against the tenant. The landlady being aggrieved by the said order of the Rent Controller preferred a revision petition in this Court which was numbered as Civil Revision 68 of 1977. In the said revision petition the landlady challenged the orders, passed by the Rent Controller dated July 5, 1977 and August 2, 1977, referred to above. The than Honble Chief Justice by an order dated November 4, 1977 allowed the revision petition filed by the land-lady and quashed the two orders dated July 5, 1977 and August 2, 1977, passed by the Rent Controller and the application for setting aside the ox parte ejectment order was also rejected. 7. Another application was filed by the tenant on 16th November, 1977 after the decision of the Civil Revision No. 100 of 1977 whereby the order of the appellate authority was quashed by the High Court. The Rent Controller by an order dated 31st December, 197 7 while deciding the preliminary issue, whether the application in the face of the aforesaid facts and circumstances was maintainable, held that the said application for setting aside the ex parte order was competent. It is this order which is challenge J in Civil Revision No. 4 of 1978, whereas in Civil Revision No. 3 of 1978, the land-lady has challenged the order of the Rent Controller whereby the execution of the ex parte order till the final disposal of the application for setting aside the ex parte order, had been stayed. 8. It is this order which is challenge J in Civil Revision No. 4 of 1978, whereas in Civil Revision No. 3 of 1978, the land-lady has challenged the order of the Rent Controller whereby the execution of the ex parte order till the final disposal of the application for setting aside the ex parte order, had been stayed. 8. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in the face of the order passed by the High Court in Civil Revision No. 68 of 1977 on 4th November, 1977, the impugned orders passed by the Rent Controller are without jurisdiction. The relevant operative portion of the order passed by the High Court is reproduced as under:— "Therefore, although the appeal was dismissed as time barred by the appellate authority it must be taken as affirming the ejectment order made by the Controller, ......................................In consequence, the ejectment order must be deemed to have merged into the appellate order. Therefore, in law there was no ejectment order on which the application before the Controller could act. The order made by the Controller on July 5, 1977 is erroneous. And his further order dated August 2, 1977 setting aside the ejectment order must be held to be without jurisdiction. The revision petition is allowed, the orders dated July 5, 19/7 and August 2, 1977 made by the Controller are quashed, and the application for setting aside the ex parte ejectment order is rejected." 9. On the contrary it is contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the application for setting aside the ex parte order of eviction had been filed by the tenant before the appeal was withdrawn. According to the learned counsel, there is no limitation prescribed to file an application to set aside an ex parte order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller. A further convention of the learned counsel for the respondent is that the High Court while deciding Civil Revision No. 68 of 1977 had held that the order passed by the Rent Controller was without jurisdiction. That being the position, according to the learned counsel, the order passed is non est and is deemed not to exist in the eyes of law. That being the position, according to the learned counsel, the order passed is non est and is deemed not to exist in the eyes of law. It is argued by the learned counsel that the principle of merger of an order of a lower court into the order of the appellate court does not apply to rent cases. The further contention of the learned counsel is that the principles of the Code of Civil Procedure do not strictly apply to the proceedings under the Rent Act, and as such the principle of res judicata would not be applicable to such cases. It is vehmently contended on behalf of the respondent that even if the principles of res judicata applies, the appeal filed by the tenant having not been decided on merit as also the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller having been passed ex parte, without going into the merits of the case, the principles of res judiata would not be applicable on that account as well. According to him under section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the matter becomes res judicata if it is finally decided. It is further contended on behalf of the respondent that in the order passed by the High Court on 4th November, 1977 the Honble Judge has held that the application for setting aside the ex parte ejectment order is rejected. According to the learned counsel for the respondent the word rejected" has been intentionally and purposely used by the Honble Judge in contradistinction of the word "dismissed". According to the learned counsel there is a vast difference between the terms "rejected" and "dismissed". The term "dismissed" applies to a decision on merit whereas the term "rejected" does not mean that the matter is finally decided on merits. At the same time, it is further contended by the learned counsel, that the previous application having been ordered to be rejected, the second application to set aside the ex parte order of eviction was competent. The learned counsel has also referred to the provisions contained in Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the point, Order 7, Rule 11 is reproduced below :~— "R. 11. Rejection of plaint. The learned counsel has also referred to the provisions contained in Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the point, Order 7, Rule 11 is reproduced below :~— "R. 11. Rejection of plaint. The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases: (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action ; (b) where the relief claimed is under-valued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so ; (c) Where the relief claimed is property valued, but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so ; (d) Where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law: (Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp papers shall not be extended unless the court, for reasor s to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional natuie from correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-papers, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that the refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.)." 10. At the same time it is relevant to reproduce the operative part of the judgment passed by this Court in Civil Revision No. 100 of 1977. The said revision petition was filed by the tenant against the order of the appellate authority dismissing the appeal of the tenant on the ground of limitation on November 8, 1977. "Accordingly, the revision petition is allowed, the order dated June 6, 1977 made by the Appellate Authority is set aside and the Appellate Authority is directed to consider the appeal afresh. In the circumstances, there is no order as to costs. "Accordingly, the revision petition is allowed, the order dated June 6, 1977 made by the Appellate Authority is set aside and the Appellate Authority is directed to consider the appeal afresh. In the circumstances, there is no order as to costs. The parties-will appear before the Appellate Authority on December 9, Iv77 for further proceedings in the appeal." The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the orders passed by the Rent Controller staying the execution of the order till the disposal of the application to set aside the ex parte order of eviction as also the order holding that an application to set aside the order of ex parte eviction is maintainable, are prima facie hit by the principles of res judicata. The learned counsel for the petitioner lias invited by attention to several judgments of different High Courts as also of the Supreme Court. There is no dispute about the proposition of law that in case a matter has been finally adjudicated upon by a competent court of law between the same parties, such a matter cannot be reagitated in subsequent proceedings. The question which arises in the present case is whether the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure strictly apply to the proceedings under the Urban Rent Control Act. The matter has been decided by this Court in case Dr. S. C. Jain v. Shrimati Sushi la Devi, reported in Indian Law Reports (Himachal Series) 1973 at page 1238. The then Honble Chief Justice R. S. Pathak, who decided the case observed as follows;— "There can be no doubt, in my opinion, that the proceedings taken by the Rent Controller under section 13 of the Act cannot be described as proceedings under the Code of Civil Procedure. The Rent Controller is not a Court but a persona designata. The Code of Civil Procedure as such has not been applied to proceedings taken by him, and there are several indications in the Act itself showing that to be so. Among them are sections 16 and 17 of the Act. They provided proof that where any power conferred on an authority constituted under the Act or an order made under the Act was to be executed as a decree of the civil court, express provision had to be made for that purpose. Among them are sections 16 and 17 of the Act. They provided proof that where any power conferred on an authority constituted under the Act or an order made under the Act was to be executed as a decree of the civil court, express provision had to be made for that purpose. Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code has not been applied to an order of eviction made by the Rent Controller. Clearly, therefore, Article 123 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which is concerned with an application for setting aside an ex parte decree, does, not come into play. The order of eviction is definitely not a decree, although it may be executable as decree by virtue of section 17 of the Act. It is urged for the petitioner that Article 137 of the Limitation Act will apply, and the perked of limitation for an application for setting aside an ex parte order of eviction is, therefore, three years. In my opinion, Article 137 also cannot be invoked. It seems to me that the Limitation Act cannot be applied to proceedings before the Rent Controller under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, The Rent Controller is not a Court and, therefore, the Limitation Act cannot be applied to proceedings before him. The Limitation Act applies to proceedings taken in a Court. Charles E. Ring v. Collector of Bombay, Git a Mittra v. S. C. Ghose, See also Alihusain Abbasbhai v. Collector. The Rent Controller has erred in proceeding on the assumption that the Limitation Act comes into play. The question then is whether is the absence of any period of limitation prescribed by statute an application for setting aside an ex parte order of eviction can be rejected on the ground of delay. An application for setting aside an ex pane order of eviction is not founded in any right conferred by the statute. The East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act is silent in that regard. If such an application can be entertained at all by the Rent Controller, it is because the interest of justice requires him to do so. It is a fundamental principle of natural justice that a party affected by an order should have notice and be heard in the matter before the order is passed. If such an application can be entertained at all by the Rent Controller, it is because the interest of justice requires him to do so. It is a fundamental principle of natural justice that a party affected by an order should have notice and be heard in the matter before the order is passed. The Rent Controller as an authority constituted by statute to make an order of eviction, has inherent power to determine whether the order passed by him was passed without notice to the tenant and whether there exists sufficient cause for the tenant not entering appearance in reply to the petition for eviction. In this connection, reference may be made to Manohar Lai v. Mohan Lai. Now, while on the one hand the Rent Controller enjoys inherent power to set aside in ex parte order of eviction in the interest of justice, enqually is he bound by the interest of justice not to interfere if the application has been made with laches or unexplained delay." 11. In view of the aforesaid judgment of this Court I am inclined to hold that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are not strictly applicable to the proceedings under the Urban Rent Control Act. That being the position the cases cited on behalf of the petitioner are not of much help to him. 12. On the contrary it is contended on behalf of the respondent that even if it is assumed that the principles of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to the proceedings under the Urban Rent Controller Act, an application under Order 9, Rule 13, C. P. C. was competent as the matter had not been finally decided on merit. In this behalf he has drawn my attention to the provisions as contained under Order 9, Rule 13, C. P. C. which is reproduced as under :— "13. Setting aside decree ex parte against defendant. In this behalf he has drawn my attention to the provisions as contained under Order 9, Rule 13, C. P. C. which is reproduced as under :— "13. Setting aside decree ex parte against defendant. In any case in which a decree is passed ex parte against a defendant, he may apply to the court by which the decree was passed for an order to set it aside and if he satisfies the Court that the summons was not duly served, or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing, the court shall make an order setting aside the decree as against him upon such terms as to costs, payment into Court or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit : Provided that where decree is of such a nature that it cannot be set aside as against such defendant only it may be set aside as against all or any of the other defendants also : (Provided further that no Court shall set aside a decree passed ex parte merely on the ground that there has been an irregularity in the service of summons, if it is satisfied that the defendant had notice of the date of hearing and had sufficient time to appear and answer the plaintiffs claim.) (Explanation.—Where there has been an appeal against a decree passed ex parte under this rule, and the appeal has been disposed of on any ground other than the ground that the appellant has withdrawn the appeal, no application shall lie under this rule for setting that ex pane decree.)" 13. An explanation has been added in the Code of Civil Procedure Amended Act, 1976. The purpose of adding the explanation appears to be that in an application to set aside an ex parte decree a party could not be deprived of an opportunity of filing an application for setting aside the decree if he has withdrawn the appeal against the ex parte decree. According to the learned counsel for the respondent since no limitation has been prescribed for filing such an application as has been held in Dr. S. C. Jains case supra, the application for setting aside the ex parte order of eviction was competent. 14. According to the learned counsel for the respondent since no limitation has been prescribed for filing such an application as has been held in Dr. S. C. Jains case supra, the application for setting aside the ex parte order of eviction was competent. 14. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that in order to attract the provisions of section il of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is necessary that the previous matter was finally decided between the parties on merits. The ex parte order of evictton being not of such a nature, the provisions of section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure would not apply to the facts of the present case. 15. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that this Court by an order dated November 4, 1977, which has been reproduced earlier above, had ordered the rejection of the application for setting aside the ex parte ejectment order. On this account it is contended by the learned counsel tbat the subsequent application for setting aside such an order was not competent. On the contrary it is vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the respondent that the Honble Chief Justice R. S. Pathak, who decided the revision petition, had deliberately used the term "rejected* and not dismissed". As such, it is contended by the learned counsel that the second application, if not barred by limitation, was competent. He has drawn my attention to a Full Bench decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Chunduru Venkata Subrahmanyam reported in AIR 1955 Andhra 74. The said High Court while dealing with the provisions of Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure observed as under :— "There is an essential distinction and the Code maintains it throughout between the rejection of a plaint and the dismissal of a suit. The rejection of a plaint takes away the basis of the suit. It is, as it were that, no suit was filed. The rejection of a plaint takes away the basis of the suit. It is, as it were that, no suit was filed. But in the case of a dismissal, the existence of the suit is recognised and its termination is indicated." On the basis of this judgment the learned counsel for the respondent contends that the second application for setting aside the ex parte eviction order was maintainable, i lie learned counsel further supports this submission by pointing out that in Civil Revision No. 100 of 197/ decided by this Court, the order of the appellate authority passed on June 6, 1977 dismissing the appeal of the tenant, was set aside. That order having been so set aside the subsequent order passed by the appellate authority on withdrawing the appeal was not a decision on merit and did not disentitle the tenant to file a fresh application to set aside the ex pane order of eviction. 16. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also drawn my attention to a decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sham Rao Tekmalkar v. Rai Lakshmi Narayana Prasad, reported in 1976 Rent Control Reporter, 3^0. This decision does not, however, supports the contention of the learned counsel but indirectly supports the respondent. This decision is not directly relevant to the decision of the present petitions. In this decision it has been held that in case an eviction petition under Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, had been withdrawn without the permission of the Rent Controller with liberty to file another eviction petition on the same ground, the second eviction petition was competent on the same cause of action. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also drawn my attention to a Division Bench decision of Allahabad High Court in Mt. Deoki and others v. Jwala Prasad reported in AIR 1928 Allahabad 679. Sulaiman, J. who wrote the said judgment observed as follows:-— "In our opinion when the appeal was withdrawn the order which we passed on that occasion granting permission to withdraw the appeal under Order 23, Rule 1 was not a decree so as to supersede the decree of the court below. Sulaiman, J. who wrote the said judgment observed as follows:-— "In our opinion when the appeal was withdrawn the order which we passed on that occasion granting permission to withdraw the appeal under Order 23, Rule 1 was not a decree so as to supersede the decree of the court below. When an appellate court does not judicially deal with the matter of a suit but merely permits an appeal to be withdrawn so that the decree of the Court below is left intact it cannot be said that it has confirmed the decision appealed from. It merely recognizes authoritatively that the appellant does not wish to go on with his appeal. We may refer to the case of Abdul Majid v. Jawahir Lal (1), where their Lordships of the Privy Council laid down this proposition with regard to an appeal which had been dismissed for want of prosecution. This case was followed in Nand Lal Saran v. Dharam Kirti Saran, (I), where the appellate Court had held that no appeal in fact lay to that Courts. There is another case of this Court, viz.; Pitam Lal v. Balwant Singh, (3) to the same effect. We are of opinion that that principle to an equal extent to the case where the appeal is withdrawn. We cannot therefore amend the decree of the Court, below. The result, therefore, is that this application must be dismissed with costs." The decision in the aforesaid case also does not help the petitioner. 17. The learned connsel for the respondent has referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in case Ram Gobinda Daw and others v. Smt, H. Bhakta Bala Dassi, reported in AIR 1971 Supreme Court 664. In this case the Honble Supreme Court held that the test of res judicata is the identity of title in the two litigations and not the identity of the actual property involved in the two cases but the previous decision must be one on a title in respect of which a dispute has been raised and which dispute was heard and finally decided by the Court. It was also held in the aforesaid case that if the matter was not heard and finally decided on merits after contest it will not operate as res judicata. 18. Admittedly the ex parte order of eviction was not decided alter contest by the Rent Controller. It was also held in the aforesaid case that if the matter was not heard and finally decided on merits after contest it will not operate as res judicata. 18. Admittedly the ex parte order of eviction was not decided alter contest by the Rent Controller. The learned counsel for the respondent has vehemently contended that the Rent Controller (3) was fully justified to come to a conclusion that the application for setting aside the ex parte order of eviction was maintainable. Similarly, according to him, the Rent Controller (3), Simla was also competent to stay the execution of the order of eviction, till the disposal of the application, to set aside the said ex parte order of eviction, even under its inherent powers. I endorse the view taken by the Rent Controller. 19. It may be relevant to point out that the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act is a social legislation and has been enacted to safe-guard the interests of tenants. Such a legislation has to be interpreted liberally in favour of a tenant. The eviction of the tenant in this case was sought on the basis of non-payment of rent. It has been stated by the learned counsel for the respondent as the bar, which fact is not disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the tenants has already deposited the rent which was due to the landlady. It is also contended on behalf of the respondent that the land-lady had also filed other proceedings before the Rent Controller for seeking his eviction on account of non-payment of rent and such proceedings are being defended by the respondent. It has been further contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the petitioner in collusion with the process serve got a report made against the respondent to the effect that the respondent had refused to accept the service. It was on the basis of this report that the ex parte order of eviction was passed against the respondent. This contention leads to a question of fact. It was on the basis of this report that the ex parte order of eviction was passed against the respondent. This contention leads to a question of fact. It is for the Rent Controller to decide the matter after recording his finding on this point, The learned councel for the respondent has drawn my attention to a judgment of the Supreme Court in case R.S. Lala Praduman Kumar v. Virendra Goyal, reported in AIR 196^ SC IJ49, regarding the effect of non-payment of rent on forfeiture of tenancy. The Supreme Court has observed that the covenant of forfeiture of tenancy for non-payment of rent is regarded by the Courts as merely a clause for securing payment of rent, and unless the tenant has by his conduct disentitled himself to equitable relief the Courts grant relief against forfeiture of tenancy on the tenant paying the rent due, interest thereon and costs of the suit. As such, the courts can use discretion in favour of a tenant against forfeiture of tenancy for non-payment of rent if the rent is paid by a tenant. 20. Keeping in view the aforesaid facts and circumstances and bearing in mind the principles of law, as discussed above, I am of the view that there is no force in these revision petitions and the same are hereby dismissed. Keeping in view the circumstances the of case the parties are left to bear their own costs. 21. The Rent Controller is directed to dispose of the matter expeditiously. Petitions dismissed.-