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1979 DIGILAW 213 (BOM)

Ukunda Deoba Korpe v. Rama Sabla Dhangar

1979-09-14

V.A.MOHTA

body1979
JUDGMENT - Mohta V., J.: - In these two writ petitions, the parties are the same, the Subject-matter is the same and the basic facts giving rise to two sets of revenue cases are also the same for that reason, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The beginning of the story is from i 2-3-1963 when the respondent tenant executed a surrender-deed in writing in favour of the petitioner in respect of field. Survey No. 23/3, measuring 18 acres 22 gunthas of mouza Mhaismal, Ta1uq Pusad in District Yavatmal. Possession of the property was :also physically handed-over to the landholder on that day though registration of the document has taken place on 20-5- 1963. Ever since 12-3-1963 it is the landholder petitioner who is in possession of the property. On 23-10-1954, suo motu proceedings came to be initiated by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal, Pusad, for transferring the compulsory ownership of the 1and to the tenant. Notices were issued to both parties as they were shown as recorded landholder and tenant respectively in the year 1960-61. On 26-3.1971 the statement of both was recorded. The landlord has put his thumb mark and the tenant his signature at the bottom of the statements. The tenant stated that he had taken the property on lease but had voluntarily surrendered and delivered possession of the property to the landholder as the landholder did not have any etherified. It was further stated that he was in ownership and possession of 15 acres of land and, therefore, under the circumstances he was not interested to become the owner of the property. The landholder, who seems to be an illiterate person, made a statement that this was the only field property with him and that the tenant had voluntarily surrendered possession without any force on his part. This case was registered as Tenancy Case No. 325/59(13)/10-F of Mhaisma1 decided on 24.1971. The Tribunal held that the tenant had delivered possession voluntarily and that this was the only land with the landholder and that from the year 1963.64 onwards the landholder has been cultivating the land. This case was registered as Tenancy Case No. 325/59(13)/10-F of Mhaisma1 decided on 24.1971. The Tribunal held that the tenant had delivered possession voluntarily and that this was the only land with the landholder and that from the year 1963.64 onwards the landholder has been cultivating the land. As the record shows that the landholder was having the land less than the family holding, the ownership was not transferred on 1-4-1961 but on 1-4-1963 in terms of section 49-A of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands(Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958, ,- {hereinafter referred to as “the Act”, and as the possession was taken without the order of the Tahsildar, the Tribunal held that the statement of the respondent about voluntariness of the handing over of the possession had no value. The tenant owned 15 acres of land and as his total limits would lot exceed three family holdings, and hence it was held- that the land in question is transferred to and vested in the respondent with effect from the tillers day which in this case was 1-4-1963. After recording these findings, the purchase price was worked out and determined. The landholder carried an appeal before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Pusad, but he was unsuccessful, the appeal being No. 51/59(13)/71-72 of Mhaismal which came to be dismissed on 5-2-1972. 3. After the decision in appeal, the landholder filed an application before the Tahsildar. Pusad, on 3.5-1972 for verification of the surrender deed dated 12-3-1963. These proceedings were registered as T C. No. 1/59 (4-A) of 1971-72 of village Mhaismal in the Court of the Additional Tahsildar ~ Pusad, decided on 12-5-1972. The Tahsildar held that the application or intimation dated 3-5- 1972 was prima facie not acceptable and that the purchase price in respect of the field property was already determined and even the appeal against that Order was rejected. Against the order rejecting the intimation, the appeal was carried at the instance of the landholder and that was registered as Tenancy Appeal No. 122/59(13) of 71-72; decided on 24-7-1972 by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Pusad. Though the Sub Divisional Officer held in favour of the landholder that the detailed order should have been passed, the final result of dismissal was not disturbed holding that no enquiry as contemplated under section 20 was necessary as prima facie the application or intimation was not maintainable having not filed within reasonable time. Though the Sub Divisional Officer held in favour of the landholder that the detailed order should have been passed, the final result of dismissal was not disturbed holding that no enquiry as contemplated under section 20 was necessary as prima facie the application or intimation was not maintainable having not filed within reasonable time. It may be mentioned that this appeal was also rejected without issuing notice to the other side. The orders in there two proceedings were challenged by the landholders before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The revision in respect of proceedings for transfer of ownership was registered as No. Ten A-510/72 whereas in respect of other proceeding it was registered as No. Ten-A-1106/72. Both these revisions were decided on one and the same day, namely, 2-8-1973. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal did not find any case for interference in either of the proceedings and thus the orders passed were maintained. Special Civil Application No. 301 of 1974 is in respect of the proceedings for transfer of ownership, whereas Special Civil Application No. 341 of 1974 is in respect of the proceedings for verification of surrender. 4. It was contended by M/s Madkholkar and Patil the learned counsel for the petitioner that the proceedings under section 49-A of the Act were not maintainable on the undisputed position on the record. The argument is that the respondent had not become owner of the property on 1.4-1961 in terms of sections 41, 42 and 46 of the Act because of the existence of section 42(c) of the Act and, therefore, in his case tillers day was extended to 1-4-1963 in view of the amended section 49-A. Inasmuch as the tenant respondent who was evicted from the land before 1-4 1963 and was not in possession of the land on that day and had not made application for possession within the period specified in section 36(1) of the Act proceedings were not maintainable. It may be mentioned that the limitation prescribed for an application under section 36(1) of the Act is three years from the date on which the right to obtain possession has been accrued. Thus, the remedy, if any, for getting ownership of the land was lost to him in terms of that section and therefore, the proceedings as well as the orders passed were wholly illegal. Thus, the remedy, if any, for getting ownership of the land was lost to him in terms of that section and therefore, the proceedings as well as the orders passed were wholly illegal. Shri Bapat, the learned counsel for the responnent tenant, on the other hand has contended that the respondent had acquired ownership rights on 1-4-1961 itself and the very claim that 1.4.1963 was the tillers day .,is-a-vis the tenancy of the respondent is itself basically wrong. It is, therefore, necessary to examine as to which was the tillers day vis-a-vis the respondent in this case. 5. It may be recalled that originally section 42 of the Act contained sub-clause(c) and read as under:- “42. The right of a tenant under section 41 to purchase from his landlord the land held by him as a tenant shall be subject to the following conditions, namely :- (a) if the tenant does not hold and cultivate personally any land, as a tenure-holder, the purchase of the land by him shall be limited to the extent of three family holdings; (b) if the tenant holds and cultivates personally any land as a tenure holder the purchase of the land by him shall be limited to such area as will be sufficient to make up the area of the land held by him as a tenure holder to the extent of three family holdings; (c) the extent of the land remaining with the landlord after the purchase of the land by the tenant whether to cultivate personally or otherwise shall not be less than one family holding.” According to the respondent whole object of sub-section(c) was not only to protect small landholder but also to protect the small tenant and, therefore, the question of leaving at least the land to the extent of one family holding with the landholder would arise only in case some land is allowed to be purchased compulsorily by the tenant. Emphasis was on the words “after the purchase of the land by the tenant”. The argument in short is that in case the landholder and the tenant both have less than a family holding, it” would not be permissible to stop conferring of the ownership rights. Emphasis was on the words “after the purchase of the land by the tenant”. The argument in short is that in case the landholder and the tenant both have less than a family holding, it” would not be permissible to stop conferring of the ownership rights. This argument vas based mainly on the hypothesis that the object of the Act was to give protection mainly to the tenants and between a small landholder and a small tenant, small tenant was intended to be preferred. 6. It appears that in the working of the Act as it originally stood, the Legislature thought that there were more difficulties and, therefore, clarification of certain position to remove the lacunae and to improve the measure certain additional provisions or amendments were necessary. It was also thought that some small landlords need some relief in the matter of resumption of land for personal cultivation and with these objects in view, the Maharashtra Act No 2 of 1962 came to be passed and was brought in force with effect from 26-1-1962. By the amending Act, sub-section(c) of section 42 was deleted and section 39-A and 49-A were introduced along with many more changes, reference to which is not useful for the present. 7. As both parties have referred to the object behind the legislation let us see the object and the reasons behind the Amending Act. The statement or object and the reasons is to be found at page 767 of the Maharashtra Government Gazette Part V dated 23-11-1961 and it reads as under:- “STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS:- During the course of implementation of the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands(Vidarbha Region and Kutch Area) Act, 1958, Government has noticed that to clarify the position or to remove lacunae or to improve the measure certain additional provisions or amendments are necessary. It is also felt that small landlords need some relief in the matter of resumption of land for personal cultivation. The Bill seeks to achieve three objects. 2. The important clauses of the Bill are explained in the following notes on clauses :- Clause 2: - This clause seeks to extend the time limit for making applications under sub-sections(2) of section 7 by a further period of one year from the commencement of the Amendment Act. The Bill seeks to achieve three objects. 2. The important clauses of the Bill are explained in the following notes on clauses :- Clause 2: - This clause seeks to extend the time limit for making applications under sub-sections(2) of section 7 by a further period of one year from the commencement of the Amendment Act. Clause 5 : - Under this clause a new section is inserted in the principal Act for giving a fresh right of resumption to small landlords, i. e. landlord whose holding does not exceed one family holding and who earn their livelihood principally by agriculture or by agricultural labour. In order to exercise this right, a landlord has to give notice to the tenant within one year from the commencement of this Amending Act and to apply for possession of his land before the 1st day of April 1963. Clause 6 : - At present according to section 42, a tenants right of purchase is subject to the condition that the land left with the landlord after purchase by his tenants not less than one family holding. This condition which perpetuates the landlord-tenant relationship is not now necessary, particularly after small landlords are given a fresh right of resumption. The condition is, therefore, being removed by this clause. Clause 7 : - This clause provides that when a tenant fails to exercise his right of purchase or his purchase become ineffective, the land is deemed to have been surrendered to the landlord, subject to the provisions of section 21 and thus the relationship of landlord and tenant is brought to an end. Clause 8: - At present, section 46 does not contain any provision for the transfer of ownership of land to a tenant who is not in possession of land on 1st April 1961, but who subsequently obtains possession by making an application under section 36. This lacuna is being removed by this clause. Clause 9 : - According to the existing scheme of the Act, a tenants right to purchase land is subject to the condition that the landlord should be left with one family holding. This provision as noted above (see clause 6) result in the continuance of landlord-tenant relationship in respect of land upon one family holdings, and denies the right of purchase to a tenant in respect of non-resumable area. This provision as noted above (see clause 6) result in the continuance of landlord-tenant relationship in respect of land upon one family holdings, and denies the right of purchase to a tenant in respect of non-resumable area. This position is not only unsatisfactory from the point of view of tenants and landlords but is not in keeping with the land reforms policy of Government. It is, therefore, necessary to give fresh right of resumption to small landlords as provided in clause 5, and to confer on tenants right of ownership over land which is not resumed by landlords or which they are not entitled to resume. This clause provides accordingly. Clause 17 and 20 : - Section 80 of the principal Act prohibits transfers of land to non-agriculturists, or to do a person holding land in excess of three family holdings. A provision is, however, made empowering the Collector to grant permission for such transfers in the prescribed circumstances. It is considered necessary that some conditions should also be attached while permitting such transfers and to make a provision for dealing with cases of breach of such conditions. Clause 21 : - This clause seeks to remove restrictions on the appearance of the leaders in tenancy proceedings. Clause 22 : - Under the provisions of the Principal Act, which came into force on 30th December 1958, certain restrictions were imposed on transfers and acquisitions of agricultural land. Transfers and acquisitions which are made in contravention of these provisions become invalid and the land transferred or acquired is liable to forfeiture under section 122. It is felt that this penalty of for felture of land is excessive, considering the fact that the agriculturists could not become conversant with the relevant provisions of the Act immediately on its commencement in December of 1958. In order to give relief to these transferees, it is considered necessary to validate all such transfers made before the 21st day of. November 1961 on payment of prescribed penalty.” It will thus be seen that by Amending Act, the protection given to small holder under section 42(c) regarding the rights of ownership was taken away and simultaneously a fresh right to resume lands for personal cultivation was granted. It may mentioned that section 39-A of the Act deals with the right of personal cultivation by a small holder. It may mentioned that section 39-A of the Act deals with the right of personal cultivation by a small holder. While granting right of resumption of land to small landlords by virtue of the provisions incorporated in section 39-1\ right of ownership was conferred on the tenants of such landholders by imposing certain conditions and those provisions are to be found in section 49-A of the Act. 8. In case of doubt or difficulty, it is now well recognised that, preamble as well as statements of objects and reasons can be looked into. They may not be very relevant in the case language of the substantive section is clear and plain. Considering the statements of objects and reasons, the object of the Act as well as various substantive sections, it does not appear that the Act either before amendment or after is intended to give protection only to the small tenants and not to small landholders. Indeed, it is worthwhile noting that though in terms of section 2(29) “small holder” has been defined, no such definition of a small tenant is to be found anywhere in the Act. It cannot be assumed in the absence of any guideline either in the preamble or the statements of objects and reasons that the small holders interest was not in view of the Legislature. There does not appear any reason why only tenant will be protected and not a landholder howsoever poor or small he may be. The only reason for incorporating section 42(c) was that minimum to the extent of one family holding land would be allowed to be retained by the landholder. When it was found that this type of protection to the small landholder was creating some difficulty, that privilege was taken away from the small landholder by deleting sub-section(c) of section 42 and some more privileges were granted in the shape of the provisions in section 39-A and few more sections. 9. In the circumstances, I am not impressed by the submission that the respondent-tenant in this case had acquiffd ownership rights on 1-4-1961 in terms of the original provisions. The principle invoked does not even apply to the facts of the present case, inasmuch as in these petitions we are not dealing with a tenant who is rendered landless by virtue of surrender. The principle invoked does not even apply to the facts of the present case, inasmuch as in these petitions we are not dealing with a tenant who is rendered landless by virtue of surrender. The position is vice a versa; where as the respondent-tenant was having additional 15 acres of land at the time of surrender the landlord was landless. Thus, there seems to be no escape from the position that the respondent did not acquire ownership rights on the first tillers day. 10. This takes us to sub-section(2), (a) of section 49-A of the Act on which strong reliance has been placed on behalf of the petitioner. “Section 49-A(2) reads as under: - (a) Where a tenant, who is evicted from the land before the 1st day of April 1963, and is not in possession thereof on that date, has made or makes an application for possession of the land within the period specified in sub-section(1) of section 36 then, if the application is allowed by the Tahsildar or in appeal by the Collector or, as the case may be, in revision by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, he shall be deemed to be the full owner of the land on the date on which the final order allowing the application is made. (b) Where such tenant has not made the application within the aforesaid period or any application made by him is finally rejected under this Act and the land is held by any other person as tenant on the date of expiry of the said period or on the date of final rejection of the application then, such other person shall be deemed to be the full owner of the land on the date of expiry of the period, or as the case may be, on the date of the final rejection of the application.” Perusal of the aforesaid provisions will show that for attraction of section 49-A of the Act, there are two conditions precedent (1) that the tenant must have been ousted from the land before 1-4-1963 and should not be in possession on that day; and (2) such tenant should make an application for possession of land within the period mentioned in section 36( I). This period is three years and the admitted position is that not only not within the prescribed period but at no time such an application has been made by the tenant and that these proceedings were initiated not at the tenants instance. It appears to me that this aspect of the matter has not even been considered by any of the authorities. May be that, this aspect was not placed before them but as the position emerges from the undisputed position on the record, at any time this pure question of law can be considered; and on considering the same the inevitable result is that proceedings referred to in Special Civil Application No. 301 of 1974 are wholly illegal and untenable. 11. At this stage, it will be necessary also to notice the provisions of section 49-B of the Act. This section has been engrafted by virtue of amendment brought about by Maharashtra Act No. 49 of 1969. Section 49-B of the Act, no doubt refers to the transfer of possession and ownership to lands in respect of certain dispossessed tenants even though the application as contemplated under section 49-A is not made. However, there are many conditions attached to exercise of the power under section 49-B. Applicability of section 49. B will depend upon various questions of fact about which enquiry has not been made and could not be made for the simple reason that when the proceedings were initiated sometime in the year 1964-65, this provision was not in existence. Therefore, it will not be in the interest of justice, is argued by ,both the parties, to work out the rights of the parties in terms of section 49-B. 12. The point that arises in Special Civil Application No. 341 of 1974 as somewhat different. After the execution of the surrender-deed as far back as in March 1963 the document was got registered on 20-5-1963. The petitioner was satisfied with getting actual possession in March 1963 after securing a document and subsequently getting it registered. Subsequent necessary follow up action which alone could have put seal of legality to the surrender, namely, its verification in the prescribed manner and order recording satisfaction of the Tahsildar about the voluntariness and the legality of the -surrender in terms of section 20 of the Act, was either forgotten or ignored. Subsequent necessary follow up action which alone could have put seal of legality to the surrender, namely, its verification in the prescribed manner and order recording satisfaction of the Tahsildar about the voluntariness and the legality of the -surrender in terms of section 20 of the Act, was either forgotten or ignored. After the right of ownership was conferred by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal and the appeal against that order was rejected, the petitioner suddenly became aware of the provisions of section 20 and for the first time moved the Tahsildar for the necessary verification for the first time on 3-5-1972 i. e. after a lapse of a long period of more than 9 years. On 12-5-1972, under the circumstances, even without issuing notice to the other side, the intimation or an application filed by the landlord was filed. The Tahsildar wrote at most a non-speaking order whereas the other 2 higher Tribunals gave certain reasons for maintaining the ultimate result. One of the reason is that there has been inordinate unexplained delay and the second was that perhaps the surrender was a result of some pressure on tenant without which there would not be such an abnormal delay. On behalf of the petitioner, it was contended firstly that no limitation was prescribed for filing such an .application for moving the Court for verification of surrender and secondly that the basis for recording a finding that the surrender may not be voluntary is wholly absent and hence order is illegal and unwarranted. The authorities were not within their judicial limits in holding that the surrender was a result of a .pressure even without giving a notice to the tenant and without hearing him especially in the background of the fact that even in the proceedings for transfer of ownership be had made a statement about -voluntariness sometime in 1971. Shri Bapat, on the other hand, submitted that the reasoning for arriving at a particular finding may not be very appropriate and still the ultimate result was correct. 13. As regards the grievance that Rule 11 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands(Vidarbha Region) Rules, 1959 prescribed for verification of the surrender were not followed it was contended that as the application for verification was per se not maintainable it was not necessary to follow the rule. 13. As regards the grievance that Rule 11 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands(Vidarbha Region) Rules, 1959 prescribed for verification of the surrender were not followed it was contended that as the application for verification was per se not maintainable it was not necessary to follow the rule. It is not disputed that Rule 11 of the Rules is mandatory but the question of acting according to those Rules would arise only in case the initial proceedings were maintainable. Even if the impugned orders of the authorities are trimmed of certain irrelevancies and over statements it seems to me, as submitted by Shri Bapat, that the ultimate conclusion to which they arrived at is unassailable. 14. I may also record here that Shri Bapat had relied upon few authorities in support of a contentions that without an order of the Tahshildar the surrender was invalid and the possession of the petitioner over the field was illegal. There cannot be any manner of doubt about the principle that was invoked 15. I have already indicated that as far as the respondent is concerned, the tillers day was 1-4-1963 it may be mentioned that after this date, the vesting is complete though it is defeasible in certain conditions one of such conditions is the pendency of the proceedings under various provisions of the Act such as sections 19, 38 and 39 of the Act. Inasmuch as no such proceedings were pending on 1-4-1963, the question of postponement of that date also does not arise in this particular case. What is relevant is~ as rightly pointed out by Shri Bapat that the relationship of a landlord and tenant ceases,. This seems to be clear even in terms of various provisions of the Act. However, this position is also backed by a decision of this Court in the case of (Sitaram Deora Mararhe v. Hawalya Plraji)l 1975 Mh.L,J, 521. It is submitted that even though no limitation for initiation of an enquiry under section 20 is prescribed, still such an application cannot be filed after the tillers day. The argument is that in order to attract section 20, minimum that is required is the presentation of an application before the tillers day. i feel this submission is perfectly correct. It is submitted that even though no limitation for initiation of an enquiry under section 20 is prescribed, still such an application cannot be filed after the tillers day. The argument is that in order to attract section 20, minimum that is required is the presentation of an application before the tillers day. i feel this submission is perfectly correct. At Doe time, there was a debate as to whether passing of an order before the tillers day was necessary for making the surrender valid but it has always been an accepted position that filing of an application for verification before the tillers day is a condition precedent to the maintainability of those proceedings. Shri Bapat has invited my attention to the decision of this Court given in Special Civil Application No. 3262 of 1968 in the case of(Bhausang Abhechand v. B. R. T.(Mudholkar and Patel JJ.); in the case of(Mahadeo v, Ramchandra)2 Spl Civil Appln. No. 1455 of 1969 decided on 17-8-1972(Vaidya J.) and in the case of(Balu Tukaram Thorat v. Shankar Laxman)3 Spl. Civil Appin. Nos. 1379 of 1971 with 2330 of 1973 decided on 13-3-1975. All these decisions are on section 15 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. 1948. It may be mentioned that section 20 of the Act with which we are concerned is analogous to that section. As referred earlier, the difference in all these cases was with reference to the date of the order verifying surrender being before or after the tillers day. One view was that it was necessary that the order was passed before the tillers day and the other view was that if application was filed before, it makes no difference as to when the order was passed. One view was that it was necessary that the order was passed before the tillers day and the other view was that if application was filed before, it makes no difference as to when the order was passed. Reliance was made chiefly on the following observations made by Rege J.:- “On the plain reading of the provision it appears to me that in order that there should be a valid surrender so as to terminate the tenancy, two things are required to be complied with, viz.,(1) there should be an application in writing for surrender or by the tenant and(2) the Mamlatdar should verify it as laid down by the said rule 9, which casts upon the Mamlatdar two distinct obligations viz, (1) to verify the application by satistying himself on enquiry that the tenant understood the nature and consequences of surrender and that it was voluntary and(2) to endorse his finding thereon. However, from the provisions of the said section 15(1) .it is clear that only the verification by the Mamlatdar and not the endorsement of his finding is made a necessary ingredient of surrender. In that ,event if the application as well as its verification were made after 1-4-1957, the surrender would be valid although ultimate endorsement of his finding on the application by the Mamlatdar were made after that date. On the ratio of the said decision therefore, if the verification on the application is made by the Mamlatdar prior to 1-4-1957, the surrender could be still complete and valid although the Mamlatdar might have endorsed his finding thereon after that date. ... . ... ... . ......... However, in cases where both verification and endorsement were made .after 1.4-1957, the surrender would be rendered invalid although the .application is made before that date. Hence that question is whether the -surrender in his case can be considered to be valid. Answer to that question 00 the admitted facts presents no difficulty. Firstly, in this case there is no application in writing on behalf of the tenant for surrendering that tenancy to the Mamlatdar required by section 15(1) of the said Act. The only application that is on record is by the landlord asking for possession on the ground that the tenant had surrendered the tenancy. That itself would not be sufficient compliance with the provisions of section 15(1). The only application that is on record is by the landlord asking for possession on the ground that the tenant had surrendered the tenancy. That itself would not be sufficient compliance with the provisions of section 15(1). Secondly, in this case although the application for surrender was made on 6-1 1-1956 i. e. prior to 1-4-1957, both the verification as well as endorsement of his findings by the Mamlatdar were admittedly made by him on 17-5.1957 i. e. after 1-4-1957. In my view of the matter, therefore, surrender in this case was invalid.” 16. I am in respectful concurrence with the aforesaid observations and the view taken and, therefore, hold that the proceeding for verification of surrender initiated on 3-5-1972 was rightly rejected by all the revenue authorities. 17. In the result, Special Civil Applications No. 301 of 1974 is allowed :and Special Civil Application No. 341 of 1974 is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Spl. C. A. No. 301/74 allowed. Spl. C. A. No. 341/74 dismissed. -----