Judgment :- 1. The petitioners in this civil revision petition are the sons of the brother of one deceased V. V. Joseph. Admittedly, V. V. Joseph was occupying premises bearing municipal door No. 9/5-20 in Nagarcoil Municipality belonging to the respondents. After the death of V.V. Joseph, a petition for eviction was filed by the respondents under S. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, read with S. 27(2) of the said Act for evicting the petitioners who by then appear to have inducted themselves into the premises. The respondents described the petitioners as legal representatives of V.V. Joseph, and sought for eviction under S. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act. The finding of fact of both the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority is that V. V. Joseph died on 8th July 1972, as a bachelor and the petitioners are not the legal heirs of the said V. V. Joseph as a member of his family up to the date of his death. It appears that V. V. Joseph was not only residing but also carrying on an incidental business of his own therein. On such a petition filed by the respondents for evicting the petitioners from the suit premises, both the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority accepted the petition and directed eviction. It is as against this the present revision petition has been filed. 2. The District Munsif found that the tenants were not entitled to the protection under the Act and also expressed the view that “they cannot say that they can continue the leasehold right of deceased V. V. Joseph in the petition schedule building”. On appeal, the Appellate authority agreed with the findings of the Rent Controller but he also curiously confirmed the order of the Rent Controller who directed the eviction of the petitioners as tenants. 3. The main question that arises for consideration in this revision petition is whether S. 27(2) of the Act has to be independently read without reference to the definition of ‘tenant’ in S. 2(8) or they should be read in conjunction with another. 4. It is not in dispute that the present petition for eviction was filed by the respondents under S. 10(3) (a)(i) of the Act. The material portion of S. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act reads— “A landlord may, subject to the provisions of Cl. 4. It is not in dispute that the present petition for eviction was filed by the respondents under S. 10(3) (a)(i) of the Act. The material portion of S. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act reads— “A landlord may, subject to the provisions of Cl. (d), apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building—(1) in case it is a residential building” Therefore, it is only a landlord who could file a petition against a tenant under the Act. The subsistence of the legal relationship of landlord and tenant is the sine qua non for invoking the provisions under the Act, and for seeking the reliefs contemplated therein. The tenants, therefore, should satisfy the definition of S. 2 (8). S. 2 (8) while defining ‘tenant’ says— “tenant’ means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building and includes the surviving spouse or any son, or daughter, or the legal representative of a deceased tenant who (i) in the case of a residential building, had been living with the tenant in the building as a member of the tenants family up to the death of the tenant, and (ii) in the case of a non-residential building, had been in continuous association with the tenant for the purpose of carrying on the business of the tenant upto the death of the tenant and continues to carry on such business thereafter, and a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour, but does not include a person placed in occupation of a building by as tenant or a person to whom the collection of rents or fees in public marketcart, stand or slaughter house or of rents for shops has been farmed out or leased by a municipal council or a Panchayat Union council or the Municipal Corporation of Madras or the Municipal Corporation of Madurai”. We shall now proceed to consider the import of S. 27(2) of the Act, which has been invoked in the present case. It reads— “(2) Where any application, appeal or other proceeding could have been made, preferred or taken, under this Act by or against any person, such application, appeal or other proceeding may, in the event of his death, be made, preferred or taken by or against his legal representative”. It reads— “(2) Where any application, appeal or other proceeding could have been made, preferred or taken, under this Act by or against any person, such application, appeal or other proceeding may, in the event of his death, be made, preferred or taken by or against his legal representative”. It is pertinent to note that under S. 27 (2), mention is made only about a proceeding made, preferred or taken under the Act by or against any person. It is delightfully silent as to who the person would be. Obviously, such a person could only be in the context of the legislation, either the landlord or the tenant. S. 27, therefore, cannot operate independently and in its own field untrammelled by the other sections which control the entire legislation. If, therefore, ‘any person’ in S. 27 is understood as either a landlord or a tenant, the word ‘person’ appearing in S. 27 has to be read in conjunction with the definition of landlord’ or ‘tenant’ as the case may be given in S. 2. We are not, however, concerned in the instant case with the definition of ‘landlord’. We have already seen what the definition of ‘tenant’ is. The condition precedent for a legal representative of a deceased tenant to be accepted as a tenant for the purpose of the Act is that he should has been living with the deceased tenant in the building as a member of the tenants family up to the date of death of the tenant. That is not the case here. Joseph was a bachelor and the petitioners before me who have been called as tenants came into the picture after the death of Joseph claiming themselves to be the brothers sons of the deceased Joseph. The finding of fact is that they were not living with Joseph when he was alive as a member of Josephs family in the building demised up to the date of his death. The finding of fact is that they were not living with Joseph when he was alive as a member of Josephs family in the building demised up to the date of his death. Therefore, whatever may be the compass of the meaning of the word ‘person’ appearing in S. 27(2) of the Act, as the word has to be read in conjunction with the relative definitions of ‘landlord’ or ‘tenant’ in my view, S.2(8) governs S. 27(2) and so understood, it should be found as a fact that the legal representatives against whom proceedings are initiated under the special provisions of this beneficial legislation would satisfy the mandatory requirements of the Act. As already stated S. 16 (3)(a)(i) provides for an application, by the landlord against a tenant. If, therefore, the petitioners do not satisfy the meaning of the word ‘tenant’ or to be more specific, they do not come within the definition of ‘tenant’ with in the meaning of S. 2(8)(i) of the Act, then it follows that a petition for eviction under S. 10(3)(a)(i) as was attempted by the respondents in this case is not maintainable and any adjudication of the application which is not maintainable in law could be considered and treated as non est . The orders of the Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority are without jurisdiction. They are, therefore, set aside and the revision petition is allowed. The respondents are at liberty to take such action as are available under general law as against the petitioners, so as to obtain possession of the property from them.